Category: Regions

Turkey’s unsustainable politics in Middle East

Ramzy Baroud

Confused may be an appropriate term to describe Turkey’s current foreign policy in the Middle East and Israel in particular. The source of that confusion — aside from the appalling violence in Syria and earlier in Libya — is Turkey’s own range of mistakes.

The Turkish government’s inconsistency regarding Israel highlights earlier discrepancy in other political contexts. There was a time when Turkey’s top foreign policy priority included reaching out diplomatically to Arab and Muslim countries. Then, we spoke of a paradigm shift, whereby Istanbul was repositioning its political center, reflecting perhaps economic necessity, but also cultural shifts within its own society. It seemed that the East versus West debate was skillfully being resolved by politicians of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The ‘Zero Problems’ policy

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, along with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, appeared to have obtained a magical non-confrontational approach to Turkey’s historic political alignment. “The Zero Problems” policy allowed Turkey to brand itself as a bridge between two worlds. The country’s economic growth and strategic import to various geopolitical spheres allowed it to escape whatever price was meted out by Washington and its European allies as a reprimand for its bold political moves — including Erdogan’s unprecedented challenge of Israel.
Indeed, there was a link between the growing influence of Turkey among Arab and Islamic countries and Turkey’s challenge to Israel’s violent behavior in Palestine and Lebanon, and its rants against Syria and Iran. Turkey’s return to its political roots was unmistakable, yet interestingly, it was not met by too strong an American response. Washington couldn’t simply isolate Istanbul and the latter shrewdly advanced its own power and influence with that knowledge in mind. Even the bizarre anti-Turkish statements by Israeli officials sounded more like incoherent rants than actual foreign policy.

Israel’s clout in the region

Political arrogance and U.S.-financed military strength are two pillars by which Israel maintains its clout in the region. The first was childishly applied when the then Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, publicly snubbed Turkey’s Ambassador, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, in January 2010 by placing him on a lower sofa. He then asked Israeli journalists to take note of the insult. The second came in May 2010 when Israeli commandos descended on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza, and killed nine Turkish citizens in cold blood.

“Idiocracy” is how Israeli columnist Uri Avnery described Israel’s behavior toward Turkey, which was once one of Israel’s most vital allies. But idiocy has little to do with it and Turkey knew that well. Israel wished to send strong messages to the Turks, that its strategic and political maneuvering was of no use here and that Israel would continue to reign supreme in the face of Erdogan’s ambitious policies. The real idiocy was Israel’s miscalculations, which failed to take into account that such behavior could only speed up Turkey’s political transformation. The fact that the U.S. was losing its once unchallenged grip over the fate of the Middle East had also contributed to Turkey’s sudden rise as a country with far-reaching ties and long-term political vision.

Turkey’s new political priorities

Erdogan quickly rose to prominence. His responses to Israel’s provocations, and to what was essentially a declaration of war, came in the form of strong words and measured actions. He conditioned any rapprochement with Israel on a clear apology over its transgressions, compensations to the victims and the families of the dead, and ending the siege on Gaza. The last condition further highlighted Turkey’s new political priorities.

As far as Turkey’s regional ascendency was concerned, it mattered little whether Israel apologized. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was losing favor, even with his own allies in Washington. And unlike Washington, under the thumb of the pro-Israeli lobby, Istanbul was a country with independent foreign policy.

The Turkish government’s inconsistency regarding Israel highlights earlier discrepancy in other political contexts. There was a time when Turkey’s top foreign policy priority included reaching out diplomatically to Arab and Muslim countries

Ramzy Baroud

When AKP triumphed in Turkey’s elections in June 2011, the so-called Arab Spring was still in its early stages. Then, much hope was placed on the rise of popular movements in countries that have been disfigured by Arab dictators and their Western benefactors. Not only did the ruling party disregard the fact that Turkey had taken part in the old political structure in the Middle East, it also escaped them that Turkey was an important member of NATO which unleashed a terrible war on Libya on March 19, deliberately misinterpreting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. Yes, Turkey had resisted the war option at first, but it was quick to forgive and forget and eventually recognized and supported its political outcome. Thanks to the war, Libya is now in a permanent state of bedlam.

