Category: Regions

  • Bosnian War Crimes Sentence Blocked

    Bosnian War Crimes Sentence Blocked

    By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
    Published: July 3, 2008
    Filed at 6:17 a.m. ET

    Pool photo by Zoran Lesic

    Naser Oric at the court house of the UN war crimes tribunal on Thursday in The Hague.

    THE HAGUE, Netherlands (AP) — A U.N. appeals court on Thursday overturned the war crimes conviction of Naser Oric, a Bosnian Muslim considered a war hero by many in his country for fighting Serbs in the embattled Srebrenica enclave during Bosnia’s 1992-95 war.

    Oric, 41, was convicted two years ago by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal of failing to prevent the murder and torture of Serb captives in Srebrenica. But judges gave him a lenient two-year sentence and ordered his immediate release because of time spent in custody.

    But appeals judges went even further, overturning both convictions because the original trial failed to establish that Oric had control over forces responsible for the crimes.

    ”The appeals chamber has no doubt that grave crimes were committed against Serbs detained in Srebrenica,” said presiding judge Wolfgang Schomburg. ”However, proof that crimes have occurred is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of an individual for these crimes.”

    Under those circumstances, ”the appeals chamber finds that the appropriate course of action can only be a reversal of Naser Oric’s convictions,” Schomburg added.

    Oric stared ahead without showing any emotion as the judgment was read and then bowed briefly to judges before sitting down. Outside court, he hugged friends and his lawyer before walking out the front door a free man.

    ”Of course I am very happy,” he said.

    His lawyer, Vasvija Vidovic, said the acquittal was no surprise.

    ”Anyone who followed the trial could expect the result that he is not guilty,” she said.

    Oric said he was not bitter about spending nearly three years in pretrial custody, only to ultimately be found not guilty on all charges. ”It was my destiny,” he said.

    Oric led the dogged defense of the Srebrenica enclave against attacks from Bosnian Serb forces from early in the war. In 1995, Serb forces stormed a U.N.-declared ”safe haven” in Srebrenica and slaughtered some 8,000 men in Europe’s worst civilian massacre since World War II.

    Oric defended the actions of Muslim fighters in the enclave, saying they were in a desperate situation.

    ”I don’t think they really committed crimes,” he said outside court. ”We were under siege. We were just fighting to survive and fighting for our lives.”

    Some Bosnian Serbs claim the 1995 massacre was an act of revenge by uncontrolled troops because Oric’s troops killed thousands of Serbs in the villages surrounding Srebrenica.

    Judges at his original trial acquitted Oric of the most serious charges against him, including direct involvement in the murder of Serb prisoners and wanton destruction of Serb villages before the fall of Srebrenica.

    One of the Serb commanders found responsible for the massacre of Muslims, Radoslav Krstic, has already been sentenced to 35 years after a conviction on genocide charges.

    The commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, Gen. Ratko Mladic — also charged with genocide for the Srebrenica killings — is still in hiding and is believed to be in neighboring Serbia.

  • Turkish Intelligence Activities under Increased Public Scrutiny in Turkey and Greece

    Turkish Intelligence Activities under Increased Public Scrutiny in Turkey and Greece

    6/22/2008 (Balkanalysis.com)

    By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso

    A number of high-impact incidents over the past few months have revealed that the historic feuding of Turkey and Greece is not a thing of the past. Some of these have been well-known, and overtly demonstrated in political events. Others have however received little mention, leaving the public curious to know what is going on behind the scenes.

    At the same time, procedural issues concerning the Turkish intelligence service’s jurisdiction and allowed methods have also been the subject of intense scrutiny among the Turkish public and media in recent weeks, raising dark memories of past indiscretions such as mass wiretapping scandals from an aggressive intelligence apparatus.

    Most recently, Turkey has demonstrated political gamesmanship by blocking the direct cooperation of NATO with the EU’s justice and security advisory mission in Kosovo, EULEX, which hopes to take a larger role in the self-declared Balkan country since the enactment of a Kosovo constitution on June 15. The EU’s gain has come to the detriment of UNMIK, the UN’s nine-year-old mission in Kosovo, which has been restricted further in its mandate by these ‘facts on the ground.’ The Turkish move comes as opposition to Cyprus, an EU but not NATO member: Turkey had already blocked the Greek Cypriots from sending peacekeepers to Kosovo. According to Deutsche Welle, “The move makes it unclear how the KFOR-EULEX relationship can now function on an official level.”

