Category: Regions

  • Turkish Parliament and Khojali massacre

    Turkish Parliament and Khojali massacre

     
     

    [ 30 Jul 2008 18:35 ]
    Ankara-APA. February 26 is proposed to be marked as Commemoration Day of Khojali massacre at the meeting of Turkish Parliament on July 29, APA Turkey bureau reports.

    MP Rashad Dogru from Nationalist Movement Party commented on terrorist act occurred in Istanbul and noted that one of the crimes committed against mankind is a genocide committed by Armenian against Azerbaijanis in Khojali city in February,1992. MP mentioned that women and children have been undergone tortures by Armenians and their lands have been occupied by Armenians.
    “Being Turks we should support these people. Armenians should be withdrawn from Azerbaijani occupied lands. Otherwise, relations cannot be developed between Armenia and Turkey. I propose to mark February 26 as Commemoration Day of Khojali massacre,” he said. MP from AKP Aladdin Boyukgaya supported proposal of his counterpart. He provided broad information to MPs about Khojali massacre.

  • Seoul to Transfer Tank Technology to Turkey

    Seoul to Transfer Tank Technology to Turkey

    In a first for the nation, Korea will transfer tank technology, including that of the homegrown next-generation XK-2 Black Panther tank, to Turkey. The technology transfer fee will be US$400 million.

    The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DPAP) and Hyundai Rotem on Tuesday announced Korea and Turkey signed an agreement whereby Korea will transfer the technology to Turkey by April 2015, and Turkey will produce about 200 next-generation tanks based on it.

    In Turkey, a ceremony was held to celebrate the signing of the agreement, attended by Korean and Turkish dignitaries including Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül.

    Korea will transfer technologies for tank engines, transmissions, automatic gun loading devices, gun barrels and gun shells — technologies which Hyundai Rotem and the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) have accumulated by developing K-1, K-1A1, and XK-2 tanks over the past three decades.

    During the initial stage, Korea will supply Turkey with about half of the necessary tank components. Turkey will develop a fire control system for precision shooting on its own.

    According to DAPA, Korea will be paid $400 million as the technology transfer fee, including production costs for four prototype tanks and components, and expenses for about 20 Korean engineers.

    Hyundai Rotem won the bidding, being selected by Turkey as the preferable bidder in June last year by defeating rival companies from Germany, a country well -known for its tradition of producing top-notch tanks.

    Rotem signed the final contract with Otokar, a Turkish tank manufacturer.

    (englishnews@chosun.com )

  • Cultural Influences On Caspian

    Cultural Influences On Caspian

    Brenda Shaffer works to define cultural domination on states’ foreign or domestic affairs in “Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy?”article. With some examples, Shaffer is explaining this event us. Firstly, Shaffer begin the article with Huntigton’s thesis: “The Clash of Civilizations”1Shaffer gives an example about different state decision-making. Some Muslim countries have Anti-American people as behavioral. But these states make alliance with the USA like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. Commonly we can see incongruent actings between states policies and people behaviors.
    Iran – Playing Politics with Islamic Style

    Samuel Huntigton’s thesis bases on idea that culture has main role in defining of policy. Also Brenda Shaffer agrees Huntigton’s thesis. Shaffer says that culture is main mechanism for diplomatic relations. Shaffer interprets culture as specific culture of country’s within religion, history and civilization.

    Western scholars researched about Islam effection in Muslim countries after 11 September terrorist act. They looked at Muslim scholars, historians, diplomats and generals. They understood Islam effection as strong as nuclear weapons. But this is not a physical thing, this is an ideology. And they speeches to newspapers, politic journals a subject that has a title as “Do Muslim countries act differently than Non-Muslim States?”

    On the other hand, Shaffer interests about this subject under the psychological perspective. Human beings are often driven by culture according to Shaffer. Also, human behavior effects on to state affairs. But state acts partly different from human behaviors. We can give example from philosophical history: Some philosophers think that the state is a thing like human. But it is systematically human. The state action is like people’s actions. State is big form of human and human is small form of the state. As behavioral psychological meaning has different dimensions.

     

    Shaffer’s Caspian perspective has common beliefs. According to Shaffer, all Caspian countries have been influenced by Islam effection after from the Soviet Union. And now they have Islamic perspective on their state affairs. But Shaffer judges all Caspian and Middle Asia area as Islamic effection zones. But it is not totally like that. Today these countries are secular except Iran.

