Turkish Forum

Category: America

  • Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

    Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

    Europe Report N°199
    14 April 2009

    To access the media release of this report in Turkish, please click here.

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.

    Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.

    Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority before 1915.

    Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners, including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the “Great Catastrophe” of 1915.

    The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.

    Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.

    U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them; Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened and trade normalised.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    To the Government of Turkey:

    1.  Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.

    2.  Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.

    3.  Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious heritage throughout the country.

    4.  Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.

    To the Government of Armenia:

    5.  Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the current process.

    6.  Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.

    7.  Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

    8.  Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever they may be located.

    To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member States:

    9.  Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.

    10.  Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S., Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    11.  Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building; and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or sub-commission, development of archive management and independent Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects of the 1915 events.

    Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009

  • Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Deglobalizing U.S. military commitments will require the “civilianization” of defense policy.

    Judah Grunstein | Bio | 09 Apr 2009
    WPR Blog

    More smart stuff from Sam Roggeveen, who points out that alert is not the same thing as alarmed, but nevertheless admits to a case of nerves:

    The thing to remember is that China does not have to match the U.S. in global capability terms for U.S. allies in the Pacific to start getting nervous about the strategic balance. All China has to do is be a credible competitor in the region, and that is already the case.

    Roggeveen goes on to argue that “. . . we have already passed the point at which the U.S. could militarily intervene in a Taiwan conflict at acceptable risk,” and that the coming years/decades will witness an inexorable expansion of that perimeter.

    Click through to see what he’s got to say about whether the budget priorities as signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, compared to the alternatives, are a good thing or not for Australia. You might be surprised.

    The broader point here is that while the “American unipolar moment” might be drawing to a close, we’re still the only country that is forced to calculate in terms of global, as opposed to regional, military capability. That reflects the magnitude of our power, influence and interests. But while an advantage in a scenario of geologic resource scarcity, it becomes potentially problematic in a scenario of political resource scarcity and a distinct disadvantage in times of financial resource scarcity.

    This reinforces the need for scaling down our commitments by involving regional powers more prominently in advancing our foreign policy objectives, what I call Middle Power Mojo™. France and Turkey were my illustrative examples before they both started acting out. But part of the initial concept was the idea of identifying regional players that have got their mojo working, so that’s inevitably going to evolve with time.

    Perhaps most significantly, this provides a political context for U.S. defense policy. The limitations of discussing the U.S. defense budget without the context of a strategic vision have been pointed out elsewhere. But so far, that’s mainly been shorthand for, “Wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review comes out next year,” and reinforces the militarization of foreign policy. Deglobalizing America’s defense commitments, on the other hand, will require filling gaps with both friendly capability and stable regional security architectures. And that’s more of a long-term interagency project that will “civilianize” defense policy.

    Source:  www.worldpoliticsreview.com, 09 Apr 2009

  • The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Implications for the South Caucasus

    The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Implications for the South Caucasus

    Turkey’s recent and ongoing rapprochement with Armenia, addressed in last week’s Caucasus Update from the Turkish angle, has implications that could reverberate throughout the South Caucasus and beyond. Arguably, the normalisation of ties between Armenia and Turkey would be an event of equivalent regional significance as the Russo-Georgian war of last August.

    Details remain unclear. This diplomatic murkiness testifies to just how explosive the issue has become for the Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian governments. The outlines, however, are apparent – that Turkey and Armenia are expected to begin opening their mutual border and establishing diplomatic relations probably sooner than later. The Turkish overtures are contingent on two things: firstly, that US President Barack Obama does not openly acknowledge the Armenian ‘genocide’, and secondly (and much less publicly) that Armenia renounces or at least quietly suspends its own push for genocide recognition and its long-dormant claims to Turkey’s eastern provinces as part of its “Greater Armenia” concept.

    A third condition – that any formal moves are also conditional on Armenian progress towards removing its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it – is unconfirmed. The very idea that Turkey would go through with the border talks without attaching any conditions on Karabakh has provoked fury in Azerbaijan, especially since Turkey sealed the border in 1993 in response to the Armenian occupation of the regions, a reality which has clearly not changed. In Baku, the issue has created a rare patch of common ground for the government and the opposition (APA, April 7).

