Benim iki Amerikali arkadasim Filistine gonullu olarak gittiler. Amaclari onlara yadimci olmak. 6 ya veya bir sene orada kalmayi planliyorlar. Onlarin gonderdigi emalleri okudukca icim burkuluyor. Onceki emailleri gondermedim; fakat bundan soraki emailleri sizinle paylasmanin uygun olacagini dusundum. Cunki bu emaller bize oradaki olaylarin ve yasamin gercek yuzunu yansitiyor. Bu emiller bize emperyalizmin acimsiz, inaslikla alaksi olmayan vahis yuzunu gosteriyor. Bu guce tellaligini yapan dunya basininin nekadar tarafli oldugu ve basinin hangi guclerin elinde oldugu birkez daha gosteriyor. Nerde domokrasi ve insan haklari telallari?
Israelin Filistinlilere yatigini Turkiye yapmis olsaydi neler olacagini siz dusunun. Bu konuda soylenecek cok sey var. Geirsisni sizin gorulerinze birakiyorum.
KM
Forwarded message
From: Patricia Daugherty <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, Nov 16, 2008 at 3:38 PM
Subject: Bethlehem News Updates: Number 4, 11-16-08
To: Maggie Coulter <[email protected]>
Bethlehem News, Volume 4, Sunday, November 16, 2008
As we sit down to write this week’s update it seems hard to believe we have already been in Palestine for one month! Our days are always full – with both planned and spontaneous happenings. (Note: If you have not received our 3 previous updates, please let us know. Also, please pass these on to others who would be interested. And if you don’t want to receive our updates, just let us know.)
This week we will limit our update to describing our visit on Friday to Wadi Fukeen. It encapsulates the bittersweet experience of Palestine: the persistent hope, tenacity and grace in the jaws of a virulent Israeli occupation of land theft, settlement building, environmental damage and ethnic cleansing.
Visiting Wadi Fukeen
Wadi (Arabic for valley) Fukeen is located in the Bethlehem district. As the crow flies, it is almost as close to the old city of Jerusalem as it is to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Distances are not far here – but for Palestinians this does not equate with ease of movement. For nearly all Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem might as well be in California as they are not allowed to travel there without a difficult-to-get Israeli-issued permit (*more info below).
We had received two invitations to visit Wadi Fukeen, one from the young woman studying about the environment, mentioned in last week’s update and one from a young man who was working the hotel where a conference we attended was held. As we made plans to visit, we realized that we also had another contact (from Sacramento), an Israeli peace activist working with the people of Wadi Fukeen.
We took a Bethlehem taxi, which, because it had Palestinian license plates, could only travel a few miles of the well-maintained settlement bypass road, before being diverted off to a poorly maintained road to the village. The bypass road, which continued on to the illegal Israeli only settlement, Beitar Illit, was built on land stolen from Bethlehem district towns and villages. And the Jewish-only settlement itself was built on stolen land from the villages of Wadi Fukeen and Nahhalin.
As we traveled down the potholed, single lane road, we passed through ancient terraced hills of olive trees into a small beautiful fertile valley; stone farm houses formed the central village. Further on were fields planted with lush vegetables tucked in on the valley floor. Since this is a dry place, seeing these beautiful green vegetables was quite a sight!
But the other sight from which one can not escape is the massive and looming settlement snaking along the length of the ridge and spilling down towards the village homes. Everyone in the village has lost land to this illegal settlement and the land theft continues. As your eye follows the settlement along the ridge you see more housing units being constructed. Beyond that, one sees where the hill has been leveled flat for more construction. Rocks and dirt scraped from the hill were pushed into the next valley, covering olive groves belonging to the village of Nahhalin. While building of the illegal Israeli settlements continues unabated, construction in the Palestinian villages is completely restricted by Israel. Our Israeli contact told us that recently, when villagers asked the Israeli authorities what land they might be able to build on in the future, they were told that all the remaining available land would be taken for the settlement.
It is difficult to comprehend how Palestinians cope with this ever-present threat to their future and that of their children. Looking at the scar left from bulldozing the ridge top, we were reminded of Har Homa, the huge illegal settlement we see everyday from Bethlehem. Har Homa used to be covered with a forest; it had been designated by Israeli as a “nature preserve”, a euphemism for land they would eventually steal. Just 10 years ago the Israelis mowed down the trees, flatted the hill top and replaced the forest with what looks like a concrete jungle. It must have been sickening for the families of Bethlehem to watch, unable to change the outcome. This all took place in plain view from the Church of the Nativity as did the construction of the huge cement apartheid wall that presumably provides security to the settlement.
After sage tea and delicious baked flat bread of zataar (like oregano) and cheese, we went off to see the vegetable fields, meeting and talking with people along the way. Wadi Fukeen is blessed by 11 natural springs. These flow into a series of rectangular collection pools from which water is let out as needed to irrigate the fields. This is traditional farming method.
