Category: USA

Turkey could be America’s most important regional ally, above Iraq, even above Israel, if both sides manage the relationship correctly.

  • NATIONAL VIEW: Turkey: Vital ally, crossroads nation

    NATIONAL VIEW: Turkey: Vital ally, crossroads nation

    July 15, 2008 6:00 AM

    Terrorist attacks in Turkey have largely been overshadowed in media attention by those in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, a vital United States ally is being overlooked — a very serious mistake.

    Political tensions in Turkey raise the stakes further. The selection last year of former foreign minister and practicing Muslim Abdullah Gul as the president by the parliament led to fears of Islamic extremism. The president’s wife Hayrunnisa publicly wears the religious headscarf, formally banned in public buildings, and has become an icon for the rise of religion in secular modern Turkey.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan led the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) to an equally decisive victory with the voters in elections to parliament last summer. Initial rejection of his foreign minister for the presidency was the principal spur to go to the people. In effect, a referendum was held on Muslim political leadership of the nation.

    Since the successful revolution in the 1920s led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s government has been constitutionally strictly secular. The army serves as watchdog to keep religion at bay. Four times in the past half century, the generals have acted. At times, military intervention has been bloody. Top officers boycotted the new president’s installation. This summer, people have been detained and two retired general arrested for allegedly plotting a coup.

    Many outside observers, especially in Europe and the U.S., fixate on signs of Islamic extremism in Turkey. Terrorist efforts in Europe since 9/11 have achieved decidedly mixed results but constantly reinforce such anxiety.

    Turkey’s relative isolation within Europe adds to concern. The European Union has turned Turkey’s application for membership into seemingly endless agony. No doubt concern about Islamic extremism contributes to caution. However, more general longstanding European prejudice against outside populations undeniably is involved. Condescension combined with inertia is reflected in the very slow motion of Brussels Eurocrats.

    In fact, developments within Turkey overall have been reassuring. The people remain committed to representative government, an effective counter against al-Qaeda and other extremist movements. To date, terrorist acts in Turkey have boomeranged, with considerable hostility toward those carrying out such criminal acts. There is anxiety about military intervention, but the AKP is politically moderate and so far has operated carefully to preclude a uniformed crackdown.

    Turkey’s primary geostrategic importance, to the U.S. and other nations, is overriding. The government in Ankara has placed priority on good relations with Israel as well as Arab states. Turkey commands vital sea-lanes and trade routes, including the Straits of Bosporus and potential oil and gas lines from the Caucasus.

    Ankara-Washington cooperation is very strongly rooted. Turkey has been actively engaged in Afghanistan, including major military command responsibilities. During the first Persian Gulf War, U.S. B-52 bombers were deployed on Turkish soil, a potentially risky move by Ankara. Turkey played a vital Allied role during the Korean War; the UN military cemetery at Pusan contains a notably large number of Turkish graves.

    This background is of great importance in an unstable region where Turkey-U.S. ties currently are badly strained. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was bitterly opposed by Ankara. Attacks by anti-Ankara Kurdish terrorists based in Iraq have led to Turkish military strikes into the northern region of that country.

    The next U.S. administration should give the highest priority rebuilding frayed relations with the nation which, along with Israel, is our most vital ally in the region. Washington has neglected Ankara for far too long.

    Source: SouthCoastToday.com, July 15, 2008

  • Now for the Hard Part: From Iraq to Afghanistan

    Now for the Hard Part: From Iraq to Afghanistan

    July 15, 2008
    By George Friedman

    The Bush administration let it be known last week that it is prepared to start reducing the number of troops in Iraq, indicating that three brigades out of 15 might be withdrawn before Inauguration Day in 2009. There are many dimensions to the announcements, some political and some strategic. But perhaps the single most important aspect of the development was the fairly casual way the report was greeted. It was neither praised nor derided. Instead, it was noted and ignored as the public focused on more immediate issues.

    In the public mind, Iraq is clearly no longer an immediate issue. The troops remain there, still fighting and taking casualties, and there is deep division over the wisdom of the invasion in the first place. But the urgency of the issue has passed. This doesn’t mean the issue isn’t urgent. It simply means the American public — and indeed most of the world — have moved on to other obsessions, as is their eccentric wont. The shift nevertheless warrants careful consideration.

    Obviously, there is a significant political dimension to the announcement. It occurred shortly after Sen. Barack Obama began to shift his position on Iraq from what appeared to be a demand for a rapid withdrawal to a more cautious, nuanced position. As we have pointed out on several occasions, while Obama’s public posture was for withdrawal with all due haste, his actual position as represented in his position papers was always more complex and ambiguous. He was for a withdrawal by the summer of 2010 unless circumstances dictated otherwise. Rhetorically, Obama aligned himself with the left wing of the Democratic Party, but his position on the record was actually much closer to Sen. John McCain’s than he would admit prior to his nomination. Therefore, his recent statements were not inconsistent with items written on his behalf before the nomination — they merely appeared s o.

