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Turkey in a Dialogue of Interests

Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat – 08/04/09//

The Turks welcomed the stances announced by the new American President Barack Obama with much fanfare and support. The officials underlined the unity of stances and interests, while the press focused on the stardom of the guest and his ability to speak to the Turkish audience.

This Turkish sense of pride at the renewal of the relations with the United States, following the setback caused by the rise of the Islamists to power, they who refused to have their country used in the invasion of Iraq, goes beyond the bilateral context to an identical analysis of and approach to the regional developments. This is based on the new American policy and the Turkish ability to cooperate with its goals.

Obama came to Ankara, the capital of Ataturk and secularism, and to Istanbul, the capital where civilizations and religions meet, following two exceptional summits in Europe, the G20 economic summit and the NATO summit.

He came fully aware of the depth of the problems facing his country on the ground, problems that are not solely confined to its image which hit an all-time low because of his predecessor’s policies. As in the G20 summit, where the United States was forced to concede to its partners over the measures to confront the financial crisis, it was also forced during the NATO summit to take their views and goals into account.

Turkey, in this regard, presents the most prominent example of responsiveness to the new American approach given its potentials and geo-strategic position. The Justice and Development Party has successfully harmonized its Islamic roots and the secular system, overcoming the financial and economic crisis that rocked Turkey in the past to record high growth rates before the Turkish economy, like all others, succumbed to the latest crisis.

In this sense, the party reconciled an Islamic regime with the requirements of democracy and wise economic management. But Turkey is more advanced than other Islamic countries with similar successes, like Indonesia which was presented more than once as the first Muslim country from which Obama will potentially address Muslims.

Turkey is superior to the other Islamic countries because it understands the dialogue of interests, not only the dialogue of religions. It is a full member of NATO and the only Islamic country to send forces to Afghanistan. Its troops are also deployed in south Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL in implementation of an international resolution. It almost sent forces and observers to Gaza as part of the efforts to solve the issue of the siege and the border crossings.

In tandem with these military roles, Turkey also played the role of mediator in the indirect Syrian-Israeli negotiations and is prepared to resume these negotiations. It also played an important role during the Israeli aggression on Gaza. It is an important player in Iraq, given its ties to the Kurdish issue and its position as a neighboring state with common interests. Ankara also enhanced its political and economic relations with the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, so that it has become an important economic partner.

In addition to this Atlantic and Arab role, Turkey overlooks a crescent of crises of interest to the United States, whether in the Caucasian region with its economic and political issues or in Iran where the nuclear program constitutes a source of anxiety for Ankara and Washington alike. Before all that, Turkey remains the eastern gate to Europe which supplies it with cultural diversity and reconciliation between religions.

Thus Turkey has all the prerequisites of a perfect partner for the United States. This is why Obama chose to declare the principles of his policy on Turkish soil. With its regime, leadership, regional and economic relations, reconciliatory approach, and diverse historical background, Turkey embodies Obama’s goals and principles.

April 9, 2009
Turkey: Bridging the divide
Editorial
Tuesday 7 April 2009

It is an inconvenient truth that the two most influential countries in the Middle East are both non-Arab – Iran and Turkey. But some hope must lie in the fact that Barack Obama yesterday chose to make Turkey the focus of an attempt to bridge the gulf between Islam and the west. Alighting on Turkey as an example of the deal that can be struck between the US and the Muslim world is as bold in foreign policy terms as it is risky in domestic ones. There are plenty on the right who would seize on Mr Obama’s self-identification as an American who has Muslims in his family. But to choose the Turkish parliament as the venue to say that his country is not and never will be at war with Islam is the mark of a man who is showing increasing confidence on the world stage.

The French president and the German chancellor, who have bolted the door to Europe, have dropped the ball on Turkey. They have yet to see what Mr Obama has already understood. Turkey’s biggest asset is its geopolitical role, and it is using it intelligently. The president, Abdullah Gul, has gone to Armenia on the first visit by a Turkish leader in the two nations’ bitter history. Ankara is also trying to transform its relationship with Iraqi Kurds. Turkey mediated indirect talks between Syria and Israel, and when the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos, telling the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, that he was killing people in Gaza, Turkish flags went up all over Palestine.

At a time when Washington is reviewing its policy on the stalled Israeli-Arab peace process, Mr Erdogan’s message that Hamas must be represented at the peace table carries weight. Not least it gives Israel, which maintains close ties with Ankara, cause for concern. If any country can reinforce the message to Mr Obama that the current status quo is untenable it is Turkey.

