Turkish Forum

Category: Regions

  • KAMPANYA: PETITION: ABC is at it again!

    KAMPANYA: PETITION: ABC is at it again!

    They will be telling the whole wide world how terrible us Turks are!
    After all we have systematically killed whoever sat a foot in Anatolia just for the sake of it!We never, ever had an Independence War!
    We were never, ever insulted, abused, massacred, invaded etc.!

    Please React!
    As the ABC promotes Have Your Say!
    Don’t forget both SBS and ABC reject to screen the documentary Armenian Revolt!

    Family Footsteps – Armenia
    8:30pm Thursday, 28 Aug 2008
    Documentary CC PG

    Family Footsteps, series two, takes us once again on an intimate journey into the lives of four young Australians as they travel back to the homeland of their parents in search of answers, a sense of belonging and for some, the chance to lay ghosts to rest. The four-part series takes us to Armenia, Uganda, Tonga and Cambodia.

    In the first episode we follow the adventures of graphic artist Joanna Kambourian from NSW who has grown up knowing very little about her Armenian culture. Overshadowing her family is a sense of shame, hiding a secret that has kept them from returning to their homeland. It weighs heavily on Joanna as she travels to Armenia in the quest to remove the stain that has haunted her family for several generations.

    Joanna has always longed to go to an Armenian school, be taught the language and customs of her ancient culture but her father didn’t think it was that important. So with few cultural references Joanna, 31, embarks on her own voyage of cultural exploration.

    It is 40 degrees in the small country town of Coraki in NSW and Joanna is packing her winter clothes. Temperatures in Armenia are 10 below zero. As she arrives, snow covers the tiny mountainous country that lies to the east of Turkey, sharing borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran. Here she will live with her mentor Tehmineh the local schoolteacher who shares her home with her husband Ara and mother-in-law Jemma. They welcome Joanna as part of their family.

    The next day Joanna starts her job in the local bakery. The local women have been making Lavash bread using the same techniques for centuries. As their days unfold Tehmineh continues to teach her students in the morning and in the afternoon introduces Joanna to the subtleties of Armenian culture.

    With Tehmineh’s help Joanna begins to investigate the history of her family’s flight from Armenia and the story of betrayal that lies behind it. They visit an historian, an expert in the Armenian genocide, who explains that in 1915 under the cover of WWI the Turks began a systematic genocide of the Christians and Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. Joanna confesses that her great, great, grandfather was the surgeon general in the Turkish army at that time, and to save his family and his life he converted to Islam.

    As her journey draws to a close Tehmineh offers Joanna the chance to take part in an ancient pagan ritual to give thanks for the transition she and her family have made.’

  • All Quiet on the Southern Front

    All Quiet on the Southern Front

    Comment by Sergey Markedonov
    Special to Russia Profile

    Despite Having Been Affected by the Russo-Georgian Squabble, Both Armenia and Azerbaijan Cautiously Abstain From Taking Sides

    The events of the “five-day war” in South Ossetia demonstrated that countries of the Southern Caucasus largely act according to their own national interests, and not on the assurances of “eternal friendships.” Thus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan behave in a careful and calculated manner, realizing that getting involved in the Russian-Georgian conflict bears a lot of “hidden reefs” which could prove to be more dangerous than the status-quo that is so despised by Baku and so cherished by Yerevan.

    Georgia’s attempts to “restore the constitutional order” in South Ossetia and the harsh Russian response have altered the politico-legal and power configurations in the CIS, and not only in the two “hot spots.” They had a serious impact on the entire ethno-political situation in Eurasia. In this regard, it is crucial to consider the consequences of this “security deficit” in the South Caucasus, especially because in recent weeks, Armenia and Azerbaijan have remained in the shadows. What lessons were Baku and Yerevan able to draw, having been brought to a conflicted state by the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the “hot August” of 2008?

    Let’s consider the horizontal links among the three former Caucasus republics, all of them now independent states in the South Caucasus region. Georgia considered Azerbaijan its natural ally. Baku was ready to reciprocate the sentiment. Let’s recall that the day before the new escalation in South Ossetia, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called Azerbaijan no less than the “guarantor of independence” of his country. Typical theatrics of the Georgian leader aside, we should recognize a few important points. First, Georgia and Azerbaijan are members of an organization whose stated goal is to play a peculiar anti-CIS role—GUAM. After Georgia officially left the CIS, GUAM remains the sole structure in which Tbilisi can realize its integration projects (another question is how successfully) within Eurasia.

