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Category: Libya

  • Turkey to serve as protecting power for U.S. in Libya

    Turkey to serve as protecting power for U.S. in Libya

    A coalition of international forces is enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.
    A coalition of international forces is enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.

    Washington (CNN) — Turkey will serve as a “protecting power” for the United States in Libya, senior State Department officials told CNN on Sunday.

    As a protecting power, Turkey will represent the United States in Libya, including acting as consular officers on behalf of U.S. citizens in Libya and looking after American diplomatic facilities in the country.

    Turkey can also pass messages between the United States and Libya, as what little communication remains between the two countries is likely to come to a grinding halt now that the U.S. is bombing Libyan targets as part of enforcement of a no-fly zone.

    Levent Sahin Kaya, Turkish ambassador to Libya, told CNN he will represent America in Libya along with the United Kingdom and Italy.

    Although the United States has not formally suspended ties with Libya, the U.S. State Department shuttered its embassy earlier this month and withdrew all of its diplomats from the country. The State Department also ordered the Libyan embassy in Washington closed and ordered its diplomats to leave the country. It recognized Ali Aujali — the former ambassador who resigned from the regime in protest of its violence against citizens and joined the opposition — as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people.

    Officials said Libya has not yet identified a protecting power of its interests in the United States.

    CNN’s Talia Kayali contributed to this report.

    via Turkey to serve as protecting power for U.S. in Libya – CNN.com.

  • Turkey, Greece closely monitoring situation in Libya (SETimes.com)

    Turkey, Greece closely monitoring situation in Libya (SETimes.com)

    ANKARA, Turkey — Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu held a phone conversation on Saturday (March 19th) with his US and British counterparts, Hillary Clinton and William Hague, to discuss recent developments in Libya. NATO member Turkey is following closely the situation and will make the “necessary and appropriate” contribution to the operation, the Foreign Ministry in Ankara said in a statement.

    French, British and US forces on Saturday launched attacks against Gaddafi’s air defence systems. The air strikes were launched after an emergency meeting in Paris between EU, US and Arab officials. The international community was determined to enforce the UN Security Council resolution 1973 to protect civilians in Libya, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou said after the meeting.

    The first air strikes were carried out by French fighter jets, which destroyed several armoured vehicles near Benghazi. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi slammed what he called “international aggression” and vowed to retaliate. (CNN Turk, Vatan, Trend, BBC, ANA-MPA, Radio Free Europe, RFI – 19/03/11)

    via Turkey, Greece closely monitoring situation in Libya (SETimes.com).

  • Tony Blair: We can’t just be spectators in this revolution

    Tony Blair: We can’t just be spectators in this revolution

    BOP KA

    The following op-ed by Tony Blair first appeared in The Times and the Wall Street Journalon Saturday 19th March 2010

    The crisis in Libya has forced back on to the agenda all the tough choices of modern-day foreign policy. Should we intervene? Do we do so for moral reasons as well as those of national interests? How do we balance the need for a policy that is strong, assertive and well articulated with the desire not to appear overmighty and arrogant, disrespecting others and their culture?

    Two preliminary points must be made. In today’s world the distinction between moral outrage and strategic interests can be false. In a region where our strategic interests are dramatically and profoundly engaged, it is unlikely that the effect of a regime going rogue and brutalising its own people will remain isolated within its own borders. If Colonel Gaddafi were allowed to kill large numbers of Libyans to squash the hope of a different Libya, we shouldn’t be under any illusion. We could end up with a pariah government at odds with the international community — wounded but still alive and dangerous. We would send a signal of Western impotence in an area that analyses such signals keenly. We would dismay those agitating for freedom, boosting opposition factions hostile to us.

    This underlines the other preliminary point: inaction is also a decision, a policy with consequence. The wish to keep out of it all is entirely understandable; but it is every bit as much a decision as acting.