Victory Speech

Erdogan’s victory speech in June 2011 attempted to paint a new picture of reality regarding future prospects and Turkey’s proposed role in all of this. “I greet with affection the peoples of Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Tunis, Sarajevo, Skopje, Baku, Nicosia and all other friends and brother peoples who are following the news out of Turkey with great excitement,” Erdogan said. “Today, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey.”

But that “win” was short-lived. The euphoria of change created many blind spots, one of which is that conflicts of sectarian and ethnic nature — as in Syria — don’t get resolved overnight; that foreign military intervention, direct or by proxy, can only espouse protracted conflict. Indeed, it was in Syria that Turkey’s vision truly fumbled. It was obvious that many were salivating over the outcome of a Syrian war between a brutal regime and a self-serving, divided opposition, each faction espousing one foreign agenda or another. Suddenly, Turkey’s regional and global ambitions of justice and morality grew ever more provisional because of fear of chaos spilling over into its border areas, the tragic rise of the number of Syrian refugees at Turkey’s borders and the fear of a strong Kurdish presence innorthern Syria.

Erdogan: ‘Israel a terrorist state’

Not even capable Turkish politicians could hide the confusion in which they found themselves. Responding to Israel’s bombing of Gaza last November, which killed and wounded hundreds of Palestinians, Erdogan described Israel as a “terrorist state.” “Those who turn a blind eye to discrimination toward Muslims in their own countries, are also closing their eyes to the savage massacre of innocent children in Gaza. … Therefore, I say Israel is a terrorist state.”

But even then, discussions were under way regarding the text of an Israeli apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara attack. That apology had finally arrived as an undeserved gift to U.S. President Barack Obama, who visited Israel in March with a message of total support for Israel.

“In light of Israel’s investigation into the incident which pointed to a number of operational mistakes, the prime minister expressed Israel’s apology to the Turkish people for any mistakes that might have led to the loss of life or injury and agreed to conclude an agreement on compensation/non-liability,” Netanyahu’s apology read. No commitment regarding Gaza was made. Erdogan’s office responded: “Erdogan told Benjamin Netanyahu that he valued the centuries-long strong friendship and cooperation between the Turkish and Jewish nations.” According to Netanyahu, the apology over the “operational mistakes” had everything to do with the need to share intelligence over Syria between both of the countries’ militaries. To balance out Turkey’s hurried retreat to its old political foreign policy, Erdogan is reportedly planning to visit Gaza in April.

“We will take on a more effective role. We will call, as we have, for rights in our region, for justice, for the rule of law, for freedom and democracy,” were the resounding words of Erdogan following his party’s elections victory last year.
It is likely that Istanbul will try to maintain a balanced position, but, as Erdogan himself knows, in issues of morality and justice, middle stances are simply untenable.

_____________

Palestinian-American journalist, author, editor, Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) taught Mass Communication at Australia’s Curtin University of Technology, and is Editor-in-Chief of the Palestine Chronicle. Baroud’s work has been published in hundreds of newspapers and journals worldwide and his books “His books “Searching Jenin: Eyewitness Accounts of the Israeli Invasion” and “The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle” have received international recognition. Baroud’s third book, “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” narrates the story of the life of his family, used as a representation of millions of Palestinians in Diaspora, starting in the early 1940’s until the present time.

April 4, 2013
Turkey’s dairy product exports to EU to restart

Turkey has obtained the right to export dairy products to the European Union which approves that Turkish firms comply with the union’s standards, Agriculture Minister Mehdi Eker says

Turkey has gained the right to export dairy products to the European Union once again after a period of 13 years, Agriculture Minister Mehdi Eker announced yesterday.