Settlers have come into the village, taken off their clothes and gone swimming in the pools, contaminating the water. Villagers have posted signs in Hebrew asking them not to do this. We have heard stories of deliberate contamination of the water by settlers in other areas of the West Bank In the past, Wadi Fukeen’s spring water was potable – but we were told that it is no longer safe to drink, in part due to the settler contamination. Now villagers must buy their drinking water from Mekorot, the Israeli water company that basically steals the water from the deep aquifer that is under the Palestinian West Bank. (Palestinians are not allowed to drill wells without Israel’s permission.)
Our village friends pointed out a large open pipe below the settlements. The pipe is an overflow for the settlement sewage (which is set up to be piped to Jerusalem for treatment). When the system overflows, raw sewage comes out of the pipe, down the hillside, contaminating the vegetable fields below. The farmers have tried to ameliorate the problem by building large raised beds and diverting the source of contamination away from the beds. However, as we write this we just received an email saying that the sewage is flowing again
The trip home
After more tea and gifts of vegetables we prepared to return to Bethlehem. In the center of the village we met up with school kids from the Aida Refugee Camp (in Bethlehem) on an afternoon field trip. A wonderful outing for kids living in very cramped conditions next to the Apartheid Wall, which cut off the last remaining near-by open space for them – an olive grove. (see ** below for more on Aida Camp) The kids and adults were waiting for their bus which had a flat tire, so we tagged along to wait, chatting more with our young village friends and playing with the kids. It was nearly dark when the bus finally came.
As the bus bumped down the road and we watched a harvest moon rise, suddenly the bus came to a halt with a repeated whisper of “Jaysh” (Arabic for army – the Israeli soldiers). All the men were ordered off the bus, both Palestinians and internationals. An armed Israeli soldier got on the bus walking down the aisle; at one point some of his gear got caught the hair of a little girl. The children were quiet. The young men got back on and we proceeded. Then suddenly there was crying and screaming! The bus lurched to a stop again. Children were running in the aisle. Patricia (who was in the back of the bus) heard several yell, “grenade!” The children were helped to file off the bus. Several had to be held tightly and consoled as they were screaming in pure terror. Thankfully, it soon it became clear that it was just a bus malfunction. A hole had blown in the heating system and steam had gushed out. But these are children who have witnessed Israeli military incursions into their camp – into their homes. A grenade on the bus after the soldier walked down the aisle was a real possibility in their minds.
We finished the day by attending a sister city event in the Bethlehem Peace Center. (Czestochowa, Poland to Bethlehem, Palestine) The Representative of the Republic of Poland to the Palestinian National Authority talked about Poland’s connection to Palestine, as two peoples who have been occupied, had their people killed and their land stolen. He offered his hope that Palestine, like Poland would also one day have its freedom from occupation and its lands restored.
* Israelis are can visit Wadi Fukeen in the Palestinian West Bank. However, Israel forbids the people of Wadi Fukeen to travel in Israel without a permit. In reality, these are rarely given except in extenuating circumstances like an illness requiring hospital treatment.
** Aida camp is one of three refugee camps in the Bethlehem district. We have mentioned Dheisheh camp (the largest) in past updates. These refugee camps have been in existence since 1948 when upwards of 800,000 Palestinians (3/4 of the population) were either forcibly expelled or forced out in fear for their lives in the months before and after Israel declared itself a state.<–>
In the latest Presidential election the U.S. has chosen to withdraw from Iraq. There will be an inevitable vacuum in the region. Many expect Turkey and Iran to become dominate in the region. Clearly, in a region that has depended on the U.S. to define the balance of powers for so many years, this is a possibility. Turkey has been pumped up over the years with U.S. military aid and supplies and looks to aggressively define its role. Syria as a Ba´athist power would be most likely to align with the militaristic Turkish regime.
Iran has social forces in the region but no real military power. Iran´s effort to acquire a nuclear weapon is clearly an attempt to address this. Should some power demonstrate a willingness to act decisively the influences of Hezbollah and Hamas on the ground could be eliminated in a week´s time. Iranian influence is based on its programs for dispossessed populations and military supplies to its sponsored militias. Iran´s performance in the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated that its military capabilities are limited. Iran may be able to influence the political landscape of Lebanon and Gaza, but it is unable to consolidate these gains territorially or economically. Militarily, Hamas and Hezbollah are engaged in a war for the Safavid Empire and its restoration. The Palestinian national question has been subordinated and redefined as an Islamic trust.
At issue is land power versus military power. Russia presents itself in this context as the dominating Asian power in the region. Economically, Turkey is dependent on Russia depends on Russia for 29 percent of its oil and 63 percent of its natural gas. Turkey´s bubble as a regional power is dependent on its alliance with the United States. Otherwise, it pops and becomes just one of several Islamist powers trying to configure a new caliphate capable of governing. Turkey´s secular status is based on its military rule and is decreasing as the Turkish military accommodates the Islamism of Justice and Development (AK). Russia has obviously faced a contentious Turkey in agricultural trade disputes, energy issues and in Turkey´s supplying Georgia with military equipment.
