Category: Middle East & Africa

  • A Major Political Test for Iraq

    A Major Political Test for Iraq

    Published: August 4, 2008

    Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk has been a political tinderbox-in-waiting that was largely ignored as war-fighting took precedence. Now that violence is way down, Iraqi leaders have no excuse not to peacefully decide the city’s future. Their failure to do so has already raised tensions and could further shred Iraq’s fragile social fabric — and unleash more bloodshed.

    Kurds who run the semiautonomous region of Kurdistan should not be allowed to unilaterally annex Kirkuk, which they regard as their ancient capital but is also home to Turkmen and Arabs. They were promised a referendum in the Iraqi Constitution, but no durable solution can result without the participation of all groups. Overconfident Kurds and their American supporters have not been looking seriously for compromise.

    The problem came to a head two weeks ago when Iraq’s Parliament passed a law again postponing a referendum on Kirkuk (it was supposed to be held by the end of 2007). The law contained a measure diluting Kurdish power in the area’s provincial council.

    The Kurds believe the referendum will endorse making Kirkuk and surrounding areas part of Kurdistan — giving them more oil revenue and furthering their goal of independence — while Turkmen and Arab leaders want the city to stay under the central government.

    Kurdish parliamentarians boycotted the session, resulting in the election law being declared unconstitutional. Another session on Sunday dissolved without reaching a quorum; lawmakers were to try again on Monday.

    The problem is not just with the Kirkuk referendum. If the Kurds continue to hold the election law hostage, provincial elections now expected in early 2009 will also be stymied. These elections are crucial to Iraq’s political stability and reconciliation efforts because they will give minority Sunni Arabs a chance to be in government for the first time since they boycotted the 2005 elections. Sunnis who played a key role fighting with American forces against Iraqi insurgents are already embittered by the failure of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government to hire enough of them for promised security jobs.

    Compromises on Kirkuk are theoretically possible, but only the U.N. seems to be seriously trying to find one. That’s baffling, since no one, other than the Iraqis, has more vested in keeping the lid on violence and on tension with Turkey and Iran than the United States.

    Iraqis proved their post-Saddam political wheeling-and-dealing skills when they adopted budget, amnesty and provincial powers laws earlier this year. It’s worth testing whether horse-trading on the crucial but deadlocked oil law and other contentious issues like minority rights and redistribution of powers could produce a Kirkuk deal all ethnic communities could live with.

    If Iraqi leaders cannot settle the matter, they might consider putting Kirkuk and its environs under United Nations administration as was done with Brcko after the Balkan wars. The imperative is to ensure that Kirkuk’s future is not drawn in blood.

     

  • Turkey can bridge the US-Iran divide

    Turkey can bridge the US-Iran divide

    By Manik Mehta, Special to Gulf News
    Published: August 03, 2008, 23:35

    Turkey’s relations with the US went through a rollercoaster, last October, when the US Congress passed a resolution on Armenia, describing the killings of Armenians during the First World War in the Ottoman empire as “genocide”. This had angered Istanbul which was already riled by the war in Iraq from where the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) launched attacks on Turkey.

    However, US-Turkish relations considerably improved, particularly after the warm welcome to Turkish President Abdullah Gul during his visit to Washington earlier this year. The ensuing strategic cooperation between the two sides is a manifestation of what Gul called a “new chapter” in bilateral relations.

    Although Turkish public opinion is unfavourable against the US, the strategic cooperation has, meanwhile, resuscitated the relationship between the two Nato partners. Kurdish nationalism is Ankara’s Achilles’ heel; it has brought Turkey closer to Iran which has its own Kurdish problem and has found a common cause with Turkey. Additionally, both sides have a vibrant trading and economic relationship.

    While critics fear that closer Turkish-Iranian ties will have ramifications for US-Turkish relations, others see an opportunity. Turkey’s close ties with Iran should be used to persuade the latter to renounce its nuclear programme which is causing a lot of concern to the US and, particularly, Israel which has been the target of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s belligerent outbursts.