    There are clear interrelations with other regional issues as well. France, notably, has supported Greece on the Macedonia name issue, with President Sarkozy’s avowed Hellenism perhaps bolstered by his country’s sale of billions in arms to Greece. The two countries held a joint military exercise in May. As Balkanalysis.com reported last year, France has also been keenly interested in reported oil deposits off the coast of Cyprus, which the country opened to foreign exploration last year- despite vociferous Turkish protests. At the same time, Israel is threatening war with Iran, something that would not fail to impact on both Turkey and Greece in different ways. It is abundantly clear that the present moment is a very complex and volatile one in the Balkans and East Mediterranean.

    Turkey’s modern intelligence service, Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı (‘National Intelligence Organization,’ abbreviated MIT) was established by parliament on July 22, 1965, with Law no. 644. It was envisioned as being run by an undersecretary reporting to the prime minister. The body specifically replaced the Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (MAH). Earlier intelligence organizations dated back to the time of Ataturk, and before him, the Ottoman Empire. However, whereas Ataturk’s era led his developing country to emulate the leading European countries’ intelligence services, the Cold War reality of the 1960’s inspired key NATO ally Turkey to follow the American and NATO models especially. MIT headquarters today consists of a gardened compound in the suburbs of Ankara with a total surface area of more than 300 hectares, of course, very well secured.

    The murky activities of the organization have fascinated the Turkish public for decades. On the domestic front, Turks in early June became transfixed by a legal battle over the MIT’s wiretapping rights and simultaneous claims from a political party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), that claimed a wiretapping operation had been carried out against it by the government. This claim appeared following the publication, in late May, of a transcript was published in the newspaper Vakit of a private meeting held between Secretary-General Önder Sav and a guest in his office.

    According to Turkish newspaper Zaman, the incident “struck a chord in the recent memory of the nation, which has seen many a wiretapping scandal in years past.” However, it was soon proven to be a false allegation, Vakit reported, as it turned out that Sav had simply forgotten to turn off his phone after speaking with a journalist. The intrepid reporter then simply proceeded to transcribe what he heard over the following 42 minutes of Sav’s meeting. Former Interior Minister Sadettin Tantan, who ironically was involved in earlier similar scandals, lamented that continual rumors of bugging will continue indefinitely, so long as the country continues to lack a proper legal apparatus. Tantan pointed out other cases, including one in Greece, in which the authorities were able to control indiscretions through the kind of proper legislation enforcement he believes is missing in Turkey. According to the article in Zaman, he stated:

    “Intelligence services, institutions and even ordinary people have access to the possibilities of high-tech products. It is really difficult to struggle with these people under the article that defines the crimes committed through the overstepping of legal powers. There is no infrastructure in Turkey regarding this matter. The Turkish legal system has no security department. And this gap can be filled by national and foreign forces. We even don’t know what foreign [intelligence] services have been wiretapping. When similar scandals broke out in Germany, Austria, England, France, Switzerland and Denmark, these countries took very serious steps with regard to communications security. It is evident that some officials in Turkey have been engaging in professional misconduct.”

    After the exposure of a wiretapping scandal in 1996, parliamentarian Sabri Ergül and 19 other deputies from his CHP party deputies submitted a resolution demanding a parliamentary investigation. According to Zaman, Ergül recently stated that a “famous intelligence official” told the commission that “everybody was being wiretapped.” According to this officer’s secret testimony, “there were bugs in the houses of prime ministers, ministers, opposition leaders and that even opposition leaders had one another wiretapped.”

    Ergül continued, noting the officer’s claims that “there was such fierce competition between intelligence services [in 1996]. That’s why they sometimes exposed their weak sides. For instance, a fight between the Police Department, the Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization [JITEM] and MIT came to light in those days. Those wiretapped before started having others wiretapped when they came to power. We even found out that directors of state institutions were wiretapping ministers. All of the bidding processes going on for public properties used to be wiretapped.”

