All the evidence suggests Elvis Presley is more alive today than Osama bin Laden. But tell that to the CIA and all the other misconceptualizers of the War on Terror.
Seven years after Osama bin Laden’s last verifiable appearance among the living, there is more evidence for Elvis’s presence among us than for his. Hence there is reason to ask whether the paradigm of Osama bin Laden as terrorism’s deus ex machina and of al Qaeda as the prototype of terrorism may be an artifact of our Best and Brightest’s imagination, and whether investment in this paradigm has kept our national security establishment from thinking seriously about our troubles’ sources. So let us take a fresh look at the fundamentals.
Dead or Alive?
Negative evidence alone compels the conclusion that Osama is long since dead. Since October 2001, when Al Jazeera’s Tayseer Alouni interviewed him, no reputable person reports having seen him—not even after multiple-blind journeys through intermediaries. The audio and video tapes alleged to be Osama’s never convinced impartial observers. The guy just does not look like Osama. Some videos show him with a Semitic aquiline nose, while others show him with a shorter, broader one. Next to that, differences between colors and styles of beard are small stuff.
Nor does the tapes’ Osama sound like Osama. In 2007 Switzerland’s Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which does computer voice recognition for bank security, compared the voices on 15 undisputed recordings of Osama with the voices on 15 subsequent ones attributed to Osama, to which they added two by native Arab speakers who had trained to imitate him and were reading his writings. All of the purported Osama recordings (with one falling into a gray area) differed clearly from one another as well as from the genuine ones. By contrast, the CIA found all the recordings authentic. It is hard to imagine what methodology might support this conclusion.
Also in 2007, Professor Bruce Lawrence, who heads Duke University’s religious studies program, argued in a book on Osama’s messages that their increasingly secular language is inconsistent with Osama’s Wahhabism. Lawrence noted as well that the Osama figure in the December 2001 video, which many have taken as his assumption of responsibility for 9/11, wears golden rings—decidedly un-Wahhabi. He also writes with the wrong hand. Lawrence concluded that the messages are fakes, and not very good ones. The CIA has judged them all good.
Above all, whereas Elvis impersonators at least sing the King’s signature song, “You ain’t nutin’ but a hound dawg,” the words on the Osama tapes differ substantively from what the real Osama used to say—especially about the most important matter. On September 16, 2001, on Al Jazeera, Osama said of 9/11: “I stress that I have not carried out this act, which appears to have been carried out by individuals with their own motivation.” Again, in the October interview with Tayseer Alouni, he limited his connection with 9/11 to ideology: “If they mean, or if you mean, that there is a link as a result of our incitement, then it is true. We incite…” But in the so-called “confession video” that the CIA found in December, the Osama figure acts like the chief conspirator. The fact that the video had been made for no self-evident purpose except perhaps to be found by the Americans should have raised suspicion. Its substance, the celebratory affirmation of a responsibility for 9/11 that Osama had denied, should also have weighed against the video’s authenticity. Why would he wait to indict himself until after U.S. forces and allies had secured Afghanistan? But the CIA acted as if it had caught Osama red-handed.
The CIA should also have taken seriously the accounts of Osama’s death. On December 26, 2001, Fox News interviewed a Taliban source who claimed that he had attended Osama’s funeral, along with some 30 associates. The cause of death, he said, had been pulmonary infection. The New York Times on July 11, 2002, reported the consensus of a story widespread in Pakistan that Osama had succumbed the previous year to his long-standing nephritis. Then, Benazir Bhutto—as well connected as anyone with sources of information on the Afghan-Pakistani border—mentioned casually in a BBC interview that Osama had been murdered by his associates. Murder is as likely as natural death. Osama’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is said to have murdered his own predecessor, Abdullah Azzam, Osama’s original mentor. Also, because Osama’s capture by the Americans would have endangered everyone with whom he had ever associated, any and all intelligence services who had ever worked with him had an interest in his death.
