Category: Syria

  • Next Battle Between Kurds and Baghdad?

    Next Battle Between Kurds and Baghdad?

    By Mohammed A. Salih, IPS News. Posted March 7, 2009.

    The balance of power in Iraq is quickly tilting toward forces that Kurds perceive as hostile.

    COLUMBIA, Missouri, U.S., Mar 3 (IPS) — When U.S. President Barack Obama announced his plan last week to pull out all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by September 2010, the news did not generate much enthusiasm among Iraqi Kurds.

    A simple math operation reveals the reasons behind the Kurds’ anxiety — add the withdrawal plan to the recent staggering victory of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s supporters in the country’s recent provincial elections.

    Kurds are now counting on Obama’s oft-repeated pledge for a “responsible” withdrawal, hoping their interests will be preserved. But a review of statements by Kurdish and U.S. officials reveals the two sides are mostly talking at cross purposes when they speak of “responsibility.”

    Recently, Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani gave his interpretation of the term “responsible.”

    “I restate that the role of the United States should be to help resolve the problems in Iraq such as Article 140, the oil law, and the law on the distribution of its oil wealth,” Barzani told reporters in the northern city of Irbil, tallying the list of contentious issues between Kurds and Iraqi government.

    Article 140 refers to a constitutional provision to settle the critical issue of disputed territories between Kurds and Iraqi Arabs, including the gold-prize contested city of Kirkuk which is afloat on some of the world’s largest oil reserves.

    But for the U.S., “responsibility” appears to mean making sure Iraqi security forces can take over the task of protecting the country against rebellious forces once it leaves. To achieve that end, the U.S. is equipping and training Iraqi security forces. But this is hardly reassuring to Kurds, many of whom see a conflict with Baghdad forthcoming in some form in the future.

    When asked whether the U.S. will act to resolve the problems between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds before leaving the country, U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Wood replied: “It’s not really up to the United States to reassure anyone” and that Iraqis had to work out their differences through their “democracy.”

    But the balance of power in Baghdad is quickly tilting toward forces which Kurds do not perceive as amenable. Just shortly before Obama officially declared the U.S. withdrawal plan, the Kurds’ number one opponent in Baghdad, PM Maliki, found himself in a boosted position as his coalition of the State of Law scored a quite unexpected victory in nine of Iraq’s 18 provinces including Baghdad, the country’s most populous city of around six million. With Kurds and Baghdad at odds over several crucial issues, Obama’s withdrawal plan would only further strengthen Maliki’s position.

    Disputes between the country’s Kurds and central government go back to the early days of the foundation of modern Iraq by British colonialism in 1920s. At the heart of contention are large chunks of territory marking the separation line between Kurdish and Arab Iraq.

    Iraqi governments, most notably under Saddam Hussein, expelled tens of thousands of Kurds and Turkomans from those areas and replaced them with Arab settlers. While Kurds want to annex these areas to their autonomous region known as Kurdistan, the vast majority of the country’s Arab political parties vehemently oppose such plans. Kurdish attempts to expand their federal region have sparked fierce reactions in Baghdad.

    Spearheading a growing trend in Iraqi politics to abort Kurdish efforts and stalling the establishment of new autonomous regions is Shia Prime Minister Maliki. He has called for further centralization of power in Baghdad, accusing Kurds of going overboard with their demands.

    Besides strengthening Maliki’s position, the provincial elections delivered a major blow to the Kurds’ only powerful ally in Arab Iraq that advocates federalism: the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, previously known to be the most powerful Shia Arab party in the country.

    With their power in Baghdad thought to be in decline, Kurdish leaders are these days loudly beating their anti-Maliki drum to draw international attention to their problems with the rest of Iraq. PM Barzani told the Associated Press last month that he thinks Maliki is seeking a “confrontation” with the Kurds.

    Kurdish officials have even reportedly called on Obama to appoint a special envoy to resolve their long-standing problems with Iraqi Arabs.

    One Kurdish official took it even further, telling the Associated Press that al-Maliki was a “second Saddam.” The alleged statement by Kamal Kirkuki, Kurdish parliament deputy speaker, was so ill-calculated that he had to issue a statement denying that he ever gave an interview to the AP.

