Category: Regions

  • Turkey helping Syrian Armenians

    Turkey helping Syrian Armenians

    Re: Syria’s Armenian minority flees from conflict, Feb. 27

    Syria’s Armenian minority flees from conflict, Feb. 27

    This article does injustice to the burden borne by Turkey regarding the Syrians seeking refuge in the neighbouring countries. Turkey, contrary to its portrayal as a country that Syrian Armenians are hiding in and as a country they once feared most, has provided and will continue to provide a safe haven for those in need without any discrimination as to their religion or nationality or any other aspect whatsoever.

    Turkey also has a non-rejection policy for the refugees at the border. That applies to the Syrian Armenian community as well. Turkey is helping them by letting its airspace open to transfer them to Armenia. Turkey is ready to help them in Turkey and/or in Syria through relevant agencies if there is a request on their part.

    Currently, the number of Syrians in the 17 camps built in Turkey is above 185,000, while another 100,000 are living with their own means or with relatives in Turkey. The national spending in this regard is approaching $600 million.

    It is also worth mentioning that before the crisis erupted in Syria, Syrian Armenians regularly visited Turkey and also many of them used Turkish Airlines for their travels around the world, including to Canada.

    Turkey also rejects the characterization of the events of 1915 as “genocide.” Our position on the issue is well known; accusing a nation with “genocide” is a serious allegation that needs to be substantiated with historical and legal evidence.

    Dr. Tuncay Babali, Ambassador to Canada, the Republic of Turkey

    via Turkey helping Syrian Armenians | Toronto Star.

  • Erdogan Angered After Opposition  In Turkey Meets With Assad

    Erdogan Angered After Opposition In Turkey Meets With Assad

    Turkish PM Erdogan shakes hands with main opposition leader Kilicdaroglu in Ankara

     

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan shakes hands with main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (R) as they meet in Ankara, June 24, 2012. (photo by REUTERS)

    The visit of four parliamentarians of the main opposition Republican People’s Party [CHP] to Damascus on Thursday and their meeting with Syrian President Bashar Assad has once again exposed an important weakness of the ruling Justice and Development Party [AKP] government.

    By: Kadri Gursel for Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse.

    About This Article

    Summary :

    Syrian President Bashar Assad’s meeting in Damascus with members of the opposition Republican People’s Party has exposed the weakness of Turkey’s Syria policy, writes Kadri Gursel.

    Original Title:
    Erdogan Angered by Turkish Opposition Meeting with Assad
    Author: Kadri Gursel
    Translated by: Timur Goksel

    As I wrote previously, the Turkish public doesn’t strongly support Ankara’s goal of toppling Bashar Assad and the Baath regime and replacing them with a new rule dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. But this capacity gap Ankara is facing in its Syria policy is not confined only to lack of adequate public approval and support. More crucial is the antagonism and polarization caused in segments of the society and national politics by the Syria policy.

    The visit of the CHP delegation to Damascus and their meeting with Assad is an outcome  of this antagonism.

    The AKP rule couldn’t transform its policy for regime change in Syria to a “national cause” by persuading the majority of the public. It simply could not goad the public to get excited by its policy. If they had been successful, the CHP delegation could not have gone to Damascus. They would have been worried about public reaction to such a visit.

    That AKP couldn’t fully convince its own constituency of the legitimacy and validity of its Syria policy is a fact. But roots of the polarization between the main opposition and the ruling party on Syria case go deeper.

    Their antagonism arises from the Alevi-Sunni polarization in Turkey. Although the Alevi minority in Turkey diverges from Arab Alewites in their beliefs and rituals and have indigenous features peculiar to Anatolia, they don’t regard the Syrian regime with sentiments of confrontation and hostility as does the Sunni mainstream Islamic current that prevails in Turkey.

    Turkish Alevis are majority secularists. When you add their fears of Sunni Islamism, it is inevitable that they feel an affinity to the secularist regime in Syria.

    And, also to be noted is that the Turkish Alevis heavily vote for the secularist CHP.

    The same goes for Arab Alewites of Hatay and Mersin regions who had elected three of the parliamentarians that were in the delegation that visited Assad. The sympathy for the Assad regime openly voiced in these two provinces is a cause of distress for the ruling party circles.