Mr Erdogan is not without his domestic problems. His Justice and Development party won about 39% of the vote at recent local elections, well down on the 47% it got two years ago. It was 36% in Istanbul and the coastal cities, a clear sign that he must listen to the progressive areas of his country. He has relaunched moves to widen ethnic and religious freedoms, and promised to work on a new and less authoritarian civilian constitution. Turkey is always reforming and never reformed, and Mr Erdogan may have personally lost faith in the ultimate goal of seeking accession to the EU, no thanks to Mr Sarkozy. Turkey is not a model country, any more than any other is. But it is a telling example. It undermines the western notion that Islam and modernity are somehow fundamentally incompatible, and it does have useful regional contacts. Next stop Iran.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/apr/07/barack-obama-turkey-east-west

The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

Author:

Steven A. Cook, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

April 2, 2009

As President Obama arrives in Ankara, he will find a Turkish government eager to play an influential role in the Middle East. While Turkey has made important contributions to the region in recent years, its activism has been controversial in Washington. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed out of a contentious panel on the Gaza crisis at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, he injected additional controversy into Turkey’s diplomatic foray in the Middle East.

The incident produced a torrent of criticism from some U.S. policymakers, analysts, and journalists who regarded the uproar in Davos as proof positive that Turkey, under Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, which is rooted in Turkey’s Islamist movement, had made the turn away from the West in favor of the radicals of the Middle East. Erdogan’s behavior at Davos, his seeming embrace of Hamas during Israel’s Gaza offensive, and his strong criticism of Israel, which at times veered into classic anti-Semitism, left observers wondering whether Turkey could continue to play a constructive role in the Middle East.

The Prodigal Pasha

Since the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) came to power in late 2002, Ankara has pursued a conscious strategy of reestablishing Turkey’s links with the former Ottoman domains to the south and the east. To be sure, there have long been Turkish diplomatic missions throughout the Middle East, but given Ankara’s foreign policy orientation, which placed a premium on relations with the West and the official secularism of the republic, Turkey was a marginal player at best in the Middle East. The AKP governments, first under Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and since early 2003 under Erdogan, embarked on an ambitious foreign policy–concomitant with their equally bold domestic political and reform program–that sought to secure Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union while simultaneously cultivating relationships with Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, and Tehran. Turkey’s effort to draw closer to both Europe and the Middle East reflected a belief within the AKP that its foreign policy needed to be normalized. Although Turkey’s almost exclusive orientation toward Europe and the United States might have been appropriate during the Cold War, when its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a paramount foreign policy fact, Turkey’s interests now demanded a multidimensional foreign policy.

The Justice and Development Party’s approach was met almost immediately with skepticism in Washington. The often testy negotiations between Washington and Ankara in late 2002 and early 2003 over the use of Turkish territory for the planned invasion of Iraq and the parliament’s subsequent inability to pass legislation giving U.S. forces permission to launch the attack from Turkey angered the United States. Yet Iraq was just the first in a series of episodes where Ankara and Washington found themselves on opposite sides in the Middle East. In 2005, for example, as the United States sought to isolate Syria over Damascus’s alleged responsibility for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and its central role in funneling jihadis into Iraq, the Turkish government continued a policy of deepening its diplomatic and economic ties with the Syrians. After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in January 2006, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and other Turkish foreign ministry officials hosted Hamas’s external leader, Khaled Meshal, at AKP headquarters in Ankara. These developments came against the backdrop of improved relations between Ankara and Tehran and Prime Minister Erdogan’s periodic tough rhetoric that Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were tantamount to “state terrorism.”

Ties Shift, Eyebrows Rise

Each of these developments at first blush raises serious questions about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Ankara’s seemingly abrupt divergence from the Western consensus was disorienting to policymakers and other observers who concluded that Turkey could no longer be considered a reliable partner or play the “honest broker” role in Middle Eastern conflicts that Turkish officials coveted. Hosting Khaled Meshal, who is responsible for a fair number of both Israeli and Palestinian deaths, was clearly a mistake. Not only did the Hamas leader resist Turkish entreaties to recognize Israel and to renounce armed struggle, the encounter also angered Jerusalem and Washington–two strategically critical relationships for Ankara. Yet, it is important to note that with all the questions about who “lost” Turkey and whether Turkey is “tilting East,” there is nothing extraordinary about Ankara’s approach to the Middle East. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s tortured relationship with the European Union, and the security fallout from the invasion of Iraq, any Turkish government would likely pursue a foreign policy similar to that of AKP. The Hamas episode aside, it is abundantly clear that Turkey’s Middle East policy is consistent with Turkey’s national interests, and importantly, one that Washington can leverage to advance its own regional goals.