    Essentially, what has developed appears to be an enormous three-way game.  Firstly, Turkey’s determination to go ahead with the thaw – including the establishment of an alleged framework for talks in the areas of border openings, diplomatic representations, and dispute commissions (Wall Street Journal, April 2) – has been curbed by its recognition of the obvious, and urgent, need to keep their ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan on side. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on April 7 that “The Azerbaijani-Armenian dispute should be resolved first. Then, problems between Turkey and Armenia can be solved, too”. According to Today’s Zaman, Turkey’s bluff may be to limit the thaw to occasional border openings and limited diplomatic contact until October, when a World Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey (the return leg of the fixture which began the whole process last September with Turkish President’s visit to Yerevan) is due to take place in Istanbul (Today’s Zaman, April 9). This would give Ankara time to push Azerbaijan and Armenia into a compromise over Karabakh, probably under the auspices of Turkey’s much-discussed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.

    Secondly, Yerevan’s strategy is to decouple the issue of the Turkish border from the Karabakh issue, ensuring that Armenia receives the economic and political benefits of relations with Turkey without having to concede ground vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian clearly illustrated this bluff on April 5 when he warned Mr. Erdogan that attempts to link the two issues were an attempt to impede progress (RFE/RL, April 7).

    Clearly, Yerevan anticipates that Turkey is unwilling to exasperate President Obama and – more importantly – undermine its role as a regional stabiliser by allowing the talks to fail. It is also attempting to ensure that the status quo in Karabakh is maintained. Armenia has no particular interest in altering the situation in the disputed territories hoping that one day Azerbaijan will be demanded by the world to reconcile with the loss of its territories (a belief that has been reinforced by the recognition of Kosovo). So without a continuing Turkish blockade Yerevan is unlikely to offer any concessions to Baku, and may in time feel emboldened enough to start demanding that Azerbaijan back down.

    Azerbaijan, thirdly, is hoping that Turkey is not willing to betray its Turkic-speaking ally. However, it reflects the level of concern in Baku that Azerbaijan is not simply relying on ethnic and linguistic solidarity but has been actively (if unofficially) challenging Turkey’s strategic interests. President Ilham Aliyev reportedly said that if Turkey made a deal with Armenia that did not consider Karabakh, Azerbaijan could cut the gas supplies to Turkey (Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 9). In this light one should consider recent cooperation between Baku and Russian energy giant Gazprom and discussions between President Aliyev and Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko on alternative gas routes via the Black Sea: in other words, the White Stream pipeline across the Black Sea to Ukraine, which would avoid Turkey (APA, April 10). Given these recent moves, it seems very likely that Azerbaijan will begin seriously reconsidering its participation in the planned Nabucco pipeline to Europe, a project with which it has already grown impatient.

    More significantly, the country could start to reconsider its whole geopolitical orientation. President Aliyev hinted at both of these possibilities at a meeting of Azerbaijan’s Security Council on April 6, in which he stressed the independence of Baku’s foreign policy and the importance of Azerbaijan for the execution of any transnational energy projects in the region (APA, April 6). The voices are getting louder in Baku arguing that the policy of trusting Turkey and the West to support it over Karabakh, incurring Russian displeasure in the process, has achieved nothing. Azerbaijan’s confidence in the West was already damaged by the Russo-Georgian war, in which Washington and Brussels indicated that they would not respond materially to any conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Turkey’s decision to negotiate with Armenia, and the vocal support of the US and the EU for the talks, has struck a further blow to Baku’s faith in the West.

    So why not turn towards Russia? Turkey clearly has diminished its leverage in any Karabakh peace talks and the OSCE’s Minsk Group has made painfully slow progress. The only actor who possesses clear and significant influence in the peace process is Russia, Armenia’s most important ally. Russia is one of the Minsk Group co-chairs but has demonstrated a willingness to act more or less unilaterally, for instance in the Moscow Declaration which it brokered between the two sides last November. Although few Azerbaijanis desire the return of Russian suzerainty, Karabakh is predominant. If Russia can help solve the conflict in a way which is acceptable to Azerbaijan, then all other considerations are secondary. Gas supplies and the cooling of ties with NATO and Washington are a small price to pay.

