Turkish Forum

Category: America

  • Brazil, Turkey to discuss Iran

    Brazil, Turkey to discuss Iran

    The leaders of UN Security Council members Brazil and Turkey, who recently signed a nuclear fuel swap declaration with Iran, are to meet next week.

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva during his three-visit to the Latin American country starting on Wednesday, AFP quoted diplomats from both countries as saying on Thursday.

    Following trilateral talks, Iran, Brazil and Turkey issued a joint declaration on Monday under which Iran agreed to send its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for the nuclear fuel it needs for medical purposes.

    Only one day after the declaration, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington had reached an agreement with other veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council for imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran.

    The diplomats said the two leaders would meet on Thursday over a working lunch in Brasilia.

    Both Brazil and Turkey, which are non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, opposed the new resolution, reaffirming their commitment to a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue.

    The UNSC comprises of five permanent — Britain, China, France, Russia and the US — and 10 temporary members. In order to be approved, the resolution needs at least nine votes in favor and no vetoes by permanent members.

    Press TV

  • Turkey’s Next Transformation

    Turkey’s Next Transformation

    By Ilan Berman
    Forbes.com
    May 18, 2010

    What a difference a few years can make. A little more than a decade ago, regional rivals Turkey and Syria nearly went to war over the latter’s sponsorship of the radical Kurdish Workers Party in its struggle against the Turkish state. Today, however, cooperation rather than competition is the order of the day, as highlighted by recent news that the two have kicked off joint military drills for the second time in less than a year.

    The thaw in Turkish-Syrian ties is a microcosm of the changes that have taken place in Ankara over the past decade. Since November of 2002, when the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party, or AKP, swept Bulent Ecevit’s troubled secular nationalist coalition from power, Turkey has undergone a major political and ideological metamorphosis. Under the direction of its charismatic leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP has redirected the Turkish ship of state, increasingly abandoning Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s ideas of a secular republic in favor of a more religious and ideologically driven polity.

    Part and parcel of this transformation has been a monumental reorientation of foreign policy. The only Middle Eastern member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey has long served as a stalwart of the West, and a critical force multiplier for European and American interests in Eurasia. Increasingly, however, Ankara no longer seems comfortable playing that role.

    Relations with the United States soured way back in 2003, when Turkey’s opposition to war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq led it to deny overflight and basing permissions to the U.S.-led coalition, thwarting plans for a “northern front” against Baghdad. Since then, diplomats in both countries have made a public show of mending fences, but deep distrust still lingers. In 2007 Turkish approval of the U.S. hit an all-time low of just 9%, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, eclipsing such bastions of anti-Americanism as Pakistan (then logged at 15%) and the Palestinian Authority (13%). Since then, matters have improved slightly. But today, at just 14% favorable, Turkish attitudes toward the U.S. can hardly be called pro-American — or a sound basis for ongoing partnership.

    Turkish attitudes toward Europe have cooled considerably as well. Membership in the “Eurozone” has been a central objective of Turkish foreign policy since the late 1980s. But since formal E.U. accession talks began in 2005, anger over Europe’s obvious reluctance to accept the country’s 77 million Muslims into its fold has gradually soured most Turks on the idea of European membership, and the cause of integration has plummeted in popularity. When tallied by Pew in 2007, only 27% of Turks viewed the E.U. favorably — less than half the number that did just three years earlier.

    Predictably, Turkey’s ties with the country that used to rank as its most reliable regional partner, Israel, have also deteriorated. Back in the late 1990s, Ankara and Jerusalem cobbled together a formidable strategic partnership on military and defense issues, animated by what Mideast scholar Daniel Pipes then described as their “common sense of otherness” in an inhospitable Middle East. Today, however, that convergence is just a distant memory. Over the past two years, a series of very public political spats has roiled diplomatic ties between Ankara and Jerusalem, and military and defense cooperation has virtually ground to a halt. The late-April announcement from Israel that it was temporarily freezing all arms sales to Turkey in protest over public criticism from Erdogan was just the latest sign that all is not well in the Turkish-Israeli entente.

    But Turkey has to belong somewhere. Which is why, in place of these traditional alliances, Ankara has increasingly drifted into alignment with countries it once considered mortal enemies. Ties with Syria, historically deeply troubled, are now anything but, with the two countries boasting multiple new agreements on economic, political and military cooperation over the past year. Turkey has likewise mended fences with Iran; a ballooning bilateral trade and growing diplomatic warmth between the two countries has made clear that — unlike its predecessors — the current government in Ankara views the Islamic Republic more as a partner than a regional competitor or security threat.

