Category: Syria

Emergence of a New Middle East Alliance

Patrick Seale

While U.S. President Barack Obama makes history in Cairo this week, a new regional grouping is taking shape in the northern part of the Middle East which could turn out to be equally significant.

Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria are developing trade, energy and security ties which signal a common will to shape their national destinies free from external – and especially Western — dictation. What are the factors driving this new grouping? They are numerous, and mostly specific to each country.

Turkey – having faced disagreements and disappointments with the U.S. (over the Iraq war), with the European Union (over the slow pace of accession negotiations) and with Israel (over the Palestine question) — has developed an ambitious regional policy towards its Arab and Islamic neighbours.

Turkey’s trade with Iran, which was a mere $1bn in 2000 rose to $10bn in 2008, and is projected to double to $20bn in the not too distant future. Turkey is planning to invest $12bn in Iran’s South Pars gas field – a policy strikingly at variance with the call by Israel and its American friends for additional sanctions against Iran. Some one million Iranian tourists visit Turkey each year, and millions more visit Iraq, especially Kerbala, the place where Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad was martyred in 680. His tomb is the Shi‘is holiest shrine.

Syria’s strategic partnership with Iran is now 30 years old, and shows no sign of waning. The Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah axis is a geopolitical fact of life in the region and was widely seen, during in the Bush years, as the main obstacle to U.S.-Israeli hegemony. In contrast to his predecessor, Obama is now seeking to reach out to both Iran and Syria, but he is apparently not yet ready to recognise that Hizballah is an unavoidable actor on the Lebanese scene. If Obama’s ambitious Middle East peace plans are to be realised, a U.S. dialogue with both Hizballah and Hamas cannot be long delayed.

Syria’s relations with Turkey – strained almost to the point of war in 1998 over Syria’s backing of the Kurdish PKK leader, Abdallah Ocalan — have improved dramatically. Two-way trade is flourishing. A straw in the wind was the recent Turkish decision to increase the flow of Euphrates water to Syria’s north-east, which has been badly hit by drought.

Syrian-Iraqi relations, marked by extreme hostility during Saddam Hussein’s rule, have also greatly improved. Last April, Syria’s Prime Minister Muhammad Naji Otri signed a wide-ranging agreement in Baghdad establishing a free trade zone and providing for cooperation in energy and education. Syria is to participate in the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk to Banias oil pipeline which passes through Syrian territory. Syria’s port at Latakia is to be expanded and road links to Iraq improved, to provide transit facilities for Iraq’s import- export trade. A train carrying 800 tons of steel left the Syrian port of Tartous on 30 May for Baghdad, the first rail freight trip between the two countries in decades.

Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have a stake in Iraq’s future. Iran would clearly like Iraq to be a friendly neighbour under continued Shi‘i leadership. It wants Iraq to revive, but never again to be so powerful as to pose a threat as deadly as Saddam Hussein’s. Memories of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war are still too recent. Iran would probably prefer Iraq to develop into a federal state, and therefore relatively weak, rather than a strong unitary state. There are, however, no illusions in Tehran that Iraq, a major Arab country with a strong nationalist tradition, will ever consent to be an Iranian puppet.

Whoever wins the Iranian presidential elections on 12 June – whether it is the conservative incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or his principal challenger, former premier Mir-Hussein Mousavi, a ‘moderate’ conservative backed by the main reformist parties – the main lines of Iran’s external policy are unlikely to change: close ties with Syria, Iraq and Turkey; opposition to Sunni extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan; support for Hizballah and the Palestinians; and continued uranium enrichment.

What sort of Iraq, its neighbours wonder, will emerge from the slaughter, destruction and chaos of the past six years? Can a new regional balance be reached now that Iraq is again able to assert its national interests?

It seems clear that Iraq has turned a corner. Violent deaths in May, at about 165, were among the lowest for any month since the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. Security is gradually returning, although still marred by horrendous suicide bombings. The Iraqi security forces – army, police, and intelligence — are steadily improving in size and efficiency. The recent conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States — with firm deadlines for the withdrawal of American armed forces — was an important expression of Iraqi sovereignty regained.

But much remains to be done. Sunni-Shi‘i relations in Iraq remain tense, while Arab-Kurdish relations remain problematic; a hydrocarbons law has not yet been passed by parliament (although the central government has thought it best to turn a blind eye to the start of oil exports from the Kurdish region to Turkey.)

War of Necessity, War of Choice, a recent book by Richard Haas contrasts the 1990 war to free Kuwait with the 2003 war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The first, he argues was a war of necessity, the second a war of choice — and a very bad choice at that. It had a catastrophic impact on America’s armed forces, on its finances and its reputation. The Iraq war killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, displaced millions, shattered the country’s infrastructure, released sectarian demons, and upset the regional balance to Iran’s great benefit.