    Secondly, Azerbaijan has always supported the territorial integrity of Georgia. Unlike Ukraine, Azerbaijan itself lost some 13 percent of the land that is recognized as its integral part, and hence its support, along with political reasons, has emotional and psychological grounds (which in politics, especially in the Caucasus, is extremely important). Thirdly, there is the economic cooperation. In 2005, during the energy crisis, it was Azerbaijan that provided gas for Georgia. “The Georgian people will never forget this,” Saakashvili said in a statement during the groundbreaking opening ceremony for the Turkish section of the “Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars” railway on July 24 (only two weeks remained before the Tskhinvali tragedy). The two Caucasian states were also united by two pipelines (oil and gas). Baku also often served as a profitable and reliable sponsor for Tbilisi.
     
    Unlike Azerbaijan, Georgia never considered Armenia as a strategic partner and even less as a “guarantor of security.” There have been a lot of sensitive issues in their bilateral relations. These include the position of Armenians in Georgia (in the Armenian populated Samtskhe-Javakheti and in Tbilisi itself, considered to be an important cultural center for all Armenians), and the role of the Armenian community in the Abkhaz events. During the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, the Bagramyan battalion fought on the side of the “aggressive separatists” (as they call them in Tbilisi). There were far fewer Armenian participants on the Georgian side (largely from the aforementioned Tbilisi). In present-day Abkhazia, the Armenian community is represented both in the government and in business, and is generally loyal to the leadership of the de facto state. The irritating factors are compounded by the military partnership between Armenia and the Russian Federation (particularly the military base in Gyumri, to which, among others, Russian military units from Georgia were moved). Prior to the withdrawal of the Russian military base from Akhalkalaki, there were many local ethnic Armenian residents employed there. Also, Georgia (along with Iran) is Armenia’s window to the world (because of the land blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan). Hence, Yerevan does not want to move past certain milestones in its relations with Tbilisi. Armenia also realizes that its gateway to Russia is through Georgia, and that is why the dependence on the dynamics of Russian-Georgian relations is an extremely sore point for Armenia. In turn, given the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi is more cautious in dealing with the “Armenian question.” The Georgian leadership cannot ignore that, unlike the Abkhazians or Ossetians, Armenians have strong support in the United States and the EU (similarly from France).

    Indeed, the given dispositions have determined the attitude that Georgia’s neighbors have toward the “hot August” events. Despite its commitment to a strategic alliance with Russia, Armenia preferred to abstain from sudden moves and categorical statements. There are many reasons for this. There is a reluctance to either clearly align their actions with the Russians or to spoil their relations with the West. They are already uneasy in connection with the events of March 1 in Yerevan. It is understandable that Serzh Sargsyan is no Alexander Lukashenko, to whom the United States and the EU have long ago given their “blessing” of more freedom in his interpretation of events.

    Armenia, which has such a vulnerable place as the Karabakh, was also not overly interested in anchoring the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to Russian-Georgian relations. Besides, even earlier, both Armenia and the NKR leadership distanced themselves from an openly pro-Ossetia and pro-Abkhazia position. This is why representatives of Armenia’s Ministry of Defense hastened to declare on August 10 that raids on the Georgian airbases were not being conducted from the Russian base located in Armenia: “The 102nd military base in the city of Gyumri has no military aircraft capable of committing acts such as these bombings,” they claimed.

    The position of Armenia in connection with the heated Russian-Turkish relations is another sensitive issue. Mild support by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan for the Russian Federation’s position is creating a feeling in Yerevan (as well as in the Armenian Diaspora in the West) that the two great powers can agree with each other to the detriment of Armenia (in particular, on the Karabakh issue). Recall that on August 13 Erdogan stated: “The situation in South Ossetia gives us cause to review the relationship between our countries, whose solidarity in this region is of great importance.” Here is what Karapet Kalenchyan, an expert at the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, wrote on this matter: “Seeing that Russia is once again entering the South Caucasus, Turkey gives it its full support in exchange for certain concessions on the part of Russia. What kind of concessions could these be? Armenians have often worried that such concessions might be made at the expense of our interests.”