    Still, for those concerned about this drift away from the West, there are tantalizing signs that Turkey could soon change course once again.

    The first is political. For years, disarray within Turkey’s notoriously fractious secular opposition prevented the emergence of a serious competitor to the AKP. Now, however, a dynamic new political challenger has arisen. Since it appeared on the scene less than a year ago, the Turkish Movement for Change (TDH), with its agenda of economic renewal and neo-Kemalist foreign policy, has captured the imagination of many Turks tired of the AKP-dominated status quo.

    It’s not by accident that the movement’s message, and its rhetoric, is so reminiscent of President Barack Obama’s successful 2008 presidential campaign. The TDH sees itself as a sort of midcourse correction that would re-center Turkish politics after years of drift. “Turkey is becoming an increasingly polarized society,” Zeynep Dereli, one of the movement’s founders, explains in the latest issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly. “To bring true democracy to Turkey, we must focus on four pillars of prosperity: a free market economy, universal social services, participatory democracy and respect for human rights and freedoms.” And that, Dereli makes clear, involves bringing Turkey back into alignment with the West on a range of foreign policy issues.

    The second development is religious. Over the past couple of years, the Turkish government’s influential Department of Religious Affairs has quietly launched an effort to modernize a key element of Islamic law. According to the BBC, this little-known effort entails the creation by theologians at Ankara University of a document revising the Hadith, the compilation of the spoken word of the Prophet Muhammad that serves as Islam’s second most sacred text.

    If it is successful, the overhaul — still in progress — will be the closest thing the Muslim world has yet had to a religious “reformation” of the sort that brought Christianity into the modern age. It could also become a powerful counterterrorism tool, redefining and demystifying parts of the Islamic tradition that until now have been exploited by radicals to justify overriding hostility to the West.

    Both trends, of course, are still nascent. The TDH’s priorities have put it on a collision course with the AKP, and coming months will determine whether it can in fact serve as a durable political alternative, as its proponents contend. Even if Turkey doesn’t experience a secular “reset,” though, it may well spark a religious one, provided the Turkish government’s plans for an Islamic “reformation” materialize and gain currency in the wider Muslim world.

    Either way, it seems, Ankara’s political evolution is far from over.

    Ilan Berman is vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

  • The UK-US Alliance Under the Microscope

    The UK-US Alliance Under the Microscope

    [from the Royal United Services Institute]

    Nick Clegg’s statement that it is time to ‘turn the page on the default Atlanticism’ of successive British governments highlights a growing unease over the UK’s most important alliance. However, the true debate is not about the merits of the alliance but Britain’s position in the world.

    By John Hemmings for RUSI.org

    ObamaAtNo10

    The UK-US alliance is a deeply-entrenched one, vital to Britain’s security interests and central to the nation’s position in the world. But is it under threat? Is the ‘special relationship’ no longer as special as it once was or is this merely a narrative driven by an over-anxious media? Certainly, reporting on the subject this side of the Atlantic would seem to suggest that there are serious problems, structural as well as cosmetic. On the cosmetic side, the lack of warmth between Gordon Brown and Barack Obama has been seized upon as evidence of a failing relationship. In addition, the last two years have seen a number of complications – insignificant on their own – but in combination add to this sense of crisis. These have included the release of Al Megrahi, the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing; the extradition to the US of Gary McKinnon, the British hacker diagnosed with autism; and remarks made by Hillary Clinton implying that the US supported Argentinean attempts to reopen negotiations over the Falkland Islands.

    The structural architecture of the relationship

    The ‘special relationship’ should not and cannot be understood as merely the relationship between a given president and prime minister. This part of the alliance is simply too cyclical, based as it is on the continual shift of democratic elections. Far more significant is the structural side of the ‘special relationship’. Birthed during war and shaped by the UK-USA Security Agreement, the military and security side of the alliance is arguably the ‘bread and butter’ of this bond and perhaps the real reason the relationship is described as special.[1] Since 1943, the US and UK have developed a complex network of close links between their defence and intelligence communities. These communities regularly grant privileged access to intelligence, planning and defence development that would be unthinkable between most other states. Personnel develop strong working relationship and contacts due to the high number of secondments within each others’ organisations. While relationships between Foreign Ministers and Heads of State wax and wane, the real partnerships take place in Whitehall and Foggy Bottom, in Langley and Vauxhall Cross, and in the combined command structures in Kabul.