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is important in this area according to Shaffer’s idea. After the collapsing of the USSR, Iran wanted to export their Islamic regime to other neighbor states. In Central Asia and Caucasus territory, Iran plays for exporting their Persian Islamic mind as a regime under the title as “Islamic Solidarity” with economic and security events. Shaffer is true for this event. Iran wanted to export their regime to other states. But American or Western scholars’ view point is different. They are looking as totally Islamic system to Iran. They say about Iran that they are working for Islamic fundamentalism. But Iran’s Islamic mind is very different from normal Islamic idea. Persian Islamic system bases on fundamentalist movement. If we look at Turkey, Egypt or others, we can see normal, laic Islamic behavior. Also Shaffer says their false point in next sentence. “Poor Muslim countries have an influence circumstance but secular Muslim countries challenges to Iran like Turkmenistan.”
    – The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (Christian Armenia versus Muslim Azerbaijan)

    But Tehran has faced three regional disputes :

    – The Chechen conflict (Chechen Muslims versus Moscow)

    – The Tajik civil war (The Islamic Renaissance Party versus Moscow

    In these mix circumstances Iranian fundamentalist approach transformed to self-interest system. And most telling of these policy preferences are Iran’s support for Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.2FinalCulture may be material interest of regime survivability. Islam is more likely to affect policy under conditions that see greater domestic and personnel influences on foreign policies.Mehmet Fatih OZTARSU
    Qafqaz University Law Faculty
    International Relations

    By these events, Iran’s state security was challenged in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia since Iran is a multiethnic state. Shaffer Gives information about Iran’s population: Half of Iran’s population is comprised of non Persian ethnic minorities; Azerbaijani groups. The majority of the residents of Iran’s northwestern provinces which border the country of Azerbaijan and they are Azerbaijani. But Iran’s relations bogged down with Baku because of Iranian self interests.

    Shaffer shows their ideas that Iranian diversity of opinion is good example for Iranian foreign policy. There are some different points as historical legacies and religious differences in policies.

    “On the other hand Turkey attempted to conduct a balanced policy toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also Turkey helped for Karabagh conflict to Baku.”

    Turkey changed its policy when Karabagh became a conflict. This is an example for cultural combines. (Brenda Shaffer)

    According to many observers, religious differences have played a central role in the Caspian region. With these happenings, Azerbaijan supported Chechnya. Also some analysts have assumed that religious differences serve as a basis for conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia. Over these events, common culture serves as a basis role for alliances and coalitions and different cultures act as an obstacle to cooperation.

    Shaffer’s opinion is that there are cultural alliances are created follow by from collapsing of the USSR.

    Tehran’s main argument is Shiite background in their helping system. Also Turkey and Azerbaijan shares ethnic Turkic and Muslim backgrounds. Also Russian and Armenian background is Orthodox Christian form. But Georgian-Russian conflict is different from this event. It bases on security alliance.

     

    Some governments explain and justify their policies in cultural terms. We must analyze a country’s foreign policy on the basis of actions. We have anticipated the New Testament to Germany or Russia or Torah to Israel like Islamic system. Shaffer asked question : “What does the Koran have to say a foreign policy question?”

    If Islam influences them, they should act with Islamic interaction. (Shaffer)

    The USA wants an enemy for their father emotion on the world. They forced as goodness of the world during the Cold War. They defended the world’s countries from dangerous communist system. Their interest was communism in that time. But they wanted a new enemy for regulate the world with themselves. After the Cold War, their White House scholars worked for a new enemy. There was a “Red Dangerous” line. But today there should be “Green Dangerous” line. And its name is Islam. 3

    The USA’s fans defense western style always. There shouldn’t be a religious system like Islam around the world according to them. But they don’t look at Israeli system or American Christiantic base.

    Today there is a Muslim conflict. And the USA is patron of the world. So they are working for peace, democracy and other good things. But the world’s people will know workings of the USA. All terror acts, all problems, all ethnic clashes…

    ———————————————————————
    1 Dogu Bati Journal – 26
    2 Karabagh conflict begin in the late 1980. And Armenia attacked to legal boundaries of Azerbaijan.
    3 Politic Declaration Fikret Baskaya – Ideologies.