    Prudence (only in the opposite direction) is also what set apart Azerbaijan’s position. Representatives of various political parties of the republic (including the ruling party) were more open in expressing their positions. According to Mubariz Gurbanly (the ruling “Yeni Azerbaijan” party), the “Georgian authorities’ actions to restore the country’s territorial integrity are fully merited. These actions were undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter.” Note that this idea (the legality of actions to punish separatists) had so far been far more popular in Azerbaijan than in Georgia. The chairman of the Supreme Majlis of the “Musavat” (opposition forces) party, Sulhaddin Akper, stated that Georgia “was forced to conduct the operation against the separatists in South Ossetia.” However, Baku was officially much more cautious than, for instance, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and the Foreign Ministry of his country (which, unlike Azerbaijan, does not have such serious interests in the region).

    The statement by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs from August 8 in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity (approved by the Georgian diplomats) contained general statements on the validity of the Georgian operation under “international law,” but was not further clarified.

    Five leaders of states that expressed their solidarity with Georgia were present at a rally in Tbilisi on August 12. There were leaders of the three Baltic countries, Poland, and Ukraine, but Ilham Aliyev, the head of the state which Saakashvili called the “guarantor of independence” less than a month earlier, was not there. Baku preferred caution, given their interest in maintaining stable relations with Russia. Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is not based on a rigid confrontational manner. In Baku, they consider Russia to be a counterweight to the West (which does not have such unambiguous relations with Azerbaijan as it does with Georgia). Azerbaijan is also afraid of being drawn into the “Iran game,” where it is destined to play a role as either a runway or the target of “Tehran’s retaliatory shot.” Hence the desire to appreciate the generally friendly, albeit difficult, relations with Russia.

    The opposition is trying to take advantage of this situation. Isa Gambar, the leader of the “Musavat” party (who received second place in the last presidential elections) believes that the official Baku reaction to the events in South Ossetia is inadequate. But what level of influence does Isa Gambar, or other opposition figures (Eldar Namazov or Ali Keremli), enjoy today that he can alter the position of the president’s team? That is a rhetorical question. Let’s consider a hypothetical situation. Tomorrow either Gambar or Namazov replace Ilham Aliyev. I think that they would also strictly separate rhetoric and realistic politics, guided by the national interests of Azerbaijan. Note that if such a scenario were to be repeated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku would receive a much tougher reaction from the West. There would even be talk of the consolidated opinion of the United States, Russia, and leading EU countries. And that is why the Azerbaijani police prohibit protests at the Russian embassy in Baku, and prevents anti-Russian hysteria from sweeping the country.

    Sergey Markedonov Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

  • Oskanian Urges ‘More Public’ Foreign Policy

    Oskanian Urges ‘More Public’ Foreign Policy

     

     

     

     

     

    By Emil Danielyan

    Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian signaled his disapproval of Armenia’s low-key stance in the Russian-Georgian conflict on Wednesday, saying that Yerevan should have been more vocal in articulating its neutrality.

    In an interview with RFE/RL, Oskanian also said rising tensions between Russia and the West will make it harder for Armenia to carry on with its long-standing “complementary” foreign policy.

    “Armenia certainly can not choose [between the two warring sides,]” he said. “Nor can it be indifferent. We should be able to find the right balance and I think that can be achieved through an upgraded complementarity.” “That means our foreign policy should be much more public,” he added.

    The Armenian government barely reacted to the August 8 outbreak of fighting in South Ossetia that developed into a full-scale Russian-Georgian war, with President Serzh Sarkisian refusing to cut short his vacation in China despite strong criticism from his political opponents. Sarkisian held a meeting of Armenia’s National Security Council only on his return to Yerevan on August 14. He also discussed the festering crisis in separate phone conversations with the presidents of Russia and Georgia.

    “Saying nothing when the situation is difficult might be a solution,” said Oskanian. “What the authorities have done in connection with the latest developments is understandable. I don’t want to voice any criticism.”

    “But my preference would have been somewhat different,” he said, adding that Yerevan should have displayed a “more public neutrality.”

    “I think that as soon as this problem arose we could have … publicly told Russia and the U.S. that what is happening does not stem from anybody’s interests, is bad for the region and in the global political sense,” continued Oskanian. “Armenia would have had a clearer stance by telling everyone that Armenia is not going to choose between its two allies. Indeed, if Russia is our strategic ally, Georgia is our natural ally.”