    There are some disturbing signs that this structural side of the special relationship is now being reconsidered due to changes in the strategic environment: the removal of the Soviet Union as a strategic competitor, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the growing variance in approach. The rise of China, distant from British shores, has revealed a gap in security priorities between the two. While China’s growing military assertiveness is a cause for consternation for American and Japanese policy-makers, Britons and their EU counterparts continue to view the relationship with China as an economic one. Furthermore, not all recent UK-US cooperation has been fruitful: the perception – real or supposed – of an inferior capability of British forces in Basra and Helmand seems to undermine the benefits of being seen as a faithful ally. Are British contributions being taken seriously, or even worse, do they truly deserve to be?

    The British role in the world

    Within the defence community in the UK, some of these questions are causing a rethink of the relationship: a recent RUSI survey of defence specialists found that nearly one-third of respondents disagreed with the proposition that a relationship with the United States, maintained above all others, best served British interests. While a finding of this kind taken from a sample of the British public might not be surprising following the deeply unpopular Iraq War, it is disturbing to find it so prevalent in the defence community, given the fact that the two sides are active partners engaged in an ongoing conflict. One cannot imagine drawing such results during the heady days of the Second World War. However one wonders if the ‘greatest generation’ would have taken such a poll in the first place. The predicted cuts to British defence spending and the potential, though unlikely, unilateral withdrawal of its independent nuclear deterrent – a point of debate in the 2010 election – mean that the UK’s future capability to partner with the US is now a concern on both sides of the Atlantic. A recent paper by Professor Malcolm Chalmers indicates that this scale-down could seriously impact the British ability to ‘punch above our weight’ in global politics.

    Has Britain effectively managed to answer Dean Acheson’s slightly belittling question: ‘What is Britain’s role in the dusk of Empire?’ American thinker Walter Russell Mead points to the historical British role in shaping the modern world and says that this explains Britain’s post-war alignment with US policy-makers.[2] Following the Imperial drawdown, it was not that Britain chose to subvert itself to US policy-makers, but rather that Britain chose to partner with the US because of the similarities in long-term political and economic objectives.

    To some extent, the Cold War revealed a major alignment of US and UK political assumptions about free market economics, the desirability of liberal democracy, and support for international organisations as a preventative of major-state conflict. While thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic debated the details, the commonality of these assumptions set the two states apart from even their closest allies. The question that is now being asked on both sides of the Atlantic is a good one: do these assumptions still hold, and do they play a major role in deciding the security priorities of both states? Despite the election of a US President who seems to share many British and European positions on nuclear weapons, multilateralism, and a preference for diplomatic over military solutions, the Tea Party syndrome and popularity of right-wing figures like Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin indicate a growing chasm between the US and the UK political culture. Furthermore, the financial scandal has raised the spectre of US protectionism of its home market, though this has yet to turn into a reality.

    A true partner

    Expectations must not be allowed to build beyond what is possible between the two states. Britain is in the strange position of having been surpassed by its own construct, but can and should still continue to contribute to a political discussion that it initiated. The deficit between the two has not been merely in hard power or trade but also in self-confidence. Arguably, the current malaise is not at all about the relationship, but about Britain losing sight of its vital role in building and maintaining the free market principles, the international institutions, and the political values that underpin the global order. With the rise of superpower economies – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the United States does not need a subordinate, neither does it want a go-it-alone Britain, it needs a true intellectual partner. In defence terms, the UK will have to make difficult choices, but these need not be permanent. It must refrain from underselling its defence and intelligence contribution to the partnership: Britain’s part has been praised by senior US political and military leaders, as well as the many troops on the ground. There may be major disagreements on the details of process or planning but that is a consequence of working so closely together on complex issues, rather than a systematic failure and should be treated as such. The main problem arises when political leaders on either side of the Atlantic, use these differences for domestic reasons. The reality of the relationship is quite promising: away from the anxious eyes of the press, away from the political heads, the relationship is extremely functional, and under the twin pressures of Islamic fundamentalism and insurgency, interoperability within the defence and intelligence communities has never been better.

    It is easy to view the relationship in terms of its failings, but the simple fact is that the ‘special relationship’ is the envy of most other US partners, and has a unique place in history. The US cannot decide Britain’s role for it, but whatever the UK decides, the US needs a strong and faithful ally.

    The views expressed above are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

    NOTES

    1. This sharing includes New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, so technically they are part of the ‘special relationship’.

    2. Walter Russell Meade, God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World’ (2009)

  • Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

    Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

     

    foto -geography.about.com

     

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus
    The emotions, whipped up by commentaries which followed the signing on October 10 of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia, have prevented a logical analysis of the situation.  In order to begin such an analysis, we need to recognize that at the roots of the signing of these accords lie a multi-sided game of significance far beyond the South Caucasus region.

