Category: Palestinian N.A.

Palestinian National Authority

  • Meanwhile, over in Istanbul…..

    Meanwhile, over in Istanbul…..

    (The following is a condensed report of an Israeli and Palestinian delegation I was part of two weeks ago in Istanbul)

    “The word ‘peace’ has become hollow. It has lost its meaning,” said one of the participants. “That may feel like the case,” said another, “but we cannot let the voice of despair and violence re-appropriate our language for the world we hope to build.”

    This excerpt came from a recent gathering of Israelis and Palestinian peace builders meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. The gathering was billed as a “Consultation” of bi-communal field experts. Over the course of three days, twenty participants acted as a think-tank to envision the seemingly impossible – the reemergence of a cross-border peace movement in Israel / Palestine.

    The host organization was a Massachusetts based NGO called the Karuna Center for Peacebuilding (KCP), which specialize in bi-communal trainings for grassroots peace-building practitioners all over the globe. Istanbul was chosen as a compromise for an off-site location close enough but far enough away from the conflict zone. Ten Israelis and ten Palestinians, from places that included Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, Jaffa, each with advanced level peace-building resumes, were invited.

    The founder of Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, Dr. Paula Green, organized this gathering with one goal in mind: to assess ‘what kind of bi-communal programming would be useful for this region.’ In other words, what kinds of trainings or actions could bring Israelis and Palestinians together in joint cooperation under today’s reality? What could be helpful now, when the prospects for meaningful resolutions are not promising and the political will of the leaders are not inspiring. But this was not a gathering of politicians. The twenty men and women, ranging from their late twenties to their early sixties, were assembled in an effort to help make sure that grassroots collaboration projects between Israelis and Palestinians do not become extinct.

    As irrelevant as co-existence work may often seem to a cynical person, this was a battle tested group of peace workers. Extensive field experience united this particular group in Istanbul. They were not beginners. They didn’t need prior agreements or ground rules as is usually the case for this type of meeting between Israelis and Palestinians. Most, if not everyone assembled, had spent the better part of the past two decades invested in some type of bi-communal work. Friends Across Borders, Givat Haviva, Neve Shalom/Wahat AlSalam, Eden Association, Kids for Peace, Face to Face, and AlWATAN are just a sample of the organizations represented in the room.Everyone here shared the same strong belief: that that sustainable peace is much more likely if a certain segment of conflicting parties in the society have the courage to cross boundaries and forge a relationship with their adversaries.

    With so much experience under one roof, facilitators Paula Green of KCP and Carol Kasbari from Jerusalem, asked the group to brainstorm ways to expand the shrinking field of peace workers inside the Holy Land. Our only assignment beforehand was to read several chapters from “Bridging the Divide: Peace-building in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, a study of lessons learned from co-existence activity edited by Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem, and Juliette Verhoeven. Invariably, we examined some of the key obstacles inhibiting our attempts at bi-communal work, many of which were easy to discuss, but difficult to imagine transcending.

    The topic of the “1%” kept surfacing -the distressing statistic that less than 1% of Israelis and Palestinians ever meet face to face for the purpose of a cooperative activity. Perhaps it is not a surprising statistic. For both political and social reasons, most Israelis and Palestinians do not base their impression of the other through personal contact. There are many reasons for this.Palestinians, for example, face extraordinary pressure to refuse participation, specifically bi-communal activity with Israelis, as part of a national anti-normalization boycott. Several Palestinians invited to this consultation had to decline for fear of losing their jobs or being labeled as traitors or collaborators.

    For Israelis, there is little incentive to participate in bi-communal work. For reasons including the construction of the wall/separation barrier, the diminished physical threat from Palestinians in recent years has sedated the Israeli public to the point that the conflict is no longer seen as an existential threat. Therefore, the desire to meet them or work in partnership has lost its sense of urgency and relevance, at least in the short term. The group all agreed, however, that this “bubble consciousness” simultaneously contributes to a growing sense of apathy and fear which, in turn, greatly reduces interest in bi-communal activities. Exploring long term mutually satisfactory arrangements to end the conflict is even less likely in this atmosphere of separation and non-cooperation.