    As tensions appear to escalate, a consensus is taking shape among many analysts that things are moving toward a possible flare-up point.

    “The threat (of conflict) is real,” Kirmanj Gundi, head of the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) in North America, told IPS in a phone interview from Nashville, Tennessee, where the largest Kurdish community in North America resides.

    “It’s unfortunate that the Kurdish leadership became more vocal about this only recently,” Gundi said. KNC is a non-profit organisation lobbying for Kurdish interests in the U.S. and Canada.

    But concerns about a possible outbreak of conflict between Kurds and the Iraqi government have gone far beyond Kurdish circles.

    “It is critical for the U.S. to start thinking about this now because as we proceed with the disengagement, our influence will wane in Iraq,” said Henry Barkey from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of the need for the U.S. to address existing problems between Kurds and the Iraqi government before it leaves the war-torn country.

    Barkey authored a report for the Washington-based think-tank on how to prevent conflict over Kurdistan. “Therefore, we need to hit the iron when it is hot. And so, it is very important to help and we haven’t done this in the past, to help look at some of these issues,” Barkey said on the sidelines of an event at Carnegie to discuss his report last month.

    While Washington appears indifferent, at least in its official discourse, to calls for helping forge a common understanding between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs, tensions are continuing to build.

    In an attempt to flex its muscles, the Iraqi government recently announced it will not recognize the visas stamped by Kurdish government on the passports of foreign visitors. It also tried to send an army division to take over security tasks in Kirkuk but had to halt the plan for the time being as it met stiff Kurdish opposition.

    The coming two years — from now until the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq — will be decisive in determining how the Kurds’ relations with the central government and the country’s Arabs will turn out. But all signs are that Iraq is far from a long-term stability.

    Source:  www.alternet.org, March 7, 2009


    [2]

    “A contemporary anectode tells how [Molla Mustafa] Barzani, accustomed to reciving Eastern Bloc arms, was once surprised and pleased to be given accidentally [!]  a consignment of Israeli made mortars, which he found superior and so demanded more. Barzani had exaggerated  expectations of Israeli capabilities:  he had, according to a  well-placed source, `set his sights  on A JOINT CAMPAIGN IN WHICH  ISRAEL WOULD CAPTURE SYRIA WHILE HE CONQUERED IRAQ’.”

    Source: “Israel’s Secret Wars; the Untold History of Israeli Intelligence”, Ian Black and Benny Morris; (Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1991)

  • Turkey’s New Mission

    Turkey’s New Mission

    Shlomo Ben-Ami

    TEL AVIV – Ever since Turkey’s establishment as a republic, the country has oscillated between the Western-oriented heritage of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, and its eastern, Ottoman legacy. Never resolved, modern Turkey’s deep identity complex is now shaking its strategic alliances and recasting its regional and global role. Indeed, Turkey’s changing perception of itself has shaped its so-far frustrated drive to serve as a peace broker between Israel and its Arab enemies, Syria and Hamas.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s missionary zeal to replace Egypt as the essential regional mediator, and his violent tirades against Israel’s behavior in Gaza, looks to many people like an attempt to recover Turkey’s Ottoman-era role as the guarantor of regional peace and security. Its credentials for this role in the Middle East are by no means negligible.

    Turkey is a true regional superpower, with one of the largest armies in the world. At the same time, it is the only Muslim country that, while no less worried than Israel about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, can maintain excellent economic and political relations with Iran, regardless of American displeasure. Of course, Syria is Iran’s ally, too, but no country in the region has the leverage with it that Turkey possesses. And Turkey’s diplomatic reach in the region is also reflected in its recent signing of a friendship treaty with Saudi Arabia, while maintaining excellent relations with Pakistan and Iraq.

    Europe’s persistence in snubbing Turkey’s attempts to join the European Union, the rise of violent anti-Western popular sentiment in the wake of the Iraq war, and strained relations with the US – owing in part to the forthcoming Armenian Genocide Act – are major factors in Turkey’s change of direction. The civilizing efforts that Ataturk’s revolution directed inward and in favor of disengagement from the Arab and Muslim worlds are now being revisited. The Turkey of Erdogan’s dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to be seeking a new mission civilisatrice , with the Middle East and the former Soviet republics as its alternative horizons.