    US-Turkish contacts have recently intensified on Iran’s nuclear programme. President George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, met Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan in July in Ankara – just before Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki arrived in Turkey – to send, apparently, a carrot-and-stick message on Iran’s nuclear programme. Subsequently, US and Iranian representatives met, for the first time in three decades, at the six-nation meeting in Geneva to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme.

    Indeed, Mottaki sounded unusually conciliatory, even calling the presence of Undersecretary of State William Burns, the third senior-most American diplomat, at the talks as “a new positive approach”. Turkey has apparently played a quiet role in Mottaki’s moderate reaction which was a far cry from Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric. Though glaring fundamental differences between the two will persist, an atmospheric improvement, with some help from Turkey, could bring both sides on “talking terms”.

    Iran’s testing of two separate rounds of long-range ballistic missiles in early July has also unnerved not only the United States and Israel, but also the Gulf Arab states. The missile firing was intended to send different messages to different audiences. The missile tests warn the West that Iran, which has strengthened its presence in the Strait of Hormuz, could target oil shipments from the Arabian Gulf ports and deal a crippling blow to the Western and also the oil-driven Arab economies.

    They were also aimed to silence Iran’s domestic critics, frustrated with the regime’s ruinous economic policies, by whipping up nationalist fervour and take the wind out of the critics’ sail.

     

    Rapprochement

    According to some American strategists, Turkey would be willing to bring about the rapprochement between the US and Iran, and thus prevent a military conflict. On the other hand, the hardcore Iranian leadership would prefer making concessions on the nuclear issue to Muslim Turkey rather than directly to the US.

    Indeed, some Americans argue that by allowing it a face-saving withdrawal, Iran could be persuaded to eventually abandon its nuclear programme. The Iranian people desperately want an end to the West-backed sanctions against their country which is treated like a pariah at every international venue because of their unpopular regime.

    Indeed, the regime knows this and also the fact that it will not be able to stop for long the tide of public disenchantment with its dogmatic attitude. This is a good time for the US to take more Turkish help and resolve the stalemate with Iran.

    Manik Mehta is a commentator on Asian affairs.

    Source: Gulf News, August 03, 2008

  • FELLOWSHIP- 2009 Junior Faculty Development Program (JFDP)

    FELLOWSHIP- 2009 Junior Faculty Development Program (JFDP)

    Posted by: Junior Faculty Development Program <[email protected]>

    The Government of the United States of America is pleased to announce the open competition for the Junior Faculty Development Program (JFDP) for the 2009 spring semester. The JFDP is a program of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State (ECA). American Councils for International Education:

    ACTR/ACCELS, an American non-profit, non-governmental organization, receives a grant from ECA to administer the JFDP, and oversee each participant’s successful completion of the program. The United States Congress annually appropriates funds to finance the JFDP, and authorizes the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to oversee these funds.

    If you are a citizen of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan, and are teaching full-time in an institution of higher education in your home country, have at least two years of university-level teaching experience, and are highly proficient in English, American Councils invites you to learn more about the program and apply.

    JFDP applications may now be downloaded as a print version or submitted online at the JFDP website. Additional information, including the 2008-2009 calendar, academic field descriptions, a list of frequently asked questions, and information about past program participants and host institutions can be found at the JFDP website:

    http:\\www.jfdp.org&Horde=4fcb6119853632a5cd4a4348e0f9d664 .

    Applications are due for applicants from Eurasia on August 29, 2008.

    Applications are due for applicants from Southeast Europe on September 5, 2008.

    Thank you very much for your help in promoting this program.

    Sincerely,

    JFDP Organizers

  • A triumph for Turkey – and its allies

    A triumph for Turkey – and its allies

    By M K Bhadrakumar

    The Israelis are expected to know something extra about their tough neighborhood that we do not know. In all probability, the two Israeli officials – Shalom Turjeman and Yoram Turbowitz – knew when they set out for Ankara on Tuesday that Turkey’s government was far from dysfunctional or was going to be in any danger of extinction within the next 24 hours.