On the range of important issues from Iraq and Iran to Middle East peace, Turkey’s policies are generally consistent with those of the United States. The Turks have long sought a stable, federal Iraq. The flowering of relations between Ankara and Irbil, the seat of the Kurdish Regional Government, combined with considerable Turkish investment in northern Iraq mitigates a complicating factor in Washington’s Iraq policy. The situation in Kirkuk and the persistence of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) violence against Turkey remain flashpoints, but as the Turks and Iraqi Kurds develop closer ties, the magnitude of these problems diminishes, forestalling some of the most dire scenarios about Turkish military intervention that could unravel the progress that Iraq has made over the last eighteen months. In the context of improved Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations, the Kurdish president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, has called upon PKK terrorists to lay down their arms or leave Iraq. For the United States, Turkey is no longer the malevolent wildcard in the game of stabilizing Iraq.

Iran, Syria, and Mammon

Viewed from a U.S. standpoint, Turkey’s two most controversial relationships in the Middle East are Iran and Syria. While critics have often used these ties as clear indications of AKP’s Islamist worldview, Ankara nurtured relations with Tehran and Damascus in the late 1990s (before Justice and Development even existed) and early 2000s. The Turkish leadership supports the Obama administration’s efforts to establish a dialogue with Tehran. From Turkey’s perspective, good bilateral relations with Iran and regional stability are critically important, not for ideological reasons, but economic calculation. Iran is the largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey only after Russia. Although the Turks would like to diversify their supplies and have plans to invest in large-scale renewable energy programs, in the short and medium term, Ankara will do all that it can to ensure its relations with both Tehran and Moscow remain cooperative and friendly.

The exigencies of energy supplies are not bound up in Turkey’s relations with Syria, but there is a strong economic component to the relationship. Turkey’s predominantly underdeveloped southeast is closer to Damascus than to Kayseri, Ankara, or Istanbul. The Turks believe that increased bilateral trade serves two critical purposes–it promotes development in places like Cizre, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakir and provides a boost to the Syrian economy. The architects of AKP’s foreign policy make the argument that if Turkey’s neighbors prosper, they are also more likely to be pacific, ensuring Turkish security and providing a regional environment more conducive to peace. Turkey’s ties with Syria serve another geostrategic interest. In 2006-2007, some foreign policy analysts were seized with the idea that Damascus could be “peeled away” from its strategic relationship with Iran. Although it is unlikely that Damascus will easily relinquish its ties with Tehran, the Turks can play an important role in providing the regime of Bashar al-Assad with an attractive alternative to Iran. It is surely preferable to Washington for the Turks to be engaging in dialogue with the Syrians than for Assad to be speaking with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in isolation. Turkey’s ties with Syria have already paid dividends in the Middle East as Ankara sponsored indirect talks between Israelis and Syrians in 2008. Those negotiations did not produce an agreement and were halted over Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008, but by all measures the Syrians and Israelis made progress with the help of Turkish mediation.

O, Jerusalem

Perhaps Turkey’s most complex relationship in the Middle East is with Israel. While the two countries maintain close military and economic ties, relations have been decidedly uneasy. From the start, the Israelis perceived a Palestinian tilt in AKP’s approach to the Middle East and were wary of Ankara’s relations with Tehran. At the same time, the Israelis, by their own admission, have complete trust in Prime Minister Erdogan’s efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria. For their part, the Turks were concerned about reports that the Israelis were developing ties with both the Iraqi Kurds and an organization related to the PKK, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan or PJAK, which is battling Iran. Ankara also argues that Israeli actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip only undermine their efforts and those of others to broker peace. Relations between the two countries deteriorated during Israel’s Gaza offensive, yet recent reports that the Israelis have dispatched a senior foreign ministry official to Ankara may indicate that both governments are looking for ways to reestablish trust. If incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu places an emphasis on striking a deal with Syria, as many expect, Turkey will initially play a prominent role in bringing the two parties together and brokering their negotiations.