    The uneasy challenge for Turkey is to secure its newfound regional role without betraying Ataturk’s democratic legacy. Turkish democracy and secular values have been greatly enhanced by the country’s dialogue with Europe and its American ties. Turkey can be a model for Middle Eastern countries if, while promoting its regional strategic and economic interests, it resists the authoritarian temptation and continues to show that Islam and democracy are fully compatible.

    For Israel, the long overdue message is that its future in the Middle East does not lie in strategic alliances with the region’s non-Arab powers, but in reconciling itself with the Arab world. In the 1960’s, David Ben-Gurion’s fatalistic pessimism about the possibility of ever reaching a peace settlement with the Arab countries led him to forge an “Alliance of the Periphery” with the non-Arab countries in the outer circle of the Middle East – Iran, Ethiopia, and Turkey (he also dreamed of having Lebanon’s Maronite community as part of that alliance).

    All of these countries did not have any particular dispute with Israel, and all, to varying degrees, had tense relations with their Arab neighbors. The myth of Israel’s military power, resourcefulness in economic and agricultural matters, and an exaggerated perception of its unique capacity to lobby and influence American policy combined to make the Israeli connection especially attractive to these countries.

    The “Alliance of the Periphery” was a creative attempt to escape the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It reflected the yearning of the Jewish state to unleash its creative energies in economic and social matters, as it created space for an independent, imaginative foreign policy that was not linked to, or conditioned by, the paralyzing constraints of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

    Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as vice-president of the Toledo International Centre for Peace, is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.

    But the security that this scheme was supposed to produce could never really be achieved; the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be attenuated. The Arabs’ capacity to maintain their pressure on Israel and to keep world opinion focused on the Palestinians’ plight made Israel’s quest for evading the consequences of the conflict, either through periodic wars or by forging alternative regional alliances, a futile exercise.

    The Islamic revolution in Iran, the changes in Ethiopia following the end of Haile Selassie’s rule, the collapse of Maronite Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s takeover of that country left Turkey as the last remaining member of Israel’s Alliance of the Periphery. Turkey’s powerful military establishment may want to maintain close relations with Israel, but the widely popular change in Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, and the serious identity dilemmas facing the nation, send an unequivocal message that the alliance can no longer serve as an alternative to peace with the Arab world. From now on, it can only be complementary to such a peace.

    Shlomo Ben-Ami is a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as the vice-president of the Toledo International Center for Peace. He is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.

    © Project Syndicate 1995-2009

    Source:  www.guatemala-times.com, 03 March 2009

  • Turkish spirit has never left Syria

    Turkish spirit has never left Syria

    Caber Kalesi (Jaber Castle) was a historical castle considered as a territory of Turkey
    within today’s Syrian borders. The tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of Osman I
    the founder of the Ottoman Empire, was placed within the castle. It was conquered by
    Ottoman Sultan Selim I during 16th century, and was ceded along with the rest of the
    Syrian province to the French Mandate of Syria in 1920, following the dissolution of the
    Ottoman Empire after World War I.

    In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty of Ankara (1921) signed between France and
    Turkey, the castle containing the tomb has been considered Turkish territory.

    In 1973, the castle was submerged into the reservoir lake of the newly built Tabka Dam.
    The tomb of Suleyman Shah was relocated to a designated area of 8,797 m² close to
    Karakozak village in Aleppo Governorate, in accordance with the negotiations between
    Turkish and Syrian governments.

    In accordance with the treaty, the tomb is guarded by a squad of the Turkish Army.

    Source: Learn.TurkishForum.co.uk

    Epigraph in the Tomb of Süleyman Şah, reading “This is the grave of SÜLEYMAN BİN
    KAYA ALP, grandfather of Osman Gazi, the founder of the Ottoman Empire. He was
    drowned in the Euphrates along with two of his men, in search for a home for himself
    and his people. This grave had been relocated to this place in year 1973 from its original
    place in CABER, due to the construction of the TABKA dam.