    According to Oskanian, the Sarkisian administration’s “silence” could also reflect negatively on Armenia’s negotiating position in the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He said Russia’s decision to unilaterally recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s de facto independence from Georgia will erode Western support for the principle of peoples’ self-determination championed by the Armenian side.

    “As I said, our silence or low-key stance on the other issue is understandable. But I think that we could lag behind on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue,” warned the man who served as Armenia’s foreign minister and chief Karabakh negotiator from 1998-2008.

    “If we fail to enter these processes and clearly express our position on Karabakh’s self-determination, I’m afraid we will find it harder to achieve results desirable to us,” he said.

    Oskanian went to on to imply that Armenia should draw parallels between the conflicts over Karabakh and Kosovo and exploit Georgia’s botched attempt to win back South Ossetia for stressing the importance of non-use of force in the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani disputed. He said Yerevan should also go as far as to threaten to formally recognize Karabakh as an independent state if Baku rejects international mediators’ existing peace plan.

    The plan calls for a gradual settlement of the conflict that would enable Karabakh’s predominantly Armenian population to determine the disputed territory’s status in a referendum. It was drawn up by U.S., Russian and French diplomats co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group. The crisis in Georgia and its geopolitical implications have left observers wondering whether Russia and Western powers will continue to work together in trying to have the conflicting parties accept the framework peace deal.

    “This is also a problem,” admitted Oskanian. “Those countries have frequently said that the Karabakh issue unites them and that they have no differences on that issue. I am really concerned that those disagreements [on Georgia] could also manifest themselves in their positions on the Karabakh conflict.”

    Oskanian reiterated in that regard his calls for Russia, the U.S. and the European Union to help create a “regional security pact” comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In an article published by “The International Herald Tribune” on Monday, he made a case for a “nonaligned Caucasus, free of security memberships and adversarial alliances.”

    When asked by RFE/RL whether that means Armenia should be ready to end its military alliance with Russia, Oskanian said, “That should be discussed by those six players, in the 3 plus 3 format. Other neighbors — and Turkey in particular — should also be involved.”

  • Geopolitical Diary: Abkhaz and South Ossetian Independence, the Russian Motive

    Geopolitical Diary: Abkhaz and South Ossetian Independence, the Russian Motive

    Stratfor.com
    August 27, 2007

    Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Tuesday
    recognized the independence of two regions in the
    territory of the former Soviet republic of
    Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia and
    Georgia fought a brief war over the territories
    earlier this month which Russia clearly won. Now
    Russia will undoubtedly enter into “formal”
    negotiations with the two “states” about either
    long-term military staging agreements or formal annexation.

    The West, which has consistently backed the idea
    of Georgia’s territorial integrity, broadly
    condemned the move, but has taken no action
    beyond rhetoric. Nor is it likely to in the short
    term. The West could deploy naval forces that can
    outmaneuver and box in Russia as a whole, but
    that requires time and political will. In the
    meantime, Russia has forces on the ground in the
    two territories and loads more nearby. The West
    doesn’t. The Russians clearly are the ones
    determining the reality on the ground, and that ­ for now ­ is that.

    But recognition is not something that seems to
    serve Russia’s interest. Unlike the drama
    surrounding the independence declaration of
    Kosovo earlier this year, there is no broad
    swathe of states standing by to recognize Abkhaz
    or South Ossetian independence. Only Belarus ­
    whose leadership is finding its leash
    ever-shorter ­ is likely to jump at the news, and
    even then not until the appropriate recognition
    speech is faxed to them from the Kremlin.
    Additionally, Russia is packed to the gills with
    its own separatist regions and Tuesday’s decision
    will only give all of these disparate and
    resentful groups food for thought. If Abkhazia
    can be independent, why not Chechnya? If South Ossetia, why not Tatarstan?

    So why open Pandora’s Box?

    First and foremost, the recognition decision is
    about Kosovo. In Kosovo, the West utterly ignored
    Russian concerns and imposed a legal regime that
    fit with Western interests. With Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia, Russia is returning the favor in its own backyard.