    The West, and Turkey, must recognise the implications of the Armenian thaw. Clearly, peace in the Caucasus is desirable. Closed borders and mutual distrust are not to be welcomed. But if Turkey’s AKP party rushes ahead, it will embolden nationalists at home who could impede the country’s progress towards the EU. This sounds counter-intuitive: opening the border with Armenia is expected to boost Turkey’s EU accession hopes. But this analysis is from Brussels’ perspective. Domestically, the AKP is weaker than before after March’s local elections, and hasty, unpopular foreign policy gestures may cripple its hopes for the 2011 general election (especially if the EU continues to block accession, regardless of the thaw) and give nationalists the upper hand.

    But even more concerning is the danger that Turkey and the West could ‘lose’ Azerbaijan to Russia. This would not only sound the death knell for Nabucco, but it would also alter the geopolitical profile of the whole of Eurasia and pose a new and serious risk in the Karabakh conflict. Patience is a virtue – Ankara, as well as Brussels and Washington, should bear this maxim in mind.

     

  • Rally “End to Armenian Lies” to be held in New York

    Rally “End to Armenian Lies” to be held in New York

    Baku – APA. A rally “End to Armenian Lies” will take place in New York on April 25, APA reports quoting Haberturk.

    The rally is intended to inform Americans that Armenian allegations on the incidents of 1915 are groundless and false.

    The rally, which will be held in Times square, is sponsored by the Young Turks Association under the umbrella of the Federation of Turkish-American Associations.

    The rally is a reply to the demonstration on “genocide” claims that will be held by Armenian Diaspora in the same square on April 26.

    The Azerbaijanis living in the US will also participate in the rally.

  • Turkey Keeps Armenia Guessing Over Border Blockade

    Turkey Keeps Armenia Guessing Over Border Blockade

    If Ankara is serious about putting relations with Yerevan onto a new footing, it will reopen the border crossings it closed in 1993.
    By Tatul Hakobian in Yerevan (CRS No. 488, 10-Apr-09)

    Despite the recent warming in relations between Armenia and its neighbour Turkey, especially following Turkish president Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yerevan last September, it is still unknown when or even whether real steps will be taken to normalise relations.

    On March 30, four United States congressmen, all of them Barack Obama’s fellow Democrats, addressed letters to Armenian president Serzh Sarksian and his Turkish counterpart, offering to promote reconciliation between the two countries.

    But a few days earlier, on March 17, four other US congressmen introduced a resolution to the House of Representatives urging American recognition of the mass killing of Armenians of 1915 as genocide.

    Meanwhile, the new American president’s keenness to promote the reconciliation process between the estranged neighbours was given further weight when he visited Turkey last week.

    On his two-day visit, April 5-6, Obama unexpectedly met both the Turkish and the Armenian foreign ministers, Ali Babajan and Edvard Nalbandian, using the opportunity to urge the ministers to complete talks aimed at restoring ties between their respective countries.

    In Ankara, at a joint press conference with Gul, Obama predicted that Turkish-Armenian talks “could bear fruit very quickly”.

    Obama said he stood by a statement he made last year that Ottoman Turks had carried out widespread killings of Armenians early in the 20th century, but finessed the sensitive issue by stopping short of using the word genocide.

    “My views are on the record and I have not changed views,” Obama said.

    Relations between Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, and Armenia, which for decades formed part of the Soviet Union, have never been cordial.

    They remain bedeviled by the events in 1915, when Ottoman forces slaughtered huge numbers of Armenians in what is now eastern Turkey. Armenians claim at least 1.5 million perished and insist it was an act of state sponsored genocide. Turkey has always disputed the number of dead, and the intention, and its courts have prosecuted Turkish writers who have described Armenian claims as valid.

    During the Soviet era, meanwhile, the 200 kilometre-long Soviet Armenian-Turkish land border formed part of the “Iron Curtain”, and the only crossing point was a train that clanked slowly from Kars in Turkey to Gyumri.