Last year Russia opened a consulate within the Kurdish Autonomous Region. The statement by Nechirvan Barzani Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government declared: “We in the Kurdistan Region believe in friendship and good relations with the international community, and have been trying hard to achieve this, especially with countries like Russia with whom we share a common history.” Russia´s economic and political role in the region is growing. Its recognition of the KRG and its work with the KRG on economic and political issues are significant.
Moving forward means learning to address old problems with new solutions. Turkey remains a threat poised on the border of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region. Russia is a power that has recognized the Kurdish nation. IntelliBriefs website reports: “Russia has made significant strategic forays in the Middle East especially in countries which were known to be strong military allies of the United States. Today it has both a political and strategic foothold in the Middle East.”
Russia has not been oblivious to Turkish actions on the border of northern Iraq in its plans against the Kurdish peoples and nation. In 2007, Leonid Ivashov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences in Moscow, elaborated that such an invasion would create a “hotspot” for Russia close to its borders. He predicted that such a Turkish invasion would create “instability, risks and challenges that would be very hard to deal with.” The Russian parliament passed an appeal in 2007 to the Turkish government calling on it to show “wisdom and restraint,” and warning about possible negative consequences of a cross-border military campaign.
In the meantime, in October the Turkish Parliament passed 511-18 an extension authorizing Turkish troops to invade Iraq. As indicated in my article “Turkish Troops Enforce Baghdad´s Violation of the Kirkuk Referendum” such an action is simply a means of enforcing what Baghdad is not capable of enforcing itself, the refusal to implement Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. It is clear that Russia is a more significant power in the region and has a much longer historical role in the region than the United States. As the United States relinquishes its influence in the region there will be new decisions to be made. One thing is assured: Turkish antipathy towards the Kurdish nation and peoples has shown no indications of changing.
Ambassador Peter Galbraith, senior diplomatic fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, talked about Iraq on NPR’s All Things Considered on November 12. The transcript is below.
SIEGEL: Well, our guest today has written in support of the partition of Iraq, the idea of splitting the country up into three countries, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. Peter Galbraith is a former U.S. ambassador to Croatia and now senior diplomatic fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. And Peter Galbraith, partition, still a good idea?
Mr. PETER GALBRAITH (Senior Diplomatic Fellow, Center For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation): Well, I don’t actually advocate partition. My point is that the country has already broken up, and the United States should not be in the business of putting it back together. We have, in the north, Kurdistan, which is, in all regards, an independent country except it doesn’t have international recognition with its own army, its own government.
And now between the Shiites and the Sunnis, there are two separate armies. There’s a Shiite army. It’s the Iraqi army, but it’s dominated by the Shiites. And in the Sunni areas, there’s now the Awakening, a hundred-thousand-man-strong militia. And it is because of the Awakening, and not so much the surge of U.S. troops, that there’s been this enormous decline in attacks by al-Qaeda. But they remain very hostile to the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi government sees them as a bigger threat than al-Qaeda.
SIEGEL: Are you satisfied by the degree to which the incoming Obama administration – what has been the Obama campaign – sees as the reality of Iraqi politics? Is it close enough to what you see as the reality of Iraqi politics?
Mr. GALBRAITH: Yes. Of course, it’s very encouraging to me that Joe Biden is the incoming vice president. He has been the prime proponent of a decentralized Iraq. And although in the campaign Senator McCain described his plan as, I think, a cockamamie idea, it is in fact what the Bush administration has done in part. The Bush administration, in 2007, decided to finance a Sunni army, which is the Awakening. And that’s why we’ve had success. Biden would only take this a next step and encourage the Sunnis to form their own region, which would control that army just as the Kurdistan region controls the Peshmerga, which is the Kurdistan army.
SIEGEL: Iraq has prickly relations with – certainly with two of its neighbors. Turkey is distressed at the possibility of a de facto or truly independent Kurdistan on its border. And the Iranians have, it seems, have been intervening in a variety of ways. Is a decentralized, loosely federalized, some would say partitioned, Iraq, is it capable of actually defending its own interests against bigger neighbors?
Mr. GALBRAITH: Well, Iraq is not, today, defending its interests. The Iranians wield enormous influence because the United States actually paved the way for Iran’s allies to become the government of Iraq. With regard to the Kurds, actually there’s been a change in attitude on the part of Turkey. There was a time when they thought the idea of an independent Kurdistan, or a de facto independent Kurdistan, was an almost existential threat to Turkey. But increasingly Turks recognize, first, that this is an accomplished fact. It’s already happened. And second that there are opportunities. After all, they share in common they’re secular, they’re pro-Western like the Turks, aspire to be democratic, and they’re not Arabs.
SIEGEL: Should the Obama administration, once it takes over, should it have a new diplomatic initiative in Iraq? And is there an occasion for some Iraqi version of the Dayton peace conference that addressed the war in the Balkans some years ago?
Mr. GALBRAITH: Yes. There are two things that the United States can do that would enhance stability in Iraq as it leaves. First, to try and solve the territorial dispute over Kirkuk and other disputed areas between the Kurds and the Arabs, and secondly to work out a modus vivendi between the Iraqi government and the Shiite-led army and the Sunni Awakening as to who will control what territory. And a Dayton-style process, with a tough negotiator like Richard Holbrooke, if he doesn’t end up being secretary of state, I think that’s exactly what the Obama administration should look at doing.