    The two advisors to (outgoing ) Prime Minister Ehud Olmert were on a sensitive mission to hold the fourth round of peace talks with Syria under Turkish mediation. The format of the talks is such that Turkish officials shuttle between the Israeli and Syrian diplomats, who do not come face to face. The Turks seem to have done a masterly job. On Monday, Syria’s ambassador to the United States, Imad Mustafa, speaking on a public platform in Washington, said, “We [Syria and Israel] desire to recognize each other and end the state of war.”

    “Here, then, is a grand thing on offer. Let us sit together, let us make peace, let us end once and for all the state of war,” Imad added, referring to the peace talks brokered by Turkey. Clearly, Turkey’s political stability is no longer just a national issue of 80 million Turks. It is a vital issue today for the international community. And Turkey’s role in the Israel-Syria peace talks is only the tip of the iceberg. In the highly volatile Middle East situation, Turkey also facilitated contacts between US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. (The two adversaries visited Ankara recently.) Furthermore, Turkey has waded into the Iraq project.

    Besides, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is poised to spread to the northern shores of the Black Sea. The new cold war has arrived in Turkey. Moscow is determined not to repeat its historic mistake of driving Turkey into the NATO camp, as it did in the 1950s.

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is scheduling a visit to Turkey. A Moscow analyst noted, “Atomstroyexport [Russia’s nuclear power equipment and service equipment monopoly] is ready to provide Turkey with a project for the construction of a nuclear power plant [NPP] that will be less expensive and more reliable than its American counterparts. Such NPPs will help Turkey to consolidate its position in the regional energy market, especially considering Iran’s nuclear energy problems. Moscow has long been hinting to Ankara that it is best to give priority to economic expediency, especially in the energy industry.”Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

    (Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

    Source: Asia Times, Aug 2, 2008

  • Cultural Influences On Caspian

    Cultural Influences On Caspian

    Brenda Shaffer works to define cultural domination on states’ foreign or domestic affairs in “Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy?”article. With some examples, Shaffer is explaining this event us. Firstly, Shaffer begin the article with Huntigton’s thesis: “The Clash of Civilizations”1Shaffer gives an example about different state decision-making. Some Muslim countries have Anti-American people as behavioral. But these states make alliance with the USA like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. Commonly we can see incongruent actings between states policies and people behaviors.
    Iran – Playing Politics with Islamic Style

    Samuel Huntigton’s thesis bases on idea that culture has main role in defining of policy. Also Brenda Shaffer agrees Huntigton’s thesis. Shaffer says that culture is main mechanism for diplomatic relations. Shaffer interprets culture as specific culture of country’s within religion, history and civilization.

    Western scholars researched about Islam effection in Muslim countries after 11 September terrorist act. They looked at Muslim scholars, historians, diplomats and generals. They understood Islam effection as strong as nuclear weapons. But this is not a physical thing, this is an ideology. And they speeches to newspapers, politic journals a subject that has a title as “Do Muslim countries act differently than Non-Muslim States?”

    On the other hand, Shaffer interests about this subject under the psychological perspective. Human beings are often driven by culture according to Shaffer. Also, human behavior effects on to state affairs. But state acts partly different from human behaviors. We can give example from philosophical history: Some philosophers think that the state is a thing like human. But it is systematically human. The state action is like people’s actions. State is big form of human and human is small form of the state. As behavioral psychological meaning has different dimensions.

     

    Shaffer’s Caspian perspective has common beliefs. According to Shaffer, all Caspian countries have been influenced by Islam effection after from the Soviet Union. And now they have Islamic perspective on their state affairs. But Shaffer judges all Caspian and Middle Asia area as Islamic effection zones. But it is not totally like that. Today these countries are secular except Iran.