    You have to look at the photos printed in Friday’s Turkish papers showing Safak Pavey, the deputy chairman of the CHP and member of Parliament from Istanbul, and the three other parliamentarians, Aytug Akici [Mersin], Hasan Akgol [Hatay] and Mevlut Dudu [Hatay], in the light of these facts.

    According to reports in the Turkish press, the CHP delegation asked Assad for the release of journalists — American Austin Tice and Palestinian Bashar Khaddumi —known to be detained by the regime. Four months ago, a CHP delegation that also included Mevlut Dudu and Hasan Akgol went to Syria and took delivery of Turkish cameraman Cuneyt Unal who had been in a regime prison for more than three months.

    The ‘’humanitarian mission’’ label affixed to this meeting must not have convinced Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His harsh reaction was headlined by mainstream daily Haberturk: “Why Did You Send Them to That Brute?”

    The “brute” that the prime minister was referring to is Syrian President Bashar Assad.

    It was the CHP chairman, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, that Erdogan was taking to task with the question that he asked at an Ankara press conference: “Why did the main opposition of this country send its parliamentarian to that brute? What did they achieve there?”

    It is possible to understand the anger of the prime minister. At issue is the political support by Turkey’s main opposition party to a regime and its leader that has been demonized by the prime minister of Turkey and his government. “Humanitarian mission” pretext is not convincing to the government.

    It was hardly surprising that Bashar Assad in a statement issued in Damascus saluted the CHP delegation and the Turkish opposition. The statement said Assad told the CHP delegation: “Syria has to distinguish between the attitudes of the Turkish people, who support stability in Syria, and the Erdogan government that supports terrorism, extremism and destabilization in the region.”

    The statement also said that the delegation led by parliamentarian Hassan Akgul conveyed the “Turkish people’s rejection of interference in internal affairs of Syria and their wish for good relations with their southern neighbor.” The Damascus meeting thus provided a vehicle to transmit Assad’s views explained to the CHP delegation to the Turkish public as well.

    According to a news report by Utku Cakirozer, the Ankara representative of daily Cumhuriyet, when asked in the meeting, “Is a regime without Assad feasible?,” Assad replied:

    ‘”I can’t leave even if I wanted to. I will not abandon ship until we get to a calm port in this storm. My people are behind me. If the storm ends one day, if there are elections, democracy comes and people tell to me leave, then I will. I mean I will go if I have to, but my people have to tell me that.’’

    It was possible to understand from these words that Assad has no intention of leaving Damascus until the 2014 elections. Assad’s remarks about Erdogan constituted a challenge:

    ‘’The Syrian crisis has become an existential struggle for Erdogan and Emir of Qatar. If Syria wins, they will lose in their country. There is also an ideological dimension of this affair. They want to see political Islam dominate Syria. We want t preserve secularism.’’

    Assad reportedly said, “Turkey has the most influence on the situation in my country. Most weapons and terrorists come via Turkey. Twenty-five percent of our land border with Turkey is under the control of the PKK, and 75 % of it is under Al Qaeda.”

    Assad also appealed to the Turkish nationalist public by saying: “There is an increased opportunity for the Kurds to set up a state in the region. Kurds in Northern Syria have linked with Iraqi Kurds. It is a matter of time for a Kurdish state.”

    It appears that the visit of the CHP delegation to Damascus has become a serious headache for AKP’s Syria policy.

    Kadri Gürsel is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish daily Milliyet since 2007. He was also a correspondent for Agence France-Presse between 1993 and 1997, and in 1995 was kidnapped by the PKK, an experience recounted in his book Dağdakiler(Those of the Mountains), published in 1996.

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-opposition-damascus-visit-against-ankara-syria-policy.html#ixzz2N2Clpsay

  • Greek Maritime Claims Rock Boat With Turkey

    Greek Maritime Claims Rock Boat With Turkey

    By ALKMAN GRANITSAS and STELIOS BOURAS

    ATHENS—Greece has renewed its territorial claims over a broad swath of disputed waters in the eastern Mediterranean where the indebted country hopes to find vast oil and gas deposits—a plan that risks sparking a confrontation with Turkey.

    Over the past several weeks, senior government officials have made a series of public statements—both at home and abroad—pointing to an almost two-decade-old international treaty granting those rights, one Greece hasn’t asserted until now. Athens also has been building support in other European capitals and stepping up a diplomatic campaign at the United Nations.