    Yet for that logic to hold, this must be only the
    beginning. For the Russians the war and this
    recognition is not really about Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia, or even about Georgia. It is about
    redefining the expectations of a broad swathe of
    actors all along the Russian periphery. Since
    1992 many entities have been eating away at the
    Russian borderlands ­ the West first and foremost
    among them. In Moscow’s view, Russia needs to
    roll that tide back not just in the Caucasus, but
    in Central Asia, the Baltics, Ukraine, and maybe even the Balkans.

    But that does not mean that tide will be rolled
    back in a day. Russia holds most of the cards,
    yet does not appear set to press its advantage,
    or at least not immediately or overtly. There are
    any number of things the Russians could do in
    Azerbaijan, Ukraine, the Baltic states ­ or even
    in Georgia ­ that they have chosen to put on hold
    for now. Tuesday’s recognition had a feel similar
    to that of the press statements of the Western
    powers: rhetoric that danced around the real issue.

    The reason for the (brief) break in the action is
    likely rooted in Russia’s mindset, which in turn
    is determined by Russia’s geography. Russia’s
    borderlands are for the most part indefensible
    and so the Russian psyche has been shaped by wave
    after wave of foreign invasion. A certain
    paranoia about outsiders is understandable.

    But there is another layer. Built into this fear
    of outsiders is a belief that Russia’s suffering
    has allowed others to escape Russia’s dark fate
    and thrive. For example, Russians feel that while
    Russia languished under Mongol subjugation, their
    resistance prevented the Mongols from conquering
    Europe. Another common belief is that the Soviet
    Union’s battles with Nazi Germany gave the United
    States and United Kingdom the time they needed to
    invade France. These national myths ­ which is
    not to say that they are fabrications, merely
    interpretations – blend Russia’s natural paranoia
    with the idea that the rest of the world owes
    them something. Therefore, it is just a matter of
    finding the right words to convince the world of that “fact.”

    In the aftermath of the Georgian war we suspect
    Russia is waiting for what they feel would
    constitute an “appropriate” response from the
    West. We suspect that the Russians expect to be
    informed that the West will recognize Moscow’s
    suzerainty in Russia’s sphere of influence and
    see no reason to push the matter so long as the
    balance of forces are so obviously in Moscow’s favor.

    For better or worse, this buys everyone a bit of
    time. Time to negotiate a West-Russia truce
    perhaps. Or perhaps time for the two sides to
    gear up for a much larger ­ and broader ­ conflict.

  • Kurdish journalists under assault in Iraq

    Kurdish journalists under assault in Iraq

    Tue Aug 26, 2008 9:06pm EDT

    By Missy Ryan and Shamal Arqawi

    ARBIL, Iraq (Reuters) – Iraq’s northern Kurdish enclave may be a haven of relative peace and serenity but independent journalists there say challenges to the political establishment are being met with intimidation and threats.

    In the largely autonomous territory, streets are swept clean and people walk without fear — a stark contrast to the concrete walls and barbed wire that have defined life for most Iraqis in more than five years of war.

    Still, about 60 Kurdish journalists were killed, threatened, attacked, or taken to court in the first half of 2008, says the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

    Last month, Soran Mamahama, a 23-year-old writer for Livin magazine, published in the Kurdish town of Sulaimaniya, was gunned down outside his home in Kirkuk, a week after his report linking security officials to prostitution rings.

    In the past few years, many other Kurdish journalists have been beaten, jailed, threatened with death or simply hassled by the authorities while doing their job.

    “In Kurdistan there is no freedom for journalists. I have proof of that — the most recent proof was Soran,” says Hemen Mamand, a young radio reporter in Arbil who wears a small likeness of Che Guevara around his neck.

    “We don’t know who killed him, but we do know that the government didn’t care,” said Mamand, who himself was threatened when he wrote a story about an alleged case of corruption linked to Kurdish President Masoud Barzani’s powerful KDP party.

    While the rest of Iraq was mired in chaotic, bloody civil strife following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Kurdish north aggressively promoted its image as “the other Iraq” — a place of stability, prosperity and above all, security.

    The last decade has seen a scrappy independent press emerge to challenge the region’s two dominant political parties. But that has coincided with a “marked deterioration in press freedom” and spates of attacks, said Joel Campagna, who headed a CPJ mission to Kurdistan last year.

    “NO PROBLEMS HERE”

    CPJ and Amnesty International have launched campaigns to draw attention to such events and pressure Kurdish authorities to hold those who are threatening journalists to account.

    “The recent incidents have really stripped off the veneer and revealed it’s not much different than other parts of Iraq,” Campagna said.

