Category: Palestinian N.A.

Palestinian National Authority

Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli Axis Revived

Gulnara Inandzh
Director
International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

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The visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Baku on February 8-11, which has attracted so much comment and speculation, is a constituent part of Tel Aviv’s policy in the post-Soviet space. An analysis of the results of this visit shows that the resonance arising from the Baku meetings of the Israeli minister serves only as a cover for the discussion behind the scenes of issues, which have strategic geopolitical importance.

Azerbaijani and Israeli media in their discussion of these meetings devoted most of their attention to several questions, including the broadening of Azerbaijani-Israeli ties at a time when contacts between Ankara and Jerusalem are increasingly tense, Azerbaijani permission for Israeli use of the territory of the country in the event of military actions against Iran, and a mediating role of official Baku in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. The links among these various issues become obvious upon close examination.

As far as the first question is concerned, one should note that Israel and part of the Jewish lobby, which has spoken out against military actions in Iran, do not consider the territory of Azerbaijan as a place des armes for military actions against Iran. Related to this and as part of an effort designed to restrain Iran, the United States and Georgia have signed an agreement on the use of Georgia’s territorial waters in the Black Sea if US military bases in the Persian Gulf are used for an attack on Iran.

Correctly assessing the situation, Israeli political analysts understand that Azerbaijan will not under any circumstances agree to the use of its territory for an invasion of Iran but rather will do everything it can to prevent the beginning of military actions against its southern neighbor. Any military invasion, be it a broad scale military action or surgical strike, would entail a humanitarian catastrophe (including an incalculable number of refugees from the northern part of Iran), a collapse of the economy, and a growth of terrorism in Azerbaijan. These threats in turn are entirely capable of delivering a destructive blow to the security of Azerbaijan. Consequently, official Baku cannot agree to such a step even in exchange for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

There is, however, a plethora of other issues that invite attention of Baku and Tel Aviv, as well as Ankara, and could hence serve as a solid foundation upon which the relations among the three could develop further. Since Lieberman’s visit to Baku, there have been several extremely interesting events. On February 16, Pinchas Avivi, the deputy director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and head of that organization’s Division for Central Europe and Eurasia, made a working visit to Ankara. Not only did the two parties discuss bilateral relations, but they also touched upon the issues of cooperation and interaction in “third countries,” in particular those in the South Caucasus (Goldenstein 2010). That suggests that the meeting in Ankara represented a continuation of the Baku negotiations. The possibility of tripartite cooperation in dealing with the regional issues at a time when Turkish-Israeli relations appear to be in “conflict” is not fantastic if one comes to analyze more closely recent events. Despite a certain public cooling in recent months, both countries have enough in common that cooperation with regard to regional issues is far from impossible. As one Turkish official put it, “populism is part of contemporary politics,” but “Turkey was and remains a most serious guarantor of Israel’s security” (Oguz 2010).

Consequently, while some experts have hurried to bury the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkish military-political union, it is obvious that precisely this union and not individual states are capable of being a key geopolitical center and playing a defining role in the region. And local conflicts, which are taking place in these countries, are considered not in isolation but as part of regional policies.

This nexus also reflects Azerbaijan’s interest in playing a larger international role. Indeed, many countries hope that it will. In May 2009, for example, when Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov was in Washington, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Azerbaijan could take on itself greater responsibility and leadership in the resolution of important issues in the region of the South Caucasus. She stressed that “Azerbaijan is a strategic location which is important not only for Azerbaijanis, but also for the region and the entire world,” including not unimportantly not only the Caucasus but the areas to its south. [1]

Not surprisingly, therefore, during Lieberman’s visit to Baku, the two parties discussed in detail the possibility of Azerbaijan’s mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Baku’s growing interest in playing a greater role in the broader region to its south is also reflected in its continuous reluctance to open up its embassy in Tel Aviv. Experts in Baku often cite relations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and with Iran as the reasons Azerbaijan has not taken that step, but the experience of Turkey and Israel suggests that in reality there is another reason at work: a desire, on the part of Baku, to demonstrate its respect for, and solidarity with, the Palestinians and the Islamic world more generally, something which will help increase the influence of Azerbaijan as a mediator in the Middle Eastern conflict.