SIEGEL: So, in that argument, it’s not, let’s try to do away with this conflict between Shia and Sunni and armed groups, but rather, let’s try to negotiate a better, more equitable deal and more stable deal between the two groups that will continue to exist for the near future.
Mr. GALBRAITH: Precisely. And if we can minimize the things that Sunnis and Shiites are going to fight over, it may be, over time, that they will find it in their interest to have much greater cooperation and that voluntarily they’ll build a stronger Iraqi state. I think it’s unlikely the Kurds would ever join that, but I think it’s quite possible as between the Sunnis and Shiites.
SIEGEL: Well, Peter Galbraith, thank you very much for talking with us today.
Mr. GALBRAITH: Well, thank you.
SIEGEL: That’s former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, who is author of a new book called “Unintended Consequences: How War In Iraq Strengthened America’s Enemies.”
Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith is the Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where his work focuses on Iraq, the greater Middle East, and conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, specifically in the Balkans, Indonesia, Iraq, India/Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. Galbraith has authored numerous books, including, most recently, The End of Iraq (2006).
Mr. Timor Beyatli is a Turkmen [1] citizen who is employed by the Turkmeneli [2] TV as a news reader at the Arabic section that broadcast from Kerkuk in Iraq. On the 5th of November 2008, Mr Timor Beyatli was on his way to Turkey to participate in conference about Media and Journalism in Istanbul, Turkey.
On the same day he left the city of Kirkuk to head towards the city of Erbil to get his flight from Erbil airport and an approximately 6.45pm before boarding his airplane he had made his a final call to his family in Turkey informing his family that he would be on his way to Istanbul airport and he would contact them upon his arrival in Istanbul, but unfortunately when the plane was landed in Istanbul he was not among the arrival of passengers.
In fact he was abducted at the airport in Irbil airportby a Kurdish security force known as the Asayish [3] that belongs to the Kurdish leader of the KDPparty Massuad Barzani prior the flight which was at 8.15pm. Mr. Tamur Beyatli was transferred from the Erbil airport to a prison in the city of Erbil for further investigation.
Also on the 25th November, 2007 Mr. Hassan Turan, a member of the governing council of Kirkuk, was arrested by the Kurdish Asayish at Erbil airport in northern Iraq following his return from participation in the international conference that was held in Istanbul in Turkey under the name of Kudus and International Conjunction .
In addition to that, on Saturday 27th October, 2007 Qasim Sari Kahya, the Turkmen writer, journalist and Secretary Editor for the Fraternity Club of Kardeslik in Baghdad, was abducted along with another three Turkmen citizens near the Kirkuk General Hospital by a Kurdish security force known as Asayish. Although, several hours later, three of the detainees were released, Mr. Qasim was kept for further interrogation.
Moreover,Mr. Lokman Nejam Ahmed was born in 1st July 1968 in the district of Telkeef that is linked to the city of city of Mosul.He was arrested on the 8th of July 2007 on the Iraqi/Turkish border Ibrahim Alkhalil by the Kurdish secret police that are known as Asayish while he was travelling from the city of Mosul to Turkey with a group of a Turkmen from the city of Erbil.
Document shows the kidnapping and arresting the Turkmen in North of Iraq. Parts of confidential State Department documents circulated to the White House, the Pentagon and the U.S Embassy in Baghdad about the abduction of the minority Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk and their transfer to the Kurdish north.
Because of the public, political, and journalistic outrage and due to the public appeal on TV and radio and Media, Mr. Tamur Beyatli was released on 7th November 2008. He was released without from the detention without formal charges and his case has not been submitted to the court.
Thus, the Turkmens plight to all the human right organisations, government officials, intellectuals, and Iraqi and Turkish government for immediate intervention to put pressure on the Kurdish police whom are terrorising the Turkmen people in Turkmeneli.
Turkmen of Iraq also call upon the Iraqi Journalists Union and all Iraqi and international organizations defending the rights of journalists and freedom of the press to move immediately to the authorities of the Iraqi government at the highest levels for the protection of the Turkmen, Arabs and Assyrian from the Kurdish oppression that are carried by Kurdish parties in North of Iraq.
Mofak Salman
Turkmeneli Party Representative for Both Ireland and United Kingdom
[1] Turkmen: The Iraqi Turkmen live in an area that they call “Turkmenia” in Latin or Turkmeneli” which means, “Land of the Turkmen. It was referred to as “Turcomania” by the British geographer William Guthrie in 1785. The Turkmen are a Turkic group that has a unique heritage and culture as well as linguistic, historical and cultural links with the surrounding Turkic groups such as those in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Their spoken language is closer to Azeri but their official written language is like the Turkish spoken in present-day Turkey. Their real population has always being suppressed by the authorities in Iraq for political reasons and estimated at 2%, whereas in reality their numbers are more realistically between 2.5 to 3 million, i .e. 12% of the Iraqi population.