    Source:  Learn.TurkishForum.co.uk

    Special thanks to our site volunteer Ghenwa from Aleppo, Syria.

  • Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities

    Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities

    Middle East Report N°83
    11 February 2009

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Candidate Obama pledged that his Middle East policy would include re-engagement with Syria; President Obama will find that the past is not easily overcome. The reasons behind his vow remain pertinent. Syria holds important cards in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, is Iran’s most important Arab ally and has substantial influence over Hamas and Hizbollah. There are indications of potential common ground on which to build, from resuming Israeli-Syrian negotiations, to consolidating progress in Iraq to blunting the rise of jihadi militancy and sectarianism. But significant obstacles to healthy, mutually beneficial relations remain, along with a legacy of estrangement and distrust. They dictate the need for a prudent approach that seeks first to rebuild ties and restore confidence. It will be critical to reassure Damascus that the U.S. is interested in improving relations and resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict, not in regime change. It is also equally critical not to compromise on core principles such as Lebanon’s sovereignty or the integrity of the international tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

    President Bush’s policy was premised on the belief that isolation and pressure would lead to substantial changes in Syrian behaviour. It failed on both counts. The policy crumbled, and the sought-after behavioural changes never truly materialised. Awareness of this outcome, coupled with Senator Obama’s own conviction that engagement – far from being a sign of weakness – was the mark of diplomatic strength, formed the backdrop to his campaign pledge and is likely to inform his presidential policy. The question no longer is whether to engage Syria but how.

    That is where the hard part begins, for engagement is easier said than done. Although the open hostility witnessed under the Bush administration was an anomaly in U.S.-Syrian relations, the ordinary state of affairs hardly has been the reverse. Even prior to the Bush presidency, whether under President Clinton or his predecessors, the relationship had been problematic, marked by disagreement as much as dialogue. From Washington’s perspective, Syria continued to support militant Palestinian and Lebanese groups; from Damascus’s, the U.S. continued to harbour a regional agenda inconsistent with its own aspirations and interests. In short, while breaking with the Bush legacy is part of the solution, simply reverting to what preceded it is not.

    Nor, even if it were advisable, would it be possible to rewind the tape. The last eight years have left their imprint in several, at times indelible ways. The legacy is threefold. First is the web of legal or administrative measures aimed at Syria. These include an array of binding UN Security Council resolutions related to Damascus’s role in Lebanon, the establishment of the international tribunal regarding the Hariri assassination and an assortment of U.S. economic sanctions. They undoubtedly will continue to shape U.S.-Syrian relations; for the most part, their relaxation will occur, if at all, as a by-product of improved relations rather than as a means of achieving them.

    Secondly, U.S. policy has deepened estrangement between the two countries. As Washington recalled its ambassador, downgraded its representation in Damascus and shunned routine encounters with Syrian representatives, Damascus responded by boycotting what remained of the U.S. embassy. Syria has undergone significant change since the U.S. last had sustained interaction. It will take time for policy-makers to come to terms with transformations in the regime’s governance style, power structure, threat perceptions, regional positioning and socio-economic constraints. A policy shift will be all the more difficult to undertake as these years coincided with a hardening of public and congressional attitudes toward Syria that inevitably will influence the new team. Most of the president’s advisers, although in favour of a policy of engagement, bore witness to Syrian action in Iraq and Lebanon, are sceptical about the nature of the regime, question prospects for a genuine shift in its regional posture and sense that Damascus is more likely to move when ignored than when courted.

    A third constraint stems from changes in the regional landscape. The Iraq invasion fuelled sectarian tensions and boosted Iran’s influence; neglect and mismanagement of the Arab-Israeli conflict bolstered Palestinian and other rejectionists; Lebanon’s polarisation and the 2006 war enhanced Hizbollah’s influence; attempts to isolate Syria strengthened its ties to Iran; jihadi militancy is on the rise; and the Arab world is as divided as ever. The net result will be to complicate any putative Syrian strategic repositioning.