    If at the outset, the opening of the borders with Armenia was one of the conditions on Turkey’s path toward joining the European Union, then at the present time, the rapprochement of the two countries depends on the geopolitical situation and Ankara’s participation in these processes.  Immediately after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian accords, as one should have expected, the EU put forward some new demands for Turkey, about which the latter could not have but known about in advance.  This means that Turkey signed the agreements with Armenia not as part of its effort to join the EU, something that provides one of the points of departure for understanding why Turkey decided to reach an agreement with Armenia.

    At the same time, we must not ignore the pressures on Turkey both direct and behind the scenes.  And those came from more places than just the capitals of the countries which were represented at the signing ceremony.  (Here, we intentionally are not touching on the role of Israel in all these complicated political games, the situation around Iran, the transportation routes for Iraqi oil and the Kurdish element in Iraq, as each of these represent a distinctive subject for discussion).

    Turkey, who bear the genetic code of the Ottoman Empire as far as great power games are concerned, will not agree to play the role of a defeated country even under the pressure of world powers.  Ankara is not in such a weak geopolitical situation that it has to act in ways that harm its national interests.  Not long ago, we should remember, Turkey felt itself strong enough to refuse the United States the right to use the military base at Incirlik for the supply of the anti-Saddam operations of the coalition forces in Iraq.

    When pointing to the harm the protocols between Ankara and Yerevan create for Azerbaijan in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one must not forget that the Armenian diaspora has terrorized Turkey with the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide.”  In its turn, Turkish diplomacy, which connects this question with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict until recently took a position absolutely the same as Azerbaijan both because of their common Turkishness and because of Turkey’s own national interests.  These two issues also served as a factor which united the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora, which resisted recognition of “the Armenian genocide” by pointing to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

    Viewed from that perspective, it would seem that Turkey, which has little to gain economically and politically by reaching an accord with Armenia, signed the protocols in a way that both undercut its own interests and angered its fraternal and strategic relationship with Azerbaijan.

    Of course, in contrast to the 1990s, Azerbaijan today is not the weak “younger brother” who needs support but an equal state that is confident in its own forces and demands respect on that basis.  This cannot entirely please the current Turkish powers that be, but it is not the occasion for a break with a reliable partner.  Differences in the question of the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey also cannot be the subject for speculation on such a strategic question as the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border.

    During the entire period of talks with Armenia, official representatives of Turkey at various levels repeated that the relationship Ankara sought would not harm the interests of Azerbaijan and that the Turkish-Armenian borders will not be opened until the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Among those who have constantly said this are Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu, members of the parliament, opposition figures and others both before and after the signing of the protocols.

    At the same time, every step of Armenian-Turkish negotiations was discussed with Baku, and talks about the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continued in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.

    And in this context, the declaration of Turkish President Gul concerning the impact in “a short time” of the Armenian-Turkish accords on “the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” merits attention and should calm many of the concerns in Azerbaijan.

    At the present time, when Azerbaijan has acquired major geopolitical importance, ignoring its interests on such an important issue is impossible.  Consequently, the interests of Baku were taken into consideration.  Note that immediately after the signing in Switzerland of the Armenian-Turkish agreement Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev arrived in Zurich where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was discussed.  Further, a short time after the signing of the agreement with the very same mission, Tina Kaidanow, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia arrived in Baku, and in the framework of the meetings of the foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with President Ilham Aliyev and his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov.  And the visit to Baku of General Ishyk Koshaner, commander of Turkish ground forces, to meet with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev is yet another confirmation of this.

    Taken together, it is clear that this cycle of visits was not a matter of chance.

    And if there were any doubt about this, the reaction both within Armenian society and also in the diaspora to the accord which should allow Armenia to escape from the blockade has been negative.  Evidently, Armenian society and politicians recognize that they will have to free the occupied territories, because otherwise no one intends to save Armenia.  It is not accidental that after the signing of the Zurich agreement, all sides represented at the ceremony except for Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan did not hide their satisfaction with what had taken place.

    In other words, everything shows that the Zurich agreement will have a positive consequence on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Judging by the presence at the signing ceremony of the representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group, it is possible to assert that all interested sides are informed about this process and about its impact on the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

    If under the pressure of the diaspora Armenia will not ratify the agreement, Azerbaijan and Turkey will return to where they were before.  If the Turkish and Armenian parliaments all the same give legal force to the agreement, then Armenia will have to free Azerbaijani territories in order to secure the opening of the Turkish borders.  Otherwise, Ankara, responding to public pressure in Azerbaijan and in Turkey will not be able to open the borders with Armenia.  In that case, Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion will be in a position to increase international pressure on Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora regarding the liberation of the occupied territories.