[2] Turkmeneli is a diagonal strip of land stretching from the Syrian and Turkish border areas from
around Telafer in the north of Iraq, reaching down to the town of Mendeli on the Iranian border in
Central Iraq. The Turkmen of Iraq settled in Turkmeneli in three successive and constant migrations
from Central Asia, this increased their numbers and enabled them to establish six states in Iraq.
[3]Asayish is an unrecognized and illegitimate force that is utilized by both Kurdish parties to terrorize innocent civilian people. They are used to kidnap and kill people who defy the Kurdish aspiration for establishing a Kurdish state.
Dear President-elect Barack Obama,
On behalf of the Iraqi Turkmen community in the United States, we would like tocongratulate you on your election as the 44th President of the United States. In these troubling times, we understand that your presidency will undoubtedly face tough policy decisions at home and abroad – especially in Iraq.
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Turkmens (the third largest ethnic group in Iraq) have struggled to have their voices heard in the formation of the new Iraqi government. While the mainstream public has come to recognize Iraq as a nation comprised of only Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, ethnic minorities of Iraq have become invisible in the eyes of U.S and Iraqi policymakers.
Thus, as the next President of the United States, we hope that you and your newly formed administration makes a conscious effort to include Iraqi Turkmens in any rhetoric regarding the future of Iraq and consider our people as an integral piece to a complex puzzle. We look forward to communicating regularly with you regarding matters pertaining to Iraqi Turkmens. Again, we send you our sincerest congratulations.
Thank you,
Ahmad Yilmaz
Nov.12, 2008
M.A – International Relations, University of Chicago
Member, Bir Ocak Turkmen Cultural Association – Chicago
6334 N. Kedzie Avenue
Chicago , IL. 60659
Tel : (773) 764 3479
e-mail : [email protected]
London—MI6 has established that secret backroom meetings at the Mediterranean Nations summit in Paris early in July could lead to a dramatic shift of power in the Middle East.
At the meetings attended by Syrian, Spanish, Italian and Israeli intelligence chiefs, it emerged that plans for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will fail to destroy them because no Western intelligence service–including Mossad– knows where every facility is located.
Gaps in the intelligence on the precise location and vulnerability of the Iranian nuclear complexes emerged during the outside-of-conference meetings between the intelligence chiefs.
At the end of one meeting, Alon Liel, a former director of Israel’s foreign ministry, confirmed Israel had been engaged in “low-key second-track discussions for many months” with Syria.
Key to the progress of those talks was whether Syria was ready to break its close ties with Iran in return for the U.S. giving Damascus financial and military backing.
Liel made it clear that any deal with Syria would require its ending support for military groups such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah–both backed by Iran.
It was also made clear that any deal with Syria would probably not come until there was a new president in the White House.
An indication of how far the backroom meetings had progressed came from the Turkish foreign minister, Ali Babacan, who said there had been “real progress in formal talks between Tel Aviv and Damascus”.
Both the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and his foreign minister, Tzipi Livni–herself a former Mossad officer–sat alongside their Syrian counterparts, President Assad and his foreign minister, Walid al-Muallim.
Publicly, Olmert acknowledged that the time was “fast approaching for direct talks”.
What prompted this dramatic change between two old enemies was that at the backroom meetings the intelligence chiefs learned for the first time precise details of the raid in September last year on Syria’s factory processing weapons grade plutonium.
The hitherto untold story of that raid is as dramatic as any of Israel’s previous daring and successful military strikes.
Israeli agent
It began on September 3, 2007, when the early morning sun caught the rust-stained hull of a 1,700-ton cargo ship as it slowly steamed into the busy Mediterranean port of Tartous in Syria. From its mast flew the flag of South Korea and the stern plate identified the al-Hamed as being registered in Inchon, one of the country’s major ports.
Watching the ship manoeuvring into its berth from a distance was a man with the swarthy skin of a Kurd or one of the Marsh Arabs of Iraq. He was fluent in both their languages as well as some of the dialects of Afghanistan. He was, in fact, a Turkish-born Jew who had eschewed the life of a carpet seller in the family business in Istanbul to go to Israel, serve in its army as a translator and finally achieve his life’s ambition to work in Mossad.
Fifteen years later, he was recognised as one of its most brilliant operatives. In that time, he had operated in a dozen countries under as many aliases, using his linguistic skills and chameleon-like characteristics to observe and be absorbed into whichever community he had been sent.
Now, for the moment, he was code-named Kamal with a perfectly faked Iranian passport in his pocket. Mossad’s chief, Meir Dagan, had stressed to him the importance of his mission: to confirm the role of al-Hamed in the dangerous relationship which the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad had formed with North Korea.
Kamal had known before he left Tel Aviv that the ship had sailed from Nampo, a North Korean port in the high security area south of the capital, Pyongyang. A NSA satellite image had shown it steaming out into the Yellow Sea on a journey which had taken it across the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope, up the Atlantic and through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean and finally into Tartous harbour.
At some stage of its voyage, it had re-flagged itself at sea and the crew had painted on the stern plate the port of registration as Inchon. The newness of their work was still apparent against the drab grey of the rest of the hull.