“The EU’s Directorate General for Health and Consumers has confirmed that Turkish firms comply with EU standards for selling dairy products to the EU members. The legislation about the issue will enter into force on April 3,” Eker said at the introduction meeting of the dairy exports project, which is being carried out by the ministry and the Packaged Milk and Milk Products Industrialists Association (ASÜD).

The minister stated that Turkey’s dairy exports to the EU had been halted in 2000 when the union took a decision on dairy exports regulations and found Turkey’s standards low. He also said that Turkey had not been able to export dairy products to other countries that also applied the same EU standards. “Some Middle East countries did not import dairy products from Turkey because it could not be exported to the EU,” he said.

The EU did not allow Turkey to export dairy products because Turkey was not able to provide safeguards against animal diseases, did not take adequate measures on animal health, or provide control mechanisms in the dairy production phase, including hygiene and laboratory conditions.

Turkey complies with EU

This approval by the EU shows that the standards applied by the Turkish state, private sector and laboratories on animal health, animal products and the struggle against animal diseases are at the same level as the union, according to Eker.

He stressed that efforts had been made since 2006 to restart dairy exports to the EU. “A seven-year struggle has come to an end with a success,” he said.

Six Turkish firms have been approved to export dairy products to the EU for the first phase. They are Aynes Gıda, Pinar Süt, Ak Gıda, Tat Konserve Sek Süt İşletmesi, Natura Gıda and Unilever’s Algida.

Eker also noted that breeding incentives had increased to 2.2 billion Turkish Liras last year from 83 million liras, adding that they expected it to reach a better point this year.

He also revealed that a “Turkey Dairy and Meat Institution” would be established after Cabinet approval this week.

via Turkey’s dairy product exports to EU to restart — BlackSeaGrain – All information on agriculture and food industry.

April 4, 2013
Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter | Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond

Kuzey Kore gerilimi öncesinde Türkiye’deki nükleer silahlar ve F16’ların durumu

Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter

Posted on April 3, 2013 by aaronstein1

In response to North Korea’s bellicose threats, the United States has been parading a bevy of nuclear dual capable aircraft near the Korean peninsula. Both the B-52 and the B-2 have a nuclear role and would, in the event of a nuclear conflict, likely use air launched nuclear cruise missiles against targets in North Korea. The F-22, which is on “static display” in South Korea, would, according to the aviationist, “probably escort the big bombers during the opening stages of an eventual campaign (after the rain of cruise missiles that would wipe out most of North Korea’s air defenses…), their role could not be limited to providing air superiority (to be easily and quickly achieved considered the status of the geriatric North Korean Air Force and its obsolete Migs): as demonstrated in last year’s Exercise Chimichanga,the F-22 has the ability to play a dual role in the same mission: HVAAE (High Value Air Asset Escort) and air-to-surface.”

While the actual threat of conflict on the Korean peninsula is low, the American show of force sheds lights on the lengths Washington will go to demonstrate its commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of an ally covered by its nuclear umbrella. Washington’s actions, as has been noted by many others, is a show force meant to demonstrate its commitment to extended deterrence. In other words, Washington is signaling its readiness to push the button. (It is also trying to deter an ROK nuclear weapons program, but I am not really going to talk about that – I will leave that for better informed Korean experts.)

Anyways, the signaling is important for the Turkish leadership in Ankara. Turkey, as regular readers of the blog are well aware, is home to ~65 American nuclear weapons. [From an EDAM issue brief I wrote about Turkey and Tactical Nuclear Weapons] According to Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, 50 bombs are slated for delivery by U.S. aircraft, but do to basing restrictions American dual capable aircraft (DCA) are not stationed permanently in Turkey. If the order were given for the release of NATO nuclear weapons, American aircraft would first have to be flown to Incirlik from another European base and armed before finally flying on to their targets. The other bombs are reserved for delivery by Turkish dual capable F-16s. However, there are conflicting reports about the status of Turkey’s nuclear fighter-bombers. According to General Ergin Celasin (ret.), the former Commander of the Turkish Air Force, “The Turkish air force’s role in NATO’s nuclear contingency plans came to an end with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in the 1990s from the Air Force units that were deployed in several air bases in Turkey.”