    The Bush administration was undoubtedly delighted to take advantage of Obama’s apparent shift by flanking him. Consideration of the troop withdrawal has been under way for some time, but the timing of the leak to The New York Times detailing it must have been driven by Obama’s shift. As Obama became more cautious, the administration became more optimistic and less intransigent. The intent was clearly to cause disruption in Obama’s base. If so, it failed precisely because the public took the administration’s announcement so casually. To the extent that the announcement was political, it failed because even the Democratic left is now less concerned about the war in Iraq. Politically speaking, the move was a maneuver into a vacuum.

    But the announcement was still significant in other, more important ways. Politics aside, the administration is planning withdrawals because the time has come. First, the politico-military situation on the ground in Iraq has stabilized dramatically. The reason for this is the troop surge — although not in the way it is normally thought of. It was not the military consequences of an additional 30,000 troops that made the difference, although the addition and changes in tactics undoubtedly made an impact.

    What was important about the surge is that it happened at all. In the fall of 2006, when the Democrats won both houses of Congress, it appeared a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was inevitable. If Bush wouldn’t order it, Congress would force it. All of the factions in Iraq, as well as in neighboring states, calculated that the U.S. presence in Iraq would shortly start to decline and in due course disappear. Bush’s order to increase U.S. forces stunned all the regional players and forced a fundamental recalculation. The assumption had been that Bush’s hands were tied and that the United States was no longer a factor. What Bush did — and this was more important than numbers or tactics — was demonstrate that his hands were not tied and that the United States could not be discounted.

    The realization that the Americans were not going anywhere caused the Sunnis, for example, to reconsider their position. Trapped between foreign jihadists and the Shia, the Americans suddenly appeared to be a stable and long-term ally. The Sunni leadership turned on the jihadists and aligned with the United States, breaking the jihadists’ backs. Suddenly facing a U.S.-Sunni-Kurdish alliance, the Shia lashed out, hoping to break the alliance. But they also split between their own factions, with some afraid of being trapped as Iranian satellites and others viewing the Iranians as the solution to their problem. The result was a civil war not between the Sunnis and Shia, but among the Shia themselves.

    Tehran performed the most important recalculation. The Iranians’ expectation had been that the United States would withdraw from Iraq unilaterally, and that when it did, Iran would fill the vacuum it left. This would lead to the creation of an Iranian-dominated Iraqi Shiite government that would suppress the Sunnis and Kurds, allowing Iran to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region. It was a heady vision, and not an unreasonable one — if the United States had begun to withdraw in the winter of 2006-2007.

    When the surge made it clear that the Americans weren’t leaving, the Iranians also recalculated. They understood that they were no longer going to be able to create a puppet government in Iraq, and the danger now was that the United States would somehow create a viable puppet government of its own. The Iranians understood that continued resistance, if it failed, might lead to this outcome. They lowered their sights from dominating Iraq to creating a neutral buffer state in which they had influence. As a result, Tehran acted to restrain the Shiite militias, focusing instead on maximizing its influence with the Shia participating in the Iraqi government, including Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

    A space was created between the Americans and Iranians, and al-Maliki filled it. He is not simply a pawn of Iran — and he uses the Americans to prevent himself from being reduced to that — but neither is he a pawn of the Americans. Recent negotiations between the United States and the al-Maliki government on the status of U.S. forces have demonstrated this. In some sense, the United States has created what it said it wanted: a strong Iraqi government. But it has not achieved what it really wanted, which was a strong, pro-American Iraqi government. Like Iran, the United States has been forced to settle for less than it originally aimed for, but more than most expected it could achieve in 2006.

    This still leaves the question of what exactly the invasion of Iraq achieved. When the Americans invaded, they occupied what was clearly the most strategic country in the Middle East, bordering Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. Without resistance, the occupation would have provided the United States with a geopolitical platform from which to pressure and influence the region. The fact that there was resistance absorbed the United States, therefore negating the advantage. The United States was so busy hanging on in Iraq that it had no opportunity to take advantage of the terrain.

    That is why the critical question for the United States is how many troops it can retain in Iraq, for how long and in what locations. This is a complex issue. From the Sunni standpoint, a continued U.S. presence is essential to protect Sunnis from the Shia. From the Shiite standpoint, the U.S. presence is needed to prevent Iran from overwhelming the Shia. From the standpoint of the Kurds, a U.S. presence guarantees Kurdish safety from everyone else. It is an oddity of history that no major faction in Iraq now wants a precipitous U.S. withdrawal — and some don’t want a withdrawal at all.

    For the United States, the historical moment for its geopolitical coup seems to have passed. Had there been no resistance after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the U.S. occupation of Iraq would have made Washington a colossus astride the region. But after five years of fighting, the United States is exhausted and has little appetite for power projection in the region. For all its bravado against Iran, no one has ever suggested an invasion, only airstrikes. Therefore, the continued occupation of Iraq simply doesn’t have the same effect as it did in 2003.

    But the United States can’t simply leave. The Iraqi government is not all that stable, and other regional powers, particularly the Saudis, don’t want to see a U.S. withdrawal. The reason is simple: If the United States withdraws before the Baghdad government is cohesive enough, strong enough and inclined enough to balance Iranian power, Iran could still fill the partial vacuum of Iraq, thereby posing a threat to Saudi Arabia. With oil at more than $140 a barrel, this is not something the Saudis want to see, nor something the United States wants to see.