    So the decision to impose a no-fly zone and authorise all necessary measures to protect threatened civilians comes not a moment too soon. It is a shift to a policy of intervention that I welcome. Such a policy will be difficult and unpredictable. But it is surely better than watching in real time as the Libyan people’s legitimate aspiration for a better form of government and way of life is snuffed out by tanks and planes.

    Events in Libya cannot be divorced from what is happening across the Middle East. It is here that Western policy is still evolving. The implications are vast.

    Decisions taken now will define attitudes to us for a generation; they will also heavily influence the outcomes. They will have to be taken, as ever, with imperfect knowledge and the impossibility of accurate foresight.

    The key to making those decisions is to develop a strategic framework for helping to shape this revolutionary change sweeping the region. We need a policy that is clear, explicable and that marries our principles to the concerns of realpolitik. It also has to recognise that we are not spectators in what is happening. History, attitude and interests all dictate that we are players.

    First, there is no doubt that the best, most secure, most stable future for the Middle East lies in the spread of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. These are not “Western” values; they are the universal values of the human spirit. People of the Middle East are no different in that sense from the people of Europe or America.

    Second, however, getting there is a lot more complex than it was for Eastern Europeans when the Soviet Union collapsed. In that case you had hollowed-out regimes that were despised by a people eager for change and, vitally, agreed as to the type of society the change should produce. They looked over the Wall, saw the West and said: that’s what we want. By and large, that is what they now have.

    In the Middle East those protesting agree completely on removing existing regimes, but then thoroughly disagree on the future. There are two competing visions. One represents modernising elements who essentially want to share the freedom and democracy we have; the other, Islamist elements who have quite a different conception of how change should go.

    In saying this, I am not “demonising” the Muslim Brotherhood or ignoring that they too have their reformists. But there is no point, either, in being naive. Some of those wanting change want it precisely because they regard the existing regimes as not merely too oppressive but too pro-Western; and their solutions are a long way from what would provide modern and peaceful societies.

    So our policy has to be very clear: we are not just for change; we are for modern, democratic change, based on the principles and values intrinsic to democracy. That does not just mean the right to vote, but the rule of law, free speech, freedom of religion and free markets too.

    Third, working in that framework, we should differentiate when dealing with different countries. This too will require difficult decisions in instances where things are often not clean and simple, but messy and complex.

    In the case of Libya, there is no way out being offered to its people. It is status quo or nothing. When Libya changed its external policy — renouncing terrorism, co-operating against al-Qaeda, giving up its nuclear and chemical weapons programme — I believe we were right to alter our relationship with it. At the onset of the popular uprising, the Gaddafi regime could have decided to agree a proper and credible process of internal change. I urged Colonel Gaddafi to take that route out. Instead he decided to crush it by force. No credible path to a better constitution was put forward.

    By contrast, round the Gulf, countries are reforming in the right direction. The pace may need to quicken but here it is right to support such a process and to stand by our allies. Even in Bahrain, although there can be no justification for the use of violence against unarmed civilians, there is a strong case for supporting the process of negotiation led by the Crown Prince that does offer a means of peaceful transition to constitutional monarchy. This is not realpolitik over principle. It is a recognition that it is infinitely preferable to encourage reform that happens with stability than to push societies into a revolution whose motivations will be mixed and whose outcome will be uncertain.

    Fourth, in respect of Tunisia and Egypt, they now need our help. Protests don’t resolve policy questions. Demonstrations aren’t the same as governments. It is up to the emerging leaders of those nations to decide their political systems. But that is only one part of their challenge. They have young populations, often without jobs. Whatever the long-term benefits of political change, the short-term cost, in investment and the economy, will be big. This will require capital. It will also require the right policy framework, public sector reform and economic change that will sometimes be painful and controversial. Otherwise be clear: the danger is that in two or three years the political change is unmatched by economic progress and then in the disillusion that follows, extreme elements start to get traction. So talk of a Marshall Plan-type initiative is not overexcitable. It is completely to the point.