Haas, a former senior American official, is now head of the prestigious New York–based Council on Foreign Relations. His book makes clear that Saddam’s alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction was not the real motive for war. Pressure to attack Iraq came essentially from the civilian leadership at the Pentagon – especially from the then deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz – and from other neo-cons in Vice-President Dick Cheney’s office, whose geopolitical fantasy was to overthrow the main Arab regimes, as well as the mullahs in Iran, and restructure the entire area, so as to make it safe for Israel.

The neo-cons’ opportunity came because of America’s perceived need, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to send a big message to the Arab world about U.S. military power. Haas’ book is likely to revive the debate about the role of Israel’s friends in Washington in pushing the U.S. into war in Iraq. It will provide Barack Obama with ammunition to resist Israeli pressure to attack Iran.

The grouping of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria may not yet be a full-fledged alliance, but numerous common interests are pulling the four states in that direction. Not least is a concern about possible Israeli aggression – directed against Iran and Syria – and of continued uncertainty about the future course of American policy.

Source: www.daralhayat.com, 06 June 2009

June 8, 2009
The Turkish Parliament Blocks Controversial Investment Plan

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 103

By: Emrullah Uslu

Border between Turkey and Syria

The Turkish government drafted a bill on a proposed de-mining project on the Syrian border, which sparked controversy among neo-nationalists and Islamists (EDM, May 21). The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government proposed to lease the de-mined area for 44 years to a foreign company. The area was first mined when the Turkish-Syrian border was determined in 1956. The mined area consists of 216,000 decares of land along a 510 kilometer long and 350 meter wide area of the border. It has an estimated value of around $500 million. Around 80 percent of the area is available for agricultural use, while 70 percent is suitable for irrigation. “It is believed that there are 650,000 landmines in the territory: approximately one landmine every 500 meters. The mines have claimed 3,000 lives in the past 50 years while crippling 7,000. The mines were marked on a map while they were being laid” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 29).

The opposition parties argued that the AKP government wanted to lease the area to an Israeli company. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan replied to the opposition concerns saying: “Money has no religion, nationality, ethnicity or color. No matter who invests, it is not Israeli’s who will work in this area, only Turkish citizens will be working there and it will help reduce unemployment within our country” (Hurriyet, May 23).

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal stated that “we cannot give a 510-kilometer long border area to a foreign country. The Arabs are on one side and the Turks are on the other, while Israelis will be in the middle framing the area. Is there any meaning to this? We will not allow this to happen” (Hurriyet, May 27). Moreover, the CHP parliamentarian, Gurol Ergin, previously criticized the AKP government’s attempt to lease this land, alleging that it might create a “second Gaza” in the region (Anadolu Ajansi, May 15).

Baykal draw a parallel between the AKP’s attempt to lease the land to a foreign company and the U.S. military requesting transit rights through Turkish territory prior to the Iraq war in 2003. Baykal said that the opposition did not permit this to happen, and now the government had to be stopped in its efforts to “lease this land to a foreigner” (Hurriyet, May 27).

The opposition parties demanded that the Turkish armed forces (TSK) should be given the sole responsibility for the mine-clearing. Moreover, they alleged that the TSK also harbored reservations over the bill (EDM, May 21). Yet, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff Army-General Ilker Basbug, stated that NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) must clear the mines (Vatan, May 22).

The opposition is not alone in criticizing the AKP government: Islamist intellectuals have also voiced concern. One well respected Islamist intellectual Ahmet Tasgetiren criticized the government in the Bugun daily, asking whether it was paying tribute to Israel because Prime Minister Erdogan had harshly criticized Israel in Davos in January (Bugun, May 28). Fehmi Koru, a childhood friend of President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, and another influential intellectual, also opposed the idea of leasing the land to an Israeli firm (Yeni Safak, May 28).

It appears that some APK parliamentarians shared these concerns. For instance, Sadik Yakut said “I am against leasing this land to an Israeli company. AKP parliamentarians are very sensitive about this issue” (Milliyet, May 29). Due to the passive resistance by AKP parliamentarians opposed to the government proposal, it was subsequently withdrawn.

The opposition and the AKP government agreed to work together to find a compromise on how to proceed to clear the mines. It was also reported that NAMSA might be permitted to visit the region to conduct de-mining operations. However, the Minister of Defense Vecdi Gonul, alleged that “the cost of clearing the mines varies at between $700 million to $3.5 billion. The government simply cannot invest that amount of money into this land. In 1992 such proposals emerged, but were abandoned due to insufficient funds” (Zaman, May 29).

Despite attracting a significant level of foreign investment to the Kurdish region, which would reduce local unemployment, suspicions toward Israel on the part of the Islamists and neo-nationalists forced the government to withdraw the proposal. Such a coalition of Islamist and nationalists also emerged during the March 1, 2003 vote to resist the AKP government over allowing U.S. troops to conduct operations in Iraq from Turkish territory.