New Osama, Real Osama
We do not know what happened to Osama. But whatever happened, the original one, the guy who looked and sounded like a spoiled Saudi kid turned ideologue, is no more. The one who exists in the tapes is different: he is the world’s terror master, endowed with inexplicable influence. In short, whoever is making the post-November 2001 Osama tapes is pretending to far greater power than Osama ever claimed, much less exercised.
The real Osama bin Laden, like the real al Qaeda over which he presided, was never as important as reports from Arab (especially Saudi) intelligence services led the CIA to believe. Osama’s (late) role in Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet resistance was to bring in a little money. Arab fighters in general, and particularly the few Osama brought, fought rarely and badly. In war, one Afghan is worth many Arabs. In 1990 Osama told Saudi regent Abdullah that his mujahideen could stop Saddam’s invasion of the kingdom. When Abdullah waved him away in favor of a half-million U.S. troops, Osama turned dissident, enough to have to move to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996 hatching sterile anti-Saudi plots until forced to move his forlorn band to Afghanistan.
There is a good reason why neither Osama nor al Qaeda appeared on U.S. intelligence screens until 1998. They had done nothing noteworthy. Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, however, and especially after director of Central Intelligence George Tenet imputed responsibility for 9/11 to Osama “game, set, and match,” the CIA described him as terrorism’s prime mover. It refused to countenance the possibility that Osama’s associates might have been using him and his organization as a flag of convenience. As U.S. forces were taking over Afghanistan in 2001, the CIA was telling Time and Newsweek that it expected to find the high-tech headquarters from which Osama controlled terrorist activities in 50 countries. None existed. In November 2008, without factual basis and contrary to reason, the CIA continued to describe him and his organization as “the most clear and present danger to the United States.” It did not try to explain how this could be while, it said, Osama is “largely isolated from the day to day operations of the organization he nominally heads.” What organization?
Axiom and Opposite
Why such a focus on an organization that was never large, most of whose known associates have long since been killed or captured, and whose assets the CIA does not even try to catalogue? The CIA’s official explanation, that al Qaeda has “metastasized” by spreading its expertise, is an empty metaphor. But pursuant to it, the U.S. government accepted the self-designation as “al Qaeda” of persons fighting for Sunni-Baathist interests in Iraq, and has pinned the label gratuitously on sundry high-profile terrorists while acknowledging that their connection to Osama and Co. may be emotional at most. But why such gymnastics in the face of Osama’s incontrovertible irrelevance? Because focusing on Osama and al Qaeda affirms a CIA axiom dating from the Cold War, an axiom challenged during the Reagan years but that has been U.S. policy since 1993, namely: terrorism is the work of “rogue individuals and groups” that operate despite state authority. According to this axiom, the likes of Osama run rings around the intelligence services of Arab states—just like the Cold War terrorists who came through Eastern Europe to bomb in Germany and Italy and to shoot Pope John Paul II supposedly acted despite Bulgarian intelligence, despite East Germany’s Stasi, despite the KGB. This axiom is dear to many in the U.S. government because it leads logically to working with the countries whence terrorists come rather than to treating them as enemies.
But what if terrorism were (as Thomas Friedman put it) “what states want to happen or let happen”? What if, in the real world, infiltrators from intelligence services—the professionals—use the amateur terrorists rather than the other way around? What is the logical consequence of noting the fact that the terrorist groups that make a difference on planet Earth—such as Hamas and Hezbollah, the PLO, Colombia’s FARC—are extensions of, respectively, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and Venezuela? It is the negation of the U.S. government’s favorite axiom. It means that when George W. Bush spoke, and when Barack Obama speaks, of America being “at war” against “extremism” or “extremists” they are either being stupid or acting stupid to avoid dealing with the nasty fact that many governments wage indirect warfare.
In short, insisting on Osama’s supposed mastery of al Qaeda, and on equating terrorism with al Qaeda, is official U.S. policy because it forecloses questions about the role of states, and makes it possible to indict as warmongers whoever raises such questions. Osama’s de facto irrelevance for seven years, however, has undermined that policy’s intellectual legitimacy. How much longer can presidents or directors of the CIA wave the spectra of Osama and al Qaeda before people laugh at them?