     

  • Azerbaijan Hospitality – Part II

    Azerbaijan Hospitality – Part II

    By Nick Nwolisa. Original can be read here.

    Azerbaijan hospitality can not to be reduced to only good gestures shown to foreigners or limited to having to be entertained by the assorted varieties of cuisines the Azerbaijanis has to offer (read Azerbaijan Hospitality – Part I); the Azerbaijan hospitality encompasses and embraces a people total way of living, its specificity is in the area of its acceptability of people from diverse cultural, religious beliefs and origins. (more…)

  • Kurdish Exiles in Germany Feel Pain of Protracted War at Home

    Kurdish Exiles in Germany Feel Pain of Protracted War at Home

    When twin bombings ripped through a busy square in Istanbul Sunday, some in Turkey blamed the militant Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) for the blasts. That renewed focus on the group doesn’t bode well for many Kurds abroad.

     

    Citing security sources, CNN-Turk television said that intelligence reports suggested the group was planning a bombing campaign in Turkish cities.

     

    Though the Firat news agency reported Monday that the PKK had denied responsibility for the blast — which killed 17 and injured more than 150, making it the worst in the city since 2003 — suspicions about Kurdish involvement still abound.

     

    “There are signs of links to the separatist group,” Istanbul Governor Muammer Guler told reporters.

     

    “Of course it’s the PKK,” Orhan Balci, a 38-year-old textile businessman from the area told Reuters news service. “This has nothing to do with politics, this is all about the PKK.”

     

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday could not be called out into naming the PKK as the culprits behind the pair of bombings saying only, “Turkey’s fight against terrorism will continue” and that “the terrorist group’s biggest aim is to make propaganda.”

     

    Fears of a foray to western Turkey

    Whether responsible or not, the rebel movement has been blamed for a number of events in Turkey since its inception in 1984. The most recent headline-making action before this weekend’s blast — the kidnapping and eventual release of three German climbers from the slopes of Mount Ararat — has led many to worry that the battle for an autonomous Kurdistan may spread into western Turkey.

     

    This fear poses a special problem for Germany, which is home to one of the largest Turkish expatriate communities and provides shelter for more than half a million Kurds. Much of the fear and hostility felt toward ethnic Kurds in Turkey as a consequence of the PKK’s actions has long simmered among the immigrant population in Germany.

     

    In November, demonstrations over Turkey’s foray into Kurdish territory in northern Iraq broke out in Berlin’s Neu-Koelln neighborhood and members of the Turkish nationalist “Gray Wolf” gang attacked people at a Kurdish culture center in the German capital. In February, the Berliner Zeitung reported on the bullying and harassment a 7-year-old Kurd received at school after wearing a scarf in the colors of Kurdistan.

     

    “We’re trying to live in peace with the Turks,” Evrim Baba, a representative of the Kurdish community in Berlin told the newspaper.

     

    “We want peace,” a young man named Achmed told DW-WORLD after the November attacks.

     

    A community divided

     

    That peace has proven difficult to attain. Even among members of the Kurdish community itself, there is disagreement about the PKK. Though Germany officially banned the PKK in 1993, many of the exiles here openly sympathize with the organization’s struggle to obtain an autonomous homeland in the triangular area of southern Turkey, northern Iraq, and northwest Iran.

     

    “The Kurds have an incredible debt toward this organization,” Mahmut Seven, who runs the only Kurdish daily newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika, told the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel. “They gave us back our pride and our identity.”

     

    Baktheyar Ibrahim, an Iraqi-Kurd who had to flee a well-paying government job in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, sees things another way. As a supporter of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan political party, he believes in the attainment of an independent Kurdistan through democratic processes. The group, which supports Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, often finds itself at odds with other organizations fighting for the same goals.

     

    But the PKK has made things especially difficult for Ibrahim and for other exiles like him in recent months as Germany’s instituted a major crackdown on the Kurdish population to curb PKK sympathies.

     

    Kurdish associations in Hannover, Kassel, Bremen, Koblenz and Berlin have all been raided by German security agencies and suspected members of the separatist movement taken into custody.

     

    Roj TV, the sole Kurdish television station in the country, was banned last June, followed shortly by a ban on the production company Viko, which is located in the western Germany city of Wuppertal.

     

    Citing political reforms in Turkey, the German government has carried out a number of asylum revocations, making the search for political refuge more difficult and angering moderate Kurds who don’t see the situation in Turkey as having improved.

