Category: Brazil

  • Lebanese security officials seize suspicious cargo from US, Brazil

    Lebanese security officials seize suspicious cargo from US, Brazil

    shamsaraLebanon’s security officials say suspicious cargo from the US and Brazil containing huge amounts of US dollars, guns, special passports and credit cards have been seized upon arrival in the Lebanese capital, Beirut.

    The items, packed in a number of chests and delivered via airmail, were discovered at Beirut’s airport, the Lebanese security officials said.

    The chests also contained a list of both well-known and ordinary Lebanese citizens including a figure related to Salafi extremist groups. The security officials have summoned a number of the individuals, whose names were on the list, arresting some of them.

    Beirut has redoubled security surveillance across the country following remarks by some Lebanese factions as well as widespread rumors about the presence of al-Qaeda in Lebanon.

    Meanwhile, the Lebanese defense minister earlier confirmed that members of the al-Qaeda terrorist group, fighting against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, have entered Syria through Lebanon.

    Over the past few months, reports have circulated that caches of weapons have been smuggled to armed gangs in Syria through the Lebanese border.

    presstv.com

  • National Iranian American Council (NIAC): The Turkey-Brazil-Iran Deal, One Year Later

    National Iranian American Council (NIAC): The Turkey-Brazil-Iran Deal, One Year Later

    By: NIAC Staff – News

    One year after a deal to remove over one ton of nuclear fuel from Iran was rejected by the U.S., experts assessed why the deal was scuttled and what have been the resulting implications.

    Erdogan-Lula

    erdogan lulaWashington, DC – In May 2010, through intensive diplomatic efforts in Tehran, Turkey and Brazil brokered an agreement for Iran to give up over one ton of its nuclear fuel in exchange for fuel to produce medical isotopes. But the deal, known as the “Tehran Declaration,” was ultimately rejected by the U.S. One year later, the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) convened a panel discussion assessing why the deal was ultimately scuttled and what have been the resulting implications.

    Barbara Slavin, non-resident scholar at the Atlantic Council, said the deal was doomed before it was even finalized.

    In October 2009, the U.S., along with England, France, China, Russia and Germany (the P5+1), had pursued a “confidence building” deal similar to the Tehran Declaration. But that deal, which came during the first high level direct talks between the U.S. and Iran in recent history, was eventally rejected by Tehran.

    By the time Turkey and Brazil managed to revisit and secure a similar agreement in May, Slavin said, the U.S. had shifted to the sanctions track. There was little interest within the Obama Administration to return to the engagement track in the midst of a nearly completed push to build consensus at the United Nations Security Council for new sanctions.

    “There had been enormous pressure to show progress on the nuclear front by the end of 2009. If that didn’t happen, Obama made it quite clear he would pivot toward sanctions. And that was exactly what he did,” Slavin said.

    But for Turkey, according to SETA Research Director Kadir Ustun, there was genuine surprise that the U.S. rejected the agreement. Ustun said that, while Ankara had never considered the agreement to be comprehensive, it believed it was a means to overcome an impasse and prevent “regional tension and eventual war.” Ankara, he said, believed that “sanctions were counter-productive and counter to regional economic integration.” He said that Turkey continues to believe it can play a critical role in providing much needed mediation between Iran and the West.

    For Brazil, according to Matias Spektor of Brazil’s Center for International Relations, President Lula da Silva was led to believe he was pursuing diplomacy on behalf of the United States. President Obama had sent Lula a letter discussing the upcoming negotiations in Tehran, and Lula thought the letter was direct encouragement for him to pursue the Tehran Declaration.

    Spektor argued that Brazil also believed it could provide much needed trust for efforts to engage Iran to be succesful. “They felt that they could talk to Iran,” he said, “because they had willingly given up its weapons program.”

    As a result of not communicating and pursuing the opportunity presented by the Brazil-Turkey deal, but instead going forward with UN sanctions, Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council observed that the U.S. is in a much more difficult situation than it was last year. By falling back on sanctions and turning down a chance to secure some of Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) through Brazilian and Turkish interlocutors, Parsi said, an important opportunity was lost. And during the time that has passed, Iran has amassed even more LEU, albeit at a slower pace.

    Parsi said that a peaceful resolution with Iran will take a far greater investment in diplomacy than has been pursued to date. “Between the end of October and the beginning of May, Brazil and Turkey engaged in more direct diplomacy (with Iran) than all of the P5+1 combined,” he stated.