As the situation around the region heats up, the links between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Israel seem certain to become closer, and this axis is destined to bear a direct effect on the broader region for years to come.

Note

[1] See (accessed 25 February 2010).

References

Goldenstein, Alexander (2010) “Турция и Израиль сохраняют координацию по Кавказу” [“Turkey and Israel keep coordination on the Caucasus”], Izrus, 17 February, available at http://izrus.co.il/dvuhstoronka/article/2010-02-17/8651.html (accessed 25 February 2010).

Oguz, Dzhem (2010) “Есть причины, вынудившие Турцию изменить отношение к Израилю” [“There are reasons that prompted Turkey to change its attitude to Israel”], Regnum, 11 February, available at (accessed 25 February 2010).

source

March 16, 2010
Turkey ‘gives Israel deadline’ for drone delivery

ANKARA — Turkey has given Israeli contractors 50 days to fulfil a long-delayed deal for the delivery of 10 drone aircraft for the Turkish army, Defence Minister Vecdi Gonul was quoted as saying Saturday.

The delays in the project, launched in 2005, have come against a backdrop of tensions between the two regional allies over Israel’s devastating war on the Gaza Strip at the turn of the year.

The two contractors — Israel Aerospace Industries and Elbit — have been sent a letter to fulfil the terms of the deal within 50 days, the CNN Turk news channel quoted Gonul as saying.

“If this letter does not bear fruit either, the tender may be cancelled. But there is no cancellation at the moment,” Gonul told CNN Turk, according to the report.

Negotiations between the two sides are continuing, he added.

Israeli officials have rejected suggestions that the delay had political links, saying the project was snagged by technical problems as Turkish-manufactured equipment proved too heavy for the aircraft.

Turkish media reported this week that Turkey had returned the only two planes to have been delivered on grounds they failed to meet the required technical norms concerning flying altitude and time.

Turkey awarded the contract in April 2005, saying that it involved the manufacture of three unmanned aerial vehicle systems, including 10 aircraft, surveillance equipment and ground control stations.

The contract was part of a 183-million-dollar project in which Turkish firms were to provide sub-systems and services amounting to 30 percent of the project.

Officials had said at the time the Israeli side was expected to complete their part in 24 to 30 months.

Israel’s ties with Turkey, its main regional ally since 1998 when the two signed a military cooperation accord, took a downturn in January when the Islamist-rooted government in Ankara launched an unprecedented barrage of criticism of the Jewish state over its deadly offensive on Gaza.

Last month Turkey excluded Israel from joint military drills and said ties would continue to suffer unless Israel ends “the humanitarian tragedy” in Gaza and revives peace talks with the Palestinians.

AFP

November 21, 2009
J Street comes alive on Washington, DC map

Friday, October 30, 2009

İLHAN TANIR

The Israel-Palestine peace process – a top foreign-policy objective of the Obama administration – faces continued challenges after months of intense diplomatic talks engineered by George Mitchell, the U.S. envoy for the Middle East. These negotiations have produced a mere handshake between U.S. President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, without being able to produce any framework for an ongoing peace process.

Obama’s tough rhetoric against Netanyahu backfired, said Ami Ayalon, the former head of the Shin Bet, Israel’s secret service, and former commander in chief of the navy after a panel discussion at the J Street conference in Washington, D.C. The initial stalemate was presented by Netanyahu as a victory, which was in reality a mere defense of the status quo, he added. Ayalon also stated that after this first round of diplomacy, Obama started to be viewed as a collaborator with the current Israeli administration, which created some questions in the Arab world regarding the degree to which he can uphold his strong stance against Israeli demands.

Under these circumstances, I asked Jeremy Ben-Ami, the executive director of the J Street movement, to describe his organization to me. “[J Street] is the political voice of American Jews and other Americans who believe that it is in our best interests and as well as that of Israel to end the conflict with the Palestinians and to have a two-state solution and a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East.”

