Category: Regions

  • Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

    Armenia Hit By Fuel Shortages

     

     

     

     

     

    By Shakeh Avoyan

    Armenia was grappling with its worst fuel shortages since the early 1990s on Monday despite the reported reopening of Georgia’s east-west railway that serves as the main supply line of the two South Caucasus states.

    A section of that railway close to the central Georgian town of Gori was damaged by a weekend fuel train explosion which Georgian officials said was caused by a landmine. It occurred just over a week after another, powerful explosion downed a nearby rail bridge. Russia denied Georgian accusations that it was behind the attack.

    The August 16 blast left the Armenian government scrambling to restore supplies of wheat, fuel and other basic commodities from the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi which process more than 90 percent of Armenia’s external cargo turnover. The government sent a convoy of about 40 fuel trucks to collect gasoline stranded in the ports.

    Officials said on Monday that the convoy returned to Armenia at the weekend with more than 500 tons of petrol. The government does not plan to send more heavy vehicles to Georgia in view of the renewed rail communication, they said.

    Meanwhile, the situation with fuel supplies only deteriorated, with the vast majority of filling stations in Yerevan resorting to severe fuel rationing on Sunday. They stopped selling petrol altogether the next morning. Only holders of prepaid corporate vouchers issued by the country’s largest station chains could buy a limited amount of petrol on Monday.

    “We have run out of gas and are selling it only to company cars. This is all the information I have at this point,” said a worker at one filling station besieged by angry motorists.

    “The war is in Georgia, but it’s Armenia that is in crisis,” one of them complained. “They keep saying that petrol is coming and there are no problems. But there is a problem.”

    “Even in the most remote Georgian village there is no petrol shortage,” said another driver. “Why? Because there are many petrol importers in Georgia but only three of them in this country.”

    The cargo company Apaven, which was assigned by the government to organize the emergency fuel imports, downplayed the crisis. “The [Georgian] railway has begun functioning at a fraction of its capacity,” Apaven’s executive director, Gagik Aghajanian, told RFE/RL. “But even that is enough. If there is any deficit, I think it will be eliminated shortly.”

    Aghajanian referred to the start of rail traffic through a smaller, disused rail bridge which Georgia, helped by Armenia and Azerbaijan, has prepared for use until the damaged bridge is repaired.

    According to the Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communications, the August 16 blast left a total of 178 rail cars, 108 of them loaded with wheat, stranded on Georgian railway sections west of Gori. “In all likelihood, 35 cars loaded with wheat will head to Armenia today,” a ministry spokeswoman, Susanna Tonoyan, told RFE/RL.

    “Besides, we have a lot of freight in the ports of Poti and Batumi awaiting shipment,” she said. “In particular, in Poti there are two ships carrying 6,700 tons of wheat and 93 rails cars of other goods. In Batumi, we have 2,500 tons of wheat, ten cars of petrol and another one thousand tons of petrol.”

    Tonoyan added that the government has also organized “intensive” fuel and wheat supplies from neighboring Iran. More than 400 tons of flour have already bee imported to Armenia through Iranian territory, she said.

     

  • Vice-President candidate of US Democratic Party, pro-Armenian Joseph Biden is one of the supporters of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act

    Vice-President candidate of US Democratic Party, pro-Armenian Joseph Biden is one of the supporters of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act

     
     

    [ 25 Aug 2008 16:42 ]
    Washington. Husniyya Hasanova – APA. In the early 90s Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Vice-President candidate of US Democratic Party Joseph Biden played an active role along with pro-Armenian senator Bob Dole in the adoption of Armenian Genocide Resolution and Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which banned U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan.

    APA’s US bureau reports that Joseph Biden is also the author of the resolution condemning the assassination of Hrant Dink in Turkey. Therefore, Armenian politicians call Joseph Biden a pro-Armenian politician.

    But, Joseph Biden also supported the resolutions defending Azerbaijan’s interests. He gave full support to the Silk Road Strategy Act introduced by U.S. Sen. Sam Brownback in 1997. Joseph Biden makes severe statements against Russia and accuses Moscow of supporting separatist movements in the post-Soviet area. In his article published in the Financial Times last year he said Russia’s supporting separatism in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova was inadmissible.

  • Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

    Should Russia recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

     
    19:00 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW. (Fyodor Lukyanov for RIA Novosti) – The Georgian-Russian conflict has dramatically changed the position of the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The idea of recognizing their independence has been put to the vote in Moscow.

    By trying to use military force to restore the country’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has killed the last hope of a political settlement to the conflict. The return of the breakaway republics to Georgian sovereignty, unlikely before Mikheil Saakashvili’s ill-advised adventure, is now completely impossible.

    But this does not mean the future is predetermined. There are two precedents that developments may follow: that of Kosovo or that of Cyprus. Russia must be very careful when choosing between them.

    The Kosovo scenario seems to promise more lasting results. Judging by the sixth paragraph on the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, or at least its Moscow version, which provides for international discussion of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would prefer the Kosovo scenario.

    But it can only be implemented if the UN Security Council approves a relevant resolution, similar to Resolution 1244 adopted in June 1999 after the end of NATO’s air raids on Yugoslavia.

    The international community already knew then that Kosovo, which had refused to bow to the central authorities long before the Yugoslav army pulled out, would never accept the sovereignty of Belgrade. However, it was impossible to announce this publicly, as this could have provoked unpredictable developments in Serbia and would amount to the crude dismemberment of a sovereign state.

    The issue was put on hold, and at Moscow’s insistence a clause was added to the resolution affirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

    This did not save Belgrade, but Russia and Serbia doggedly quoted that clause when contesting Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence and its recognition by several Western countries.

    The Russian leaders only state the facts when they say that Saakashvili has dealt a deadly blow to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Yet the Security Council cannot approve a document that does not affirm it. Not only the West, bent on supporting Tbilisi, but also most other countries, would oppose it.

    It is one thing when some states act illegally, as when Kosovo’s independence was legalized. But it is quite another matter when the international community approves a resolution sanctioning the dissolution of a sovereign state. No country, including those that will never experience such problems, could approve it.

    On the other hand, Moscow will find it extremely difficult for domestic reasons to tolerate any mention of Georgia’s territorial integrity in a UN resolution. It has made quite a few public statements and pledged to pay for the restoration of South Ossetia. Besides, it will be impossible to explain to the public why a military victory has not translated into a political win.

    It will take refined diplomatic skills to formulate ideas in such a way that all sides can interpret them as victory. Otherwise, the danger is that developments in Georgia will follow the Cyprus scenario. Russia would unilaterally recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia according to the formula that has linked Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which only Turkey has recognized, since 1974.

    This would create new problems without solving old ones.

    If Russia opts for that scenario, the position of the breakaway republics will not change in terms of international law, even though many countries have lately been violating it. It should be said, for justice’s sake, that Moscow is not among the leaders in this ignoble race.

    The practical situation will not improve either. The United States encouraged a score of influential countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but Russia is unlikely to convince even one country to follow its example. International support for Russia’s actions, or rather lack thereof, became apparent during its clash with Georgia.

    Unilateral recognition of their independence will not help Abkhazia or South Ossetia to break out of international isolation, but will put powerful pressure on Russia. Moscow could not be blamed for its stance on Kosovo because it acted strictly according to international law, while Western countries appealed to expediency. The situation can be reversed this time, with Russia’s actions losing consistency and integrity.

    It would be extremely difficult to follow the Kosovo scenario even if the Security Council approved a resolution on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Their new status can be formalized only if the process becomes international, whereas Moscow and the two breakaway republics would like to decide the matter without international involvement. Unfortunately, they cannot do so, because Russia lacks the political resource.

    The issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s status will take some time to decide. It took nine years for Kosovo to gain independence, and even then only part of the international community recognized it. Northern Cyprus has been demanding independence for nearly 34 years.

    Hasty moves motivated by a desire to score political points at home or demonstrate Russia’s ability to disregard the opinions of others would seriously damage the Kremlin’s prestige. But hard daily political and diplomatic efforts will eventually bring about the desired effect.

    Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of the Moscow-based magazine Russia in Global Affairs.

  • Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

    Russian military concerned by larger NATO presence in Black Sea

     
    16:33 | 25/ 08/ 2008
     

    MOSCOW, August 25 (RIA Novosti) – Russia has to be concerned that NATO is continuing to get a stronger foothold in the Black Sea, the deputy chief of General Staff said Monday.

    “NATO’s naval deployments in the Black Sea, where nine foreign vessels have already been sent, cannot but provoke concern,” Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said.

    According to a Russian military intelligence source, the NATO warships that have entered the Black Sea carry over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles between them.

    NATO has so far deployed the USS McFaul and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, the Polish frigate General Pulaski, the German frigate FGS Lubeck, and the Spanish navy ship Admiral Juan de Borbon.

    “NATO is actually deploying a surface strike group in the Black Sea,” the unidentified source said Monday.

    The McFaul unloaded 55 tons of humanitarian aid in the Georgian port of Batumi on Sunday, with two more U.S. Navy ships due in port later this week. The Polish, Spanish and German ships also entered the Black Sea on Friday.

    Nogovitsyn said Russian peacekeepers, who continue to be deployed in Georgia after the country’s war with breakaway South Ossetia, would not carry out checks of foreign ships entering Georgian Black Sea ports.

    But he said peacekeepers at a checkpoint near the Poti port would conduct patrols in the area. “Patrols are a civilized form of control,” he said.

    The senior military official put it more colorfully on Saturday: “Poti is outside of the security zone, but that does not mean we will sit behind a fence watching them riding around in Hummers.”

    Nogovitsyn promised that Russia would not exceed the numbers defined by international agreements, including a 1992 pact, when sending peacekeepers to South Ossetia.

    But he warned that Georgia was planning to deploy troops in the towns of Gori and Senaki.

    “The Georgian Armed Forces command is continuing to conduct acts aimed at restoring the combat readiness of its army directed at South Ossetia,” he said. “Communication systems are being restored, units are planned for deployment in the military towns of Gori and Senaki.”

    Georgia is also planning acts of sabotage on infrastructure and transportation facilities, Nogovitsyn said.

    “Georgian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are reinvigorating their efforts… and are preparing military actions along the routes of Russian armored columns, as well as acts of sabotage on transportation infrastructure,” he said.

  • Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Aid to Georgia Raises a Question for Russia

    Stratfor.com
    August 25, 2008

    The Russians still have not completed withdrawal
    from Georgia. It is clear that, at least for the
    time being, the Russians intend to use the clause
    in the cease-fire agreement that allows them
    unspecified rights to protect their security to
    maintain troops in some parts of Georgia. Moscow
    obviously wants to demonstrate to the Georgians
    that Russia moves at its own discretion, not at
    the West’s. A train carrying fuel was blown up
    outside of Gori, with the Georgians claiming that
    the Russians have planted mines. Whether the
    claim is true or not, the Russians are trying to
    send a simple message: We are your best friends
    and worst enemies. The emphasis for the moment is on the latter.

    It is essential for the Russians to demonstrate
    that they are not intimidated by the West in any
    way. The audience for this is the other former
    Soviet republics, but also the Georgian public.
    It is becoming clear that the Russians are intent
    on seeing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
    removed from office. Moscow is betting that as
    the crisis dies down and Russian troops remain in
    Georgia, the Georgians will develop a feeling of
    isolation and turn on Saakashvili for leading
    them into a disaster. If that doesn’t work, and
    he remains president, then the Russians have
    forward positions in Georgia. Either way, full
    withdrawal does not make sense for them, when the
    only force against them is Western public
    opinion. That alone will make the Russians more intractable.

    It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship
    delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians.
    The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the
    Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to
    the south. That the ship was a destroyer is
    important. It demonstrates that the Americans
    have a force available that is inherently
    superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S.
    Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could
    well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.