    “Talking for just three weeks isn’t enough to bridge the divide.”

    via National Iranian American Council (NIAC): The Turkey-Brazil-Iran Deal, One Year Later.

  • What’s Behind the Currency War?

    What’s Behind the Currency War?

    Antony P. Mueller writes: In September 2010, a short time before the international financial summit of the Group of Twenty (G20) took place in South Korea, Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega declared that the world is experiencing a “currency war” where “devaluing currencies artificially is a global strategy.”

    currency war DollarGunBarrelBy announcing the outbreak of a “currency war,” Mantega wanted to draw attention to the problems caused by the ongoing exchange-rate manipulations that governments put in place in order to gain economic advantages. In this sense, “currency war” denotes the conflict among nations that arises from the deliberate manipulation of the exchange rate in order to gain international competitiveness by way of currency devaluation.

    Competitive Devaluation

    Calling competitive devaluation a “war” may seem like a gross exaggeration. Yet in terms of its potential of destruction, the current global financial conflict may well rank at a level similar to that of a real war.

    In a wider historical perspective, the current currency war is the latest conflict in a series of acute crises of the modern international monetary system. In a world of national monetary regimes based on fiat money without physical anchors, domestic monetary instability automatically transforms into exchange-rate instability. As before, the current crisis of the international economic order is mainly the result of monetary fragilities coming from the unsound national monetary systems and reckless domestic monetary and fiscal policies.

    The immediate cause of the currency war entering an acute stage is the policy of massive quantitative easing practiced by the US central bank. Whatever the original intention of this policy may have been, the consequences of the Fed’s measures include monetary expansion, low interest rates, and a weaker US dollar. With dollar interest rates approaching the “zero bound,” the United States is joining Japan in the effort to stimulate a sluggish economy with massive monetary impulses.

    Until recently, the currency war was contained as a kind of financial cold war. The conflict entered its hot phase as a result of the expansive monetary policies that were put in place in the wake of the financial-market crisis that began in 2007. In defiance of the fact that the financial crisis itself was the result of the extremely expansive monetary policies in the years before, many central banks have now accelerated monetary expansion in the vain attempt to cure the disease with the same measures that had caused it in the first place.

    Easy Money and International Financial Flows

    What has emerged in the global financial arena over the past couple of years is the interplay among easy money, low interest rates, international trade imbalances, financial flows, and exchange-rate manipulations. The failure of attempts to cure overindebtedness with more debt, and to stimulate weak economies by giving them interest rates as low as possible, provokes a repetitive pattern of bubble and crash where each phase ends in a higher level of government debt.

    A global search for higher yields has been going on not unlike what happened in the late 1960s and 1970s, when the United States inflated and the countries that had linked their exchange rates to the US dollar suffered from imported inflation. Nowadays, the formal dollar-based fixed-exchange-rate system no longer exists. It has been replaced by a system that sometimes is called “Bretton Woods II”: a series of countries, particularly in Asia this time, have pegged their exchange rates (albeit without a formal agreement) to the US dollar.

    If a country wants to slow down the appreciation of its exchange rate that comes as a consequence of the financial inflows from abroad, it must intervene in the foreign-exchange markets and monetize at least a part of the foreign exchange. This way, the monetary authorities will automatically increase the domestic money stock. Additionally, under this system relatively poor countries feel forced not only to buy the debt issued by the relatively wealthy countries like the United States but also to buy these bonds at their current extremely low yields.

    Under current conditions, the monetary expansion gets globalized and invades even those countries that wish to practice restrictive monetary policy. Relatively high levels of the interest rate improve the restrictive currency’s attractiveness. Thus, more and more monetary expansion happens on a global scale, which in turn provides the fuel for the next great wave of international financial flows.

    The weaker countries, which compete with each other on the basis of low prices, are getting pushed to the side; it was just a matter of time until more and more governments would begin to intervene in the foreign-exchange markets by buying up foreign currencies in order to try to prevent their exchange rates from appreciating too much, too fast.

    Yet using the exchange rate as a tool in order to gain economic advantage or avert damage for the domestic economy is inherently at variance with a sound global monetary order, because one country’s devaluation automatically implies the revaluation of another country’s currency and thus the advantage that one tries to obtain will be achieved by putting a burden on other countries.