Ultimately, the challenge for Turkey is, first, whether it has the capacity to pursue an activist role in the region without undermining its other priorities, and second, the extent to which other regional powers want Ankara to play the role it intends. Thus far, the Turks seem able to balance their desire to be influential in the Middle East with other national interests in the Caucasus, Cyprus, and Europe. There is also a palpable sense in the Middle East that Turkish activism, while helpful at times, can nevertheless undermine the efforts of more traditional regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As Cairo and Riyadh seek Palestinian reconciliation, there is concern that Turkish activism will provide a way for Hamas to resist Arab pressure to come to terms with Fatah. Still, there is no question that Turkey can play a constructive role in the Middle East. It has gained the confidence of the regional players on most of the major issues of great importance. As a result, in an era of diminished resources for the United States, Turkey can be a critical ally in the pursuit of Washington and Ankara’s overlapping interests.

KEYNOTE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY

KEYNOTE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AT THE EUROPEAN BUSINESS SUMMIT

(BRUSSELS, 26 MARCH 2009)

Distinguished Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to participate in the Seventh European Business Summit. I am confident that, the Summit will provide to the business community yet another occasion to address important problems that face Europe, at present.

Business people will better know that, the “fine line” between success and failure is the ability to shape perceptions according to changing conditions. I believe that the same applies to international affairs.

To influence global developments, we should be able to renew our perceptions about political, social and economic challenges.

The European Union was conceived by such visionary leaders as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman: They have changed the perceptions about the future of Europe by launching the idea of a united continent.

This project started as a marriage of coal and steel. However, today, the same project has reached the dimension of a political, economic and social integration process. The dream of a “European Union” is today a reality.

Furthermore, the European Union is now poised to be a major force to run world affairs in the 21st century.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

While the EU is now a global economic and political powerhouse, it is not immune to global challenges.

Quite the opposite!

The most immediate challenge the EU, together with the world community, faces is the recent global financial and economic crisis. This is a testing time for Europe. But Europe has faced other challenges in the past. It has always succeeded in overcoming them. Europe should be confident in its capacity to overcome today’s ordeal and emerge from it even stronger.

The EU today draws its strength from the sense of common destiny, with its common values, policies and institutions. It is well equipped to face present challenges.

I have no doubt that at the end, thanks to the truly European spirit of debate and compromise, we shall emerge from this crisis stronger than before. Such a debate has already started to produce creative ideas.

The EU’s greatest achievements of the last decades, from the “Single Market” to “enlargement”, have all been the results of acting collectively and responsibly in an inclusive way. Today, the EU, employing the same principles and instruments, is finding the right path to its political and economic future.

No one can claim that, in the face of today’s economic, political and social crises, an inward-looking, divided, weak or smaller EU would be better off.

Distinguished Guests,

Turkey, as an accession country, a member of the G-20, and the sixth largest European economy, is uniquely placed to work hand in hand with the EU to overcome the global economic crisis which started out in the financial markets.

Turkey is ready to do its share in order to deal with this global economic crisis and to provide sustainable solutions. Indeed, Turkey went through such a financial crisis in 2001. We lost almost one fourth of our GDP. As a result, we made extensive structural reforms focused on strengthening the regulatory bodies. This proved to be an expensive but valuable lesson. At least today, our banking system is very sound.

We all know that the basis of economic activity is transparency and trust. Therefore, while reforming the financial system, this basic tenet must be upheld. We share the consensus view that governments, central banks and the business world must engage in strong collective action in this direction.

We must also stimulate economic growth while keeping inflation under control. Therefore, it is essential to support the real economy and at the same time promote social solidarity.

We need to give much thought to a new global financial architecture based on supervision and regulation. It is a positive development, that such issues are now being dealt with, not only at the national level, but also at the supranational level. In this direction, the World Bank, the IMF and other financial organizations need to be restructured to answer the requirements of modern economic times.

A well-regulated free market economy should definitely continue to be our main point of reference. We should never overlook the productivity brought about by private sector activity. Although the shares of some financial institutions have been or will have to be transferred to national treasuries, these shares should come back to the hands of the private sector whenever conditions permit.

Protectionism is also a dangerous trend. In the medium to long term, it is our own people, the consumers, who pay the price of protectionist policies. At the end of the day, such policies hurt everybody.

In this respect, Turkey is ready to cooperate with the EU at the G-20 and the Doha Round.