    But there are promising signs, too. For several reasons – most having little or nothing to do with the U.S. – Damascus appears to be softening its posture on Iraq and Lebanon, undertaking at least some effort to control its border with the former while establishing diplomatic relations with the latter. Talks with Israel, although halted due to the war in Gaza and the elections in Israel, might well resume with U.S. participation. Relations with Turkey have become a central element of Syrian foreign policy, offsetting Iran’s exclusive influence and providing Ankara with real leverage. Signs of unease already can be detected in Syrian-Iranian relations; with patience and deft management, they might be substantially transformed.

    How the two sides first engage one another will be critical; mistakes, miscalculations or mismatched expectations could do significant damage. In this, the second of three companion reports, Crisis Group examines in greater depth the last eight years’ legacy, drawing lessons for the new administration’s Syria policy. It concludes that, in order to pave the way for a more fruitful relationship, the U.S. early on should take the following steps:

    • Clearly articulate a set of guiding core principles, including:

    ­– support for and participation in renewed peace negotiations on all tracks;

    – consistent with past Israeli-Syrian negotiations, any final agreement should entail full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, firm security arrangements and the establishment of normal, peaceful bilateral relations;

    – no arrangement or compromise over the international tribunal or Lebanon’s sovereignty;

    – respect for such international norms should not be read as a desire to destabilise or change Syria’s regime; and

    – open acknowledgment of positive Syrian measures.

    • Set in place effective channels of communication, by:

    – nominating an ambassador;

    – requesting that Syria treat U.S. diplomats respectfully and doing likewise with Syrian diplomats posted in the U.S.;

    – establishing a privileged, personal and direct channel between President Obama and President Assad, possible through Middle East Peace Envoy George Mitchell; and

    – conducting a relatively early visit by a high-level U.S. military official in order to establish U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation.

    • Carefully rethink sanctions in line with clear policy objectives, streamline licensing procedures and loosen restrictions on humanitarian or public safety grounds, such as for medical items or civil aviation-related goods to help replace an ageing and dangerous national fleet.

    The initial briefing in this series described lessons from the French experience at re-engagement with Syria. The third and final report will consider evolutions on the Syrian side and propose broader policy recommendations for Washington and Damascus.

    Damascus/Washington/Brussels, 11 February 2009

  • Erdogan Searches for Diplomatic Response to Israeli Invasion of Gaza

    Erdogan Searches for Diplomatic Response to Israeli Invasion of Gaza

    Erdogan Searches for Diplomatic Response to Israeli Invasion of Gaza

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 1
    January 5, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Israel’s ongoing offensive against Gaza has generated waves of anger among the Turkish public and Turkish political elite. Paralleling mounting street demonstrations throughout Turkey are international attempts by the country’s leaders to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The attacks came amid Turkey’s growing involvement in the Middle East as a significant power seeking to exert influence through nonmilitary means, including economic and trade relations, cultural exchanges, and its new-found role as a regional peace broker. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has successfully involved Turkey in attempts to resolve the region’s protracted problems, most importantly Israel’s entangled relations with its Arab neighbors.

    When Israel launched air strikes on December 27, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the high number of civilian deaths and emphasized Turkey’s concern that the developments might undermine regional stability (www.mfa.gov.tr, December 27). Erdogan criticized the operation and labeled Israeli aggression as an act against Turkey’s peace initiatives, noting that through this action Israel had shut the door on diplomacy. He said that any diplomatic contact with Israel was meaningless at that point and called on the United Nations to intervene to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. He also cancelled his plan to call Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to discuss Israel-Syria negotiations, because Israeli aggression was also “an act of disrespect toward Turkey” (Radikal, December 27).

    Erdogan’s disillusionment with Israel can be better understood given Olmert’s visit to Ankara a few days earlier, during which they discussed the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Olmert asked Erdogan to revitalize the Israeli-Syria talks (www.cnnturk.com, December 23). Erdogan was preparing to play a more assertive role as a peace-broker in 2009, but Israel’s unrestricted use of force and apparent “insincerity” toward Turkey might have shattered his optimism about finding a comprehensive solution to Middle Eastern conflicts through dialogue.