An Intellectual House of Cards
Questioning osama’s relevance to today’s terrorism leads naturally to asking how relevant he ever was, and who might be more relevant. That in turn quickly shows how flimsy are the factual foundations on which rest the U.S. government’s axioms about the “war on terror.” Consider: We know that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) planned and carried out 9/11. But there is no independent support for KSM’s claim that he acted at Osama’s direction and under his supervision. On the contrary, we know for sure that the expertise and the financing for 9/11 came from KSM’s own group (the U.S. government has accepted but to my knowledge not verified that the group’s core is a biological family of Baluchs). This group carried out the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa and every other act for which al Qaeda became known. The KSM group included the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings Abdul Rahman Yasin, who came from, returned to, and vanished in Iraq, as well as Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of that bombing, who came to the U.S. from Iraq on an Iraqi passport and was known to his New York collaborators as “Rashid the Iraqi.” This group had planned the bombing of U.S. airliners over the Pacific in 1995. The core members are non-Arabs. They had no history of religiosity (and the religiosity they now display is unconvincing). They were not creatures of Osama. Only in 1996 did the group come to Osama’s no-account band, and make it count.
In life, as in math, you must judge the function |of a factor in any equation by factoring it out and seeing if the equation still works. Factor out Osama. Chances are, 9/11 still happens. Factor out al Qaeda too. Maybe 9/11 still happens. The other bombing plots sure happened without it. But if you factor out the KSM group, surely there is no 9/11, and without the KSM group, there is no way al Qaeda would have become a household word.
Who, precisely, are KSM and his reputed nephews? That is an interesting question to which we do not know the answer, and are not about to find out. Ramzi Yousef was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing after a trial that focused on his guilt and that abstracted from his associations. Were our military tribunal to accede to KSM’s plea of guilty, he would avoid any trial at all. Moreover, the sort of trial that would take place before the tribunal would focus on proving guilt rather than on getting at the whole truth. It would not feature the cross-examination of witnesses, the substantive proving and impeachment of evidence, and the exploration of alternative explanations of events. But real trials try all sides. Do we need such things given that KSM confessed? Yes. There is no excuse for confusing confessions with truth, especially confessions in which the prisoners confirm our agencies’ prejudices.
The excuse for limiting the public scrutiny of evidence is the alleged need to protect intelligence sources. But my experience, as well as that of others who have been in a position to probe such claims, is that almost invariably they protect our intelligence agencies’ incompetence and bureaucratic interests. Anyhow, the public’s interest in understanding what it’s up against should override all others.
Understanding the Past, Dealing With the Future
Focusing on Osama bin Elvis is dangerous to America’s security precisely because it continues to substitute in our collective mind the soft myth that terrorism is the work of romantic rogues for the hard reality that it can happen only because certain states want it to happen or let it happen. KSM and company may not have started their careers as agents of Iraqi intelligence, or they may have quit the Iraqis and worked for others, or maybe they just worked for themselves. But surely they were a body unto themselves. As such they fit Osama’s description of those responsible for 9/11 as “individuals with their own motivation” far better than they fit the CIA’s description of them as Osama’s tools.
More important, focusing on Osama and al Qaeda distorts our understanding of what is happening in Afghanistan. The latter-day Taliban are fielding forces better paid and armed than any in the region except America’s. Does anyone suggest seriously that Osama or al-Zawahiri are providing the equipment, the money, or the moral incentives? Such amounts of money can come only from the super wealthy of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The equipment can come only through dealers who work at the sufferance of states, and can reach the front only through Pakistan by leave of Pakistani authorities. Moreover, the moral incentives for large-scale fighting in Pushtunistan can come only as part of the politics of Pushtun identity. Hence sending troops to Afghanistan to fight Pushtuns financed by Saudis, supported by Pakistanis, and disposing of equipment purchased throughout the world, with the objective of “building an Afghan nation” capable of preventing Osama and al Qaeda from messing up the world from their mountain caves, is an errand built on intellectual self-indulgence.