However, Norris and Kristensen cite Pentagon sources who say that Turkey’s current fleet of nuclear capable F-16s are receiving a “stop gap” modification to carry the B-61-12. Reports indicate that Turkey’s nuclear capable combat aircraft no longer train for nuclear missions. In the past, the air force’s dual capable aircraft trained for nuclear missions and were certified to carry out nuclear strikes. Turkish aircraft reportedly now only train as non-nuclear escort aircraft for NATO’s nuclear fighter wings. However, NATO has made clear that it does not foresee any scenario that would require the rapid use of nuclear weapons, which raises a number of unanswered questions about Turkey’s current nuclear posture. In any future scenario that might call for the use of nuclear weapons, the return of American DCAs and the re-certification of Turkish DCAs would likely be an important signal to a potential adversary.* [snip]

In any case, the Alliance, should the need arise, has ample time to move American aircraft into Turkey. The move, perhaps combined with a very public crash course for Turkish pilots to drop the Bomb, would be a very powerful signal to a potential adversary. Or, in other words, extended deterrence.

Hence, I do not see a real difference in Turkey’s post-Cold War thinking about nuclear weapons, even though the threat of a nuclear attack has diminished tremendously since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, Turkey continues to value nuclear weapons because of the widespread belief that they are necessary to deter regional foes like Iran and Syria. (It is also worth nothing, that both of these countries are not covered by a US negative security assurance.)

Moreover, I suspect that there is a small group in the Turkish Armed Forces that are looking at the American show of force in Korea with satisfaction. Ankara, for a number of very good reasons, is perpetually wary of the American security commitment. Turkey, therefore, sees the forward deployment of nuclear weapons as an important symbol of Alliance solidarity and as a symbol of the US commitment to come to Turkish defense. This belief, however, is predicated on the notion that the bombs will actually be used (debatable actually), should the need arise.

The American show of force, therefore, should not solely be interpreted in Turkey as the US commitment to ROK security. In fact, the American moves are also aimed at the leadership in Ankara. And I can guarantee that they are paying attention.

via Lessons in Extended Deterrence: Why the Status of Turkish F-16s Doesn’t Matter | Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond.

April 4, 2013
Turkey: John Kerry to talk about Syria with PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Secretary of State John F. Kerry will head to Turkey before the end of this week to discuss the continuing Syrian conflict, which has just entered its second year.
Photo by: J. Scott Applewhite
Secretary of State John F. Kerry (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)
A Turkish official confirmed the upcoming meeting with the Reuters news agency and said it will likely take place before Sunday.

The meeting comes as The Guardian reports another 100 people were killed in a Damascus neighborhood by warplane strikes. The death toll in the ongoing conflict has been estimated at 70,000, the United Nations reported.

Mr. Kerry’s stop in Turkey is part of a Western Europe and Asian visit. And his talks with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be closely watched. The United States sees Turkey as a crucial player for helping rebel fighters oust Syrian President Bashar Assad and implement a new government.

“Mr. Kerry will visit Turkey,” said the unnamed Turkish spokesman in the Reuters report. “The date is not clear yet but possibly it will take place either on Friday or on Saturday.”

The State Department did not comment in the Reuters report.

via Turkey: John Kerry to talk about Syria with PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan – Washington Times.

April 4, 2013
Turkey brings a gentle version of the Ottoman empire back to the Balkans
Growing presence in Bosnia has given Turkey an expanding field of influence in Europe
- Michael Birnbaum for the Washington Post
- Guardian Weekly, Tuesday 2 April 2013 14.03 BST
Turkish students in Sarajevo, where two Turkish-run universities have opened. Photograph: Jasmin Brutus/Alamy

Turkey conquered the Balkans five centuries ago. Now Turkish power is making inroads through friendlier means. Two Turkish-run universities have opened in Bosnia’s Ottoman-influenced capital Sarajevo in recent years, bringing an influx of Turkish students and culture to a predominantly Muslim country still reeling from a brutal ethnic war almost two decades ago.