J Street, with a history a mere 18 months in the making, attracted thousands of supporters, the support of hundreds of the members of Congress, high-profile attendees and the Obama administration’s unequivocal backing last week. The Obama administration has shown its support by sending the National Security Adviser, Ret. General James L. Jones, to represent the President and to speak at the conference. Gen. Jones concluded that “this U.S. administration will participate in J Street’s other activities in the future.” On the other hand, while J Street hosted many members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, the one person who shied away from the conference was Israel’s ambassador to Washington, D.C., Michael Oren. According to the statement that was released by the Israeli embassy, there were “concerns over certain policies of the organization that may impair the interests of Israel.”

One would rightly ask why is it that this new movement attracted so much attention and sparked a range of discussion in America and across the globe, while Israel already has a mighty lobby, centered around the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, in Washington, D.C., an organization that has been staunchly and unequivocally defending Israel’s policies? What is it that makes J Street so unique to draw thousands of participants, many of whom come from the other states and places as far away as Jerusalem?

I attended most meetings of the conference for two-and-a-half days to receive answers to these questions. I met many ordinary participants as well as religious leaders, rabbis and humanitarian workers from Jerusalem. I met a couple of the participants during the “Jewish Community Town Hall” meeting, after speeches by Rabbi Eric Yoffie, the president of the Union for Reform Judaism and Jeremy Ben-Ami. After these speeches, the crowd discussed some of the questions of the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the Israeli-Arab peace process in general. Two participants were from Oxfam International, a confederation of 14 organizations working in more than 70 countries to find permanent solutions to poverty and injustice. One of these participants was John Prideaux-Brune, Oxfam’s country director, who has been living in Jerusalem and Gaza for about five years.

John said that Israel still occupies Gaza from the sea, land and air, even if it claims officially it does no longer do so. According to the Geneva Conventions, Israel has to allow humanitarian help to enter Gaza. However, John argues, what is allowed to go into Gaza is incredibly limited. For example, macaroni cannot get in because it is considered a luxury food item. Israel only allows about 100 trucks of food to go in to Gaza a day, as opposed to 600-700 trucks before the Gaza conflict. Cement or any other construction materials are not allowed by the border officials as they could be used to make tunnels. His frustration goes further by talking about the terrible circumstances the Gazans live under; ordinary Jewish-American people also sitting at our table are equally angry and add their own criticisms to his frustrations. Another Jewish-American participant who is equally frustrated by the Israeli government’s harsh treatment of the Gazan people was Naftali Kaminski, a doctor, who joined the conference from Pittsburgh.

Therefore, the first reason for J Street’s success and wide popularity undoubtedly comes from the grassroots support of ordinary American Jews who are tired of Israel’s grinding policies in Gaza and stubborn settlement practices. The grassroots support is, I believe, the most important element for any organization to be effective and apparently J Street has it all. There is another very important reason for J Street’s immediate success, which is that it coincided perfectly with a new U.S. administration coming into office. J Street’s close relationship with and support of the Obama administration was seen very clearly during the conference and this special relation apparently makes the organization’s mission to fill a gap in American politics even stronger. J Street defends many parallel policies that fit well with the Obama administration’s plans, such as the two-state solution and a complete freeze of the settlements. It was also interesting to see that whenever a panelist talked about a two-state solution, criticized Israel for what it did during the last Gaza war or called for ending the occupation, the J Street crowd roared and applauded excitedly.

Even though J Street received heavy flak from AIPAC and other hard-line right-wing Israeli factions in respect to their criticism of Israel’s policies, the open-minded discussions and honest debates on the panels were exhilarating and personally lifted my hopes for the peace process. To see a crowd in an inaugural conference describe themselves ‘pro-Israel,’ but stand up against the country’s many wrong-headed policies gained my deep respect.

PS. Washington, D.C. marks its streets with letters, and J is missing from the actual map.

__._,_.___

November 1, 2009
Turkey: An Ally No More

by Daniel Pipes
Jerusalem Post
October 28, 2009

the Middle East Forum, headed by Daniel Pipes

The foreign ministers of Turkey and Syria met in Aleppo in October 2009.

“There is no doubt he is our friend,” Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, says of Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even as he accuses Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman of threatening to use nuclear weapons against Gaza. These outrageous assertions point to the profound change of orientation by Turkey’s government, for six decades the West’s closest Muslim ally, since Erdoğan’s AK party came to power in 2002.