Intellectual Authority
The CIA had as much basis for deeming Osama the world’s terror master “game, set, and match” in 2001 as it had in 2003 for verifying as a “slam dunk” the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and as it had in 2007 for determining that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program. Mutatis mutandis, it was on such bases that the CIA determined in 1962 that the Soviets would not put missiles in Cuba; that the CIA was certain from 1963 to 1978 that the USSR would not build the first strike missile force that it was building before its very eyes; that the CIA convinced Bush 41 that the Soviet Union was not falling apart and that he should help hold it together; that the CIA assured the U.S. government in 1990 that Iraq would not invade Kuwait, and in 1996 that neither India nor Pakistan would test nuclear weapons. In these and countless other instances, the CIA has provided the US government and the media with authoritative bases for denying realities over which America was tripping.
The force of the CIA’s judgments, its authority, has always come from the congruence between its prejudices and those of America’s ruling class. When you tell people what they want to hear, you don’t have to be too careful about premises, facts, and conclusions. Our problem, in short, is not the CIA’s mentality so much as the unwillingness of persons in government and the “attentive public” to exercise intellectual due diligence about international affairs. Osama bin Laden’s role may be as good a place as any to start.
Angelo M. Codevilla, a professor of international relations at Boston University, a fellow of the Claremont Institute, and a senior editor of The American Spectator, was a Foreign Service officer and served on the staff of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee between 1977 and 1985.He was the principal author of the 1980 presidential transition report on intelligence. He is the author of The Character of Nations: How Politics Makes and Breaks Prosperity, Family, and Civility.
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TEL AVIV – Ever since Turkey’s establishment as a republic, the country has oscillated between the Western-oriented heritage of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, and its eastern, Ottoman legacy. Never resolved, modern Turkey’s deep identity complex is now shaking its strategic alliances and recasting its regional and global role. Indeed, Turkey’s changing perception of itself has shaped its so-far frustrated drive to serve as a peace broker between Israel and its Arab enemies, Syria and Hamas.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s missionary zeal to replace Egypt as the essential regional mediator, and his violent tirades against Israel’s behavior in Gaza, looks to many people like an attempt to recover Turkey’s Ottoman-era role as the guarantor of regional peace and security. Its credentials for this role in the Middle East are by no means negligible.
Turkey is a true regional superpower, with one of the largest armies in the world. At the same time, it is the only Muslim country that, while no less worried than Israel about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, can maintain excellent economic and political relations with Iran, regardless of American displeasure. Of course, Syria is Iran’s ally, too, but no country in the region has the leverage with it that Turkey possesses. And Turkey’s diplomatic reach in the region is also reflected in its recent signing of a friendship treaty with Saudi Arabia, while maintaining excellent relations with Pakistan and Iraq.
Europe’s persistence in snubbing Turkey’s attempts to join the European Union, the rise of violent anti-Western popular sentiment in the wake of the Iraq war, and strained relations with the US – owing in part to the forthcoming Armenian Genocide Act – are major factors in Turkey’s change of direction. The civilizing efforts that Ataturk’s revolution directed inward and in favor of disengagement from the Arab and Muslim worlds are now being revisited. The Turkey of Erdogan’s dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to be seeking a new mission civilisatrice , with the Middle East and the former Soviet republics as its alternative horizons.
The uneasy challenge for Turkey is to secure its newfound regional role without betraying Ataturk’s democratic legacy. Turkish democracy and secular values have been greatly enhanced by the country’s dialogue with Europe and its American ties. Turkey can be a model for Middle Eastern countries if, while promoting its regional strategic and economic interests, it resists the authoritarian temptation and continues to show that Islam and democracy are fully compatible.
For Israel, the long overdue message is that its future in the Middle East does not lie in strategic alliances with the region’s non-Arab powers, but in reconciling itself with the Arab world. In the 1960’s, David Ben-Gurion’s fatalistic pessimism about the possibility of ever reaching a peace settlement with the Arab countries led him to forge an “Alliance of the Periphery” with the non-Arab countries in the outer circle of the Middle East – Iran, Ethiopia, and Turkey (he also dreamed of having Lebanon’s Maronite community as part of that alliance).