I hope that the EU will also stand up for the basic principles which have made it a great economy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let us consider some of the major challenges facing Europe today:

Economic recession; Unemployment; Demographic decline; Illegal immigration; Terrorism; Energy security; Climate change and others.

I am convinced that all of these challenges will be tackled much more effectively when the EU finally enlarges to Turkey. The ties that bind Turkey and the EU together are already strong and deep-rooted:

– Our common values, like democracy, rule of law and human rights,

– Our strong economic partnership framed by a highly successful Customs Union,

– Our shared interests on matters like energy security, good governance, effective regulation of the free market and the fight against poverty,

– Our joint objectives of expanding peace and stability in our region and beyond.

The interests of Turkey and the EU overlap in a vast geography and across many areas.

Turkey’s geography and its historical ties in a large region covering the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia give it unique opportunities. Out of the thirteen European Security and Defense Policy missions worldwide, seven are being conducted in Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey is the largest non-EU contributor to ESDP missions.

On issues as diverse as Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Georgia, Kosovo and others, Turkey’s efforts directed at facilitating dialogue and compromise are clearly constructive. Just to cite a few examples:

– Israel and Syria began indirect peace talks under Turkey’s auspices.

– Turkey, together with Egypt, is actively working for inter-Palestinian reconciliation.

– My trips to Baghdad two days ago and to Teheran two weeks ago are indications of our efforts to contribute to international peace and stability.

– Next week, we shall bring together the Presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan together with their military and intelligence officials in Ankara.

– My first-ever trip to Armenia last year and our initiative for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform have been part of our commitment to a better atmosphere in the Caucasus region.

In short, Turkey is a force for good in a number of the world’s principal pressure points. Clearly, increased synergy between Turkey and the EU will be to our mutual benefit.

Therefore, obstacles preventing benefits of such a synergy, like the Cyprus issue, should be removed before wasting more time and losing more opportunities. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have already done their share for a peaceful settlement of this issue. We are committed to continue in the same line. Our vision is to create another strong pillar of Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean among Turkey, Greece and the island of Cyprus once a comprehensive settlement has been reached.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Energy is yet another area of interest for all of us. It is obvious that energy security is closely associated with prosperity and stability.

In this respect, let us not forget that Turkey is close to nearly 70 percent of the world’s energy resources. It has a strategic location along the main transport routes of the oil and natural gas resources of the Middle East, Central Asia and Caspian regions.

Turkey’s energy security strategy overlaps with the EU’s policy of diversification of energy supply routes. Indeed, Turkey is aiming at becoming Europe’s fourth artery of natural gas after Russia, Norway and Algeria. Following the realization of the main projects of the East-West Corridor, we are now working with our partners to realize the Southern Energy Corridor which includes natural gas pipeline projects going through the territory of Turkey.

In this context, the Nabucco Project is a priority of our energy strategy. It will play a crucial role in moving gas further towards European markets.

Distinguished Guests,

I have outlined some of the main areas where Turkey is uniquely placed to help address the challenges faced by Europe. Turkey is a negotiating candidate country determined to join the EU. Turkey continues on its path to accession and an enormous transformation process is also taking place. The comprehensive political reforms enacted in the past six years have enhanced our democratic system. We are determined to take them further ahead.

We will continue the negotiations in good faith with the shared objective of accession as clearly stated in the negotiating framework of the EU. It is essential that Turkey’s accession process be continued objectively, fairly, in a foreseeable way and according to the rules of the game.

Distinguished Guests,

Strategic vision is no longer confined to military or geopolitical considerations alone. Strategic approaches now aim for common values, intercultural dialogue and mutual harmony. Such a strategic approach implies Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Turkey’s accession will carry within it some keys to solving many of the EU’s political, social and economic problems. I shall remind you that tomorrow’s Turkey will be a much different and stronger country compared to what it is today. When Turkey becomes a member, it will shoulder some of the burdens of Europe.

Turkey is proof that a well-functioning secular democracy in a predominantly Muslim society can prosper, preserve its traditional values and also be a part of Western institutions.

None of these are new concepts in defending the cause of Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, their importance increases as the challenges confronting us gain urgency with every day going by.

The case is a rather simple one: The world needs the EU’s soft power. And to become a global power, the EU needs Turkey. For such a successful “peace project” involving 500 million people, Turkey’s integration is the most viable way forward.