    Internal Iraqi factions want the Americans to stay, and regional powers want the Americans to stay. The Iranians and pro-Iranian Iraqis are resigned to an ongoing presence, but they ultimately want the Americans to leave, sooner rather than later. Thus, the Americans won’t leave. The question now under negotiation is simply how many U.S. troops will remain, how long they will stay, where they will be based and what their mission will be. Given where the United States was in 2006, this is a remarkable evolution. The Americans have pulled something from the jaws of defeat, but what that something is and what they plan to do with it is not altogether clear.

    The United States obviously does not want to leave a massive force in Iraq. First, its more ambitious mission has evaporated; that moment is gone. Second, the U.S. Army and Marines are exhausted from five years of multidivisional warfare with a force not substantially increased from peacetime status. The Bush administration’s decision not to dramatically increase the Army was rooted in a fundamental error: namely, the administration did not think the insurgency would be so sustained and effective. They kept believing the United States would turn a corner. The result is that Washington simply can’t maintain the current force in Iraq under any circumstances, and to do so would be strategically dangerous. The United States has no strategic ground reserve at present, opening itself to dangers outside of Iraq. Therefore, if the United States is not going to get to play colossus of the Middle East, it needs to reduce its forces dramatically to recreate a strategic reserv e. Its interests, the interests of the al-Maliki government — and interestingly, Iran’s interests — are not wildly out of sync. Washington wants to rapidly trim down to a residual force of a few brigades, and the other two players want that as well.

    The United States has another pressing reason to do this: It has another major war under way in Afghanistan, and it is not winning there. It remains unclear if the United States can win that war, with the Taliban operating widely in Afghanistan and controlling a great deal of the countryside. The Taliban are increasingly aggressive against a NATO force substantially smaller than the conceivable minimum needed to pacify Afghanistan. We know the Soviets couldn’t do it with nearly 120,000 troops. And we know the United States and NATO don’t have as many troops to deploy in Afghanistan as the Soviets did. It is also clear that, at the moment, there is no exit strategy. Forces in Iraq must be transferred to Afghanistan to stabilize the U.S. position while the new head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus — the architect of the political and military strategy in Iraq — f igures out what, if anything, is going to change.

    Interestingly, the Iranians want the Americans in Afghanistan. They supported the invasion in 2001 for the simple reason that they do not want to see an Afghanistan united under the Taliban. The Iranians almost went to war with Afghanistan in 1998 and were delighted to see the United States force the Taliban from the cities. The specter of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan unnerves the Iranians. Rhetoric aside, a drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and a transfer to Afghanistan is what the Iranians would like to see.

    To complicate matters, the Taliban situation is not simply an Afghan issue — it is also a Pakistani issue. The Taliban draw supplies, recruits and support from Pakistan, where Taliban support stretches into the army and the intelligence service, which helped create the group in the 1990s while working with the Americans. There is no conceivable solution to the Taliban problem without a willing and effective government in Pakistan participating in the war, and that sort of government simply is not there. Indeed, the economic and security situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate.

    Therefore, the Bush administration’s desire to withdraw troops from Iraq makes sense on every level. It is a necessary and logical step. But it does not address what should now become the burning issue: What exactly is the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? As in Iraq before the surge, the current strategy appears to be to hang on and hope for the best. Petraeus’ job is to craft a new strategy. But in Iraq, for better or worse, the United States faced an apparently implacable enemy — Iran — which in fact pursued a shrewd, rational and manageable policy. In Afghanistan, the United States is facing a state that appears friendly — Pakistan — but is actually confused, divided and unmanageable by itself or others.

    Petraeus’ success in Iraq had a great deal to do with Tehran’s calculations of its self-interest. In Pakistan, by contrast, it is unclear at the moment whether anyone is in a position to even define the national self-interest, let alone pursue it. And this means that every additional U.S. soldier sent to Afghanistan raises the stakes in Pakistan. It will be interesting to see how Afghanistan and Pakistan play out in the U.S. presidential election. This is not a theater of operations that lends itself to political soundbites.

    www.stratfor.com

  • Appo Jabarian Speaks in Lebanon on:”The Armenian Factor in the American Media”

    Appo Jabarian Speaks in Lebanon on:”The Armenian Factor in the American Media”

    Appo Jabarian Speaks in Lebanon on:
    “The Armenian Factor in the American Media”

     
    By Appo JABARIAN
    Executive Publisher/Managing Editor
    USA ARMENIAN LIFE Magazine
     
    appojabarian@gmail.com
     
    My recent journey to Lebanon, the country of eternal Cedars and my birthplace, was highlighted by both personal and community events.
     
    My December 31, 2006 trip to Lebanon took place after my older brother Vatché suddenly passed away at the age of 53, because of a heart attack. My July 2008 trip to Lebanon was to celebrate the academic success of Vatché’s daughter, my niece, Rita.
     
    Back in mid-2007, when Rita informed me of her anticipated graduation from Haigazian University of Beirut, one of the top ten universities in Middle East, I promised myself to be there and congratulate her in person. Be there, I did!
     