    Escalation

    By recycling the monetary equivalent of the trade surplus into the financial markets around the globe, monetary authorities in surplus countries form a symbiosis with trade-deficit countries in fabricating a worldwide monetary expansion of extreme proportions.

    “Once again, the international monetary system is on the brink of a breakdown.”

    The paradoxical, or rather perverse, features of the current state of affairs were highlighted a short time ago when in January 2011 the monetary authorities of Turkey decided to lower the policy interest rates so as to make the inflow of foreign funds less attractive, despite a booming Turkish economy that shows plenty characteristics of a bubble.

    Exchange-rate policies produce the usual spiral of interventionism: the de facto consequences tend to diverge from the original intentions, prompting further rounds of doomed interventions. This interventionist escalation is not only limited to an incessant repetition of the same failed policies, but the errors committed in one policy area also affect other parts of the economy. Thus, it is only a matter of time until errors of monetary policy lead to fiscal fiascos, and exchange-rate interventions lead to trade conflicts.

    At first sight, exchange-rate intervention may appear tolerable as the legitimate pursuit of national self-interest. But exchange-rate policies are intrinsically matters that tend to stir transnational controversies. When a country’s exchange rate policy collides with the interests of the trading partners, the tit-for-tat of mutual retaliation automatically tends to lead to an escalation of the conflict. Once the process of competitive devaluation has started, a devaluation by one country invites other countries to devaluate their exchange rates as well. As a consequence, the international monetary order will eventually disintegrate, and sooner or later the conflict will go beyond currency issues and affect a wide spectrum of economic and political relations.

    Therefore, because of the unsound monetary system, a peaceful international political system also is constantly at risk. Monetary conflicts provoke political confrontations. Besides the immediate costs of exchange-rate conflicts that come from the damage to international trade and investment, and thereby to the international division of labor, harm will also be done to confidence and trust in the international political arena.

    The dispute about exchange rates is the consequence of contradictory tensions that are innate to the modern monetary system. In this respect the currency war is an expression of the defects that characterize an unsound and destructive financial system. The outbreak of the currency war is a symptom of a deeply flawed international monetary order.

    Brazil

    When Brazil’s finance minister repeated his warnings in January 2011 and said that “the currency war is turning into a trade war,” Mantega sent a signal to the world that the escalation of the trade war had started. Because of the massive inflow of money from abroad, the Brazilian currency had sharply appreciated and the Brazilian economy was losing competitiveness.

    In order to reduce the impact on is domestic economy, Brazil had been intervening in the foreign-exchange markets, diminishing the degree of currency appreciation. In doing so, the monetary authorities had to buy foreign currencies, mainly US dollars, in exchange for its domestic money.

    By pursuing such a policy over the past couple of years, Brazil has increased its foreign-exchange reserves from around 50 billion to 300 billion US dollars.[1] Yet even despite these foreign-exchange interventions, the Brazilian currency appreciated drastically against the US dollar and other currencies.

    By various estimates, Brazilian foreign trade suffers from an exchange-rate overvaluation of around 40 percent. As a consequence, Brazil’s current account balance, which was still at surplus in 2007, has plunged into a deficit of 47.5 billion US dollars in 2010.[2] At the same time when an artificial boom is taking place as the result of massive monetary expansion, the Brazilian economy suffers from creeping deindustrialization.[3]

    Part of the explosion of Brazil’s current-account deficit can be explained by weak demand from its trading partners, which have plunged into a prolonged recession. Yet beyond this circumstance, there has been another causal chain at work: the inflow of funds from abroad that boosts the exchange rate provides the grounds for an exorbitant increase of the country’s monetary base.[4]

    The combination of ample liquidity at home, weak demand from some trading partners abroad, and a strong exchange-rate appreciation provides the basis for an extreme import expansion that vastly exceeds exports. Unlike a country such as Germany, for example, whose industry is pretty resilient against currency appreciation, Brazil resembles in this respect the countries of the Southern periphery of the eurozone in its incapacity to cope effectively with an overvalued currency.

    When, in January 2011, a new government took power in Brazil, the newly-elected president, Dilma Rousseff, declaredin her inauguration speech that she will protect Brazil “from unfair competition and from the indiscriminate flow of speculative capital.” Guido Mantega, the former and new Brazilian finance minister, did not hesitate to join in when he asserted that the government has an “infinite” number of interventionist tools at its disposal with which to protect national interests. Mantega said that the government is ready to use taxation and trade measures in order to stop the deterioration of Brazil’s trade balance.