Three events this past month reveal the extent of that change. The first came on October 11 with the news that the Turkish military – a long-time bastion of secularism and advocate of cooperation with Israel – abruptly asked Israeli forces not to participate in the annual “Anatolian Eagle” air force exercise.

Erdoğan cited “diplomatic sensitivities” for the cancelation and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu spoke of “sensitivity on Gaza, East Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque.” The Turks specifically rejected Israeli planes that may have attacked Hamas (an Islamist terrorist organization) during last winter’s Gaza Strip operation. While Damascus applauded the disinvitation, it prompted the U.S. and Italian governments to withdraw their forces from Anatolian Eagle, which in turn meant canceling the international exercise.

As for the Israelis, this “sudden and unexpected” shift shook to the core their military alignment with Turkey, in place since 1996. Former air force chief Eytan Ben-Eliyahu, for example, called the cancelation “a seriously worrying development.” Jerusalem immediately responded by reviewing Israel’s practice of supplying Turkey with advanced weapons, such as the recent $140 million sale to the Turkish Air Force of targeting pods. The idea also arose to stop helping the Turks defeat the Armenian genocide resolutions that regularly appear before the U.S. Congress.

Ministers of the Turkish and Syrian governments met at the border town of Öncüpınar and symbolically lifted a bar dividing their two countries on October 13.

Barry Rubin of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya not only argues that “The Israel-Turkey alliance is over” but concludes that Turkey’s armed forces no longer guard the secular republic and can no longer intervene when the government becomes too Islamist.

The second event took place two days later, on October 13, when Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem announced that Turkish and Syrian forces had just “carried out maneuvers near Ankara.” Moallem rightly called this an important development “because it refutes reports of poor relations between the military and political institutions in Turkey over strategic relations with Syria.” Translation: Turkey’s armed forces lost out to its politicians.

Thirdly, ten Turkish ministers, led by Davutoğlu, joined their Syrian counterparts on October 13 for talks under the auspices of the just-established “Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council.” The ministers announced having signed almost 40 agreements to be implemented within 10 days; that “a more comprehensive, a bigger” joint land military exercise would be held than the first one in April; and that the two countries’ leaders would sign a strategic agreement in November.

The cover of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book, “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position.”

The council’s concluding joint statement announced the formation of “a long-term strategic partnership” between the two sides “to bolster and expand their cooperation in a wide spectrum of issues of mutual benefit and interest and strengthen the cultural bonds and solidarity among their peoples.” The council’s spirit, Davutoğlu explained, “is common destiny, history and future; we will build the future together,” while Moallem called the get-together a “festival to celebrate” the two peoples.

Bilateral relations have indeed been dramatically reversed from a decade earlier, when Ankara came perilously close to war with Syria. But improved ties with Damascus are only one part of a much larger effort by Ankara to enhance relations with regional and Muslim states, a strategy enunciated by Davutoğlu in his influential 2000 book, Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (“Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position”).

In brief, Davutoğlu envisions reduced conflict with neighbors and Turkey emerging as a regional power, a sort-of modernized Ottoman Empire. Implicit in this strategy is a distancing of Turkey from the West in general and Israel in particular. Although not presented in Islamist terms, “strategic depth” closely fits the AK party’s Islamist world view.

As Barry Rubin notes, “the Turkish government is closer politically to Iran and Syria than to the United States and Israel.” Caroline Glick, a Jerusalem Post columnist, goes further: Ankara already “left the Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis.” But official circles in the West seem nearly oblivious to this momentous change in Turkey’s allegiance or its implications.

The cost of their error will soon become evident.

Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.

October 29, 2009
‘Iran is our friend,’ says Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan

• We have no difficulty with Ahmadinejad – Erdogan
• Warning to Europe not to ignore Turkey’s strengths

With its stunning vistas and former Ottoman palaces, the banks of the Bosphorus – the strategic waterway that cuts Istanbul in half and divides Europe from Asia – may be the perfect place to distinguish friend from foe and establish where your country’s interests lie.