    The group also spent time examining what has worked in the peace-building field over the years including the specific characteristics of why certain groups have lasted. A powerful example of effective, inspiring and sustainable bi-communal activity mentioned repeatedly was the work ofBereaved Parents’ Circle, a joint support group of Palestinian and Israeli parents who have lost children from violence in the conflict. No matter what your politics are, given what these parents have endured, it is pretty hard imagining anyone convincing these people why they should hate each other.

    But what makes a project like this effective and sustainable? One could say these parents are taking huge risks, but they are also meeting real human needs. Encouraging Israelis and Palestinians to cross boundaries, literally and figuratively, has to resonate on a deep enough level to motivate taking the risk – the type of risk that makes it so plainly obvious that we are all in this together. Is it precisely these types of encounters, which wake us up to our interdependence, that this consultation was geared to uncover.

    One specific encounter that emerged during the sessions was the role of a new third party. Not a third party as a moderator, but one with high stakes in the conflict. A discussion was convened around the simple question: can joint German-Palestinian-Israeli dialogue make a difference to our future?” Although the format is unclear, what was clear is that Germany’s history is directly linked to the formation of Israeli society and has immense consequences on where Palestinian are today. This is well documented from the Israeli perspective, in Avrum Burg’s book, “The Holocaust is Over, We Must Rise From Its Ashes.” The question of the German voice in this conflict, however, peeked genuine curiosity. If organized and facilitated appropriately, perhaps the German narrative, in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, may enable parties to directly confront issues of shame and blame in an unprecedented manner. Who knows what would ultimately yield, but these were the kind of imaginative and risk-taking suggestions that emerged.

    Other brainstorming sessions focused around different but interrelated topics, based on questions raised by the participants: Some of these included: What if we did all live in one state?What are the lessons to learn from the success of Hamas and the Settler movements? What is the role of Diaspora Jews and Palestinians in encouraging bi-communal work? How can we build a constructive struggle to end the occupation? What are the criteria for an effective peacebuilding program?

    On some level, most of these conversations were not new. But on another level, few could say they had been able to talk about these subjects with peace building practitioners from both sides.The amount of expertise in the room was demonstrated less by what was actually spoken, but more by what was implicitly understood. The lack of defensiveness was noticeable, but even more striking was the sheer absence of blame. Resisting the urge to blame is a quality that cannot be understated in any context, but particularly in bi-communal work.

    With help from the Karuna facilitators, the group was guided along a certain trajectory. By the final day the conversation had shifted to the practical. The challenge was clear. With support from Karuna, would members of this delegation be able to take ownership of a project to train more peace builders in this region? Could more people, on both sides, be mentored and supported to further this critical goal of meeting the other for the purposes of shared cooperation? Were there others out there even interested?

    The answer was a unanimous, resounding, almost self-evident yes. But more questions remained. Could this kind of cross-border training be done given the political and social barriers?Not easily. Would there be money for it? It would have to be raised. Where would it happen? It would have to be researched. There were no simple answers and no template of success to work from. All Karuna could offer was its experience in other conflict regions and its limited resources to help push this into a reality. It was up to these twenty individuals to be the “people they were waiting for.”

    That was the story of the Middle East Consultation in Istanbul. The entering question, “what kinds of programs would be useful in this region,” was actually the beginning of the answer. The kind of program constructed and run by people who’ve been working tirelessly for years to advance a cooperative interdependent bi-communal future – that is the kind of program needed.

  • Arabs Look to Istanbul

    Arabs Look to Istanbul

    Turkey and the Arab World

    Turkey is not wavering in the slightest from its pro-European course. Nevertheless, as a trading nation with a dynamic economy that is the living proof of the fact that Islam, a secular political landscape and a parliamentary democracy are indeed compatible, it has in recent times rediscovered its Arab neighbours. Rainer Hermann reports

    Assad and Erdogan Istanbul AP Bulent Kilic
    One of the success stories of Turkey's new foreign policy is Syria. In 1998, the two neighbours stood on the brink of war. Today, their economic and political ties are close

    There was one good thing about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to Lebanon: although it increased tension prior to the publication of the indictment by the special international tribunal into the murder of Rafiq Hariri, it also demonstrated that in the Arab world, Iran can now really only be sure of the support of Shiites. In Beirut and during his trip to South Lebanon, Ahmadinejad was almost exclusively cheered on by Shiites; Sunni Muslims in the Arab world, on the other hand, viewed his visit to Lebanon with considerable disquiet.