    China

    The countries that form the favored group that gets targeted by international financial flows in search of higher yields compete among themselves in order to prevent their currencies from appreciating too much, and as a group these countries compete against China in their efforts to maintain a competitive exchange rate.

    China’s position forms part of a long causal chain, which includes low interest rates and monetary expansion in the United States, that fuels higher import demand. Given that China drastically devalued its exchange rate as early as in the 1980s, this country was at the forefront of gaining advantage of America’s import surge; China grabbed the golden opportunity to turn itself into the major exporter to the United States.

    In order to maintain its currency at its undervalued level, the Chinese monetary authorities must buy up the excess of foreign exchange that accumulates from its trade surplus, preferably by buying US treasury notes and bonds. In this way, China became America’s main creditor. Over the past decade, China increased its foreign exchange position from a meager $165 billion in 2000 to an amount that was approaching $3 trillion at the end of 2010.

    From the 1980s up to the early 1990s, China devalued its currency from less than 2 yuan to the US dollar to an exchange rate of 9 yuan against the US dollar. And despite its huge trade surpluses, China has only slightly revalued the yuan ever since, establishing the current exchange rate at 6.56 yuan per US dollar.

    Over the past decade, China has become the major financier of the US budget deficit. Together with other monies flowing in from abroad, the US government was relieved from the need to cut spending. The inflow of foreign capital also allowed the US government to pay lower interest rates for its debt than it would have if only domestic supply of savings were available. Foreign imports put pressure on the price level, and the US central bank could continue monetary expansion without an immediate effect on the price-inflation rate.

    If China wants to hold its competitive position through an undervalued currency, the Chinese monetary authorities must continue their policy of intervention in the foreign-exchange markets. As a consequence of buying dollars from its exporters, the domestic money supply in China continues to rise, throwing additional fuel on a domestic boom that is already in full swing.

    Even more so than their Brazilian counterparts, China’s political-decision makers have failed to exert moderation or restraint when it comes to interventionist measures. As long as China’s leadership presumes that it gains from exchange-rate manipulation, its currency interventions will go on.

    Global Financial Fragilities

    Since the abandonment of the gold standard, the global financial system has been in disarray. All the international monetary arrangements that have been established since then have ended in crisis and finally collapsed. For almost a hundred years now, one interventionist scheme has been established and then soon fallen to pieces.

    When the monetary and fiscal decision makers in the United States and Europe discarded all restraints against intervention in the wake of the financial market crisis, socialist and interventionist governments around the globe felt vindicated. They had long been convinced that only through state control could financial stability be obtained. Due to the policies adopted by Western countries in their futile attempt to overcome the financial-market crisis, the leaders of the so-called emerging economies have become even more unscrupulous interventionists.

    Political leaders around the globe have shed the little that was left of support for free markets and set the controls for a way back on the road to serfdom.

    It is mainly due to ignorance that the modern monetary system gets labeled as a laissez-faire or free market system. In fact not only the basic “commodity” of this scheme, i.e., fiat money, but also its price and quantity are largely determined by political institutions such as central banks.

    It is more than absurd when, in the face of crises and conflicts, more government intervention gets called upon: it was state intervention in the first place that laid the groundwork for the trouble to appear.

    So-called “speculative” international capital flows already happened decades ago. What has changed since then is the amount of hot money and the speed with which it floats around the world. It would be wrong to describe these financial movements as an expression of free markets. The fact, for instance, that in 2010 daily transactions on the international currency market have reached a volume of four trillion US dollars is the result of unhampered fiat-money expansion and massive state intervention in the foreign-exchange markets.

    The increase in the global money supply that has been going on for many years finds its complement in a global asset boom. The inflation of money drives up the price of precious metals, natural resources, and food. Once more, the world experiences a period of fake prosperity not much different from the real-estate bubble, and many other episodes, that led to previous financial crises.

    Conclusion

    The political endeavors to gain competitive advantages through exchange-rate devaluation sows mistrust among nations; and the ensuing regime uncertainties frustrate the business community. Over time the conflict over exchange rates tends to destroy the global division of labor.