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    This week, Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras broached the topic with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a meeting in Istanbul where he called on Turkey to respect Greece’s rights under international law. So far, Ankara, which says those resources belong to Turkey and has warned for almost 20 years that any effort to draw new boundaries could lead to war, has called for further dialogue.

    Mr. Erdogan told Greek state television on Monday that “we’re approaching the issue with hope and without prejudices as we continue to work on territorial waters and Aegean-related matters. So long as the sides approach this matter with goodwill, there’s no reason not to get results.”

    For Greece, the stakes are enormous. An estimated €100 billion ($130 billion) of undersea hydrocarbon reserves—if proven—could ease the country’s crippling debt burden and make Greece a significant energy supplier for Europe, which wants to reduce its dependence on Russia. Mounting evidence of those reserves, along with recent moves by Cyprus to assert its own claims, have raised the stakes even further.

    Those reserves “will mean, clearly, wealth for Greece, wealth for Europe, a significant improvement in Europe’s energy security and a significant enhancement in Greece’s geopolitical role,” Mr. Samaras said in a recent speech to a business conference.

    For now, Greece is proceeding cautiously to avoid confrontation and is using U.N. procedures to gradually build its case. Athens’s end goal is clear: Greece hopes to gain international recognition for the exclusive use of a 200-nautical-mile zone around the country, basing its claims on the fact that it is a signatory to the U.N.’s Law of the Sea treaty and Turkey isn’t.

    To date, 165 nations and territories—including the European Union—have ratified the treaty. The U.S., which helped negotiate the pact in the 1980s, hasn’t ratified it but generally recognizes its provisions. Last summer, the Obama administration attempted to pass the treaty through the Senate, but fell one vote short of the two-thirds majority needed.

    Athens “is eager to assert its rights, but we don’t want to do anything that creates turbulence in the region,” said a senior Greek government official. “For now, we are proceeding slowly” through legal channels.

    One such step came in late January, when Greece’s foreign minister lodged a formal complaint at the U.N. after Turkey said in April that it would issue exploration licenses in a disputed area south of the Greek island of Rhodes.

    Turkey has said Greece’s counterclaims “have no basis in international law” and said it would take reciprocal steps at the U.N.

    In an interview with a Turkish newspaper this week, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said energy issues shouldn’t be a source for tension in bilateral relations and said Ankara had no imminent plans to issue those licenses. “Don’t we know any exploration creates a controversy? Of course we know,” he told the Hurriyet newspaper.

    The next move for Greece, government officials said, would likely be another submission to the U.N. formally delineating Greece’s nautical coordinates. That would be a prelude to declaring an exclusive economic zone under the provisions of the sea treaty.

    Under terms of the 1994 treaty, Greece is entitled to extend its territorial rights to as many as 12 nautical miles from shore—double the six it now claims—and an exclusive economic zone of as many as 200 miles. Athens has refrained from doing so. In 1995, the year Greece ratified the treaty, Turkey’s parliament declared that any unilateral move to assert such claims would constitute a cause for war.

    At issue is the complex geography in the Aegean Sea that separates Greece from Turkey. After the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, Greece was given sovereignty over most of the islands that dot the Aegean and form a continuous archipelago between mainland Greece and Turkey.

    Under the present limit, Greece claims more than 40% of the Aegean as its own, compared with less than 10% for Turkey. By widening the limit to 12 miles, more than 70% of the Aegean and its seabed would be in Greek territory. A 200-mile exclusive economic zone would mean Greek claims also stretched far into the Mediterranean—enveloping Turkey—and reaching as far as Cyprus in the southeast.

    Geologists believe there are oil and gas deposits in the north Aegean, where drilling first began on a small scale in the early 1980s. More recently, a bonanza gas find off Israel’s coast in 2010, a second find off Cyprus since then, and various surveys have indicated that oil and gas is to be found in the eastern Mediterranean.

    Encouraged, Greece began hunting for hydrocarbons late last year in less-contentious areas west and south of the country. The government, which is struggling under a €300 billion debt burden, aims to auction off exploration licenses for those areas toward the end of this year.

    In February, French President François Hollande, during a visit to Athens, appeared to back Greece’s position by referring to the country’s legal rights under the Law of the Sea treaty.

    “The presence of gas deposits that can, first, be found, and then subsequently exploited, represents an opportunity for Greece and for Europe; and I believe that here, international law, the Law of the Sea, will prevail,” he said.