The latest controversy between the opposition and AKP government once again exposed the depth of anti-Israeli sentiment among many segments of the Turkish population. Even AKP parliamentarians, who have had a tendency to vote in sympathy with Erdogan’s initiatives, refused to support the government over this sensitive issue.

Source: www.jamestown.org, May 29, 2009

May 30, 2009
White House asserts control over foreign policy

Ed Lasky

The focus of power involving foreign policy is in the National Security Council, not the State Department. The model Obama is following is that of Nixon White house where the hapless Secretary of State William Rogers twisted in the wind for years as Nixon-Kissinger ran foreign policy from the White House.

Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski were advisers to Barack Obama and both are proponents of this model.

I wrote about this months ago here.

Now we are seeing signs of this dynamic at work. This Haaretz article by Barak Ravid and Natasha Mozgovaya shows that NSC advisor James Jones is spreading the word about Obama’s “get tough” policy with Israel:

Gen. James Jones, national security adviser to President Barack Obama, told a European foreign minister a week ago that unlike the Bush administration, Obama will be “forceful” with Israel.

Meanwhile, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel told an AIPAC conference last night that two states for two peoples is the only solution the United States is committed to.

[snip]

Emanuel called for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation if Iran is to be countered effectively.

He said the United States was trying to enter a dialogue with countries such as Syria and Iran, even though it was still unclear whether these countries would alter their behavior. He reiterated that the United States wants to talk with Iran in the hope that Tehran will relinquish its efforts to gain nuclear weapons.

Jones is the main force in the Obama administration stressing the Palestinian question and believes that the United States must become more intensively involved in the matter vis-a-vis both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Looks like Bibi is in for some tough talk from Jones and the president.

Source: www.americanthinker.com, 5 May 2009

May 24, 2009
Turkey lets more water out of dams to Iraq – MP

* Iraq MP says Turkey boosts river flow, after complaints

* MP says still falls short of amount needed

* Iraq facing “catastrophe”, water boss says

By Muhanad Mohammed

BAGHDAD, May 23 (Reuters) – Turkey has boosted the flow of the Euphrates river passing through its dams upstream of Iraq to help farmers cope with a drought after Iraqi complaints, but it is still not enough, a top Iraqi lawmaker said on Saturday.

Iraq is mostly desert and its inhabitable areas are slaked by the Tigris, which comes down from Turkey, the Euphrates, also from Turkey but passing through Syria, and a network of smaller rivers from Iran, some of which feed the Tigris.

Iraq accuses Turkey, and to a lesser extent Syria, of choking the Euphrates by placing hydroelectric dams on it that have restricted water flow, damaging an Iraqi agricultural sector already hit by decades of war, sanctions and neglect.

The dispute is a delicate diplomatic issue for Iraq as it seeks to improve ties with its neighbours and Turkey is one of Iraq’s most important trading partners.

Saleh al-Mutlaq, leader of a Sunni Arab bloc in parliament, said he flew to Turkey on Friday and met Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul to ask them to release more water from the river, which has been depleted by a drought.

“They have since increased the quantities of water coming to Iraq by 130 cubic metres per second,” he said.

“It’s not enough, but it has partly solved the water problems preventing our farmers from planting rice,” he said.

That makes the flow of water to Iraq 360 cubic metres per second, up from the 230 cubic metres per second that Iraq received before Turkey took action.

Iraq’s director of water resources, Oun Thiab Abdullah, said last week that Iraq faced a catastrophe this summer unless Turkey triples the Euphrates water flow. A drought has already withered crops and created severe water shortages. The river has dropped 35 percent since January, Abdullah said.

Iraq wants Turkey to let 700 cubic metres per second out, almost double what now flows through even after the increase.

Iraq’s parliament voted last week to force the government to demand a greater share of water resources from neighbours upstream of its vital rivers, Turkey, Iran and Syria, turning up the heat on long running disputes.

They agreed to block anything signed with the nations not including a clause granting Iraq a fairer share of river water.

Turkish firms dominate northern Iraq’s economy and Turkish firms have billions of dollars of contracts in Iraq.

Some 400,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day — more than a fifth of its exports — are piped through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. (Additional reporting by Aseel Kami; Writing by Tim Cocks; Editing by Jon Hemming)

Source: www.reuters.com, May 23, 2009

May 24, 2009
Controversy Erupts over Proposed De-Mining of the Turkish-Syrian Border

Controversy Erupts over Proposed De-Mining of the Turkish-Syrian Border

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 98

May 21, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

The Turkish parliament began debating a controversial bill last week to clear and destroy mines along the border with Syria. A private contractor plans to carry out the de-mining and secure the allocation of the cleared area for its agricultural use. The bill once again exposed divisions between the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the opposition parties, as well as within the ruling party. The prospects that the tender might be awarded to foreign and especially Israeli companies, alarmed opposition parties, which have argued that the proposed legislation is another indication that the AKP is betraying Turkish national interests.