Through a contact in the Tartous harbourmaster’s office, he had managed to check the al Hamed’s manifest and all day had watched trucks being loaded with the cement it listed. Then, as the sun began to set, military trucks arrived at the dockside and from the ship’s hold, cranes lifted crates covered in heavy tarpaulin which soldiers guided into the trucks. Using a high resolution camera no bigger than the palm of his hand, Kamal photographed the transfer. When he had finished, he pressed a button on the camera to transmit the images to a receiving station inside the Israeli border with Lebanon. In an hour, they were in Mossad headquarters.
Kamal knew then his trip had achieved all Meir Dagan had hoped. Though he could not see inside the crates, the spy intuitively knew the steel-cased containers were holding weapons-grade plutonium, the element which had fuelled the American atomic attack that destroyed the Japanese city of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. In his mission briefing, Kamal had been told by Professor Uzi Even, who had helped to create Israel’s own nuclear facility at Dimona, that the plutonium would, in its raw form, be easily transported as nuggets in lead protective drums, and the shaping and casting of the material would be done in Syria.
Now, on that warm September day almost fifty-two years after Nagasaki had been destroyed, sufficient plutonium had been delivered to Syria to devastate an entire country, its neighbour, Israel.
Intelligence briefing
Shortly before noon on September 4, 2007, a number of cars drove past the concert hall of the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra in Tel Aviv and entered the heavily guarded headquarters of Major General Eliezer Shkedy, the country’s air force commander. As a fighter pilot he had won a deserved reputation for daredevil tactics coupled with a cool analytical mind. His speciality had been flying dangerously close to the ground, manoeuvring past peaks and rocky outcrops, then hurtling skywards to ten thousand feet, nearing the speed of sound, before diving on the target, his weapons system switched on, his eyes flitting between the coordinates projected on his hood screen to the bombsight and the target. Weapons released, he would turn radically, the screech from the strain on the airframe like a banshee wail, and he would once more hurtle skywards. From dive attack to his second climb would take him only seconds.
For the past week Shkedy had prepared for an unprecedented operation which would require those tactics to be carried out by pilots he had hand-picked because their flying skills matched his own. But they would be flying not the F-16 fighter plane he had once commanded, but Israel’s latest jet, the F-151. Flying at almost twice the speed of sound and capable of delivering a 500-pound bunker-busting bomb, it was the most formidable fighter plane in the Israeli air force.
For weeks the pilots had practised the flesh-flattening G-force of right-angle turns, diving and evading, to hit a small circle, the IP, aiming point, carrying out bombing runs at an angled dive of thirty degrees. They had practised all this in the pitch black of night in the Negev Desert. At first many of the dummy bombs had fallen wide of the IP, but soon they were landing inside, a number scoring the required bullseye.
Shkedy called them “my Top Guns”– though they were far removed from the Hollywood version of Top Gun pilots. His fliers were sober-sided, led quiet lives, rarely partied and had trained day and night for when they would finally be given the order to fly tactical strikes against Iran. Those attacks, they had been told, would take place at dawn or dusk. But all they knew so far about the mission they were spending weeks training for, was that it would take place in the dead of night. No one had yet told them when or where and they were content it should remain so. Curiosity was not one of their traits.
While F-151 twin afterburners glowed over the desolate night landscape and the pilots dropped their dummy bombs which exploded white phosphorous smoke on the ground’s IP to determine the accuracy of the drops, in Shkedy’s Tel Aviv complex his staff studied the approach to the target and discussed the precautions each F-151 must take from the moment its pilot pressed the red button on the control stick to release his bomb.
The time they would spend over the actual target, TOT, would have to be between two and four seconds. In that period with its bomb released, an F-151 would sink dangerously towards the ground, giving the pilot a second to fire his afterburner to climb and avoid the “frag pattern”, the deadly metal fragments of spent explosive which would follow the detonation. A bomb’s shrapnel would rise to three thousand feet in seven seconds and unless the aircraft was clear of the target area, it could be blown up and other pilots already at various stages of their bomb runs would fly into a curtain of lethal fragments which could destroy them. To avoid this, each pilot would have to endure body-crushing pressure of eight Gs while negotiating a radical ninety-degree turn away from the IP after bombing and climb to thirty thousand feet from the target zone to avoid ground missiles.
To calculate the precise distance from take-off to target and the exact angle for the attack, the planners pored over computer graphs, satellite images and physics tables to check and re-check figures. The targeters calculated that because the bombs would pierce the target roof before exploding inside, the roof would momentarily serve as a shield, reducing the frag pattern by between thirty and forty percent. To help further protect the lead aircraft over the target, it would have its laser-guided bomb fitted with a delay fuse, providing a precious two-seconds lead time before the detonation.
Given the distance to the target, it was clear the F-151s would each have to carry two external fuel tanks, one under each wing. Filled with five hundred gallons of fuel, each tank added three thousand pounds to the aircraft weight. That required further complex calculations to be made: the exact point at which the bombing dive would start and the altitude at which the ordnance would be dropped.