Turkish investment has expanded across the Balkans, even in Croatia and Serbia, where mostly Christian residents remember the sultans from Constantinople (now Istanbul) as occupiers, not liberators. Turkey has helped broker talks between formerly bitter enemies in the Balkans. And the growing presence has given Turkey an expanding field of influence inEurope at a time when the country’s prospects of joining the European Union appear dubious.

“Turkish leaders are working at a new Ottoman empire, a gentle one,” said Amir Zukic, the bureau chief of the Turkish Anadolu news agency’s Sarajevo office, which has expanded in recent months. “Turkey, a former regional power, is trying to come back in a big way.”

Turkey’s presence in Bosnia was largely dormant during the more than 40 years that the Balkan country was part of communist Yugoslavia, which was not receptive to Turkish religious and historical influences. But during the mid-1990s, as Yugoslavia fell apart, Turkish aid started flowing to the Muslims who comprise about half of Bosnia. Since then, Turkish funding has helped reconstruct Ottoman-era monuments that were targets of ethnically motivated destruction.

Now Turkey’s cultural influence is hard to miss. Turkish dignitaries are frequent visitors to Sarajevo. A grand new Turkish embassy is being built near “sniper alley”, a corridor where, during the three-year siege of the capital city in the war, Bosnian Muslims struggling to go about their daily business were frequently shot at by Serbian snipers stationed on nearby hills. Billboards advertise round-trip flights to Istanbul for the equivalent of $75. And this year, a baroque soap opera based on the life of Suleiman the Magnificent, a 16th‑century ruler of the Ottoman empire, has mesmerised couch potatoes in Bosnia’s dreary winter.

The biggest outposts in Bosnia have been the two Turkish-backed universities, which have mostly Turkish student bodies.

At the International University of Sarajevo, students who enter the main door of the building erected two years ago have to pass under the watchful eye of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, the Ottoman ruler who introduced Islam to Bosnia in 1463. The private university is backed by Turkish businessmen who are close to Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political party. The university started in 2004 and has grown to 1,500 students. It is shooting for 5,000, the capacity of its new building.

Classes are held in English, and there is a western curriculum heavy on practical subjects such as business and engineering. But both Turkish and Bosnian students say that part of the attraction of the school is the cultural exchange that takes place among the groups. Each cohort has to learn the other’s language.

Administrators are transparent about the school’s ambitions. “The Turks are attracted to come here because they believe that Bosnia, for all its problems, will be in the EU before Turkey is. And they see this as a bridge between two countries,” said Muhamed Hadziabdic, the vice-rector of the school, who is a Bosnian Muslim. Turkish people “like Bosnia”, he said. “It’s European, but it still feels like home. The smell, the culture, it’s recognisably Turkish.”

Bosnian students eye Turkey’s growing economy with interest; their country’s official unemployment rate last year was 46%, far higher than in Turkey. Many of the Turkish students, who make up 65% of the school, say they are there for a taste of freedom away from the watchful eye of their families. Some say they plan to stay in the region and develop businesses.

“When I was little, I wanted to go to a foreign country. I wanted to learn a foreign language,” said Fatih Selcuk, 19, a first-year student from Izmir, Turkey. “Bosnia was in the Ottoman Empire, so it’s similar to Turkey. My father said you should go to Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it’s Slavic but it’s Muslim.”

The other Turkish school in Sarajevo, the International Burch University, opened in 2008 and has connections to Fethullah Gulen, an influential Muslim Turkish preacher who runs an international religious and educational movement from Pennsylvania.

Officials at Burch also speak of their desire to forge connections between Turkey and the Balkans. Students there tend to be more religiously conservative, but as with the International University of Sarajevo, the curriculum is secular.