    In 1991, Turkey, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, refused to establish diplomatic relations with the then newly independent Armenia.

    Ankara then closed its borders with Armenia entirely in 1993 in protest against Armenia’s military operations in Nagorno Karabakh and in sympathy with Armenia’s foe, Azerbaijan.

    But between 1991 and 1993, after Armenia became independent, two crossing points were opened at Akyaka-Akhurian and Alijan-Margara through which Turkish wheat was imported in 1992-93.

    Residents of Margara still remember the winter of 1992, when Turkish trucks full of wheat crossed the border.

    The newly independent country was suffering from poor economic conditions and there was a lack of wheat in the country.

    Local people welcomed the trucks as soon as they crossed the bridge and chatted with the drivers, some of whom were Turks.

    The local village head in Margara, Khachatur Asatrian, therefore, has been following signs of a thaw with interest.

    But there are no preparations for the border to reopen at present.

    Some Armenians expected the Kars-Gyumri rail line to start up again at least for several days last September, so that Turkish fans could come to Yerevan and watch the World Cup qualifier football match.

    The Armenian side started railway repair works but the border remained closed, while Gul and a few score fans arrived by plane.

    “Everything can be arranged in a short period, provided a political decision is taken to open the borders,” the head of Margara told IWPR.

    “I don’t feel any work is being done to open the border [now] but as soon as the time comes, it won’t take the authorities much time.”

    Margara, which is about 40 km away from Yerevan, lies right on the banks of the river Araks.

    But the villagers can’t even go down to the riverbank. A barbed wire fence, erected along Armenian-Turkish border in Soviet times, a relic of Cold War tensions, still stands.

    Both Margara village, and the bridge leading to it, have another meaning for Armenians. In 1915, people fleeing the Ottoman slaughter only felt safe once they had crossed the bridge into then Tsarist Russia.

    Kima Karapetian, who teaches history at Margara school, says there were many bridges across the Araks but this one holds special memories.

    “For Armenians who survived the genocide this place was a place of hope,” she told IWPR.

    In spite of bitter memories of Armenian suffering at the hands of the Turks, like most of Margara residents, Karapetian wants the borders to open, as this might revive the village.

    “I do have some fears, but we’d rather have the borders open and establish relations between the two countries,” she said. “There must be cooperation between us at long last.”

    But over and above all the issues of border points and barbed wire fences remain the events of 1915.

    Still robustly denied by Turkey, this remains by far the most difficult issue in the two states’ bilateral relations.

    It has become a question worrying the international community and remains a moot point in US-Turkey relations, especially on the eve of April 24, when Armenians commemorate the victims.

    The new US president has hitherto been a reliable supporter of pro-Armenian resolutions in Congress. During his presidential campaign, he also told the American-Armenian diaspora he would not shrink from using the term genocide in his speech on April 24 – though did not use it on his recent visit to Turkey.

    Turkish officials insist such steps would undermine Turkish-Armenian efforts to restore ties and recent progress in their relations as a whole.

    Many Armenians are suspicious of these assertions. They believe Turkey has no real intention of establishing relations with Yerevan, or of lifting the blockade on Armenia.

    They fear Ankara seeks only an “imitation” dialogue with Armenia in order to hamper formal US recognition of the 1915 events as genocide.

    At the official level, however, both Armenia and Turkey have continued to make optimistic statements in public.

    “Turkey and Armenia are closer then ever to peace,” Babajan, said on February 6, while adding that “US efforts toward the recognition of the Armenian genocide will harm the process”.

    Babajan added that reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia had never been so close.

    “I can’t say we’ve already found a solution, but where we stand now is the closest point ever to a settlement with Armenia,” he said.

    The next day, at the Munich Security Conference, Sargsian made similar noises. The visit of his Turkish counterpart to Yerevan had been a step forward towards, he said.

    “I think we are going the right way and if we continue doing so, we can speak about a different level of relations at the second half of the year,” Sargsian concluded.