    There are many reasons why Iran’s influence in the Arab world has passed its zenith. One of them is the circumstances that surrounded Ahmadinejad’s re-election in June 2009 and the bloody crackdown on protests. Another is the growing influence of Turkey.

    Last July, Khalil Shikaki’s Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research discovered that 43 percent of all Palestinians consider Turkey to be their most important foreign policy ally, ahead of Egypt at 13 percent and Iran at only 6 percent. Support for Turkey in the West Bank and in Gaza is virtually the same.

    In Lebanon, Ahmadinejad did not succeed in reversing this trend. Shortly before his arrival in Beirut, the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was back in Damascus for another meeting with President Bashar al-Assad. In the race for the post of prime minister in Iraq, both these men support the secular Shiite Iyad Allawi, while the powers that be in Iran prefer Nouri Maliki.

    In addition to the matter of Iran, Erdogan and Assad spoke about opportunities for reviving the peace process. Assad made it clear that indirect talks with Israel could only be restarted if Turkey were to act as mediator.

    Turkey is a “success story” in the Middle East

    Up until ten years ago, Turkey was not a player in the Middle East, despite the fact that it shares borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran. It was a quiet neighbour. Today, the state that succeeded the Ottoman Empire is a popular go-between and trading partner. For the states and societies of the Middle East, Turkey – with its dynamic economy and practical evidence that Islam, a secular political landscape and parliamentary democracy are indeed compatible – is a “success story”; it has become a “soft power”.

    Erdogan Hamad Bin Khalifa Assad Sarko AP Michel Euler
    Up until ten years ago, Turkey was not a player in the Middle East, despite the fact that it shares borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran. Today, the state that succeeded the Ottoman Empire is a popular go-between and trading partner, writes Rainer Hermann

    There are heated debates in the West as to whether Turkey is currently just rediscovering the Middle East or whether it is actually returning to it and – if this is indeed the case – whether it is abandoning its foreign policy orientation towards the West. These questions were recently addressed at a conference in Istanbul organised by the Sabanci University, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the Robert Bosch Foundation.

    One of the conclusions reached at the event was that although Turkey has adopted a new, active foreign policy, it has not abandoned its pro-European, pro-Western course. Nor has it shifted the main lines of its foreign policy. The policy of opening up towards its neighbours in the Middle East is much more a matter of diversifying its diplomacy and increasing prosperity in Turkey by tapping into new sales markets.

    Foreign policy in the service of trading interests

    Turkey’s former foreign policy was based on security considerations and the priority of territorial integrity. Its new foreign policy, on the other hand, is in the service of Turkey the trading nation and seeks to guarantee security and safeguard borders by increasing prosperity. Sükrü Elekdag, one of the best-known ambassadors in the country’s old diplomatic guard, often liked to say that Turkey always had to be ready for “two-and-a-half wars”, i.e. wars against Greece, Syria and the PKK.

    Aussenminister Istanbul AP Ibrahim Usta
    New diplomacy: Turkey's current foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has formulated a "policy of no problems" towards all neighbours, the aim of which is to maximize cross-border trade

    In sharp contrast to this, Turkey’s current foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has formulated a “policy of no problems” towards all neighbours, the aim of which is to maximize cross-border trade. With the exception of Armenia, this policy has worked so far.

    Turkish foreign policy is more than just classic diplomacy, it is trade policy. It is above all Turkey’s new, up-and-coming middle class – the backbone of the ruling AKP – that is benefitting from the new, economy-based foreign policy of Turkey the trading nation.

    The industrial cities of Anatolia, which have been dubbed the “Anatolian tigers”, are eyeing as yet unexploited market opportunities in neighbouring countries. While their entrepreneurs are also trading with Europe, they are increasingly focussing their efforts on the Middle East because of Europe’s restrictive Schengen visa policy, which also hits entrepreneurs and investors. This is why they support the visa-free zone which Turkey has established with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.