The Turkish expansion into the region comes as Turkey’s long-held dream of joining the EU seems remote. Western European powers, especially Germany, have been concerned that Turkey’s 74 million residents could flood Europe in search of jobs. Some officials have questioned whether the Muslim-majority country is European at all.

But Bosnia is firmly within Europe – even though Sarajevo’s old city is a dense warren of shops and centuries-old storefronts that is reminiscent of Istanbul. Turkey’s expansion into European regions that once were part of its empire is one way of making up for being excluded from the EU, some analysts say.

Turkey’s growing presence has upset some Bosnian Serbs, who maintain a parallel government in Bosnia under the complicated system dictated by 1995 peace agreements. Officials from the parallel government have complained that the Bosnian Muslim part of the country is falling under the influence of a former imperial power.

“For Islamists, a return of Turkey back to the Balkans is a fulfilment of ambitions. But for many Serbs and also for many Croats, their national struggle in the 19th century is still in their minds,” said Esad Hecimovic, the editor of news programmes on OMT, the private television station that has been airing the soap opera about Suleiman the Magnificent.

Still, even Serbia and Croatia have welcomed Turkish investment. Turkey was the third-largest investor in Mediterranean Croatia in the first three-quarters of 2012, and Erdogan has pursued closer ties with Serbia, a long-time rival. Turkish diplomats also have worked to broker talks between the Serbian and Bosnian governments.

The efforts in the Balkans have given Turkey a new venue for economic growth as it has grappled with ethnic violence that has engulfed neighbouring Syria. There, a diverse nation that also was once part of the Ottoman Empire is threatening to tear itself apart – a development that has similarities to what happened in Yugoslavia.

Many in the Balkans think they are merely a waypoint on the route toward Turkey’s broader goals. “They are a big regional power,” said Hayruddin Somun, a former Bosnian ambassador to Turkey. “The Balkans was always their path to conquering Europe. They had to come through here.”

• This article appeared in Guardian Weekly, which incorporates material from the Washington Post
April 3, 2013
Turkey and Israel: A ‘what next?’ mindset

Turkey and Israel: A ‘what next?’ mindset

By CAN KASAPOGLU

At this point, the critical question is how to turn the forthcoming strategic dialogue into strategic cooperation.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Photo: REUTERS/Stringer

Following the early signs of rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, analysts on both sides focused on why and how this was happening.

Meanwhile, many columnists voiced their opinions about who should take credit for this critical development; some praised the Turkish foreign policy that succeeded in making Israel apologize, others praised Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for his strategic wisdom, and of course US President Barack Obama for his excellent mediation skills. There were even academics who discussed whether the Israeli government did or did not exactly apologize. Although these issues might be very attractive to read about in foreign policy columns, they don’t make much sense at all in the “Hobbesian real world of the Middle East” which is “nasty and brutish” indeed.

Instead of all endless “why, how, and what happened exactly” debates, this paper prefers to focus on the vital question of “what to do next, and how to accomplish it.”

From Détente to strategic dialogue: Following “the apology and the positive response,” now we have a détente in Turkish- Israeli relations that offers a cautious optimism for the future. The first and foremost requirement should be turning this détente into a strategic dialogue.

Having political figures from both countries photographed shaking hands would just be a PR effort. Instead, we, the Turks and the Israelis, right away need our experts to talk openly about Syrian chemical and biological agents’ locations, Assad’s ballistic missiles’ combat-readiness, and trajectory of the Syrian civil war. Likewise, a rise in tourist exchange would be nice in order to overcome mutual distrust in people-to-people relations. However, more urgently, we need our think-tanks setting forums for brain-storming about Iran’s military trends and nuclear program.

In sum, we need a comprehensive strategic dialogue to compensate for the times days of deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations. As the author of this op-ed has stated, when the crisis between the two nations culminated in the flotilla incident, “Bouazizi was still alive in Tunisia, Ankara and Damascus were holding joint cabinet meetings, and Iranian officials hadn’t threatened Turkey due to NATO assets on Turkish soil.” In other words, while we were having problems in our marriage, the neighborhood was only as dangerous as usual; but now everywhere is on fire and we have really serious issues to handle.