    —Emre Peker in Istanbul contributed to this article.

    https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323978104578332352776971978

  • Turkey appoints ambassador to ‘Palestine’

    One-time close ally of Israel gives consul-general in Ramallah an upgrade

    Turkey has appointed an ambassador to the ‘State of Palestine’, Palestinian Ma’an News Agency reported Tuesday night. Akir Ozkan Torunlar, Turkey’s current consul-general, is taking on the new honorific title as the nation’s representative to Ramallah.

    Though the Palestinians enjoy non-member state status at the United Nations, a “State of Palestine” is not recognized by most countries.

    Tornular met with PA Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki in Ramallah, according to the report, who thanked the Turkish diplomat for his nation’s support of last year’s successful Palestinian bid for non-member state status at the United Nations.

    Israel and Turkey enjoyed close diplomatic and business relations for years, but a gradual deterioration in ties was accelerated with the May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, in which clashes between pro-Palestinian activists and IDF troops aboard the Mavi Marmara ship resulted in the deaths of nine activists, eight of them Turkish citizens, and injuries to several Israeli soldiers.

    Relations between Ankara and Jerusalem have since remained sour, with Turkey demanding an apology, and compensation for the families of those killed, as prerequisites for the renewal of ties.

    Raphael Ahren contributed to this report.

    via Turkey appoints ambassador to ‘Palestine’ | The Times of Israel.

  • Why Turkey is giving up on the European Union

    Why Turkey is giving up on the European Union

    And it’s no longer wedded to following America’s lead, explains Pitt professor RONALD H. LINDEN

    By Ronald H. Linden

    This year marks the 50th anniversary of Turkey’s formal association with what is now the European Union, and it has been more than 25 years since Ankara formally applied to join. Since that first approach, 21 other countries have become members, including fellow NATO states, such as Greece, and the former communist countries of Europe, including some that were once republics of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Turkey waits.

    The formation of a customs union with the EU in 1996, Turkey’s designation as a “candidate member” in 1999 and the beginning of negotiations in 2005 indicated that membership would come, eventually. But “eventually” turned into “not soon” and, perhaps, “not ever.”

    Turkey’s prime minister, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, like a spurned suitor, has declared that “the EU is not a must for Turkey. It is not the apocalypse if they do not let us in the EU.”

    With Turkey’s robust economic growth compared to Europe’s anemia and its young labor force compared to Europe’s aging population, he is not wrong. Mr. Erdogan went on to suggest that Turkey should seriously consider joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a loose grouping of Central Asian states backed by Russia and China. Originally set up to try to limit the influence of separatist or religious threats, this group now aims mostly to challenge the influence of the West.

    While sentiments born of frustration — “I’ve been thrown out of better bars than this” — might be written off as the product of an impulsive and occasionally emotional leader, they do echo public views in Turkey. Where once three-quarters of Turks supported joining the EU, the latest polls show that two-thirds now feel Turkey should abandon the effort, according to EDAM, a leading Turkish think tank.

    EU officials have raised entirely legitimate concerns about Turkey’s readiness for membership, which include issues of minority rights, freedom of expression and the continued non-recognition of (not to mention a Turkish military presence in) an EU member state, Cyprus. Still, many Turks, including the prime minister, suspect that the holdup has more to do with Turkey’s 99 percent Muslim population.

    And they take it personally. It rankles Turkey’s extraordinarily successful businessmen, for example, that citizens of virtually all the states of the former Yugoslavia — whether candidate members or not — can now travel to Europe visa-free while they must wrestle with forms and delays to enter the border-free area.

    The Turks are not waiting around for a warmer welcome. Those same business travelers can — and do — go to Russia without visas. Russia has become Turkey’s largest trading partner, surpassing the EU, and hosts more than $17 billion in Turkish investment projects. Russia is also Turkey’s major energy supplier, sends 3.5 million tourists a year to Turkey and will soon begin construction on Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. In 2010 the two countries signed a “strategic partnership,” which has produced cooperation at the Cabinet level, including between foreign ministries.