Distinguished Guests,

The EU needs to approach this matter with a sense of vision.

It must take the vision of its own Founding Fathers who aimed to eliminate barriers which divided Europe and not create new barriers. Therefore, I wish to recall the Czech Presidency’s motto: “Europe without barriers”.

Thank you for your attention.

Poor Richard’s Report

Turkey, U.S.: Strengthening Ties as Ankara Rises
March 19, 2009 | 1837 GMT ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoganSummary
U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Turkey on April 6-7 and meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The United States and Turkey have many areas of mutual interest, including Iraq, Middle Eastern diplomatic efforts, Iran and Central Asia. Obama’s visit indicates that his administration recognizes Turkey’s growing prominence, and it gives the United States a chance to coordinate policy with a rising power.

Analysis
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed late March 18 that U.S. President Barack Obama will be visiting Turkey on April 6-7. In an interview with Turkish news channel Kanal 7, Erdogan said he had invited Obama to attend a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations initiative in Istanbul on April 7, but “did not expect” Obama to arrive a day early for an official state visit to Ankara. “Combining the two occasions is very meaningful for us,” he added. Obama’s trip to Turkey will follow a visit to London for the G-20 summit on the global financial crisis, a NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, and a trip to Prague to meet with EU leaders.

Obama’s decision to visit Turkey this early in the game highlights his administration’s recognition of Turkey’s growing prominence in the region. The Turks have woken up after 90 years of post-Ottoman hibernation and are in the process of rediscovering a sphere of influence extending far beyond the Anatolian Peninsula. The Americans, on the other hand, are in the process of drawing down their presence in the Middle East in order to free up U.S. military capabilities to address pressing needs in Afghanistan. With the Turks stepping forward and the Americans stepping back, there are a number of issues of common interest that Obama and Erdogan will need to discuss.

The first order of business is Iraq. The United States is putting its exit strategy into motion and is looking to Turkey to serve as an exit route for U.S. troops and equipment from Iraq. The Turks would not have a problem with granting the United States such access, but they also want to make sure that U.S. withdrawal plans will not interfere with Turkey’s intentions of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. With key Kurdish leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani retiring soon and Kurdish demands over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk intensifying, the Turks want to make clear to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq that Ankara promptly will shut down any attempts to expand Kurdish autonomy. Turkey will not hesitate to use the issue of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters hiding out in northern Ir aq as a pretext for future military incursions should the need arise to pressure the KRG in a more forceful way, but such tactics could run into complications if the United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces through northern Iraq. Therefore, the decision on where to base U.S. troops during the withdrawal process will be a political one, and one that will have to address Turkish concerns over the Kurds. Washington likely will see this as a reasonable price to pay, as it has other problems to handle.

Related Special Topic Page
Turkey’s Re-Emergence
Beyond Iraq, the United States is looking to Turkey as the Muslim regional heavyweight to take the lead in handling some of the knottier issues in the Middle East. The Israeli-Syrian peace talks that went public in 2008 were a Turkish initiative. These negotiations are now in limbo, with the Israelis still working to form a new government, but the Turks are looking to revive them in the near future. Turkey, Israel, the United States and the Arab states all share an interest in bringing Syria into a Western alliance structure, with the aim of depriving Iran of its leverage in the Levant. However, the Syrians are setting an equally high price for their cooperation: Syrian domination over Lebanon. These negotiations are packed with potential deal breakers, but Turkey intends to take on the challenge in the interest of securing its southern flank.

Iran is another critical area where the United States and Turkey see eye to eye. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of the Shia in Iraq have given Iran a platform for projecting influence in the Arab world. But the Turks far outpace the Iranians in a geopolitical contest and will be instrumental in keeping Iranian expansionist goals in check. Erdogan’s outburst over Israel’s Gaza offensive was just one of many ways Turkey has been working to assert its regional leadership, build up its credibility among Sunnis in the Arab world and override Iranian attempts to reach beyond its borders. At the same time, the Turks carry weight with the Iranians, who view Turkey as a fellow great empire of the past and non-Arab partner in the Middle East. Washington may not necessarily need the Turks to mediate in its rocky negotiations with Iran, but it will rely heavily on Turkish clout in the region to help put the Iranians in their place.