All of these countries did not have any particular dispute with Israel, and all, to varying degrees, had tense relations with their Arab neighbors. The mythof Israel’s military power, resourcefulness in economic and agricultural matters, and an exaggerated perception of its unique capacity to lobby and influence American policy combined to make the Israeli connection especially attractive to these countries.
The “Alliance of the Periphery” was a creative attempt to escape the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It reflected the yearning of the Jewish state to unleash its creative energies in economic and social matters, as it created space for an independent, imaginative foreign policy that was not linked to, or conditioned by, the paralyzing constraints of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as vice-president of the Toledo International Centre for Peace, is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.
But the security that this scheme was supposed to produce could never really be achieved; the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be attenuated. The Arabs’ capacity to maintain their pressure on Israel and to keep world opinion focused on the Palestinians’ plight made Israel’s quest for evading the consequences of the conflict, either through periodic wars or by forging alternative regional alliances, a futile exercise.
The Islamic revolution in Iran, the changes in Ethiopia following the end of Haile Selassie’s rule, the collapse of Maronite Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s takeover of that country left Turkey as the last remaining member of Israel’s Alliance of the Periphery. Turkey’s powerful military establishment may want to maintain close relations with Israel, but the widely popular change in Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, and the serious identity dilemmas facing the nation, send an unequivocal message that the alliance can no longer serve as an alternative to peace with the Arab world. From now on, it can only be complementary to such a peace.
Shlomo Ben-Ami is a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as the vice-president of the Toledo International Center for Peace. He is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.
From February 3 to 5 Turkish President Abdullah Gul is visiting Saudi Arabia as King Abdullah’s official guest. Gul is accompanied by several members of the Turkish cabinet as well as about 150 Turkish businessmen. Since the visit comes amid discussions on how to bring calm to the Middle East in the wake of Israel’s Gaza offensive, it provides an opportunity for the leaders of the two major regional countries to discuss developments in their neighborhood. The visit also marks the deepening bilateral ties between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which have gained momentum since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. In addition to bilateral and regional matters, Gul and his hosts discussed issues important to the Islamic world.
Gul spoke at the Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia, which made him the first Muslim head-of-state to address the Saudi assembly. Regional peace and Gaza-related developments took up a major part of Gul’s speech. He praised King Abdullah’s work toward ensuring regional peace and stability and described Riyadh’s foreign policy as “constructive and responsible.” “We always maintain close political consultation about regional issues,” Gul added (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 4).
Gul complemented King Abdullah for his past efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem, and he gave his support to the Saudi peace plan, which called on Israel to withdraw to its 1967 borders in return for normalization of relations with its Arab neighbors. He also reiterated Turkey’s position that the solution of the conflict depends on ensuring reconciliation among Palestinian factions. As a successful example of mediation, Gul cited a meeting between Fatah and Hamas that was hosted by King Abdullah in Mecca in 2007. He asked the leaders of Arab and Muslim countries to work toward ensuring that Palestinians achieve a national unity government. In an Islamic internationalist tone, he presented the Palestinian problem as the responsibility of the Muslim nations: “The number one issue is the unity of the Palestinians, the unity of the Arab world, and the unity of the Muslim world, with all of us showing our responsibility and desire to act together when there are major issues” (Today’s Zaman, February 5).
In his address to the Saudi assembly, Gul also touched upon another issue of common interest to Muslims worldwide. Gul expressed his concern about growing “Islamiphobia” in the West. Gul argued that the source of misperceptions and growing enmity toward Islam was the tendency in some circles to equate Islam with terrorism. Noting that terrorism may spring from any society and any religion, he described Islam as a religion of peace that urged its followers to respect others (Zaman, February 5).
The visit also highlighted the flourishing Turkish-Saudi bilateral relationship. The Turkish president said that he felt at home on his the trip, calling Turkey and Saudi Arabia sister states and sister nations. Gul recalled that King Abdullah had gone to Turkey in 2006 and 2007 and that these two visits in such a short time had shown Riyadh’s “extraordinary attention and concern for Turkey.” Gul added that he had wanted to return the gesture by paying a visit without any delay to show the high esteem that Turkey attached to relations with Saudi Arabia (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, February 4). Diplomatic observers believe that Riyadh might be seeking to develop a strategic partnership with Turkey to counter the growing Iranian influence in the region (www.cnnturk.com, February 3).