    Fifth, we ignore the importance of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians at our peril. This absolutely must be revitalised and relaunched. I know it is said that this wasn’t the issue behind the uprisings. That is true. But we are deluding ourselves if we don’t think that its outcome matters profoundly to the region and the direction in which it develops. In any event, the change impacts immediately and directly on the parties. For Israel it makes peace all the more essential; it also sharpens acutely its security challenge. For the Palestinians it gives them a chance to be part of the democratic change sweeping the region, but only if they are on the march to statehood. If not they are highly vulnerable to their cause being hijacked yet again by extremists.

    Sixth, we should keep up pressure on the regime in Iran. We should be open and forthright in supporting change in Tehran. If there were such change, it would be possibly the single most important factor in stimulating optimism about change elsewhere. Tehran’s present influence is negative, destabilising and damaging. It needs to know what our red lines are and that we intend to enforce them.

    Finally, in the Middle East religion matters. Nothing in this region can be fully explained or understood without analysing the fundamental struggle within Islam. That struggle can only ultimately be resolved by Muslims. But how non-Muslims have a dialogue and, if possible, a partnership with Islam can influence crucially the debate between reform and reaction.

    This is a large agenda. Some will object to the very notion of our having such an agenda: “Leave them to solve their own problems.” The difficulty is that their problems swiftly become ours. That is the nature of the interdependent world we inhabit today.

    Others will say we should be careful of forming “our agenda”: it will be “resented”; we will heighten “anti-Western feeling”, “remember Iraq and Afghanistan” and so on.

    One essential part of handling this right is to liberate ourselves from a posture of apology that is not merely foolish but contrary to the long-term prospects of the region. Of course you can debate whether the decisions to go to war in Iraq or Afghanistan were right. But the idea that the prolonged nature of both battles invalidates intervention or is the “West’s” fault is not only wrong, it is at the root of why we find what is happening today not just in the Middle East but also in Pakistan and elsewhere so perplexing. The reason why Iraq was hard, Afghanistan remains hard and Pakistan, a nation with established institutions, is in difficulty, is not because the people don’t want democracy. They do. They have shown it time and again. It is because cultural and social modernisation has not taken hold in these countries, and proper religion has been perverted to breed fanatics, not democrats.

    What this means is not that we turn away from encouraging democracy; but rather that we do so with our eyes open and our minds fully aware of the need for a comprehensive agenda so the change that occurs is the change that people really want and need.

    Some years ago, under the previous US Administration, there was a concept called the Greater Middle East Initiative, about how to help to bring about change in the region. The circumstances of the time were not propitious. They are today. We should politely but firmly resist those who tell us this is not our business. It is. In dealing with it, we should show respect, but also strength, the courage of our convictions, and the self- confident belief we can achieve them.

    www.tonyblairoffice.org, Mar 18, 2011

  • Cyprus says against use of British bases for Libya

    Cyprus says against use of British bases for Libya

    awacs
    A U.S. Air Force AWACS surveillance aircraft comes in for a landing at the Royal Air Force base at Akrotiri in Cyprus March 20, 2011. REUTERS/Andrew Winning

    LIMASSOL, Cyprus (Reuters) – Cyprus said on Sunday it opposed any use of British bases on the island to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya but conceded it had no power to stop their involvement.

    Britain has two sovereign military bases on Cyprus, an island in the eastern Mediterranean and a former colony.

    A command centre to coordinate the movement of British assets over Libya has been set up at an RAF base at Akrotiri, on the southern coast of the island.

    “Unfortunately these bases are sovereign and can be used merely with Britain issuing an advisory (to Cyprus). We have given the message to Britain that we do not wish for these bases to be used, that we are against that,” Cypriot President Demetris Christofias told reporters.

    His communist party has frequently called for the closure of British bases on the island.