Some problems may arise, however, when U.S.-Turkish talks venture beyond the Middle East and enter areas where the Turkish and Russian spheres of influence overlap. Turkey’s influence extends into Central Asia and deep into the Caucasus, where the Turks have a strong foothold in Azerbaijan and ties to Georgia, and are in the process of patching things up with the Armenians. As the land bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey is also the key non-Russian energy transit hub for the European market, and through its control of the Bosporus, it is the gatekeeper to the Black Sea. In each of these areas, the Turks bump into the Russians, another resurgent power that is on a tight timetable for extracting key concessions from the United States on a range of issues that revolve around Russia’s core imperative of protecting its former Soviet periphery from Western meddling.

The U.S. administration and the Kremlin have been involved in intense negotiations over these demands. Washington is still sorting out which concessions it can make in return for Russian cooperation in allowing the United States access to Central Asia for supply routes to Afghanistan, and in applying pressure on Iran. As part of these negotiations, Obama will be meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the G-20 summit and later in the summer in Moscow. Though it is still unclear just how much the United States is willing to give the Russians at this juncture — and how flexible the Turks will be in challenging Russia — Washington wants to make sure its allies, like Turkey, are on the same page.

But as STRATFOR has discussed in depth, Russia and Turkey now have more reason to cooperate than collide, and recent diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Ankara certainly reflects this reality. In areas where the United States will want to apply pressure on Russia, such as on energy security for the Europeans, the Turks likely will resist rocking the boat with Moscow. The last thing Turkey wants at this point is to give Russia a reason to politicize its trade relationship with Ankara, cause trouble for the Turks in the Caucasus or meddle in Turkey’s Middle Eastern backyard. In short, there are real limits to what the United States can expect from Turkey in its strategy against Russia.

Obama and Erdogan evidently will have plenty to talk about when they meet in Ankara. Though the United States and Turkey have much to sort out regarding Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia, this visit will give Obama the stage to formally recognize Turkey’s regional prowess and demonstrate a U.S. understanding of Turkey’s growing independence. Washington can see that the Turks are already brimming with confidence in conducting their regional affairs, and can expect some bumps down the road when interests collide. But the sooner the Americans can start coordinating policy with a resurgent power like Turkey, the better equipped Washington will be for conducting negotiations in other parts of the globe.

Tell STRATFOR What You Think

Obama adviser urges talks with Hamas

Paul Volcker, a senior adviser to President Barack Obama, has urged him to break with US policy and open talks with Hamas in order to test the militant group’s willingness to join a unified Palestinian government.

By Alex Spillius in Washington
Last Updated: 4:19PM GMT 15 Mar 2009

Paul Volcker has urged talks with Hamas

Mr Volcker, a former Federal Reserve chairman who was picked by the president to head his new economic recovery advisory board, signed a letter with nine other Washington veterans and senior ex-officials urging him to open dialogue.

Other signatories of the letter, delivered to the president days before he took office, include Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to the first George Bush, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who performed the same role under Jimmy Carter.

The group is expected to be granted an audience at the White House as early as this week to make their case that lines of communication should be opened with the group that is blacklisted as a terrorist organization and is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Israeli civilians.

They are likely to make a forceful case given their personal experience of tortuous Middle East negotiations. “I see no reason not to talk to Hamas,” Mr Scowcroft told the Boston Globe. “The main gist is that you need to push hard on the Palestinian peace process. Don’t move it to end of your agenda and say you have too much to do.”

Mr Obama has made peace in the Middle East a central goal of his presidency. Within days of taking office he appointed former senator George Mitchell, a heavy-hitting veteran of the Northern Ireland peace process, as a special envoy to the region.

Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, made an early trip to the Middle East and swiftly held out an olive branch to Iran-backed Syria, sending in senior diplomats for talks.

Some in Washington see a rare opportunity to open talks with Hamas now that the group is discussing a unity government with Fatah, the more moderate Palestinian faction. Hamas was elected to power in Gaza in 2007 and has been shunned by the US for its refusal to renounce violence or recognize Israel’s legitimacy.

Source: www.telegraph.co.uk, 15 Mar 2009

Category: Syria

Turkey in a Dialogue of Interests

Abdullah Iskandar Al-Hayat – 08/04/09//

Turkey: Bridging the divide

The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

KEYNOTE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY

Poor Richard’s Report

Obama adviser urges talks with Hamas

Paul Volcker, a senior adviser to President Barack Obama, has urged him to break with US policy and open talks with Hamas in order to test the militant group’s willingness to join a unified Palestinian government.