    While it was a warship, however, it was only a
    destroyer ­ so it is a gesture, but not a threat.
    But there are rumors of other warships readying
    to transit into the Black Sea. This raises an
    important issue: Turkey. Turkey borders Georgia
    but has very carefully stayed out of the
    conflict. Any ships that pass through Turkish
    straits do so under Turkish supervision guided by
    the Montreux Convention, an old agreement
    restricting the movement of warships through the
    straits ­ which the Russians in particular have
    ignored in moving ships into the Mediterranean.
    But the United States has a particular problem in
    moving through the Bosporus. Whatever the
    Convention says or precedent is, the United
    States can’t afford to alienate Turkey ­ not if
    there is a crisis in the Caucasus.

    Each potential American move has a complication
    attached. However, at this moment, the decision
    as to what to do is in the hands of the United
    States. The strategic question is whether it has
    the appetite for a naval deployment in the Black
    Sea at this historical moment. After that is
    answered, Washington needs to address the Turkish
    position. And after a U.S. squadron deploys in
    the Black Sea, the question will be what Russia,
    a land power, will do in response. The Europeans
    are irrelevant to the equation, even if they do
    hold a summit as the French want. They can do
    nothing unless the United States decides to act,
    and they can’t stop the United States if it does decide to go.

    The focus now is on the Americans. They can let
    the Russo-Georgian war slide into history and
    deal with Russia later on, or they can act. What
    Washington will decide to do is the question the
    arrival of the U.S.S. McFaul in Georgia posed for the Russians.

  • Iran says new oil and gas deals more attractive

    Iran says new oil and gas deals more attractive

    TEHRAN, Aug 25 (Reuters) – Iran’s revised oil and gas development contracts offer more incentives to foreign firms and Turkey’s reservations about the deals reflect an initial lack of knowledge, the Iranian oil minister said on Monday.

    A Turkish Energy Ministry source said last week Turkey would not sign a natural gas accord with Iran until changes acceptable to global investors were made to so-called “buy-back” deals, which are often criticised by foreign firms.

    The gas deal was expected to have been signed when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Turkey earlier in August.

    “The Oil Ministry’s international agreements have made good progress. The modification of the buy-back contracts provides more incentives for foreign companies to participate in Iranian projects,” Oil Minister Gholamhossein Nozari said.

    He did not give details.

    “The Turks were not informed about the culture of the buy-back contracts. But with the negotiations that took place there (in Turkey), they were told the price ceiling of the contract is determined after carrying out tenders,” he said.

    His comments were made to journalists, according to the Oil Ministry’s news website SHANA.

    Turkey and Iran last year signed a preliminary accord on joint gas production and export under which Iranian gas would be exported to Europe through Turkey and Turkey would produce 20.4 billion cubic metres of natural gas in the South Pars gas field.

    The United States, which is seeking to isolate Iran in a row over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, has opposed the deal.

    The Turkish ministry source said the proposed buy-back system created “serious risks” for Turkey in terms of pricing. Turkey wants to buy gas directly from the fields and wants Iran to give a guarantee on contributing towards investments.

    Under such buy-backs, firms generally hand over operations of fields to Iran after development and receive payment from oil or gas production for a few years to cover their investment.

    Iran says it is revising terms but has not given details.

    The Turkish source said the risks linked to the buy-back system included issues such as commodity price rises, financing costs, the lack of a production guarantee and insurance costs.

    Nozari dismissed the idea of production sharing deals, a form of oil contract found elsewhere. “Such contracts have been abolished in the world and less than 10 percent of oil production is done using this mode of contract,” he said.

    An Iranian oil official told Reuters this month Iran was negotiating a deal with Asian oil firms for two oil and gas blocks in the Caspian Sea and this could involve a production sharing contract, if parliament and the authorities agreed that the model was best for the high-cost Caspian area.

    Iran says a study has shown Iran’s Caspian region contains an estimated 21 billion barrels of oil and gas equivalent.

    “A number of wells have been drilled in the shallow parts of the Caspian Sea in order to determine commerciality but we have not received a definitive answer on that,” Nozari said, adding that seismological tests were also going ahead. (Reporting by Hashem Kalantari, writing by Edmund Blair)