    With the second-largest military in NATO, Turkey is hardly a perfect alliance partner for Russia. The two countries hold quite different views on several pressing issues, most immediately how to handle the impending collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. Turkey also has irritated Moscow by agreeing to host a sophisticated NATO radar system designed to counter a possible Iranian nuclear arsenal and, more recently, Patriot missiles to protect the border with Syria. Last fall, Turkey forced a passenger jet headed to Syria from Russia to land in Ankara so it could be inspected for possible weapons smuggling

    Such episodes have not prevented Turkey and Russia from making clear their shared hostility to military action against Iran or a more muscular NATO presence in the Black Sea. Ankara has repeatedly blocked NATO efforts to expand Operation Active Endeavor, an anti-terrorism effort in the eastern Mediterranean, into its Black Sea neighborhood. Turkey, like Russia, sees this region as its own responsibility and prefers to police it with its own forces — with Russian participation.

    In 2010 Turkey agreed to let Russia build its South Stream pipeline through Turkish waters — offering a direct route from Russia to Europe — a project in direct competition with Europe’s own Nabucco pipeline. With supplies uncertain and gas prices falling, it is not clear if both pipelines are economically viable, but true to its own plan to become an “energy hub,” Turkey signed on to both South Stream and Nabucco.

    As these moves indicate, the Turkish government is pursuing policies in accordance with its own strategic vision, which has been outlined explicitly by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, often described as “the Turkish Henry Kissinger.” Under his guidance and with the strong backing of the ruling Law and Justice Party, Turkey has reversed years of relative isolation from its neighbors and strict adherence to policies preferred by Washington to undertake active, even aggressive diplomacy.

    Turkey now has full embassies in nearly 100 countries and representation in more than 200. State-owned Turkish Airlines flies to more countries from a single airport (Istanbul) than either Lufthansa or Air France. In Africa and the Balkans, Turkish companies are building roads and airports and, in former Ottoman areas, facilitating cooperation, such as between Bosnia and Serbia, refurbishing mosques and supporting Turkish communities.

    Like ambitious powers before them, the Turks have discovered — most recently in the Middle East — that their involvement is not always effective or welcome. Former close allies, like Bashar Assad in Syria, do not take kindly to Turkey’s willingness to host rebel groups — a posture for Turkey that is especially tricky considering that it occasionally bombs the territory of its neighbors, as in Iraq, where anti-Turkish groups operate.

    As it searches for a new role in the post-post-Cold War world, Turkey is learning what another influential international power learned in its day. “Britain,” Lord Palmerston said in 1848, “had no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only interests that were eternal and perpetual.”

    In a rapidly changing, post-ideological age, the Turks are applying that lesson. Their once and future friends in the West might want to take notice.

    Ronald H. Linden is professor of political science and director of the European Union Center of Excellence/European Studies Center at the University of Pittsburgh (linden@ pitt.edu).
    First Published March 3, 2013 12:00 am

    Read more: http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/perspectives/why-turkey-is-giving-up-on-the-european-union-677683/#ixzz2Mz1ikOym

  • A new rapprochement for Turkey and Israel?

    A new rapprochement for Turkey and Israel?

    The relationship between Turkey and Israel is currently entering a new season, the raison d’état of which is business. After breaking diplomatic relations following the Israeli military offensive against the Turkish boat Mavi Marmara in 2010 – a bloody attack against the activists of the Gaza-bound Freedom Flotilla that resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens – late last month the Turkish media announced the signing of an agreement for the sale of military aircraft electronic system by Tel Aviv to the Ankara government.

    Erdogan-Assad

    Erdogan (left) and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in better days (Photo: todayszaman.com) 

     

    The new system will complete the aircraft system already developed by the Turkish military industry, the so-called AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). AWACS is a radar system designed to intercept airplanes, boats and vehicles over long distances and to manage air battles against possible enemies. The agreement, over one hundred million dollars, dates back to 2002 and includes the sale of four Boeing 737 with radar control and an electronic defense system.

     

    This contract was never implemented, however, because of the Israeli refusal to provide the last two parts necessary to complete the AWACS system. This refusal followed the Turkish decision to freeze all the diplomatic relations with Israel and to proceed with trials in absentia against the Israeli soldiers and officials charged with the deaths of the nine activists.

     

    At the time of the attack of the Israeli special forces against the Mavi Marmara, Turkish premier Erdogan asked Israel for an official apology and financial compensation for the families of the nine victims. Those were the Turkish conditions for resumption of bilateral relations, but Israel refused to meet these demands. In the final report of the Turkel Commission, an Israeli government committee of inquiry to investigate the Mavi Marmara “incident”, “experts” completely absolved the government of any guilt and labeled Israel’s use of force against unarmed activists “as appropriated and proportionate to the threat”.