    In response to Israel’s uncompromising position, the Erdogan government embarked on a diplomatic offensive to mobilize the international community. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Erdogan has spoken to world leaders such as the UN Secretary-General and European politicians (Anadolu Ajansi, January 4). He went on a “Middle East tour” to consult with regional leaders and explore a common position against Israel. On the first step of his shuttle-diplomacy, he met with the leaders of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as Palestinian politicians. The second step of his tour took him to Saudi Arabia. Following his meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Erdogan announced Turkey’s proposal for a two-stage plan to calm tension in Gaza. The first stage would be a ceasefire supervised by international peacekeepers, including Turkish forces. The second stage would seek to find a common ground between rival Palestinian groups in order to achieve a sustainable peace in the region (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 2; Sabah, January 3).

    In the midst of these initiatives, Turkey appears to be seeking ways to bridge the divisions among Arab countries as well. While some Arab countries tend to feel that Hamas has the main responsibility for the collapse of talks with Fatah and are seeking to isolate it because of its alleged connections to Iran, Turkey is arguing against its isolation (Referans, December 30). At a time when Hamas is also coming under international criticism for sparking Israeli aggression, Erdogan defended the organization by saying that “agitation does not come from Hamas; rather, Israel has created fertile ground for this agitation.” Referring to a June 2008 deal brokered by Egypt, he maintained that “Hamas complied with the six-month long ceasefire. Yet, Israel did not lift the embargo. The people of Gaza are living in an open prison.” Erdogan went on to add that “Turkey could sponsor Hamas’s conditions for a ceasefire at the UN Security Council [UNSC], because Hamas’s trust in the Palestinian authority and Egypt has been shaken” but it still had full confidence in Turkey (Yeni Safak, January 3; www.cnnturk.com, January 4).

    Here, Erdogan had in mind Turkey’s new role as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, which it assumed this month. However, the United States’ threat to veto any resolution to halt Israeli attacks, as reflected in the January 3 consultation meeting of the SC, will not make it easy for the Erdogan government to use this avenue for supporting Palestinian interests. It is also important to note that Erdogan has repeatedly emphasized Turkey’s willingness to work in tandem with Egypt as a defender of the Palestinian cause.

    At the same time, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met with his counterparts. He phoned the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, himself a Turk, and arranged an emergency meeting of the OIC Foreign Ministers (www.mfa.gov.tr, December 28). The final communiqué of the OIC meeting held on January 3 strongly condemned “the ongoing barbaric Israeli assault on the Palestinian people in Gaza” and proposed a number of measures to mobilize the international community to relieve the suffering of Palestinians and end Israel’s attacks (www.oic-oci.org, January, 3). Similarly, Turkey also urged the Arab League’s foreign ministers to work toward a ceasefire and facilitate reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.

    The start of Israel’s ground offensive despite these efforts raises questions about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. In response to a question, Erdogan had earlier said, “Inter-governmental relations cannot afford emotions. Yet, injustice cannot be permitted either. If there is oppression, we cannot support it. We seek to solve it through talks” (Zaman, January 2). Given Israel’s lack of interest in “talks,” on the one hand, and Turkey’s pro-Hamas position and exclusion of Israel from its diplomatic initiatives, on the other, it will be interesting to see how Erdogan will advocate Palestinian rights in international forums and whether Turkish-Israeli cooperation can survive the storm.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-searches-for-diplomatic-response-to-israeli-invasion-of-gaza/

  • A BOMB TARGETED A TURKMEN JUDGE IN IRAQ

    A BOMB TARGETED A TURKMEN JUDGE IN IRAQ

    An explosive device that was placed inside the house of Judge Abdul-Mahdi Najar who lives in Tuz Khormatu went off about three o’clock this afternoon on the 2nd of January 2009.

    The blast occurred in the Aksu neighbourhood in Tuz Khormatu district which is one of the Turkmeneli districts; it is located on the highway between Baghdad and the strategic oil city of Kirkuk.

    The blast has caused minor damage to the house inhabited by the Turkmen judge who works at Tuz Khormatu court it also caused damaged to the car that was parked in front of the house belonging to one of the guests.

    The Turkmen Judge also was targeted on 9th of September 2008 by a suicide car bomb which resulted in the death of ten Turkmen people.

    The Türkmen judge has complained to the police authorities, which refuses to allocate security guards for his protection from the police.

     

    Mofak Salman