    Nevertheless, significant legal challenges have indeed been raised in recent weeks on the issue of wiretapping. On June 5, Hurriyet reported that Turkey’s Supreme Court overturned on appeals a decision of the High Criminal Court that had authorized the Turkish police (gendarmerie) with country-wide monitoring, “saying no institutions can be given an authority that covers monitoring in the entire country.” According to Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin “the decision by the Supreme Court was quite extensive. My personal view is that the decision will cover the National Intelligence Organization and police, too.” The issue arose when the Justice Ministry objected to the criminal court’s authorization of the MIT and the gendarmerie to tap all phone, SMS and email traffic, citing potential abuse of authority and international human rights conventions.

    Naturally, given a turbulent common history, the issue of Turkish intelligence methods and practices is also of interest to many Greeks, and the subject is the subject of periodic discussion in the Greek media. However, as is inevitable in such scenarios the testimony of genuine experts is often confounded by uninformed speculation and conjecture. As in Turkey, where the public has reacted at various levels of hysteria regarding the most recent wiretapping charges- which turned out to be false – so it is in Greece that the public is prepared to expect the worst from its historic neighbor.

    The role of Turkish intelligence in large-scale human trafficking has also captivated the Greek public in recent months. In the early morning hours of Friday, April 25, a Greek coast guard vessel in the Eastern Aegean captured a Turkish craft which was carrying illegal Asian immigrants, some 3.5 nautical miles off the island of Lesvos. Also in the boat was a 38-year-old Turkish Army officer, Serkan Kaya. According to EmprosNet and other Greek news reports citing Greek intelligence sources, Kaya is a special unit operator who was also involved with the Turkish MIT. These reports claimed that Kaya was involved in the human trafficking partially in order to launch an intelligence gathering activity in the Greek islands. Moreover the Turkish officer was carrying with him Army credentials and a special weapon “used only by secret services,” that identified him with the security apparatus of Turkey.

    An interesting aspect of the role of the Turkish secret services in trafficking via the Aegean is illustrated by American demands, first made in 2006, to establish a customs control facility in Turkish port cities, beginning with Izmir. The request, so far stonewalled, is part of a program, the Customs Container Security Initiative, envisioned for over 30 foreign countries. In these countries, the US would like the ability to inspect all maritime traffic bound for American shores, to secure against nuclear components and other possible terrorist weapons.

    While several other countries have gone along with the American initiative, Turket has not. In fact, it has been the MIT in particular that has refused the US demands, reports Zaman, “over concerns of the ramifications for Turkey’s sovereignty rights. In a letter sent to the Undersecretariat for Customs and Foreign Trade, MIT enumerated its concerns, saying such a system could turn into an environment for espionage activity… Although the number of containers shipped from Istanbul to the US is three times the number of containers shipped from Izmir, it is not known why the US wanted Izmir to be the first port for such a system.” Whether Greek lobbying or concerns raised by the Greek intelligence services in Washington had anything to do with this choice would be an interesting question for researchers to explore.

    One recent claim that got attention in Athens was made by Greek journalist Aris Spinos, a well-known specialist in security matters. He spoke about the subject of Turkish intelligence practices in the first week of May 2008, on the late show of Greek nationwide television network, Extra Channel. Spinos claimed that certain private clinics in Ankara are actually owned by MIT, which uses them to perform plastic surgery on its best spies who are then sent ‘in disguise’ for missions abroad, something in line with the Soviet KGB model.

    Greeks have also claimed in recent years that MIT agents persuaded tourists from other countries to spy for Turkey. Usually, cases were reported during tourist season, when tourists come back and forth between places such as Bodrum-Kos (2 miles apart), or between islands like Lesvos, Chios and Samos and their respective Turkish port destinations, to try to capture videos and photos with Greek military bases, in order to sell them to the Turks and receive payments- sometimes, allegedly, in the form of paid vacations. However, this sort of speculation is the least likely to be corroborated and the most prone to exaggeration and misuse.

    Greek experts have also disclosed other aspects of the MIT’s believed operating habits. According to several articles in the Greek journal Stratigiki, the MIT has a special psy-ops unit, named TIB that has an extensive network in Europe and especially in Germany, where the largest Turkish diaspora in Europe resides. It is a large sector that employs academics, journalists and Turkish diaspora professionals, functioning broadly along the lines of Israel’s MOSSAD. Similarly, it is widely assumed that domestically the MIT maintains a very large network of civilian informants that span all levels of society and professional life in Turkey- something that goes back to the Cold War and likely even earlier.

    Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the resulting anxiety for both Turkey and Greece, a ‘hot’ period ensued between 1989-1996, when a ‘secret war’ erupted between Greek and Turkish intelligence services, that involved assassinations, arson, high-level psychological attacks, and heavy espionage activity. The Turks accused Greece on supporting the Kurdish PKK fighters (PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was later protected in Greece and Greek diplomatic installations until being kidnapped by the Turks in Kenya in 1998). The tensions escalated to the point of potential armed conflict over the contested islet of Imia near Kalymnos in early 1996.

    Today, numerous unfolding events indicate that Greek and Turkish machinations are going to be amplified by the actions of larger powers. For example, Israel recently conducted a robust air force exercise over Greek waters, which American and other analysts interpreted as a warning of an impending strike against Iran. Turkey, on the other hand, has had to develop closer ties with Iranian security services, as both countries share the problem of Kurdish separatists. How the fortunes of Greece and Turkey would wax or wane in the event of an Israeli (and, potentially, American) war with Iran is just one of the many fascinating questions to emerge from this. Given the complexity and high stakes of international relations in the Balkans and Middle East today, it appears likely that the traditional war of one-upsmanship between Greece and Turkey will continue into the foreseeable future, and that their intelligence services will, as always, be at the forefront of this battle.

    Source: Balkanalysis.com, 6/22/2008

  • Russia-Turkey: Blue Stream is not enough

    Russia-Turkey: Blue Stream is not enough

    01/07/2008 19:45

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) – Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is to hold talks with his Turkish counterpart Ali Babacan when he visits Ankara on July 2.

    He will be also received by President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Such a high-level welcome usually indicates that the host side attaches great importance to a visit, or that the trip is a prelude to a visit by the head of state. In some cases, both are true. A visit by President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey, our major Black Sea neighbor and Russia’s special trade and economic partner, would be timely.

    Russia and Turkey have many issues to discuss, apart from their routine agenda: settlement in the Middle East, Iraq, and on Cyprus; the Iranian nuclear program; the situation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Kosovo. One of the major issues is trade and economic cooperation.

    Trade between the two countries is booming. Last year, it was $22.5 billion, and in the first four months of this year, it soared more than 60% to reach $10.6 billion. Russian-Turkish trade in 2008 is expected to break all records of 2007. Russia accounts for a quarter of all projects built by Turkish companies abroad. Last year, they were awarded three billion dollars worth of contracts.

    It is a pity, then, that the visit will be marred by the latest tourist scandal, whereby Turkish firms refused to provide accommodation for Russian tourists who had already sent them their money. But such problems are inevitable when the flow of the Russian tourists is rapidly on the rise. This sensitive issue will not be at the top of the agenda, but Mr. Lavrov will have to talk about the record of Turkish companies in fulfilling their commitments to their Russian partners. The situation here leaves much to be desired, and the problems are not confined to the tourism industry.

    This year, Russia has blacklisted foreign companies that are not complying with their obligations to Russian partners, and avoiding implementation of rulings by international commercial courts of arbitration. The compilers of the blacklist have not disclosed the number of Turkish companies on their register, but it is rumored that there are dozens of them. It is rather difficult to monitor companies with a bad record because in Turkey a host of firms (legal entities) may be registered in the name of one individual. Therefore, while checking on the reliability of future partners, Russian businessmen are advised to ignore the name of the company, and to pay closer attention to its owners and managers. This will help them discard a dishonest partner.

    Many Russian medium-sized businesses are reluctant to deal with Turkey because it is next to impossible for foreigners to win a suit against dishonest Turkish companies. The national courts prefer to help their compatriots. Turkish companies are also adept at the mechanism of bankruptcy to dodge the implementation of legal decisions, meaning foreigners seldom receive any money even if they do win a case in court.

    Although these problems pose a real and substantial impediment to the development of partnership, Turkey and Russia have more important problems to discuss. Fundamentally, the established system of trade and economic ties has long become too narrow for Moscow and Ankara. For the last ten years it was based on the famous Blue Stream project. It is certainly unique and was well managed. It was the backbone for all other projects, and even determined our foreign policy partnership at both regional and global levels. But now it has become too small to embrace our new projects. For all the optimistic figures and facts, reliance on Blue Stream is likely to become a stumbling block to widening cooperation. Russia and Turkey have to put it on a new level.