    During my six-day stay, I visited – alas – a limited number of colleagues. One of my destinations was a pilgrimage to Bikfaya-based summer Seat of His Holiness Aram I, the Catholicos of The Great House of Cilicia.
    I also met with several special individuals, including Honorable Antoine Daher and his family. Mr. Daher is my former teacher at St. Paul College – College de Bzommar in Beirut in early 1970’s. He is now the Presiding Judge of Lebanon’s Northern District. Since my graduation from CDB and on my frequent visits to Lebanon I have made a special point to see him always remembering how much he influenced me during my teen years. It is with gratitude that I remember how he shared with his students his invaluable knowledge of academic and intellectual discipline. During his tenure at CDB, Mr. – now President – Daher used to study law at the St. Joseph University.
     
    Next, I visited Shahan Kandaharian, the dynamic Managing Editor of Aztag daily who proposed that I present a report on the Armenian factor in the American media during a town hall meeting to be held on my fourth day in Lebanon. I accepted the invitation. The impromptu mini-conference took place as planned. Below is the news report published in Aztag daily on July 8:
     
    The Aztag Daily of Lebanon presented its 14th Town Hall meeting on Monday, July 7, at 7 p.m., at its editorial headquarters. The presentation of the topic “The Armenian Factor in the American Media,” was made by Appo Jabarian, Managing Editor of the Los Angeles-based USA Armenian Life Magazine.
     
    This impromptu conference was attended by several editors and journalists representing various political party organs and other community-based organizations. Among the guests was Ms. Satenig Karabaghtsian, the Managing Editor of Armenia-based “Menk Mer Masin” (“Us About Us”) monthly magazine.
     
    The opening remark was delivered by Jacques Hagopian, one of Aztag’s Executive Editors. He noted that the topic of the mini-conference was especially important because lately the Armenian American community and the proliferation of Armenian issues in America have become the center of attention throughout the Armenian world.
     
    Hagopian said that the main issue constituted the Armenian Cause. He then presented the main speaker’s curriculum vitae.
     
    Next, Appo Jabarian delivered his remarks. First, he saluted the spirit of cooperation and solidarity among the various members of the Armenian Lebanese media. The Armenian Lebanese community is primarily served by the official organs of the main Armenian political parties: Zartonk of Ramgavar Armenian Democratic League, Ararat of Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, and Aztag of Dashnaktsutiune-ARF. He underlined that the positive atmosphere and camaraderie in one community influences positively on others in the Diaspora.
     
    Jabarian presented the Armenian American print and electronic media listing Asbarez Daily, Nor Or Weekly, Nor Gyank-New Life (co-founded by Jabarian in 1978), The California Courier, Armenian Observer, USA Armenian Life, Hye Kiank Armenian Weekly, The Armenian Reporter, The Armenian Mirror Spectator, The Armenian Weekly, Hayrenik and several monthlies.
     
    Jabarian presented the 12 most important political challenges confronted by the Armenian Americans since 2005. Each challenge, presented by the Turkish denialist government, was handily converted to a resounding Armenian political victory. For the audience members, it was interesting to learn about the inner workings of community-wide efforts in the general context of mainstream American life.
     
    He said that 2005 proved to be a ground-breaking year because the emerging challenges gave Armenian activists and organizations the unique opportunity to regroup their resources and launch massive campaigns with unprecedented momentum.
     
    Reflecting on the issue of Armenian Genocide acknowledgment adversely affecting U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans’s career, Jabarian stated that the subsequent hold on Ambassador Richard Hoagland’s nomination by Sen. Robert Menendez of New Jersey, and the recent postponement by US Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the nomination of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, dealt serious political setbacks to Pres. George Bush’s administration.
     
    Speaking of the Anti-Defamation League’s executive director Abraham Foxman’s denialist remarks, Jabarian said that as a result of the Armenian and mainstream American activism initiated on July 6, 2007 by David Boyajian of the Greater Boston Area, 13 Massachusetts municipalities have canceled their “No Place For Hate” partnership with Foxman’s ADL.
     
    Jabarian noted that the adoption of the congressional resolution (HR106) on the Armenian Genocide by the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives is nothing new. But the strong reaction and the anti-Armenian propaganda unleashed by the pro-Turkish neo-conservative machine and the subsequent dissemination of over ten thousand news items on the Armenian Cause in the mainstream American and international media is a far-reaching accomplishment.
     
    The speaker also reflected on PBS and the proposed insulting panel discussion giving two Turkish denialists an opportunity to plant the seed of doubt in the mind of American TV viewers on the veracity of the Armenian Genocide. The post-show was slated to be broadcast April 2006 immediately after the dissemination of a documentary on the genocide. He said a worldwide wave of protest erupted as a result of the investigative article written , the Publisher of The California Courier. As a direct result, PBS stations in the largest cities canceled the denialist post-show panel, and the denialist PBS Vice President Jacoba Atlas resigned from her position at PBS.
     