Following its ratification of the Ottawa Convention on the destruction of anti-personnel mines (APM’s) in 2003, Turkey pledged to destroy its existing stockpiles and those already placed along its borders. According to the Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, Turkey has since destroyed 43 percent of its 2,690,929 APM’s and plans to remove the remainder by 2010. Moreover, there are currently around 981,790 APM’s deployed along its borders and in strategic locations. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has started mine-clearing operations within some provinces (ANKA, May 17).

Around two-thirds of the 900,000 APM’s on Turkey’s borders are located on the Turkish-Syrian border. The finance and defense ministries supported the view of the Turkish military authorities that the best option was to sub-contract the de-mining of the border. Under that tender, to be conducted in accordance with the Public Procurement Law, the company awarded the mine-clearing rights will be required to complete its work within five years. Moreover, it will have the right to lease cleared areas belonging to the treasury for agricultural use for up to 44 years (Today’s Zaman, June 24, 2008; www.cnnturk.com, May 3). The management of underground resources, such as oil and minerals, is not covered by the tender. The Turkish petroleum company TPAO plans to explore drilling for oil in this area (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 18).

The plan to sub-contract the clean-up project to private companies has long been featured on the government’s agenda. The MHP and CHP opposition parties expressed concern that foreign companies, especially Israeli firms, might become involved in the project. An earlier tender was canceled by the council of state owing to such objections. The government has delayed parliamentary discussions on a revised bill, which is intended to provide a more solid legal framework to conduct the project (www.rotahaber.com, March 17, 2008). Since it has also come under increasing pressure to meet the deadline set by the Ottawa Convention, the bill was finally presented to parliament last week, prompting heated discussion.

The opposition parties raised several objections. They claimed that allowing foreign companies to operate on Turkey’s borders might pose a threat to its national security. Consequently, they demanded that the TSK should be given the sole responsibility for mine-clearing. Moreover, they alleged that the TSK also harbored reservations over the bill. In their defense, government officials referred to “classified” correspondence with the TSK in which the latter expressed a preference for sub-contracting to private companies. Equally, they noted the military’s concerns had been incorporated into the draft bill. According to the government, land required for ensuring border security will not be leased to the contractor (Anadolu Ajansi, May 14). However, those statements failed to satisfy the opposition, who argued that the government had misled the public. One CHP representative invited the TSK to issue a statement clarifying its stance on the bill. He also called for its withdrawal, saying that if approved in parliament, the party will refer the issue to the constitutional court (Anadolu Ajansi, May 18).

Moreover, some opposition deputies claimed that the wording within the bill indicates it was drafted to favor awarding the tender to Israeli companies. They alleged that this proved the hypocrisy of the AKP’s foreign policy, given Erdogan’s earlier anti-Israeli rhetoric (ANKA, May 16). In response, the Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek denied that this was intended, and said fourteen companies were currently in competition for the tender. He added that although there are no Turkish companies specializing both in mine-clearance and agriculture, some might consider forming consortiums with foreign partners to compete for the tender (www.cnnturk.com, May 13). Although Simsek did not disclose the identity of any company involved, one Turkish daily said that it had obtained the list of contenders which included companies from Britain, Croatia, Denmark, France, Israel, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine and the United States (Today’s Zaman, May 17).

In addition, many opposition deputies, including those from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society, demanded that the areas designated for mine-clearance should be distributed locally, in order to benefit the rural economy. Simsek, however, contends that such redistribution might result in the inefficient use of agricultural land, and therefore the government prefers to lease it en masse. Many AKP parliamentarians also share the opposition’s concerns (www.nethaber.com, May 16). Owing to these objections, the government has been unable to rapidly pass the bill in parliament.

Moreover, given the continued controversy over the possible involvement of Israeli firms, the conservative press favoring the AKP has also joined the rising criticism of the bill (Yeni Safak, May 20). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a hastily convened closed door meeting to allay the concerns of the AKP deputies. In a bid to reassure them that bill adequately protected Turkish national interests, Erdogan allegedly claimed that “the controversy was a product of the opposition parties, trying to wear us down through their unfair accusations” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 20).

The heated discussion surrounding the bill reveals that concern over national security remains high on the domestic political agenda. Across the political spectrum there is sensitivity to any initiative that might imply an infringement of the country’s territorial integrity. The presence on Turkish soil of foreign capital or troops, can easily be manipulated to garner opposition against any effort to develop closer ties with the outside world.

https://jamestown.org/program/controversy-erupts-over-proposed-de-mining-of-the-turkish-syrian-border/

May 22, 2009
Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84

May 1, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.

May 8, 2009