    If Armenia does not follow through, then Turkey will always be in a position to find reasons to close the borders.  In such a case, Azerbaijan will be left with only one choice – the liberation of the occupied territories by military means; and the countries involved in the division of spheres of influence in the region will have to agree with this.  Otherwise Azerbaijan, using its status as “the most reliable country for the transportation of gas,” will have every reason for refusing to allow the Nabucco project to pass through its territory.


    Every country has its own interests and priorities, and in this case, that means that there is no chance that Turkey will sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan for new ties with Armenia.

  • US ambassador hails Turkey’s role in Iran talks

    US ambassador hails Turkey’s role in Iran talks

    U.S. Ambassador to Ankara James Jeffrey said Wednesday that Turkey has played crucial role as a mediator regarding Iran’s nuclear problem for some time.

    Answering questions of journalists at an industrial zone in Ankara, Jeffrey said another mediator Brazil was in close cooperation with Turkey. U.S. President Barack Obama met with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Washington, D.C. and they discussed the issue of being a mediator for Iran’s nuclear problem, Jeffrey said.

    Meanwhile, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed hope on Wednesday that diplomatic efforts Turkey jointly exerted with Brazil yielded a positive result over Iran’s nuclear program. “We are continuing our vigorous consultations in full coordination with Brazil. We will have fresh initiatives in the coming days and I hope our joint efforts will bring about positive results,” Davutoglu told reporters in a press meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart Kostyantyn Hryshchenko in capital Kiev.

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has agreed “in principle” to a Brazilian role in breaking the deadlock over a U.N.-backed nuclear fuel swap with the West.

    Under the U.N. plan first put forward in 2009, Western powers would send nuclear fuel rods to a Tehran reactor in exchange for Iran’s stock of lower-level enriched uranium. The U.S. and its allies fear Iran’s disputed nuclear program aims to build nuclear weapons, and view the swap as a way to curb Tehran’s capacity to do so.

    Brazil denies nuclear swap plan

    Iran, which insists its nuclear program only aims to generate electricity, rejected the original exchange proposal. At the same time, the country’s leaders have worked to keep the offer on the table, proposing variations, though without accepting the terms set in the U.N. proposal.

    A statement posted on Ahmadinejad’s website late Tuesday said during a telephone conversation with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the Iranian president “announced his agreement in principle” to Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s mediation proposal.

    However, a spokesman for Brazil’s Foreign Ministry said Wednesday Brasilia had not made an official offer to mediate yet, but that Brazil was ready to help with talks any way it can.

    A Brazilian foreign ministry spokesman told AFP that no such plan had been proposed during a visit to Tehran last month by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.

    “We were informed that an official Iranian government website mentioned President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad supported a Brazilian ‘program.’ But there was no presentation of a formal program during the foreign minister’s visit,” the spokesman said.

    Brazil and Turkey, which are currently non-permanent members of the Security Council, oppose a new round of sanctions, insisting that only talks will resolve the impasse.

    —–

    Compiled from AA, AFP and AP reports by the Daily News staff.

    www.Hurriyetdailynews.com
  • Osama bin Laden is in Washington, says Ahmadinejad

    Osama bin Laden is in Washington, says Ahmadinejad

    WASHINGTON — Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Wednesday denied recent press reports that Osama bin Laden is in Tehran and insisted that the Al-Qaeda leader is, in fact, in the US capital of Washington.

    “Rest assured that he’s in Washington. I think there’s a high chance he’s there,” the Iranian leader told ABC television in an interview.

    Without backing up the claim, the Iranian leader said he had “heard” that bin Laden was in the US capital.

    “Yes, I did. He’s there. Because he was a previous partner of Mr. Bush,” he said referring to former president George W. Bush.

    “They were colleagues, in fact, in the old days. You know that. They were in the oil business together. They worked together. Mr. bin Laden never cooperated with Iran but he cooperated with Mr. Bush,” Ahmadinejad said.

    He added that, at any rate, US officials ought to know the extremist Islamic leaders whereabouts.

    “The US government has invaded Afghanistan in order to arrest bin Laden. They probably know where bin Laden is. If they don’t know he is, why did they invade? Could we know the intelligence?” he asked ABC.

    “First they should have tried to find his location, then invade, those who did not know about his location first they invaded and then they tried to find out where he is, is that logical?”

    AFP