    Next, he discussed the Los Angeles Times’ denialist Managing Editor Douglas Franz fiasco. Franz had committed discrimination against a long-established and highly respected journalist Mark Arax. Franz had killed in March 2007 a front-page story on the congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide using Arax’s Armenian background as the basis for an 11th hour decision not to publish it. The community-wide uproar erupted when Sassounian broke the story. Denialism cost Franz his job and irreparably damaged his career in journalism.
     
    Jabarian also said that almost all American presidential candidates during the 2008 U.S. Presidential Primary campaign affirmed their acknowledgment of the genocide. He underlined that this latest development is unprecedented. He emphasized that the presidential primary period is a unique opportunity to further the issues that interest the Armenian American community.
     
    He informed that the number of Armenian-related news stories appearing in the mainstream American media is on the rise and that fact is the direct result of organized continuous efforts. The speaker said that due to these recent accomplishments, the Armenian Diaspora has amplified the Armenian Factor’s growing importance on the American and the world stage.
     
    Then he said that one must benefit from the facilities offered by the worldwide web by way of mass letter-writing for the purpose of defending Armenian interests; and by employing other communication means in order to educate the international community on the Armenian Cause.
     
    In his closing remarks, Jabarian said that as Sassounian had clearly outlined in the April 24 interview with the Los Angeles Times, Armenian activists must move from recognition of the genocide to demand for Justice in order to recover what was forcibly taken away from their ancestors by Turkey. Then he answered a series of questions presented by the participants.
     
    The discussion also touched upon the Turkish lobby. In this regard, Jabarian said that the Armenian lobby was created in direct response to the existence of long-entrenched Turkey’s cronies in Washington.
     
    He outlined the orientation adopted by community-based organizations and their tactics. He stated that the Armenian American organizations pay special attention to the welfare of the Artsakh/Karabagh Republic and the further economic and social development of the 17 year-old independent Republic of Armenia.
     
    He concluded by underlining the importance of achieving progress through a “step-by-step” strategy by being vigilant about any and all anti-Armenian activities, and by swiftly countering them whenever or wherever is necessary.
     
    The conference was followed by a reception at the editorial headquarters of Aztag in Bourj Hamoud.
     
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  • US, Armenia agree to upgrade Armenian capabilities against nuclear smuggling

    US, Armenia agree to upgrade Armenian capabilities against nuclear smuggling

    WASHINGTON: The United States and Armenia have agreed to cooperate against the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials.

    U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian signed the agreement in what is called a “joint action plan” that makes the cooperation activities official.

    The document was signed Monday at the State Department and establishes a 28-step program to increase Armenia’s abilities to prevent, detect and respond to attempts at smuggling dangerous nuclear materials.

    In June 2003, authorities in Armenia’s neighbor Georgia arrested an individual trying to smuggle six ounces of highly enriched uranium into Armenia. Such trafficking surged as the Soviet Union broke apart in the early 1990s.

    Source: International Herald Tribube, July 14, 2008

  • Is America Ready for a Post-American World?

    Is America Ready for a Post-American World?

    The following is a transcript of a commencement address by Francis Fukuyama, delivered at the Pardee Rand Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA, June 21, 2008.

    Is America Ready for a Post-American World?

    I’m really deeply honored to be asked to be the commencement speaker for Pardee Rand Graduate School this year, and to able to serve on the boards of both the PRGS and now the RAND Corporation.

    I’d like to extend my congratulations to all of those receiving degrees today. I’ve been there before, I know what a struggle it is to make it this far. I’d like to congratulate the families, the mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, spouses, children, because without their support, it really is not possible to achieve this educational level. And I’d also like to congratulate Frank Carlucci and Alain Enthoven who are getting honorary degrees today. I can’t imagine two people more deserving of this honor for their lifetime of public service to get honorary degrees. And finally, I’d like to acknowledge the hard work of the faculty and staff at PRGS.

    I attended my son’s high school graduation last week, and at that event, people say the usual things about how you’re just starting on a long road in life, and you’ve got your futures ahead of you. Those of you, particularly those of you getting PhDs today, aren’t really in that position. I would say that you have already committed yourselves to a certain road. I don’t think there’re many of you who are going to become architects, or accountants, or stand-up comedians; maybe that’s in your future. But I suspect that having invested this amount of time in the serious study of public policy you are committed really to that way of life. And so, you are now in the business of helping your country, whatever country that is, make better choices in the public realm. And so, in a sense, this is less of a commencement than a rededication to a path that you have chosen some time ago. The only difference is that now, perhaps, you’ll be able to earn some money in the process of doing it.

    Now, the subject that I want to address today, is how the world has changed. I think that the period from when I started at RAND as a summer intern in 1978 to the present is an amazing period in history, during which we’ve gone through three distinct phases.

    In 1978, we were in the midst of the cold war, and at that time I was one of about a dozen full-time people here at RAND who studied the former Soviet Union. People overstate how simple and predictable the world was back then, but, the Cold War did in fact provide a very recognizable framework that all of us operated in. When I left RAND, or at least when I left Santa Monica, we entered a post-war world, one that was characterized by American hegemony. I think in that respect both the Clinton and the Bush presidencies, despite their political differences, shared a common assumption, that the United States was absolutely the predominant power in the world and that American power would be sufficient to shape outcomes all over the world. I think the Clinton administration tended to emphasize this in the area of economic policy, and the Bush administration in the area of security, but, in that respect, they both were the beneficiaries and practitioners of American hegemony.