Bilateral economic cooperation was a major theme on Gul’s agenda. He emphasized that the two countries had already signed agreements covering tax exemption, investment protection, and transportation (ANKA, February 4) and expressed the hope that the two sides could extend this cooperation further. Turkish ministers and the businessmen accompanying Gul signed new agreements with their counterparts in such areas as educational exchange programs, cooperation in youth and sports, and maritime transportation (Hurriyet Daily News, February 4).
Gul also spoke at a meeting of the Turkish-Saudi Business Council. Noting that structural reforms in Turkey had helped the country withstand the global crisis and created favorable conditions for foreign investors, Gul highlighted the strengths of the Turkish banking system. He invited Saudi businessmen to invest in Turkey. Given Saudi Arabia’s projected investments in infrastructure, Turkish businesses, especially contractors, view Saudi Arabia as a lucrative foreign market (Cihan Haber Ajansi, February 4).
Despite the positive outlook for the economy and financial sector that Gul presented, Turkey urgently needs an injection of foreign capital to cushion the effects of the crisis. The government has been reluctant to sign a credit agreement with the IMF, because it would impose stringent conditions on government spending (EDM, January 29). There has been constant talk in Turkey about attracting petrodollars, or “Gulf capital” as the Turks like to call it, as a way to finance Turkey’s economic development. Turkish businessmen have hoped that Turkey might be able to attract Gulf capital leaving the Western banking system, especially after September 11. Lately, it has often been said that Gulf capital might make Istanbul a worldwide financial center, and end Turkey’s dependence on the IMF (Zaman, January 28, 2008). As a matter of fact, although the AKP government has been successful in boosting the volume of Arab investments in Turkey, it could not raise it to a level that would reduce Turkey’s dependence on money borrowed from Western financial institutions.
Following Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s walkout from a meeting in Davos, the Turkish media was full of speculative reports that Middle Eastern countries, impressed by Erdogan’s stance, were preparing to invest further in Turkey. Reportedly, financial institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates might offer Turkey almost a “blank check,” which might relieve the Turkish economy (Yenicag, January 31). It remains to be seen, however, whether Gul can use Turkey’s new image in the Middle East and his personal ties to King Abdullah to bring home good news about Saudi investment.
Israel’s ongoing offensive against Gaza has generated waves of anger among the Turkish public and Turkish political elite. Paralleling mounting street demonstrations throughout Turkey are international attempts by the country’s leaders to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The attacks came amid Turkey’s growing involvement in the Middle East as a significant power seeking to exert influence through nonmilitary means, including economic and trade relations, cultural exchanges, and its new-found role as a regional peace broker. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has successfully involved Turkey in attempts to resolve the region’s protracted problems, most importantly Israel’s entangled relations with its Arab neighbors.
When Israel launched air strikes on December 27, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the high number of civilian deaths and emphasized Turkey’s concern that the developments might undermine regional stability (www.mfa.gov.tr, December 27). Erdogan criticized the operation and labeled Israeli aggression as an act against Turkey’s peace initiatives, noting that through this action Israel had shut the door on diplomacy. He said that any diplomatic contact with Israel was meaningless at that point and called on the United Nations to intervene to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. He also cancelled his plan to call Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to discuss Israel-Syria negotiations, because Israeli aggression was also “an act of disrespect toward Turkey” (Radikal, December 27).
Erdogan’s disillusionment with Israel can be better understood given Olmert’s visit to Ankara a few days earlier, during which they discussed the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Olmert asked Erdogan to revitalize the Israeli-Syria talks (www.cnnturk.com, December 23). Erdogan was preparing to play a more assertive role as a peace-broker in 2009, but Israel’s unrestricted use of force and apparent “insincerity” toward Turkey might have shattered his optimism about finding a comprehensive solution to Middle Eastern conflicts through dialogue.