    The Islamic Republic of Iran is important in this area according to Shaffer’s idea. After the collapsing of the USSR, Iran wanted to export their Islamic regime to other neighbor states. In Central Asia and Caucasus territory, Iran plays for exporting their Persian Islamic mind as a regime under the title as “Islamic Solidarity” with economic and security events. Shaffer is true for this event. Iran wanted to export their regime to other states. But American or Western scholars’ view point is different. They are looking as totally Islamic system to Iran. They say about Iran that they are working for Islamic fundamentalism. But Iran’s Islamic mind is very different from normal Islamic idea. Persian Islamic system bases on fundamentalist movement. If we look at Turkey, Egypt or others, we can see normal, laic Islamic behavior. Also Shaffer says their false point in next sentence. “Poor Muslim countries have an influence circumstance but secular Muslim countries challenges to Iran like Turkmenistan.”
    – The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (Christian Armenia versus Muslim Azerbaijan)

    But Tehran has faced three regional disputes :

    – The Chechen conflict (Chechen Muslims versus Moscow)

    – The Tajik civil war (The Islamic Renaissance Party versus Moscow

    In these mix circumstances Iranian fundamentalist approach transformed to self-interest system. And most telling of these policy preferences are Iran’s support for Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.2FinalCulture may be material interest of regime survivability. Islam is more likely to affect policy under conditions that see greater domestic and personnel influences on foreign policies.Mehmet Fatih OZTARSU
    Qafqaz University Law Faculty
    International Relations

    By these events, Iran’s state security was challenged in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia since Iran is a multiethnic state. Shaffer Gives information about Iran’s population: Half of Iran’s population is comprised of non Persian ethnic minorities; Azerbaijani groups. The majority of the residents of Iran’s northwestern provinces which border the country of Azerbaijan and they are Azerbaijani. But Iran’s relations bogged down with Baku because of Iranian self interests.

    Shaffer shows their ideas that Iranian diversity of opinion is good example for Iranian foreign policy. There are some different points as historical legacies and religious differences in policies.

    “On the other hand Turkey attempted to conduct a balanced policy toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also Turkey helped for Karabagh conflict to Baku.”

    Turkey changed its policy when Karabagh became a conflict. This is an example for cultural combines. (Brenda Shaffer)

    According to many observers, religious differences have played a central role in the Caspian region. With these happenings, Azerbaijan supported Chechnya. Also some analysts have assumed that religious differences serve as a basis for conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia. Over these events, common culture serves as a basis role for alliances and coalitions and different cultures act as an obstacle to cooperation.

    Shaffer’s opinion is that there are cultural alliances are created follow by from collapsing of the USSR.

    Tehran’s main argument is Shiite background in their helping system. Also Turkey and Azerbaijan shares ethnic Turkic and Muslim backgrounds. Also Russian and Armenian background is Orthodox Christian form. But Georgian-Russian conflict is different from this event. It bases on security alliance.

     

    Some governments explain and justify their policies in cultural terms. We must analyze a country’s foreign policy on the basis of actions. We have anticipated the New Testament to Germany or Russia or Torah to Israel like Islamic system. Shaffer asked question : “What does the Koran have to say a foreign policy question?”

    If Islam influences them, they should act with Islamic interaction. (Shaffer)

    The USA wants an enemy for their father emotion on the world. They forced as goodness of the world during the Cold War. They defended the world’s countries from dangerous communist system. Their interest was communism in that time. But they wanted a new enemy for regulate the world with themselves. After the Cold War, their White House scholars worked for a new enemy. There was a “Red Dangerous” line. But today there should be “Green Dangerous” line. And its name is Islam. 3

    The USA’s fans defense western style always. There shouldn’t be a religious system like Islam around the world according to them. But they don’t look at Israeli system or American Christiantic base.

    Today there is a Muslim conflict. And the USA is patron of the world. So they are working for peace, democracy and other good things. But the world’s people will know workings of the USA. All terror acts, all problems, all ethnic clashes…

    ———————————————————————
    1 Dogu Bati Journal – 26
    2 Karabagh conflict begin in the late 1980. And Armenia attacked to legal boundaries of Azerbaijan.
    3 Politic Declaration Fikret Baskaya – Ideologies.