    Today, we are evidently entering a very different kind of world. The Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria has labeled this a “post-American world”. I’m not sure he’s right about this, but I do get a very strong sense that as we speak, conditions in the global economy are changing in very dramatic ways, and I don’t think that the assumptions that undergirded either the cold war world, or this extended period of American hegemony, are going to be sufficient to guide us in the world that is emerging.

    Let me go over some of the ways in which the world is changing. The first obviously has to do with the emergence of a multi-polar world. This is not a story about American decline. The United States remains the dominant power in the world, but what is happening is the rest of the world is catching up. The power shift in terms of economic earnings is very dramatic. Russia, China, India, the states of the Persian Gulf are all growing while America is sinking into a recession; something that underlines the stark differences in a way the rest of the world has become decoupled from the American economy.

    In the Clinton years and in the Bush years, the United States was used to lecturing the rest of the world about how to get it’s economic house in order, but it seems to me that those kinds of lectures tend to ring a bit more hollow now that we have suffered the kind of financial crisis that we’ve experienced in the past year. The most dramatic evidence of this shift in power is the simple facts about the endebtedness of the United States, and the accumulating reserves on the part of a lot of countries in the rest of the world. The People’s Republic of China has something like one and a half trillion dollars in reserves; Russia $550 billion, Korea $260 billion, Thailand $110 billion, Algeria $120 billion. The little states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, collectively have about 300 billion in reserves. Saudi Arabia just by itself is saving money at the rate of approximately 15 billion dollars every single month, as a result of energy exports.

    Obviously this kind of accumulation of reserves is a phenomenon that in the short run doesn’t signal a shift in power because money of this sort doesn’t obviously translate into military or other kinds of power. On the other hand, a few hundred billion dollars here, a few trillion dollars there, and pretty soon you’re talking about real money. I suspect that as time goes on, this kind of earning power is going to be translated into important shifts in the way that countries interact. Down the road, I think it is inevitable that we are going to be facing a world in which American options are much more constrained. This may be due to shifts in the military balance of power down the road, but it’s also in terms of soft power. Today, the Chinese and Indians export movies, there are Korean pop stars that are popular all over Asia; the Japanese produce anime and manga; there are, in short, other sources of cultural creativity besides the sort that comes out of this particular city, Los Angeles. One particularly worrying trend is the growing reluctance of foreign students to study in American Universities due to the obstacles we ourselves have put up to their coming here. I’m glad to see that in the PRGS class, non-Americans are extremely well represented, but over the past few years, students from around the world have been finding other alternatives than going to American universities.

    The emergence of this economic multi-polar world has been much commented on. But there’s a second important respect in which the world has changed, which has to do with the very character of international relations today. If you look at the part of the world that extends from North Africa through the Middle East into the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, all the way to the borders of the Indian sub-continent, you are dealing with a world that I think is quite different from the classical world that is taught in international relations theory courses, or that characterized the world of the 20th century.

    That world was dominated by strong, centralized states, and international politics was the story about the interaction of these strong, centralized states—Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, the former Soviet Union, and the like. What is different about today’s international world is that it is dominated not by strong states, but by weak and sometimes failing states where the usual instruments of power, in particular, hard military power, don’t work that well.

    The characteristics of the weak state world were noted after the Lebanon war in 2006 by Henry Kissinger, who said that Hezbollah “is in fact a metastasization of the Al Qaeda pattern, it acts openly as a state within a state, a non-state entity on the soil of a state with all the attributes of a state and backed by the major regional powers, is something new in international relations.”

    Well, unfortunately, it’s not simply new, and it’s not simply characteristic of Lebanon, it is true of many countries throughout that part of the world. Why does this weak state world exist? I think it has to do with a lot of different factors. It has to do with the fact that around the world as development occurs, we have the mobilization of new social actors and groups that were formally excluded from power, like the Shiites in Lebanon, but, it extends to our continent as well. We’ve had tremendous turmoil in the Andean region of Latin America because of the fact you have indigenous peoples in places like Bolivia and Ecuador who were largely cut out of power, and who are now demanding their share of it, and are consequently destabilizing the democratic institutions that are in place there.

    There is furthermore a dark side to globalization. We have gotten used to celebrating globalization as a source of international trade, investment, and therefore, economic growth. Countries like China and India have benefited enormously from globalization. But globalization means a reduction in the barriers to things crossing international borders, and sometimes those things are bad things—they can be things like drugs or international gangs. They can be laundered money, they can be blood diamonds, or they can be militias and political parties that act fluidly across international boundaries using the Internet. We have a big trade in international gangs between Los Angeles and Central America.

    And there is a strange world that is now appearing in which national development is intimately connected with international affairs. Today in sub-Saharan Africa, a region widely recognized as the poorest part of the world, some 10% of the GDP of that entire region comes from international donors. The international community both helps countries there develop, but also makes if difficult for states to consolidate themselves in ways that European states did in the 400 years after the Reformation. For all of these reasons, this weak state world I think is here to stay for some time.