    The current Armenian leadership, unlike that of Robert Kocharian whose presidency gave priority to international recognition of the genocide, now lays stress on the importance of normalising relations with Turkey.

    However, Nalbandian denies that recognition of the genocide has fallen off the agenda.

    “It has been said many times, that we [together with Turkey] must turn this sorrowful page of our history, not by forgetting it but by acknowledging it,” he said in January.

    “Armenia… will never tell our diaspora, or some states, to stop their efforts towards securing recognition of the genocide. This will never happen.”

    Yet Sargsian and Nalbandian, unlike former president Kocharian and former foreign minister Vardan Oskanian, rarely speak of the genocide at international forums.

    In turn, Turkey seems less inclined to draw parallels between the Karabakh issue and the normalisation of relations with Armenia than before.

    Meetings between Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers have become more frequent since Gul’s historic trip to Yerevan.

    In February, Sargsian also had a short meeting with the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the Davos forum in Switzerland.

    But Oskanian tells IWPR there is only one way to measure real improvement in relations between Armenia and Turkey – the
    opening of the border.

    “That is the only way to judge whether Turkey is sincere in its declared intentions to normalise relations with Armenia,” he said.
    “If this happens in the coming months, we will welcome it, and that will vindicate the efforts of the Armenian side.

    “Recently, we have heard a lot of optimism about the border opening. I hope there are serious grounds for such optimism.”

    Giro Manoyan, senior member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, one of the ruling parties in Yerevan, says it is possible 2009 will see the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and the lifting of the land blockade by Turkey.

    “Turkey is also interested in achieving these, firstly because after the August 2008 Georgia-Russia war, Turkey wants to take advantage of the new situation in the region and… Turkey also wants to avoid the US recognition of the Armenian genocide,” he said.

    “Turkey cannot realise the former, when it is in fact in a state of undeclared war with Armenia because of the blockade; and regarding the latter reason, Turkey has been advised… that to avoid President Obama doing what candidate Obama promised, Turkey should establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and lift the blockade.”

    Turkey has been dragging its feet in doing either, threatening to cut off negotiations with Armenia in case Obama or the House of Representatives qualify the events of 1915 as genocide.

    “But in the end,” Manoyan concluded, “because it is also in Turkey’s interest to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and lift the blockade, both will happen.”

    Other experts agree change may be on the way. “The normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations is not being conducted only within a bilateral format,” said Alexandr Iskandarian, a Yerevan-based political scientist.

    “The US is taking part in the process, and Russia and Europe have their own role here too. This kind of talk may have certain results.”

    Meanwhile, Vahan Gasparian, station master at Gyumri, told IWPR that Gyumri can handle train traffic with Turkey; the problem is the railway on the Turkish side.

    “The rail line on the Armenian side is already in peak condition. Regular trains already run from Kars to Akyaka, the station right on the Turkish side of Armenia-Turkey border,” Gasparian said.

    It would be possible to restore the Kars-Gyumri connection in a short period. It all depends on whether Yerevan and Ankara have the political will to do so.

    Tatul Hakobian is a commentator with the English-language Armenian Reporter newspaper, published in the United States.

  • Azerbaijani and Turkish Americans against reopening of borders

    Azerbaijani and Turkish Americans against reopening of borders

    Baku. Rashad Suleymanov–APA. Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Union of Azerbaijani-Turkish Businessmen (ATIB) and Azerbaijani-Turkish American Foundation (ATAF) Ahmet Erentok addressed the US officials protesting against reopening of Turkey-Armenia borders, ATIB press service told APA.

    He addressed President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator John Kerry and said that the opening of Turkey-Armenia borders outside of Azerbaijan’s position wouldn’t bring expected results. “In this case, relations of Azerbaijan with Turkey and the United States will be strained. The opening of borders will lead to the instability and complication of situation in the region”.

    Erentok asked the US officials to be more sensitive in approaching of this issue.

    Vice Chairman of ATIB Borad of Governors Cemal Yangin informed the World Turkish Business Forum in Istanbul on Friday about the ATIB’s position on the opening of Turkey-Armenia borders and spread the text of ATIB statement against the border opening among the forum participants.