And sitting in his grandiose headquarters beside the strait, long the symbol of Turkey‘s supposed role as bridge between east and west, Recep Tayyip Erdogan had little doubt about who was a friend and who wasn’t.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran‘s radical president whose fiery rhetoric has made him a bête noire of the west? “There is no doubt he is our friend,” said Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister for the last six years. “As a friend so far we have very good relations and have had no difficulty at all.”

What about Nicolas Sarkozy, president of France, who has led European opposition to Turkey’s bid to join the EU and, coincidentally, adopted a belligerent tone towards Iran’s nuclear programme? Not a friend?

“Among leaders in Europe there are those who have prejudices against Turkey, like France and Germany. Previously under Mr Chirac, we had excellent relations [with France] and he was very positive towards Turkey. But during the time of Mr Sarkozy, this is not the case. It is an unfair attitude. The European Union is violating its own rules.

“Being in the European Union we would be building bridges between the 1.5bn people of Muslim world to the non-Muslim world. They have to see this. If they ignore it, it brings weakness to the EU.”

Friendly towards a religious theocratic Iran, covetous and increasingly resentful of a secular but maddeningly dismissive Europe: it seems the perfect summary of Turkey’s east-west dichotomy.

Erdogan’s partiality towards Ahmadinejad may surprise some in the west who see Turkey as a western-oriented democracy firmly grounded inside Nato. It has been a member of the alliance since 1952. It will be less surprising to Erdogan’s secular domestic critics, who believe the prime minister’s heart lies in the east and have long suspected his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development party (AKP) government of plotting to transform Turkey into a religious state resembling Iran.

Erdogan vigorously denies the latter charge, but to his critics he and Ahmadinejad are birds of a feather: devout religious conservatives from humble backgrounds who court popular support by talking the language of the street. After Ahmadinejad’s disputed presidential election in June, Erdogan and his ally, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul, were among the first foreign leaders to make congratulatory phone calls, ignoring the mass demonstrations and concerns of western leaders over the result’s legitimacy.

Talking to the Guardian, Erdogan called the move a “necessity of bilateral relations”. “Mr Ahmadinejad was declared to be the winner, not officially, but with a large vote difference, and since he is someone we have met before, we called to congratulate him,” he said.

“Later it was officially declared that he was elected, he got a vote of confidence and we pay special attention to something like this. It is a basic principle of our foreign policy.”

The gesture will be remembered when Erdogan arrives in Tehran this week for talks with Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, that will focus on commercial ties, including Turkey’s need for Iranian natural gas. Ahmadinejad has voiced his admiration for Erdogan, praising Turkey’s recent decision to ban Israel from a planned Nato manoeuvre in protest at last winter’s bombardment of Gaza.

Since the election, Iran has witnessed a fierce crackdown on opposition figures that has resulted in activists, students and journalists being imprisoned and publicly tried. Detainees have died in prison, and there have been allegations of torture and rape. Some of those alleging mistreatment have sought refuge in Turkey.

But Erdogan said he would not raise the post-election crackdown with his hosts, saying it would represent “interference” in Iranian domestic affairs.

He poured cold water on western accusations that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, saying: “Iran does not accept it is building a weapon. They are working on nuclear power for the purposes of energy only.”

Erdogan has overseen a dramatic improvement in the previously frigid relations between Turkey and Iran, which was viewed with suspicion by the pro-secularist high command of the powerful Turkish military. Trade between the two countries last year was worth an estimated £5.5bn as Iran has developed into a major market for Turkish exports.

Erdogan’s views will interest US foreign policy makers, who have long seen his AKP government as a model of a pro-western “moderate Islam” that could be adopted in other Muslim countries. They will also find an audience with President Barack Obama, who signalled Turkey’s strategic importance in a visit last April and has invited the prime minister to visit Washington. They are unlikely to impress Israel, which has warned that Erdogan’s criticisms risk harming Turkey’s relations with the US.

Erdogan dismissed the notion, saying: “I don’t think there is any possibility of that. America’s policy in this region is not dictated by Israel.”

He insisted that the Turkey-Israel strategic alliance – which some AKP insiders have said privately is over – remains alive but chided the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, who he said had threatened to use nuclear weapons against Gaza.