    This weak state world has a lot of implications for American power. We need to consider this very perplexing fact: The United States spends as much on its military as virtually, the entire rest of the world combined, and yet, when you look at Iraq, a country of some 24 million people, it is now five years and counting since the United States invaded and occupied that country, and to this day we have not succeeded in pacifying it fully. And the reasons for that I think really have to do with the nature of power itself, because we are trying to use an instrument—hard military power—that we used in the 20th century world of great powers and centralized states in a weak state world, and that instrument does not work as well. You cannot use hard power to create legitimate institutions to build nations, to consolidate politics and all of the other things that are necessary for political stability in this part of the world.

    There are other things afoot in international politics because of American dominance over the last two decades: other countries are mobilizing against the United States. You have alliances like the Shanghai Cooperation Council that had organized themselves to push the United States out of Asia, after our post September 11 entry into that region. We cannot call on our democratic allies to the extent that we used to be able to. This was obviously true in Iraq, but even in a country like Afghanistan, where our allies in principle agree with the legitimacy of the intervention, we have had tremendous difficulties in getting them to pony up the necessary resources, troops and support. Even a country like Korea that has been a traditional American ally has been convulsed with anti-American demonstrations over the past couple of months because of the controversy over imports of American beef.

    And so, we face a world in which we need a very different set of skills. We need to be able to deploy and use hard power, but there are a lot of other aspects of projecting American values and institutions that need to underlie a continuing leadership role for the United States in the world. Let me give you one illustration. Back in the early 1990s, my colleague at Johns Hopkins, Michael Mandelbaum, wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs. It was a critique of American foreign policy as social work, in particular of the Clinton administration’s efforts in the Balkans and Somalia and Haiti to do nation building. His message was that real men and real foreign policy professionals don’t do this kind of nation building or deploy soft power, but rather deal with hard power with military force.

    But in fact, American foreign policy has to be preoccupied with a certain kind of social work today. If you look at the opponents of American power around the world, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hammas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Mr. Ahmadinejad in Iran, as well as populist leaders in Latin America like Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, or Evo Morales, all of them have succeeded in coming to power because they can offer social services directly to poor people in their countries. The United States, by contrast, has really had relatively little to offer in this regard over the past generation. We can offer free trade, and we can offer democracy, these are very good and important things, the basis for growth and political order. But they tend not to appeal to poor populations that are the real constituents of this struggle for power and influence in the world.

    So the requirements of an American leadership role are quite different and the question that arises; “Is America really ready to deal with a world in which it cannot assume its own hegemony?” Now, I want to make one thing very clear at the outset. I do not believe in inevitable American decline, and this is not going to be a talk about how we are declining. The United States has enormous assets in technology, in competitiveness, in entrepreneurship, flexible labor markets, and financial institutions that are in principle strong (laughter), but are having a little bit of difficulty at the present moment.

    I think one of America’s greatest advantages is its ability to absorb people from other countries and cultures. Virtually all developed countries are experiencing the severe demographic crisis. They are getting smaller with every passing year, because of falling birthrates of native-born people. Any successful developed country in the future is going to have to accommodate immigrants and people from different cultures, and I believe the United States is unique in its ability to do so.

    I think that the problems that the United States faces are really ones that are of our own creating. None of the problems and challenges that the United States faces are insoluble. The problems are really political and institutional ones.

    First, we face a number of long term fiscal challenges. I don’t have to explain to anyone at RAND about the long term health care liabilities that we are creating for ourselves. A single program, Medicare, is going to punch this enormous hole in the federal budget if we do not act to do something about it. Social Security is similarly a long term time bomb, and there are long deferred investments in infrastructure that have not been made over the past few years. But, in principal, all of these problems are soluble.

    I would identify three particular areas of weakness that we must remedy if we are to get through this particular set of challenges. These three are, first, the diminishing capacity of our public sector; secondly, a certain complacency on the part of Americans about understanding the world from a perspective other than that of the United States; and third, our polarized political system that is incapable of even discussing solutions to these problems.

    Let me go over each of these. Let’s begin with the problem of the declining capacity of the public sector. We have seen in the past few years a depressing number of policy failures due to the inability of our public officials to actually carry out, plan and implement policies that we agree on. The most obvious case of this was the failure to adequately plan for the occupation and subsequent counter-insurgency war that broke out in Iraq. Part of that was the result of a political miscalculation as to how the United States would be received, but even after it was clear that the United States was in Iraq for the long haul, it took an extraordinary amount of time to adjust to those conditions and move to move to a counter-insurgency strategy. Indeed, it took President Bush longer to find a good general, General Patraeus, than it took Lincoln to find Grant in the Civil War. There are many other examples where we have actually agreed on policies, and have not been able to follow through.

    We’ve engaged in two major reorganizations of the federal government in Washington over the last few years; the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and reorganization of the intelligence community. I would say that as a result of these reorganizations, we are less capable in both of those areas than we were, had we not done the reorganizations in the first place. The Department of Homeland Security was supposed to enable the United States to respond to major urban disasters, and yet, the response to Hurricane Katrina was a total fiasco.