    The British bases’ headquarters said Akrotiri was not being used to launch offensive strikes on Libya, nor was it hosting air assets from any other nation for the operation.

    There were no plans to deploy Typoon or Tornado aircraft at the base, it said in a statement. There were surveillance aircraft at the facility, it said.

    In London, Defence Secretary Liam Fox told BBC television Britain would deploy Typhoons and Tornadoes to a base in southern Italy either later on Sunday or on Monday.

    (Writing by Michele Kambas, editing by Mike Peacock)

    af.reuters.com, Mar 20, 2011

  • Arab League condemns broad bombing campaign in Libya

    Arab League condemns broad bombing campaign in Libya

    ALBy Edward Cody,

    CAIRO—The Arab League secretary general, Amr Moussa, deplored the broad scope of the U.S.-European bombing campaign in Libya on Sunday and said he would call a new league meeting to reconsider Arab approval of the Western military intervention.

    Moussa said the Arab League’s approval of a no-fly zone on March 12 was based on a desire to prevent Moammar Gaddafi’s air force from attacking civilians and was not designed to embrace the intense bombing and missile attacks—including on Tripoli, the capital, and on Libyan ground forces—that have filled Arab television screens for the last two days.

    “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone,” he said in a statement on the official Middle East News Agency. “And what we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians.”

    Moussa’s declaration suggested some of the 22 Arab League members were taken aback by what they have seen and wanted to modify their approval lest they be perceived as accepting outright Western military intervention in Libya. Although the eccentric Gaddafi is widely looked down on in the Arab world, Middle Eastern leaders and their peoples traditionally have risen up in emotional protest at the first sign of Western intervention.

    A shift away from the Arab League endorsement, even partial, would constitute an important setback to theU.S.-European campaign. Western leaders brandished the Arab League decision as a justification for their decision to move militarily and as a weapon in the debate to obtain a U.N. Security Council resolution two days before the bombing began.

    As U.S. and European military operations entered their second day, however, most Arab governments maintained public silence and the strongest expressions of opposition came from the greatest distance. Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Evo Morales of Bolivia and Fidel Castro of Cuba condemned the intervention and suggested Western powers were seeking to get their hands on Libya’s oil reserves rather than limit the bloodshed in the country.

    Russia and China, which abstained on the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention, also expressed regret that Western powers had chosen to get involved despite their advice.

    In the Middle East, the abiding power of popular distrust against Western intervention was evident despite the March 12 Arab League decision. It was not clear how many Arab governments shared the hesitations voiced by Moussa. But so far only the Western-oriented Gulf emirate of Qatar has announced it would participate despite Western efforts to enlist Arab military forces into the campaign.

    The Qatari prime minister, Hamad bin Jassem Al-Thani, told reporters Qatar made its decision in order to “stop the bloodbath” that he said Gaddafi was inflicting on rebel forces and civilians in rebel-controlled cities. He did not describe the extent of Qatar’s military involvement or what the mission of Qatari aircraft or personnel would be alongside U.S., French and British planes and ships that have carried out the initial strikes.

    Islam Lutfy, a lawyer and Muslim Brotherhood leader in Egypt, said he opposed the military intervention because the real intention of the United States and its European allies was to get into position to benefit from Libya’s oil supplies. “The countries aligned against Libya are there not for humanitarian reasons but to further their own interests,” he added.

    But the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies in the Youth Coalition that spearheaded Egypt’s recent upheavals took no official position, busy instead with Saturday’s referendum on constitutional amendments designed to open the country’s democracy. Similarly, the provisional military-run government took no stand and most Cairo newspapers gave only secondary space to the Libya conflict.

    When the Arab League approved imposition of a no-fly zone, only Syria and Algeria opposed the league’s decision, according to Egyptian officials. The Syrian Foreign Ministry on Thursday reiterated Syria’s opposition, as diplomatic momentum gathered for the U.S.-European operation.