     

    It took the direct intervention of the American company Boeing to push the stalled sale agreement forward. According to an official of the Turkish Defense Ministry, “Boeing told Israel that its refusal to complete the delivery was damaging their own business”.

     

    Thus, Israel decided to end its two years of “embargo” against Turkey: since 2010, the Netanyahu government had banned exports to Ankara. However, this relationship was restarted as business is business: not only in the military field, but also in that of energy.

     

    On the table there is also an agreement for a joint Turkish-Israeli project to construct a pipeline from Israel via Turkey for the export of natural gas to Europe. In this case, it’s the Turkish government that is slowing down project implementation. Just two weeks ago the Turkish Minster of Energy, Taner Yildiz, said that Ankara would not give the green light for the project until final approval of Erdogan.

     

    The Israeli offer includes the construction of a pipeline that starts from the Leviathan basin – the richest one in Israel – and continues along the southern coast of Turkey in order to meet the energy needs of European countries for a total of 425 billion cubic meters of gas.

     

    The Israeli hurry is understandable, but Turkey brakes: first of all, Tel Aviv must meet the political conditions of Erdogan. The Turkish premier, in words, has always shown himself as a strenuous opponent of the Jewish state: several time the prime minister called the Israeli state a “terrorist state”.

     

    But don’t forget another element, essential to understand the current relations between the two countries: the intention of Ankara to assume the role of leader of the Arab world, taking advantage of an Egypt still too unstable and a Syria engrossed in civil war. Erdogan doesn’t hide his desire to make Turkey the new regional power, breaking relations with his former ally Bashar al-Assad and highlighting Iran as the common enemy.

     

    In such a context, Israel needs to get closer to Turkey, given the relations (similar to a cold war) with Damascus and Teheran. Turkey could become for Israel what Egypt was for decades: under Mubarak’s dictatorship, Israel enjoyed the support of Cairo, a guarantee of great value inside the Arab world.

     

    But what makes Turkey close to the Jewish state? According to Palestinian writer and political analyst Nassar Ibrahim: “In order to understand the current game of alliances, we need to start from the history: for decades Turkey and Israel have maintained good political and military relations. The attack against Mavi Marmara is the exception, not the rule. The Turkish prime minister took this opportunity to show himself as the only Arab leader able to face Israel and to defend the right of the Palestinian people. In those months, there were lots of Turkish flags raised during demonstrations in West Bank and other Arab countries. Erdogan’s success, however, didn’t come from his political stature, but from frustration over the silence of the other Arab regimes”.

     

    Until the outbreak of the Arab Spring. “Erdogan, as leader of a party belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, understood that it was the time for Turkey,” notes Ibrahim. “Ankara could make a difference and become the new leader in a Middle East led by the Muslim Brotherhood. Because of this idea, Erdogan immediately pushed Turkey against the regimes of Mubarak, Ben Alì and Ghaddafi. And at the end, against Bashar al Assad, making a strategic mistake of great importance: Syria was a close ally of Turkey for decades. The two countries had excellent political, economic and military relations until Erdogan’s decision to abandon the old friend Assad, in the belief that the Syrian president would soon fall and leave space to a new government, led – like in Tunisia and in Egypt – by the Muslim Brotherhood”.

     

    Yet two years after the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Damascus hasn’t fall down and – while the traditional Islamic opposition groups (including the Muslim Brotherhood) are losing ground – Al Qaeda militias advance. “Erdogan is in crisis, his strategy is also in crisis because of internal unrest. The Turkish people is traditionally and historically close to the Syrian one and no one there understands the need to abandon Damascus. In particular the army, a strong and rooted power in Turkey, is harshly criticizing Erdogan: to promote his party’s interests (to become the point of reference of all the Muslim Brotherhood parties), he sacrificed the political and economic interests of Turkey”.

     

    “It is in this context that we must read the new rapprochement with Israel,” Ibrahim explains. “Turkey is isolated, it is now surrounded by antagonistic states: Syria, Iraq, Iran. Erdogan now has only NATO, Europe and United States, the closest allies of Israel. If Ankara wants western support and the Patriot missiles, it needs to renew its relationship with Tel Aviv”.