In late August, while the al-Hamed was entering the Straits of Gibraltar, General Shkedy flew to the base of 69th Squadron in the Negev; the squadron was the Air Force’s frontline air assault force trained to attack Iran. Waiting for Shkedy in the airfield briefing room were the five pilots whom he had selected to carry out the raid. With an average age of twenty-six, many came from families who were Holocaust survivors, like Shkedy himself.
For him the pilots had a kind of nobility to their youth; behind their relaxed and open manner was a steelness. Once before he had flown to speak to them at the start of their special training and had begun by saying they had been selected for an air-to-ground mission, military speak for bombing a ground target. He had looked into their faces, glad to see they showed no emotion. No one had looked at the huge wall map of the Middle East. Nevertheless he anticipated each would be creating in his mind the potential mission profile: a low level flight to the target, then a high level return very possibly into headwinds. In the Middle East the winds are always easterly, blowing in from the Mediterranean. It could be Iran. But they had not asked him then and they did not do so on that late August morning when Shkedy once more met them in the briefing room.
Standing before a plasma screen, he used a zapper to illuminate it. For the first time the pilots saw the target; a complex deep inside Syria almost one hundred miles northeast of Damascus. He explained there was “good and sufficient intelligence” to destroy the complex which the Syrians were using to build nuclear bombs. He waited for the flicker of response then continued.
Under the cover of being an agricultural research centre, the complex was already engaged in extracting uranium from phosphates. Soon it would have weapons-enriched plutonium coming from North Korea. He told them the Israeli satellite Ofek-7, which had been launched only two months before, had been geo-positioned to watch the activities at the complex near the small Syrian city of Dayr az-Zawr. He indicated its position on the screen. No bombs must fall on civilians.
Shkedy then turned to the route in and out of the target area. The aircraft would fly up along the Syrian coast and enter its airspace at the last moment north at the port town of Samadogi and then follow the border with Turkey. At the point where the River Euphrates began its long journey south into Iraq, the attack force would swing south to the Syrian desert town of ar-Raqqah beyond which they would begin the bombing run. The way out would be a high-altitude straight run between the Syrian towns of Hims and Hamah to the Mediterranean.
Over the coast of Lebanon they would turn south and return to base. The total mission time would be 80 minutes. In the event of an emergency, navy rescue launches would be positioned off the Syrian coast.
He ended the briefing by saying the attack would be in the early hours of the morning and would take place “soon”. For a moment longer the air force commander looked at the small group of pilots. Perhaps sensing their one concern, he added that every step would be taken to ensure Syria’s vaunted air defences would be jammed. He did not say how and no one asked. It was a mark of the trust and respect they had for General Eliezer Shkedy.
Massive explosion
The genesis for the operation was a massive explosion on a North Korean freight train heading for the port of Nampo on April 22, 2004. Mossad agents had learned that in a compartment adjoining a sealed wagon were a dozen Syrian nuclear technicians who had worked in the Iranian nuclear programme at Natanz, near Tehran, and had arrived in North Korea to collect the fissionable material stored in the wagon.
Their bodies were flown home in lead-encased coffins aboard a Syrian military plane. By then a wide area around the crash site had been cordoned off and scores of North Korean soldiers in anti-contamination suits had spent days recovering wreckage and spraying the entire area. Mossad analysts suspected they were recovering some of the estimated fifty-five kilos of weapons-grade plutonium North Korea possessed. Since the crash–its cause never established–the intelligence service had tracked Syrian military officers and scientists on a dozen trips to Pyongyang where they met with high-ranking officials in the regime. The most recent meeting was shortly before the al-Hamed had left Nampo.
It was Kamal’s report and photographic evidence of the arrival and unloading of the ship that was the focus of the meeting in General Shkedy’s headquarters on September 4, 2007. The air force commander’s briefing room was dominated by large plasma screens on two walls. One contained a blow-up of the ship and the covered crates being off-loaded and driven away. A second screen showed the town of Dayr az-Zawr. A third screen displayed a satellite image of a large square building surrounded by several smaller ones and a security fence. The area was identified by the word: “Target”.
Sunburst
Sat around the conference table with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert were the other key players in the operation, codenamed “Sunburst”. For Olmert it was further proof of his powers of survival. A year ago he had been close to being driven out of office after the debacle of the war in Lebanon when he was vilified as the most incompetent leader Israel had ever had.
He had fought back, appointing Ehud Barak as his new defence minister and Tzipi Livni as foreign minister. Both now flanked him at the table giving Olmert the political support he needed for Sunburst. Beside them sat Benjamin Netanyahu, a former prime minister and now leader of the Likud Party, having taken over from the stricken Aerial Sharon. Like Barak, Netanyahu was experienced in the complexities of “black” operations. Barak had been a leader in Sayeret Matkal, Israel’s elite commando force who bore the same motto as Britain’s SAS: “Who Dares Wins”. Netanyahu had approved several Mossad missions while in office.