The Guardian

October 26, 2009
Israel is in denial over Turkish rage
Turkey was shocked by Goldstone’s report on the Gaza conflict, but Israel is seeking other explanations for deteriorating ties
- Simon Tisdall
The apparent inability of Israeli leaders to see their actions as others see them – that is to say, to put themselves in other people’s shoes – may partly explain the depth of the outrage with which they greeted the Goldstone report on last January’s Gaza conflict. Prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems to have been genuinely taken aback by the UN inquiry’s hard-hitting conclusions, in particular its recommendations about the investigation of individual Israeli responsibility for possible war crimes.

What Netanyahu, former prime minister Ehud Olmert, opposition leader Tzipi Livni, defence minister Ehud Barak and rightwingers such as foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman viewed as a fully justified act of self-defence in the face of relentless Palestinian rocket attacks was seen by much of the world, despite Israel’s ban on media access, as an appalling, disproportionate assault on a defenceless civilian population. Gaza did enormous damage to Israel’s reputation and interests – but it is unclear, even now, whether this is fully understood in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Radically differing perceptions, running exclusively in parallel lines, also exacerbate touchy issues such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons arsenal and the apparent contradiction of denying Iran its nuclear “rights”. But sometimes, worlds collide.

An unexpected move by Turkey last week to postpone military exercises with Israel suddenly channelled conflicting versions of reality into a direct, head-on crash. Ankara’s decision was its way of expressing its continuing displeasure over Gaza. Prime minister Tayyip Erdogan fell out publicly with Shimon Peres, Israel’s president, over the issue at Davos in January. The row has been simmering ever since. But by dramatically wrecking the flagship exercises, which also involved the US and other Nato members, Turkey effectively forced Israel’s leadership to look at things from the other side’s perspective.

The picture thus produced is both instructive and discouraging. Secular Muslim Turkey is (or was) Israel’s best friend in the Middle East. Bilateral trade between the two countries is worth about $3bn a year; military co-operation, including Israeli arms sales, is long-established. Before Gaza, Turkey acted as mediator in talks between Israel and its old foe, Syria. Ankara also offered a link to sympathetic Arab states of the Gulf. Turkey’s economy is growing overall, as is its importance as an energy and commercial hub. In short, it was clear that Turkey was a uniquely important and influential ally.

Recognising the value of the link, some Israeli politicians tried to play down the rift, apparently hoping to patch things up. But others, including commentator Amir Oren, looked for different reasons to explain Turkey’s behaviour, refusing to believe Gaza could be the cause. “Erdogan is aiming for a large-scale reconciliation with old enemies: the Armenians, the Syrians, the Greek Cypriots and the Kurds. Israel is a burden for him, not an asset,” Oren said.

Other explanations included the assertion that Erdogan had imposed his will on Turkey’s weakened military, which in the past would have resisted his order to cancel the exercises. Meanwhile, Ofra Bangio, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University, told the Christian Science Monitor that Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy calculations were shifting as it strengthened its ties with Iraq, Syria and other leading Arab world countries and turned away from an unwelcoming European Union. “In Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s ideological framework, Israel doesn’t play a central role,” Bengio said.

A senior Israeli foreign ministry official, speaking to the Haaretz newspaper after an emergency meeting to discuss the crisis with Turkey, was even more pessimistic. “It may be that the reality has changed and that the strategic ties we thought existed have simply ended,” the official said. “Maybe we need to be the ones who initiate renewed thinking regarding our ties and must adopt response measures.”

On this analysis, Israel’s relationship with Turkey, valuable for so many reasons, may soon be a thing of the past – an avoidable outcome since the analysis looks fundamentally flawed. They’re not pretending; Turks really are upset about Gaza, as indicated by a much-watched Turkish television drama series depicting clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians that has further inflamed relations. The Turkish public was scandalised by January’s events and Turkey’s politicians have reacted accordingly, as politicians do.

But among Israeli leaders, the perception is different. Gaza, a justifiable action, cannot be accepted as the real reason for the row; so ulterior motives and complicated explanations are sought. Inhabiting a parallel world, they just don’t get it.

Source: www.guardian.co.uk, 22 October 2009
October 26, 2009