In response to Israel’s uncompromising position, the Erdogan government embarked on a diplomatic offensive to mobilize the international community. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Erdogan has spoken to world leaders such as the UN Secretary-General and European politicians (Anadolu Ajansi, January 4). He went on a “Middle East tour” to consult with regional leaders and explore a common position against Israel. On the first step of his shuttle-diplomacy, he met with the leaders of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as Palestinian politicians. The second step of his tour took him to Saudi Arabia. Following his meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Erdogan announced Turkey’s proposal for a two-stage plan to calm tension in Gaza. The first stage would be a ceasefire supervised by international peacekeepers, including Turkish forces. The second stage would seek to find a common ground between rival Palestinian groups in order to achieve a sustainable peace in the region (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 2; Sabah, January 3).
In the midst of these initiatives, Turkey appears to be seeking ways to bridge the divisions among Arab countries as well. While some Arab countries tend to feel that Hamas has the main responsibility for the collapse of talks with Fatah and are seeking to isolate it because of its alleged connections to Iran, Turkey is arguing against its isolation (Referans, December 30). At a time when Hamas is also coming under international criticism for sparking Israeli aggression, Erdogan defended the organization by saying that “agitation does not come from Hamas; rather, Israel has created fertile ground for this agitation.” Referring to a June 2008 deal brokered by Egypt, he maintained that “Hamas complied with the six-month long ceasefire. Yet, Israel did not lift the embargo. The people of Gaza are living in an open prison.” Erdogan went on to add that “Turkey could sponsor Hamas’s conditions for a ceasefire at the UN Security Council [UNSC], because Hamas’s trust in the Palestinian authority and Egypt has been shaken” but it still had full confidence in Turkey (Yeni Safak, January 3; www.cnnturk.com, January 4).
Here, Erdogan had in mind Turkey’s new role as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, which it assumed this month. However, the United States’ threat to veto any resolution to halt Israeli attacks, as reflected in the January 3 consultation meeting of the SC, will not make it easy for the Erdogan government to use this avenue for supporting Palestinian interests. It is also important to note that Erdogan has repeatedly emphasized Turkey’s willingness to work in tandem with Egypt as a defender of the Palestinian cause.
At the same time, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met with his counterparts. He phoned the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, himself a Turk, and arranged an emergency meeting of the OIC Foreign Ministers (www.mfa.gov.tr, December 28). The final communiqué of the OIC meeting held on January 3 strongly condemned “the ongoing barbaric Israeli assault on the Palestinian people in Gaza” and proposed a number of measures to mobilize the international community to relieve the suffering of Palestinians and end Israel’s attacks (www.oic-oci.org, January, 3). Similarly, Turkey also urged the Arab League’s foreign ministers to work toward a ceasefire and facilitate reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.
The start of Israel’s ground offensive despite these efforts raises questions about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. In response to a question, Erdogan had earlier said, “Inter-governmental relations cannot afford emotions. Yet, injustice cannot be permitted either. If there is oppression, we cannot support it. We seek to solve it through talks” (Zaman, January 2). Given Israel’s lack of interest in “talks,” on the one hand, and Turkey’s pro-Hamas position and exclusion of Israel from its diplomatic initiatives, on the other, it will be interesting to see how Erdogan will advocate Palestinian rights in international forums and whether Turkish-Israeli cooperation can survive the storm.
An explosive device that was placed inside the house of Judge Abdul-Mahdi Najar who lives in Tuz Khormatu went off about three o’clock this afternoon on the 2nd of January 2009.
The blast occurred in the Aksu neighbourhood in Tuz Khormatu district which is one of the Turkmeneli districts; it is located on the highway between Baghdad and the strategic oil city of Kirkuk.
The blast has caused minor damage to the house inhabited by the Turkmen judge who works at Tuz Khormatu court it also caused damaged to the car that was parked in front of the house belonging to one of the guests.
The Turkmen Judge also was targeted on 9th of September 2008 by a suicide car bomb which resulted in the death of ten Turkmen people.
The Türkmen judge has complained to the police authorities, which refuses to allocate security guards for his protection from the police.