The lynchpin of Sunburst was Meir Dagan. Early in the summer, he had presented Olmert with evidence of what he called “the nuclear connection” between Syria and North Korea that had reached a dangerous level. Syria already possessed sixty Scud-C missiles, which it had bought from North Korea, and on August 14, when the freighter al-Hamed was already bound for Syria, North Korea’s foreign trade minister, Rim Kyong Man, was in Damascus to sign a protocol on “co-operation and trade in science and technology”. Afterwards the minister had flown to Tehran, furthering the triangular relationship between North Korea, Syria and Iran.
Mossad’s analysts had concluded that Syria was not only a conduit for the transport to Iran of an estimated £50 million ($74million) of missiles, but also could serve as “a hideout” for North Korea’s own nuclear weapons, particularly its plutonium, while the regime continued to promise it would give up its nuclear programme in exchange for the massive security guarantees and financial aid the West had promised.
Until recently, Meir Dagan had remained uncertain whether this was the case. Now, the latest intelligence from his agents in the country showed that Syria was determined to create its own nuclear weapons.
The meeting had been called to discuss the matter. Dagan began by saying the crates unloaded from the al-Hamed had been tracked by Israel’s satellite to the complex. Dagan continued the meeting with his usual succinct analysis. The building was now almost certainly to be where the crates had been delivered. Inside its main structure was the machinery to cast the warheads for housing the weaponised plutonium. Scientists at Dimona had concluded that a small quantity of polonium and beryllium would be used to create the chain reaction for the plutonium, after the pellets were machined in “glove boxes”, sealed containers accessed only by special laboratory gloves to protect the technicians at the site. Dagan had concluded with a final warning: the longer Israel waited to destroy the site, the closer the technicians in the building would come to creating their weapons.
Within minutes the decision was taken to eliminate the complex.
In the late evening of September 5, 2007, Israeli commandos from the Sayeret Matkal dressed in Syrian army uniform, crossed into Syria over its northern border with Iraq. They were equipped with a laser guidance system designed to guide aircraft on to the target. With them were specialists from the Israeli Defence Force. In their backpacks was equipment linked to IDF electronic counter-measure jamming technology designed to disrupt Syria’s formidable air defences. When they were forty miles from the target the men hid and waited.
At their airfield in the Negev, the five mission pilots sat down to a large dinner; even though they were not hungry, they knew they would need all the nutrients for the sheer physical energy and mental skills they would expend in the coming hours. Afterwards they went to the briefing room where Shkedy was waiting with other senior officers. The briefing officer once more ran through the mission procedure: radio frequencies, radio silence protocols and individual call signs.
Take-off time would be at 23.59 with twenty seconds separating each plane. There would be a dogleg out to sea at 500 knots, over eight miles a minute, then, with Haifa to their right, they would drop to sea level and head up the coast of Lebanon, past Beirut and continue into Syrian airspace. From there it was on to the IP.
When the officer had ended, Shkedy walked to the front of the room and paused to look at each pilot.
“You all know the importance of your target. It must be destroyed at all costs. This is the most important mission any of you have taken or probably will ever take. Every step has been taken to protect you. But if anything does happen, we will do everything to rescue you. That I promise you. But I am confident that surprise is on our side. You will be in and out before the Syrians realise what has happened”, said General Shkedy.
No one in the room doubted him. They all knew the mission was a pivotal point in the protection of Israel. The silence was broken by Shkedy’s final words: “God be with you!” Then he stepped forward and shook the hand of each pilot.
The mission
By eleven-forty-five in the evening, the ordnance technicians had checked the bombs, ensuring each was securely positioned in its release clip beneath the wings of each F-151. After his check, the technician removed the metal safety pin from each bomb.
A minute later, the runway crew had reported the strip was clear of small stones or any other obstruction that could be sucked into the engine and destroy it.
From the twin tailpipes of the first aircraft, followed by the others, came the scalding heat from the afterburners.
In each cockpit the pilots had gone through the same drill: activating the computerised checks of the navigation, mechanical, communications and finally the firing systems.
Each pilot wore two suits: his flight suit and, over it, the G-suit, a torso harness, survival gear and a helmet. Clipped to each harness was a small gadget that would send a homing-signal if he was forced to abandon the mission.
At one minute to midnight the first F-151, with a roar and a plume of exhaust marking its progress, sped down the runway. Shortly after midnight the last of the planes had retracted its wheels. ‘Sunburst’ had begun.
The mission was a total success. Satellite images showed the complete destruction of the complex and, next day, Syrian bulldozers covering the blitzed area with earth to avoid the spread of radiation. It would be ten days before the country’s vice-president, Farouk al-Sharaa, would only say: “Our military and political echelon is looking into the matter”. In Tel Aviv Ehud Olmert, not quite able to conceal his smile, said: “You will understand we naturally cannot always show the public our cards”.
But to play them, in the early hours of the morning of September 6, 2007, those pilots had carried out one of the most daring air strikes ever.
In January 2008, three days after President Bush had left Israel, where he had been privately briefed on the mission, the Israeli Defence Force released a satellite image that showed Syria had commenced rebuilding the destroyed site.
Gordon Thomas is the author of a new edition of Gideon’s Spies: The Inside Story of Israel’s Legendary Secret Service, The Mossad, by JR Books of London and available on Amazon Books.