    “Syria rejects all forms of foreign interference in Libyan affairs, since that would be a violation of Libya’s sovereignty, independence and the unity of its land,” it said in a statement.

    Al Qaeda, which could be expected to oppose foreign intervention in an Arab country and embrace Gaddafi’s qualification of the campaign as a new crusade, made no immediate comment. This likely was due in part to the Qaeda leadership’s difficulty in communicating without revealing its position. But it also was a reminder of Gaddafi’s frequent assertions that Al Qaeda was behind the Libyan revolt and that he and the West should work hand-in-hand to defeat the rebels.

    Iran and its Shiite Muslim allies in Lebanon’s Hezbollah, reflexively opposed to Western influence in the Middle East, also were forced into a somewhat equivocal position, condemning Gaddafi for his bloody tactics but opposing the Western military intervention.

    “The fact that most Arab and Muslim leaders did not take responsibility opened the way for Western intervention in Libya,” declared Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, in video speech Sunday to his followers. “This opens the way for foreign interventions in every Arab country. It brings us back to the days of occupation, colonization and partition.”

    At the same time, Nasrallah accused Gaddafi of using the same brutality against his opponents as Israel has used against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

    The Iranian Foreign Ministry, which previously criticized Gaddafi’s crackdown, on Sunday expressed “doubts” about U.S. and European intentions. Like the Latin American critics, it suggested the claims of wanting to protect civilians were just a cover for a desire to install a more malleable leadership in Tripoli and make it easier to exploit Libya’s oil.

    Gaddafi has been on the enemies’ list of Shiite activists in the Middle East since 1978, when Lebanon’s paramount Shiite leader, Imam Musa Sudr, disappeared during a fund-raising visit to Tripoli. His fate has never been officially cleared up but Palestine Liberation Organization investigators determined that he was probably killed by Gaddafi’s security agents after they misunderstood an order from Gaddafi to “get rid of” Sudr and his pestering for money.

    codyej@washpost.com

    www.washingtonpost.com, 20 March 2011

  • Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    by Şaban Kardaş

    Today’s Zaman, 20 March 2011, Sunday

    Turkey’s policy on Libya so far has drawn criticism from many angles, most notably due to the growing dissonance between Ankara and the international community on the issue of pursuing coercive policies against the Gaddafi regime’s use of brutal force against its own people to crack down first on the peaceful demonstrations and later the uprising across the country.
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have expressed opposition to imposing sanctions on Libya, as the United Nations Security Council was evaluating the unfolding crisis. Later, as the attention shifted towards the establishment of a no-fly zone or even a military intervention against the Gaddafi forces, Turkey again objected to those calls.

    Against this background, it is often possible to hear criticism that Turkey is pursuing immoral policies or taking a pro-Gaddafi stance. Interestingly, however, Erdoğan not only claims that Turkey is in fact the only country that follows moral politics in this case, but he also maintains that the Western powers contemplating coercive policies against Libya are driven by material interests. There is indeed a dilemma here: How come a country claiming to follow an ethical approach to the crisis has been against the actions whose declared aim is to end the crimes against humanity perpetrated by Gaddafi forces?

    One can point to various reasons why Turkey is openly opposed to a more robust international reaction to the Gaddafi regime. As some Turkish diplomatic sources underline, in a situation where Turkey has investments in the country worth billions of dollars and many Turkish citizens have been stranded in Libya, it would not be wise to take a clear side in the unfolding civil war between the Gaddafi regime and the opposition forces. One can sympathize with this argument, for above all, the Turkish government is obliged to protect the interests of its own citizens and cannot be expected to take any action which might put them in harm’s way. Moreover, one can also debate the justifiability of military action on practical grounds. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made such an argument when he stated his reservations to a military option, saying that it would make the situation even worse and that a foreign military presence would not be welcome by the Libyan people, including the leaders of the rebellion against Gaddafi. From a realpolitik point of view, these are all plausible arguments, and many other Western leaders have utilized similar justifications.