    One of the success stories of Turkey’s new foreign policy is Syria. In 1998, the two neighbours stood on the brink of war. Today, their economic and political ties are close. The Turkish-Syrian rapprochement went hand in hand with a cooling of relations with Israel. This process had already begun under Erdogan’s predecessor, the left-wing nationalist Bülent Ecevit, who accused Israel of “genocide” against the Palestinians. That being said, Erdogan visited Israel as recently as 2005; two years later, Israeli President Shimon Peres addressed the Turkish parliament.

    Pro Hamas Demo in Gaza TRFlagge dpa
    Khalil Shikaki's Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research discovered that 43 percent of all Palestinians consider Turkey to be their most important foreign policy ally, ahead of Egypt at 13 percent and Iran at only 6 percent. Pictured: a Turkish national flag at a Hamas rally

    Turkey’s policy towards Israel and the Palestinians is very different to that of the EU. While both advocate a peaceful resolution to the conflict and a two-state solution, they are talking to different players. Turkey accuses European diplomacy of ignoring reality because it is only talking to Fatah and boycotting Hamas. The Turkish reasoning is that there cannot be a peaceful solution without the involvement of Hamas. This is why Turkey is trying to pull Hamas into the political “mainstream”.

    The differences of opinion between Turkey and the West are particularly blatant when it comes to Iran. While the West is toughening its sanctions against Iran, Turkey is developing its trade with the Islamic Republic.

    Westerwelle Davutoglu AP Kerim Okten
    Although Turkey has adopted a new, active foreign policy, it has not abandoned its pro-European, pro-Western course – that is the conclusion reached at at a conference in Istanbul organised by the Sabanci University, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the Robert Bosch Foundation. Pictured: the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Turkey, Guido Westerwelle and ahmet Davutoglu

    Last June, Turkey voted against harsher sanctions in the UN Security Council. Unlike the West, Turkey believes that the only way to normalise Iran is to normalise relations, which involves trade and diplomacy. Turkey is familiar with the kind of bazaar mentality that is needed for negotiations with Iran. For fear of destabilizing the region, neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Turkish Republic has ever supported rebellions in Iran. For centuries, the safeguarding of a regional balance of power has been more important than the pursuance of a foreign policy based on ideology. This is why Turkey’s sympathy with the dissident “green” movement is only modest.

    Just like the EU, Turkey only plays a secondary role in the Middle East behind the United States. At the end of the Cold War, however, it correctly identified the shifting of the tectonic plates in world politics and now, as a modern, self-confident, trading nation, wants to grasp the opportunities that are arising. Turkey still has its sights set on Europe. But the door to Europe remains locked and so this newly self-confident nation is pursuing its own interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.

    Rainer Hermann

    © Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung/Qantara.de 2010

    Translated from the German by Aingeal Flanagan

    Editor: Lewis Gropp/Qantara.de

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  • Rabbis visit torched mosque, condemn attack

    Rabbis visit torched mosque, condemn attack

    Under heavy IDF, Palestinian escort, a delegation of settler rabbis visits village of Beit Fajar, condemns mosque attack; ‘This is not how we educated our children, Islam not hostile religion,’ one rabbi says

    Rabbi Menachem Fruman
    Rabbi Menachem Fruman

    A day after the torching of the Beit Fajar mosque near Bethlehem, apparently by a group of extreme settlers, a delegation of prominent settler rabbis visited the site and publicly condemned the attack.

    The delegation included Rabbi Lichtenstein from Gush Etzion, Rabbi Menachem Fruman from Tekoa, Efrat’s Chief Rabbi Shlomi Rifkin and Rabbi Shlomo Brin from Yeshivat Har Etzion. They were escorted by IDF officers and jeeps,while dozens of Palestinian policemen deployed at the village and around the mosque – a day after a request to carry out the visit was denied.

    Rabbi Brin stated that “Our goal is to share our horror at the attack of the mosque and to clearly state that this is not the way of the Torah or the Jewish way.”

    “This act does nothing for the settlements; it is morally and religiously wrong and is offensive to its core,” he saidl “This is not how we educated our children; Islam is not a hostile religion even if we have a dispute with some of its followers.”

    ‘Very serious offense’

    In conclusion, Rabbi Brin made it clear that “religion is religion and the mosque is a holy place to Muslims. We have no interest in offending their religious beliefs. To attack a place that is holy to our Muslim friends is a very serious offense. The person responsible for the attack is insignificant and didn’t even bother to mention his name.