     

    “Go back to Turkey?” asked Mostafa, a 32-year-old refugee from Istanbul who’s since become a naturalized German. “For me, that’s impossible.”  

    Courtney Tenz

  • Blood and Belief  –  Kurdish Identity

    Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence

    by Aliza Marcus
    New York: New York University Press, 2007. 349 pp. $35

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    Most writers on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, best known by its Kurdish language acronym, the PKK, substitute advocacy for accuracy, so their books about the PKK tend to have limited practical use for policymakers. But Marcus, a former international correspondent for The Boston Globe who spent several years covering the PKK, has done important work in Blood and Belief. While sympathetic to her subject—the substitution of “militant” for “terrorist” grates—she retains professional integrity and does not skip over inconvenient parts of the PKK narrative such as its predilection to target Kurdish and leftist competitors rather than the Turks; the patronage it has received from the Syrian government; and the important role of European states and the Kurdish diaspora in its funding.

    Blood and Belief has four sections: on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s life and the PKK’s beginnings; the PKK’s consolidation of power; the civil war; and the aftermath of Öcalan’s 1999 capture.

    The Kurds inhabit a region that spans Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and Marcus does not let national borders constrain her analysis. Events in Iraq—such as the squabbling between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani—influenced Öcalan, who concluded that he should tolerate no dissent. “We believed in socialism, and it was a Stalin-type of socialism we believed in,” one early PKK member relates.

    Steeped in Kurdish and Turkish history, Marcus provides better context than many other journalists who have tackled this subject. The PKK took hold, she shows, largely because of the weakness of the Turkish state in the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Turkish government barely functioned. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military restored order. But when Barzani offered the PKK shelter in northern Iraq, the group remained beyond reach, allowing it to plan and launch a full-scale guerilla war against Turkey. Marcus concludes that the group’s continued survival in Turkey is because, at some level and among some constituents, it remains popular; its support is not all driven by intimidation as some Turkish analysts claim.

    Marcus impressively covers the civil war years (1984-99), and her narrative, combining dialogue and context, is rich and accessible. While many journalists and authors satisfy themselves with a single round of interviews, Marcus concentrates not on active PKK members, who she realizes do not enjoy the freedom to speak, but rather on past members, villagers, and family members whose accounts she cross-checks. She also incorporates Turkish language press accounts and interviews with Turkish officials.

    It is unfortunate, though, that her coverage of PKK resurgence, between 1999 and 2007, is just thirteen pages long. An exploration of how Öcalan has retained control while in prison and where he and his henchmen might take the PKK has seldom been more relevant. One hopes that this new chapter of PKK history will become the basis for a sequel.

     

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    Kurdish Identity

    Human Rights and Political Status

    Edited by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 336 pp. $65

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    The reader of Kurdish Identity, published in 2007, will find himself reading such timely insights as former State Department Iraq coordinator Francis Ricciardone explaining that, “Of course, we have no relations at all with [Baghdad],” and former deputy assistant secretary of state David Mack writing that he understands both Kurdish aspirations and “the potential danger that a ruthless regime in Baghdad poses,” as though Saddam Hussein’s regime had not ceased to exist in 2003.

    The collection of articles published by MacDonald and O’Leary, Kurdish experts at, respectively, Florida International University and American University, might have been useful to practitioners in April 2000, the date of the conference for which they were written, but the articles are now out-of-date.

    Some chapters are useful to historians. Robert W. Olson’s essay on Turkish-Iranian relations between 1997 and 2001 capably reviews that period. Kurdistan Regional Government financial advisor Stafford Clarry’s analysis of the U.N.’s humanitarian program retains value because of his precision and attention to detail, all the more so in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program scandal, which he helped expose. Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.

    The editors conclude with an essay updating the reader on world events. Both are academics well worth reading, but they provide no insights in this collection not already published elsewhere. Their comments in passing on the dire situation of Syrian Kurds, who do not enjoy equal protection under the law, raises the question why Kurdish Identity does not address this subject.

    Had MacDonald and O’Leary reassembled their April 2000 conference participants to reconsider their contributions seven years later and analyze where they were right and wrong, Kurdish Identity would have advanced scholarship in a novel way. As it stands, however, their book offers too little and much too late, suggesting that academics live in a world of publish or perish with the content of those publications sometimes a secondary consideration.