From strategic dialogue to cooperation Upon a comprehensive strategic dialogue on key issues of Turkish and Israeli national security agendas, decision-makers of both sides would need to develop a robust cooperation to confront the drastically worsening landscape of regional threat.

As PM Netanyahu pointed out immediately after he initiated the US-brokered rapprochement, the most critical strategic priority would be Syria’s prolonged civil war. Within this context, Turkey and Israel have to get ready to secure the Baathist tyranny’s chemical and allegedly biological weapons arsenal along with other strategic weapons systems in case of an uncontrolled regime collapse. Furthermore, we also need to carefully watch for any mass transfer of game-changing weapon systems in asymmetric conflicts, such as man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and antitank guided missiles (ATGM) into the hands of non-state groups that might target Turkey or Israel. In a moment of irrational shock, Assad or members of the elite surrounding him might attempt to ignite a regional war by provoking Turkish or Israeli administrations. In this case, the two nations need to be prepared to act in coordination, to nip the threat in the bud.

At this point, the critical question is how to turn the forthcoming strategic dialogue into strategic cooperation. While everyone recalls the strategic partnership in the 1990s between Turkey and Israel, during the years of deterioration of their relationship the author of this op-ed has tried to point out the presence of another cooperation model in Turkish- Israeli relations, namely, the peripheral pact signed in 1958. This model was narrowly-designed to cover specifically determined military-political affairs, and was handled within a limited community of top decision makers. Although the current rapprochement is an overt development, we should also take the two countries’ domestic political constraints into consideration. Israel has just formed a new government with the participation of right-wing and centrist figures that excluded the ultra- Orthodox. On Turkey’s end, municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections will take place only in two-a-half years, although constitution debates are ongoing. Moreover, both Israel’s apology and Turkey’s positive response are “security-oriented” to a large extent, and the two states will have to deal with very critical threats.

Who would say no to some extra benefits Although the US-brokered restoration is taking place out of national security urgencies on both sides, Turkish- Israeli relations have always had the potential to produce momentous results. The first prospective development might be a come-back in military ties. As the relations normalize, frozen military deals can be gradually revived. In that sense, Turkey’s ongoing efforts in promoting missile defense capabilities, drone warfare and armor modernization would be attractive to the Israeli defense industry. Moreover, the two countries can restart naval and air force drills and Turkey might drop its veto on NATO-Israeli cooperation, as things get better. More importantly, effective energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean would a bright idea, especially when the Greek Cypriots are swamped with their banking crisis and corrupt governance; Turkey and Israel can work on an alternative energy corridor that would be much more beneficial.

In the long run, if everything goes even better than expected, the special relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and Israel’s close defense and intelligence cooperation with Baku can be enhanced to prompt a trilateral partnership to counterbalance the Iranians’ aggressive agenda.

In sum, the most important bilateral ties of the Middle East, relations between the only two democracies of this dangerous region, might be on the eve of a major restoration. The crucial track would be driving this prospect into a strategic dialogue, and then an effective cooperation. However, at this point we should keep an eye on Palestinian affairs and Lebanon, where anyone who is uncomfortable with Turkish-Israeli partnership might try to provoke an Israeli military action, and thereby, a Turkish diplomatic reaction. If Turkish and Israeli officials want to keep their rapprochement safe, they should remember that on one hand there are the likes of Obama, who is happy with how things are going so far. Nevertheless there are some others who are already starting to go mad to see the Turks and the Israelis acting in coordination in Syria.

The writer, who holds a Ph.D. from the Turkish War College, served as a post-doctoral fellow for the BESA Center at Bar-Ilan University. He is currently a research fellow at the Istanbul based Turkish think-tank EDAM.

April 3, 2013