     

  • Blood and Belief  –  Kurdish Identity

    Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence

    by Aliza Marcus
    New York: New York University Press, 2007. 349 pp. $35

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    Most writers on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, best known by its Kurdish language acronym, the PKK, substitute advocacy for accuracy, so their books about the PKK tend to have limited practical use for policymakers. But Marcus, a former international correspondent for The Boston Globe who spent several years covering the PKK, has done important work in Blood and Belief. While sympathetic to her subject—the substitution of “militant” for “terrorist” grates—she retains professional integrity and does not skip over inconvenient parts of the PKK narrative such as its predilection to target Kurdish and leftist competitors rather than the Turks; the patronage it has received from the Syrian government; and the important role of European states and the Kurdish diaspora in its funding.

    Blood and Belief has four sections: on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s life and the PKK’s beginnings; the PKK’s consolidation of power; the civil war; and the aftermath of Öcalan’s 1999 capture.

    The Kurds inhabit a region that spans Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and Marcus does not let national borders constrain her analysis. Events in Iraq—such as the squabbling between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani—influenced Öcalan, who concluded that he should tolerate no dissent. “We believed in socialism, and it was a Stalin-type of socialism we believed in,” one early PKK member relates.

    Steeped in Kurdish and Turkish history, Marcus provides better context than many other journalists who have tackled this subject. The PKK took hold, she shows, largely because of the weakness of the Turkish state in the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Turkish government barely functioned. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military restored order. But when Barzani offered the PKK shelter in northern Iraq, the group remained beyond reach, allowing it to plan and launch a full-scale guerilla war against Turkey. Marcus concludes that the group’s continued survival in Turkey is because, at some level and among some constituents, it remains popular; its support is not all driven by intimidation as some Turkish analysts claim.

    Marcus impressively covers the civil war years (1984-99), and her narrative, combining dialogue and context, is rich and accessible. While many journalists and authors satisfy themselves with a single round of interviews, Marcus concentrates not on active PKK members, who she realizes do not enjoy the freedom to speak, but rather on past members, villagers, and family members whose accounts she cross-checks. She also incorporates Turkish language press accounts and interviews with Turkish officials.

    It is unfortunate, though, that her coverage of PKK resurgence, between 1999 and 2007, is just thirteen pages long. An exploration of how Öcalan has retained control while in prison and where he and his henchmen might take the PKK has seldom been more relevant. One hopes that this new chapter of PKK history will become the basis for a sequel.

     

    ***********************************************************************

     

    Kurdish Identity

    Human Rights and Political Status

    Edited by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 336 pp. $65

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    The reader of Kurdish Identity, published in 2007, will find himself reading such timely insights as former State Department Iraq coordinator Francis Ricciardone explaining that, “Of course, we have no relations at all with [Baghdad],” and former deputy assistant secretary of state David Mack writing that he understands both Kurdish aspirations and “the potential danger that a ruthless regime in Baghdad poses,” as though Saddam Hussein’s regime had not ceased to exist in 2003.

    The collection of articles published by MacDonald and O’Leary, Kurdish experts at, respectively, Florida International University and American University, might have been useful to practitioners in April 2000, the date of the conference for which they were written, but the articles are now out-of-date.

    Some chapters are useful to historians. Robert W. Olson’s essay on Turkish-Iranian relations between 1997 and 2001 capably reviews that period. Kurdistan Regional Government financial advisor Stafford Clarry’s analysis of the U.N.’s humanitarian program retains value because of his precision and attention to detail, all the more so in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program scandal, which he helped expose. Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.

    The editors conclude with an essay updating the reader on world events. Both are academics well worth reading, but they provide no insights in this collection not already published elsewhere. Their comments in passing on the dire situation of Syrian Kurds, who do not enjoy equal protection under the law, raises the question why Kurdish Identity does not address this subject.

    Had MacDonald and O’Leary reassembled their April 2000 conference participants to reconsider their contributions seven years later and analyze where they were right and wrong, Kurdish Identity would have advanced scholarship in a novel way. As it stands, however, their book offers too little and much too late, suggesting that academics live in a world of publish or perish with the content of those publications sometimes a secondary consideration.