    Let me site one further case that some of you here at RAND may know about, the Freedom, which is a new class of littorall combat ships, was recently launched by the US navy. Now, this program has been repeatedly delayed and is more than twice over budget as a result of some major design flaws. RAND knows a lot about military procurement, and I’m sure that long time observers of the procurement process will say that this is nothing new. We’ve had a lot of similar fiascos like this in the past. What caught my eye though was a comment by our Navy Secretary about this case that was quoted in the New York Times. He “lamented the Pentagon’s eroding expertise in systems engineering—managing complex new projects to ensure that goals are achievable and affordable—and faulted the notion that industry could best manage ambitious development projects.” Now, this one procurement case is not in itself too significant, but I do not think there is a single agency across the entire federal government where you could not tell the similar story, where the capacity of the public sector to adequately manage the contractors and to retain within itself the capacity to carry out complex projects has not eroded over the last thirty years.

    The causes of this erosion are complex. Some people blame it on politicization of senior offices. That may be the case, but, I’m afraid there may be a deeper problem in our public sector. It is very hard to attract bright young people to go into public service today. It’s partly because there are a lot of competitive jobs in the private sector that offer better pay. It’s also because in public service, we have managed to tie ourselves into knots where people in public service end up dealing more with process than with substance. Since the late 1990s, the US State Department by statute has been forced to dedicate itself to protecting its own personnel as its primary job, not representing the United States to foreign governments, and as a result, diplomats spend their time holed up in massive concrete bunkers, rather than going out and dealing with people in other countries. Stories like this, I think, are spread across the American public sector.

    The second issue has to do with complacency about the outside world. After Sputnik in the late 1950s, the United States responded to the Soviet challenge by making massive investments in basic science and technology. This proved to be a very successful set of investments that reaffirmed American technological leadership. After September 11th, we could have reacted in a similar way, by making large investments in our ability to understand complex parts of the world that we did not understand very well like the Middle East. It is a scandal that in this monstrous new embassy we’ve created in Baghdad, we only have a handful of fluent Arabic speakers. As I was driving to work the other morning, I was listening to an NPR radio program in which they were praising their own coverage of the Beijing Olympics, and of China in general. They said “We have a reporter on staff in Beijing, and he actually can speak Chinese!” I’ve heard that there are some reporters in the Chinese press agency Xinhua in Washington who can in fact speak English.

    The final issue I think really has to do with the political deadlock that we face with our political system. Again, this has been commented on a great deal. The polarization has put off the table serious discussion of how to solve some of these long term and very clear challenges that every public policy expert understands. It is not possible to talk about raising taxes to pay for badly needed public goods on the Right. It is not possible to talk about issues like privatizing social security, or raising the retirement age on the Left. Neither the Left nor the Right has had the political courage to suggest raising energy taxes, which has been the obvious way of dealing with foreign energy dependency and encouraging alternative sources of energy. And so the political culture that we have created as a result of this kind of politics is incapable of making the decisions that we need.

    I’ve spoken a lot about the United States today. I realize that among our graduates, there are many people who are not Americans, and many of you will return to your countries and will pursue public policy analysis there. Everybody, I believe, will benefit from better policy analysis of the sort that a PRGS education provides. But I don’t think that anyone around the world will benefit from an America that is inward looking, incapable of executing policies, and too divided to make important decisions. That hurts not just Americans, but, I think, the rest of the world as well. Graduates should be very proud of their having spent the time and effort to dedicate themselves to learning how to make better public policy. This is a noble objective, and one that is sorely needed in both in this country, and abroad.

    RAND is dedicated to objective non-partisan research, but I suspect that all of you who have pursued degrees at PRGS have done so because you have a certain passion, an individual passion for public issues, and you want to make those policies better. So, as you leave RAND, I think that it is important that you maintain your objectivity and your credibility in your mode of doing research, but that you safeguard that passion because that is what is going to drive you to do good things out in the world.

    Thank you very much.

    Source: The American Interest, Posted on July 7th, 2008

  • Envoy Blair cancels visit to Gaza

    Envoy Blair cancels visit to Gaza

    From: Tolga Cakir <tolga@tolgacakir.co.uk>

    To: Haluk Demirbag

    Tony Blair is focusing on economic
    issues as Middle East envoy

    The international Middle East envoy, Tony Blair, has cancelled a planned visit to the Gaza Strip.

    A spokesman said that the visit had to be postponed because of a specific security threat.

    He would have been the most highly ranked international diplomat to visit the strip since the militant movement Hamas took control there in 2007.

    He was due to meet UN officials to discuss humanitarian work in the strip and visit a water treatment plant.

    He had not been expected to meet any representatives from Hamas.

    The international community does not recognise the Hamas government in Gaza.

    The European Union, the United States and Israel consider Hamas to be a terrorist organisation.

    The movement seized control of Gaza in June 2007 from Fatah forces loyal to the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

    The former British prime minister was appointed as Middle East envoy in the same month by the Quartet – the US, the EU, the UN and Russia.

    Mr Blair was asked to focus on economic issues with the aim of bolstering the chances of a peace deal this year.

    Source: BBC, 15 July 2008