    Although violence has dropped sharply, Iraq remains the world’s most dangerous place for the press, with more than 130 journalists killed working there since 2003.

    Many reporters in Kurdistan see themselves as most at risk when they report critically about Kurdish security forces, government officials or political parties.

    They say Barzani’s KDP party, based in Arbil, and the PUK, its historic rival, controlled by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and based in Sulaimaniya, wield near-total control of their respective Kurdish domains.

    “In Kurdistan, there isn’t really a political opposition. So the government thinks that journalists are the opposition,” said Rebin Rasul Esmail, who until 2004 was a senior editor for Hawlati, a leading independent newspaper.

    In 2006, men tried to abduct his wife, fellow journalist Azhen Abdul Khaleq, off the street. The couple believed the attack was related to Abdul Khaleq’s reporting on officials’ attempts to sexually assault female journalists.

    Kurdish officials categorically reject suggestions they strong-arm the press or look the other way when violence occurs.

    They paint a picture of a feckless, ill-trained media that traffics in unsubstantiated reports and personal attacks.

    “The problem, you know, with our journalists, they think they are free to say anything and do anything,” State Interior Minister Karim Sinjari said in an interview. “Somebody tells them something, and they make a story.”

    Asked about attacks or intimidation of the press, Arbil Governor Nawzad Hadi Mawlood said only: “No problems here.”

    Sinjari pledges to protect reporters and investigate crimes, but says he can do nothing if journalists fail to report them.

    “NO RED LINES”

    Reporters acknowledge the Kurdish media often fails to properly source reports or back up assertions. It’s also an open secret that many reporters are on government and party payrolls.

    “Journalists are a big part of the problem,” the former editor Rasul Esmail said.

    Others blame the government for starving the press of information, leaving reporters little choice but to cast about for leads or trust disgruntled insiders.

    Kurdistan’s parliament may soon resume debate on a new press law some hope will encourage a more mature, thriving press.

    An earlier version of the law laid down fines of up to $8,400 for reports about people’s private lives that “insult” them — even if true — or “stain common customs and morals”.

    Facing a widespread outcry, President Barzani rejected the draft law.

    A U.S. official in Arbil said the draft caused concern because it “could be used to stifle free expression”. “A free and independent press will make an important contribution to democratic development” in Kurdistan, he said.

    Ahmed Mira, editor of Livin magazine, is awaiting the results of a probe into his colleague Mamahama’s death.

    Mira is no stranger to intimidation. In 2007, he was seized from his home and thrown into solitary confinement after he wrote an article calling into question Talabani’s health. Talabani is in his 70s and had heart surgery this month.

    Still, Mira promises his magazine will not be cowed.

    “There are no red lines. There is no censorship for any subject published in Livin,” he said.

    (Additional reporting by Sherko Raouf in Sulaimaniya; Editing by Catherine Evans)

  • Mahindra & Mahindra launches tractors in Turkey

    Mahindra & Mahindra launches tractors in Turkey

    Auto major Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) today said it has launched its tractors under three different ranges in Turkey in partnership with ILCE Group.

    Mahindra & Mahindra, India

    We are delighted to launch our product range in Turkey which is a long-term, strategic market for us. With their strong and durable features, our tractors are ideal for the small and medium farmers who comprise close to 80 per cent of the farming community in Turkey,” M&M President (Farm Equipment Sector) Anjanikumar Choudhari said in a statement.

    M&M, which has diverse business interest, has introduced its 55 HP, 60 HP and 65 HP range of tractors in the Turkish market in partnership with ILCE Otomotiv Servis ve Ticaret, the statement said.

    “The latter (ILCE Otomotiv) is also the distributor for the Mahindra Goa and pik up range in Turkey,” it added.

    ILCE Group is active in the finished motor vehicle logistics and transportation field.
    M&M has a wholly-owned subsidiary, Mahindra USA, with three assembly plants catering to the American market and selling 10,000 tractors annually.

    Mahindras FES recently acquired a 51 per cent stake in Chinese firm Jiangsu Yueda Yancheng Tractor Manufacturing Co (Yancheng Tractor), which is the second tractor venture of M&M in the country.

    It has a tractor business in China namely, Mahindra China Tractor Co (MCTCL).

    Source : Press Trust Of India / New Delhi