    Once again, the international monetary system is on the brink of a breakdown. As in the past, the main reason behind the current conflict is extreme monetary expansion. Unsound monetary systems produce turmoil not just at home but also in the international arena. Excessive monetary expansion, which is the cause of domestic malinvestment, is also the root of economic distortions at a global level.

    Without a fundamental change of the monetary system itself, without a return to sound money, the international monetary system will remain in a state of permanent fragility — ever oscillating between the abyss of deflationary depression and the fake escape of hyperinflation. This is the fate of the world when nations implement fiat monetary systems and put them under political authority.

    Antony Mueller is a German-born economist who lives in Aracaju in Northeastern Brazil where he teaches at the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS). He is an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute USA and academic director of theInstituto Ludwig von Mises Brasil. See his website and blog. Send him mail. See Antony P. Mueller’s article archives.

    www.marketoracle.co.uk, Feb 23, 2011

  • ‘Turkey, Brazil will not attend P5+1 talks’

    ‘Turkey, Brazil will not attend P5+1 talks’

    Senior Iranian lawmaker Alaeddin Boroujerdi says Turkey and Brazil will not be present in Iran’s multifaceted talks with major world powers.

    Head of the Parliament (Majlis) National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Alaeddin Boroujerdi
    Head of the Parliament (Majlis) National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Alaeddin Boroujerdi

    On October 14, EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton expressed the West’s readiness to return to negotiations and proposed three-day talks with Iran in mid-November in the Austrian capital of Vienna.

    Dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 — Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US plus Germany — has been stalled since October 1, 2009, when the two sides met in Geneva.

    Iran on Tuesday announced that its multifaceted talks with the P5+1 would restart on December 6 in Switzerland.

    “We will have two rounds of talks with the West; one is talks with the P5+1 and the other is negotiations with the Vienna Group — France, Russia, the US, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — about fuel for the Tehran reactor,” head of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission told Khabar Online on Sunday.

    Tehran has stressed that it would negotiate the issue of a nuclear fuel swap with the Vienna group within the framework of the Tehran declaration, and its talks with the P5+1 would not include nuclear issue.

    “Regarding negotiations with the Vienna Group based on the Tehran declaration, the three countries (Iran, Turkey and Brazil) wrote a letter to IAEA chief [Yukiya Amano] and stressed that all three countries would be present in talks,” Boroujerdi said.

    Iran signed a declaration with Turkey and Brazil on May 17 based on which it agreed to exchange 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium on Turkish soil with nuclear fuel.

    Boroujerdi refrained from giving his opinion about the result of negotiations and said the US has lost the political struggle.

    “When the foreign ministers of the European countries were in Tehran they explicitly said that we (Iran) are not allowed to use two centrifuge machines but today we have crossed all these borders,” he added.

    The US and its allies used their influence on the UN Security Council to press for fresh sanctions against Iran over the country’s nuclear program which they claim is aimed at developing nuclear weapons.

    Iranian officials have repeatedly refuted the accusations, arguing that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the IAEA, Tehran has the right to use peaceful nuclear technology.

    MYA/HGH/MMN

  • Brisa Looks for India, Turkey Highway Chances After Brazil Exit

    Brisa Looks for India, Turkey Highway Chances After Brazil Exit

    Brisa-Auto Estradas de Portugal SA, Portugal’s biggest toll-road company, is looking for opportunities to expand in India and Turkey after selling its stake in Cia. de Concessoes Rodoviarias SA, Brazil’s biggest toll-road operator.

    “After selling CCR, Brisa’s portfolio is very unbalanced,” Chief Executive Officer Vasco de Mello said at a presentation to investors, according to a regulatory filing posted on the website of the country’s securities markets watchdog. “Too much concentrated in Portugal.”

    The company, based near Lisbon, plans to bid for a contract to operate and manage a highway in Mumbai, and sees opportunities in the privatization of motorways and Bosphorus bridges in Turkey. Brisa has already sold 9.4 percent of CCR and plans to sell the remaining 7 percent by the end of the year.

    Brisa is facing sluggish growth in Portugal as the country’s austerity measures to curb the budget deficit choke consumer demand. The company predicts higher toll revenue next year as drivers must now pay to use some competing highways that were formerly toll-free, and Brisa’s own tolls rising 0.6 percent.

    The company expects to invest between 200 million euros ($273 million) and 300 million euros in new business opportunities, according to the filing. Average annual capital spending on Portuguese highway projects for 2011 through 2015 will be 95 million euros, dropping to 65 million euros from 2016, it said.