    They should expand their contacts in such major spheres as the nuclear power industry. The Atomstroyexport (Russia’s nuclear power equipment and service export monopoly) is ready to provide Turkey with a project for the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) that will be less expensive and more reliable than its American counterparts. Such NPPs will help Turkey to consolidate its positions at the regional energy market, especially considering Iran’s nuclear energy problems. Moscow has long been hinting to Ankara that it is best to give priority to economic expediency, especially in the energy industry.

    The two countries will not be able to strip their relations of politics. But it would be sensible to thoroughly weigh all economic and political issues. Russia has long been ready for this.

  • “opinion of Azerbaijanis will carefully be considered”

    “opinion of Azerbaijanis will carefully be considered”

    Barack Obama: “I can assure you that opinion of Azerbaijanis will carefully be considered if the issue of Mourad Topalian’s terrorist activity comes before the Senate”

    [ 02 Jul 2008 11:53 ]

    Washington. Husniyya Hasanova–APA. “I can assure you that opinion of Azerbaijanis will carefully be considered if the issue of American Armenian National Committee’s former chairman Mourad Topalian’s terrorist activity comes before the Senate”, said US presidential nominee Barack Obama in his response to the letter of protest of Azerbaijanis living in Illinois.

    Obama represents Illinois in the US Senate. The presidential candidate also noted that he was gratified by the opportunity that the people of Illinois had given him to work on some very challenging issues that would affect the country’s future. This year, the U.S. Senate has considered – or will soon consider – important legislation relating to the President’s surveillance program, consumer protection, energy policy, and next year’s federal budget. “As I have approached these and other issues, I have appreciated the input I have received from Illinoisans like you. While lawmakers and their constituents may hold different perspectives at times, I feel it is particularly important that I hear the views of any Illinois resident, who feels strongly about a particular issue”, said Obama. Former chairman of the American Armenian National Committee arrested for his terrorist activity met after his release with the pro-Armenian Congressman Howard Berman and discussed with him the “Lobbyist issue”. Thousands of Azerbaijanis living in the United States sent letters of protest to all elected bodies of the country, as well as to Senator Barack Obama via US Azerbaijanis Network (USAN). Alongside with Obama, other congressmen have also reacted to the Mourad Topalian’s meeting with the Howard Berman, member of Californian House of Representatives.

  • Stratfor – Is War With Iran Coming?

    Stratfor – Is War With Iran Coming?

    Stratfor

    Geopolitical Diary: A U.S.-Iranian Dance of Diplomacy

    The United States has raised the possibility of opening a diplomatic interests section in Iran. To avoid giving the impression that the idea was an unqualified U.S. position, State Department officials carefully leaked word of an ongoing debate about the plan to the press. But the news was not met with immediate denial by U.S. officials. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refused to rule the idea out — instead Rice said she preferred not to comment on internal U.S. deliberations.

    Hours after her statement, the official Iranian news agency said Iran was prepared, in principle, to consider the request if it is officially made by the United States. So, a week after word was leaked to The New York Times of Israeli maneuvers in preparation for a possible air strike on Iran, the Administration has opened a diplomatic door. 

    Currently, American affairs in Iran are handled by the Swiss Embassy, without U.S. diplomats present. Under full diplomatic relations, which this new deal still would not be, the United States would have an embassy and ambassador in Tehran, and the Iranians would have one in Washington. This is a step short of diplomatic recognition. U.S. diplomats would be present in Tehran — and Iranians in Washington — but likely working under the auspices of the Swiss and Pakistani Embassies, which house their respective interest sections presently. The United States has this sort of arrangement with Cuba. It allows diplomatic presence and representation without full recognition.

    Cuba is hardly a model of international warmth for the United States, but the question is trajectory. At the moment, there is no formal diplomatic presence in Iran. There would be if this were to happen. And that would obviously represent a major psychological shift in U.S.-Iranian relations. It is not that the Americans and Iranians don’t talk. Apart from direct meetings in Baghdad, the Iranians have high-level diplomats in New York. There have also been meetings, varying in degrees of formality, in Switzerland and other venues. In fact, the Americans and Iranians talk all the time, directly, indirectly and sometimes it appears in Haiku poetry. The idea that the United States and Iran don’t talk just isn’t true.