    Yet, one is puzzled by Erdoğan’s statements on the subject, which makes one think that there is more to Turkey’s objections to sanctions or a no-fly zone. Erdoğan’s position is rather categorical in the sense that his opposition is not based necessarily on the content of the policy instruments under consideration. For instance, when he said he was against the introduction of sanctions because they would hurt the Libyan people and that sanctions would never work, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to harm the Libyan people per se. They targeted the Gaddafi regime and called for an investigation into the violations of human rights. Similarly, on the issue of using military instruments or inviting NATO to play a role in such a scenario, Erdoğan again raised a categorical objection. He not only maintained that a military option would create more trouble, he also questioned the involvement of NATO. For him, intervention in Libya will not be NATO’s business, as its only task is to protect member states. This was quite a puzzling statement coming from a Turkish leader, if one recalls that it was Turkey that advocated NATO’s humanitarian interventions in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Although no NATO member was under attack, Turkey worked hard to convince the alliance to intervene in Bosnia and later Kosovo to protect its coreligionists against the Serbian forces. This is quite a dramatic change, indeed.

    ‘The seduction by analogy’

    Such categorical objections raised by Turkish leaders suggest that they might partly be suffering from what Yuen Foong Khong once called “the seduction by analogy” problem. Analogies guide the thinking of leaders in crisis situations. When confronted with a situation full of unknowns, many decision makers relate the crisis at hand to past instances that have resemblance to the case at hand. When carefully selected, analogies in fact are useful tools; for instance, they might help reduce the time for processing information and choose the right policy responses. However, analogies may also result in disastrous foreign policy decisions. Decision makers may resort to analogies as an excuse to avoid investing the necessary time to study the particularities of each case. Moreover, once formed, analogies can become self-perpetuating myths and act as mental shortcuts, in that decision makers may be seduced to interpret new developments under the light of familiar experiences from the past. As a result, more often than not, the lessons drawn from past analogies are applied to new cases without careful consideration of the underlying differences and similarities.

    A close examination of Erdoğan and other Turkish officials’ statements on Libya shows that the analogies they often resort to are the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The misguided American interventions in these two cases and the resulting destruction have affected the thinking of Turkish leaders in the last decade. For years, Turkish leaders have watched how sanctions imposed on the Saddam regime produced nothing but misery for the Iraqi people. Moreover, having spent much of their energy on addressing the threats and risks created by the US military interventions, Turkish decision makers have grown increasingly skeptical of the ability of the international community to implement military instruments. This formative experience has bred an aversion against foreign involvement which has come to be seen as a source of humanitarian tragedy and regional instability.

    The analogies of Afghanistan and Iraq have shaped Turkey’s thinking in recent years, when foreign involvement in Turkey’s neighborhood was up for debate. A large part of Turkey’s opposition to US policy on Iran is based on the negative lessons drawn from these two experiences. Turkey’s thinly veiled opposition to American assistance to Georgia during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was also affected by the same mode of thinking on foreign intervention. It seems the same analogies are at work again and have come to determine Turkey’s position on Libya as well. At the same time, the use of such analogies, blended with anti-imperialistic rhetoric, resonate well with the Turkish public, which has turned increasingly nationalistic.

    What is at stake in Libya is the risk that the unfolding civil war might take a dramatic turn and warrant an international military action that might fall under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Although Turkey has taken part in humanitarian interventions in the past, it has failed to develop a principled position, and its approach has evolved case-by-case. Short of any principled position on humanitarian intervention, Turkish leaders are easily seduced to follow analogies that happen to fit to their domestic political agenda. However, they need to engage in a serious reconsideration as to whether they are using the right analogies in Libya, and whether Bosnia or Kosovo would not be better fits. More importantly, if they are serious about pursuing moral politics, they need to come to terms with cosmopolitan ideas and formulate a principled position on humanitarian intervention, independent of contextual factors.

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