    Toll Machines

    Brisa predicts operating costs will be unchanged in 2011, after dropping 4 percent this year, more than the 3 percent initially forecast. The company expects additional costs from the opening of new highways to be offset by savings from the introduction of cash and card toll machines on Portuguese highways, forecast to total 3.5 million euros from 2011.

    The company will complete its corporate reorganization by the end of the year, creating a holding company that will control its three business areas. Brisa said it will finish this year with net debt of 2.3 billion euros and has “no major short-term” refinancing needs.

    Brisa plans to pay a 31 euro-cent dividend to shareholders for the next five years and is considering a share buyback to bring its holding up to 10 percent, including 4 percent the company already owns.

    To contact the reporter on this story: Anabela Reis in Lisbon at areis1@bloomberg.net.

    To contact the editor responsible for this story: Angela Cullen at acullen8@bloomberg.net

    via Brisa Looks for India, Turkey Highway Chances After Brazil Exit – Bloomberg.

  • President Gül says Turkey may join ranks of BRIC countries

    President Gül says Turkey may join ranks of BRIC countries

    President Abdullah Gül has said he hoped Turkey’s economic progress would take it into the ranks of emerging BRIC countries — Brazil, Russia, India and China — although he made it clear Turkey remains committed to joining the European Union.

    Gül, in an interview with the Financial Times, said the international order was shifting towards the East. “It wouldn’t be surprising if we start talking about BRIC plus T,” he said. The BRIC countries are considered to be at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development, and their growing influence in the global scene is seen as an indication of the shift in economic power from the developed West towards the developing world.

    Turkey, which has built closer ties with its Middle East neighbors under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, has been accused in the West of turning away from the Western club and cozying up to countries such as Iran.

    Gül, who was on a visit to Britain to receive the prestigious Chatham House Prize, said in the interview that Turkey still saw membership in the EU as a “strategic vision” and wanted to be part of the principles that Europe defends, promising that Ankara would make sure it met all standards required for membership even though large parts of its entry negotiations are frozen.

    But Gül, speaking a day before the European Commission criticized Turkey for restrictions on freedom of expression and over Cyprus in an annual progress report released on Tuesday, also complained of political obstacles raised by some EU member countries. “We see certain political issues being included in the process, which have the effect of slowing down and, to a certain extent, hijacking these negotiations. We are not happy about this,” Gül told the Financial Times on Monday.

    Speaking in Oxford also on Monday, Gül said some EU member states were creating “artificial problems” in Turkey’s EU membership negotiations but said Turkey would stick to the task. “The injection of some political issues of certain member countries in the negotiating process leads to certain artificial problems that in our point of view are not fair and not acceptable,” he said at an event hosted by the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. “But Turkey is determined to move forward in the direction of working on the negotiations,” he said.

    Gül declined to name any country when he complained that certain, unnamed, “short-sighted” EU countries had hidden behind the Greek Cypriots to pursue their own objective of delaying Turkey’s membership bid in interviews with the British media. But Turkish officials say some EU countries, such as France, are using the impasse over Cyprus to stall Turkey’s accession bid.

    He also said one cannot say for sure that Turkey will eventually join the EU because there will be public votes in several EU countries on Turkish membership after conclusion of accession talks with Turkey. “When the time comes, those countries will decide whether or not Turkey would be a burden on them. Maybe Turkish people would say, ‘although we concluded the negotiation process successfully, let us not be a member’,” Gül told the BBC’s “HARDtalk.”

    Responding to a question on Turkey’s position regarding a planned NATO-wide missile defense system, Gül was hopeful that the alliance’s upcoming summit in Lisbon will produce a consensus on the issue. “The NATO Summit will convene in Lisbon next week. I think everybody will reach a consensus in the end,” he said.

    Turkey insists that no country should be named as a potential threat in relevant NATO documents, a reference to Turkey’s neighbor, Iran.

    When it was pointed out that US President Barack Obama addressed Muslim countries and relayed messages about peace and dialogue when he first came to power and he was asked whether Obama has caused disappointment since then, Gül said: “No, I think he is kindhearted. He does good things sincerely. However, maybe he could not succeed. Not only Muslims but others should listen to Obama. He should also persuade others, not just one party, to achieve peace in the region.”

    via Today’s Zaman, your gateway to Turkish daily news.