    The importance of this offer is not what it would yield, but that it was made. The United States took the first step, even if it did not take it irrevocably and no formal offer was made. The administration is being cautious. The Americans still recall how in 2003 they were embarrassed by the Iranians who rebuffed an offer by the United States to send help and a visit by a high-level U.S. delegation, including the elder George Bush, to the earthquake-ravaged city of Bam.

    Today the United States is not offering diplomatic exchanges. While it said it might offer them, the United States emphasized its division on the subject. U.S. diplomatic translation: “We’d like to exchange diplomats but if you say no, we never asked.” The Iranians quickly replied that if asked, they might agree. Iranian diplomatic translation: “Ask and we’ll say yes.” The speed of the Iranian response is telling. They were not surprised by the request. Their answer was ready. Which means, as one would expect, they were sounded out before.

    So on Friday it appeared that the world was on the verge of war between Israel and Iran, with the United States supporting Israel. By late Monday, the United States was proposing raising the level of diplomatic relations and the Iranians were indicating that they were open to it. In our mind this reinforces the idea that the careful leaking of putative Israeli war games was part of a “bad cop, somewhat better cop” routine, designed to work the Iranians psychologically. They were offered the choice between Israeli air strikes or improving diplomatic relations. The second offer sounded much better than the first.

    Setting aside the purple rhetoric on all sides, we have long believed that the Americans and Iranians were talking and actually working together in Iraq. The massive decline in casualties in Iraq is not simply due to U.S. military operations. The decision by the Iranians to rein in Shiite Iraqi militias had a significant impact on it. Indeed, in our view, the Iraq issue has always been more important to both countries than the nuclear weapon issue, and in Iraq, there has been progress.

    Both governments are urgently concerned with face. Neither wants to appear to be conceding anything to the other. When the Great Satan meets the Axis of Evil, no public compromise is possible. So all compromising is done privately. And that’s what makes this important. The tentative offer is very public and comes from the highest levels of government. It has been acknowledged officially. Now, this is the United States and Iran so anything public can collapse quickly. But the offer itself, no matter how it was couched, is extremely significant as is the response. In many ways we regard this as more significant than the Israeli exercises. 

  • Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging

    Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging

    From: “[iso-8859-1] Besým Can ZIRH”
    List Editor: Mark Stein
    Editor’s Subject: H-TURK: New Book: Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany [B C Zirh]
    Author’s Subject: H-TURK: New Book: Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany [B C Zirh]
    Date Written: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 06:59:36 -0400
    Date Posted: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 06:59:36 -0400

    Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany
    Ruth Mandel, Duke University Press.

    In Cosmopolitan Anxieties, Ruth Mandel explores Germany’s relation to the more than two million Turkish immigrants and their descendants living within its borders. Based on her two decades
    of ethnographic research in Berlin, she argues that Germany’s reactions to the postwar Turkish diaspora have been charged, inconsistent, and resonant of past problematic encounters with a Jewish “other.” Mandel examines the tensions in Germany between race-based ideologies of blood and belonging on the one hand and ambitions of multicultural tolerance and cosmopolitanism on the other. She does so by juxtaposing the experiences of Turkish immigrants, Jews, and “ethnic Germans” in relation to issues including Islam, Germany’s Nazi past, and its radically altered position as a unified country in the post–Cold War era.

    Mandel explains that within Germany the popular understanding of what it means to be German is often conflated with citizenship, so that a German citizen of Turkish background can never
    be a “real German.” This conflation of blood and citizenship was dramatically illustrated when, during the 1990s, nearly two million “ethnic Germans” from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union arrived in Germany with a legal and social status far superior to that of “Turks” who had lived in the country for decades. Mandel analyzes how representations of Turkish difference are appropriated or rejected by Turks living in Germany; how subsequent generations of Turkish immigrants are exploring new configurations of identity and citizenship through literature, film, hip-hop, and fashion; and how migrants returning to Turkey find themselves fundamentally changed by their experiences in Germany. She maintains that until difference is accepted as unproblematic, there will continue to be serious tension regarding resident foreigners, despite recurrent attempts to realize a more inclusive and “demotic” cosmopolitan vision of Germany.