    Another rabbi who took part in the visit added that “the people visiting today are residents of Judea and Samaria who believe that the presence and settlement in the land of our forefathers is part of our stance. In spite of this, we condemn the attack.”

    YNETNEWS

  • Greece reassures Arab allies over Israel ties

    Greece reassures Arab allies over Israel ties

    Freedom to Palestine
    A demonstrator holds a banner reading, 'Freedom to Palestine' during a protest outside the Greek parliament

    ATHENS — Greece moved Wednesday to reassure Arab allies over the strength of its friendship, following an improvement in ties with Israel after a landmark visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

    Improved Greek-Israeli ties were “for the good of Greece and all of the Middle East region… and do not exclude our close cooperation with the Arab world, and particularly our Palestinian friends,” Dimitris Droutsas, Greece’s Deputy Foreign Minister, said in an interview with radio station Flash.

    “Our rapprochement with Israel is not opposed to our traditional relationship of exceptional trust with the Arab world,” he said, adding that the improvement in ties had been discussed with “all our friends in the Arab world”.

    Meetings on Monday and Tuesday with the visiting Israeli prime minister were “very useful and entirely successful because we achieved the fixed objectives: deepening of relations and cooperation with Israel,” Droutsas said.

    “The cooling of relations between Turkey and Israel is not a reason for the political rapprochement with Israel,” Droutsas said, adding that Greece would look at all opportunities in foreign policy.

    The minister said bilateral discussions had focused on security, military cooperation and economic cooperation. He also reiterated the importance of Israeli tourists to the Greek economy.

    Netanyahu’s visit was the first by an Israeli head of government to Greece, which has traditionally been pro-Arab and did not recognise the Jewish state until 1991.

    The move to increase security and strategic cooperation comes as diplomatic ties between Israel and neighbouring Turkey have soured in the wake of an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla in May that left nine Turks dead.

  • Wikipedia editing courses launched by Zionist groups

    Wikipedia editing courses launched by Zionist groups

    Two Israeli groups set up training courses in Wikipedia editing with aims to ‘show the other side’ over borders and culture

    Rachel Shabi in Jerusalem and Jemima Kiss

    israel
    Two Israeli groups have set up 'Zionist editing' courses with aims to alter perceptions about Israel. Photograph: David Silverman/Getty Images

    Since the earliest days of the worldwide web, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has seen its rhetorical counterpart fought out on the talkboards and chatrooms of the internet.

    Now two Israeli groups seeking to gain the upper hand in the online debate have launched a course in “Zionist editing” for Wikipedia, the online reference site.

    Yesha Council, representing the Jewish settler movement, and the rightwing Israel Sheli (My Israel) movement, ran their first workshop this week in Jerusalem, teaching participants how to rewrite and revise some of the most hotly disputed pages of the online reference site.

    “We don’t want to change Wikipedia or turn it into a propaganda arm,” says Naftali Bennett, director of the Yesha Council. “We just want to show the other side. People think that Israelis are mean, evil people who only want to hurt Arabs all day.”

    Wikipedia is one of the world’s most popular websites, and its 16m entries are open for anyone to edit, rewrite or even erase. The problem, according to Ayelet Shaked of Israel Sheli, is that online, pro-Israeli activists are vastly outnumbered by pro-Palestinian voices. “We don’t want to give this arena to the other side,” she said. “But we are so few and they are so many. People in the US and Europe never hear about Israel’s side, with all the correct arguments and explanations.”

    Like others involved with this project, Shaked thinks that her government is “not doing a very good job” of explaining Israel to the world.

    And on Wikipedia, they believe that there is much work to do.

    Take the page on Israel, for a start: “The map of Israel is portrayed without the Golan heights or Judea and Samaria,” said Bennett, referring to the annexed Syrian territory and the West Bank area occupied by Israel in 1967.

    Another point of contention is the reference to Jerusalem as the capital of Israel – a status that is constantly altered on Wikipedia.

    Other pages subject to constant re-editing include one titled Goods allowed/banned for import into Gaza – which is now being considered for deletion – and a page on the Palestinian territories.

    Then there is the problem of what to call certain neighbourhoods. “Is Ariel a city or a settlement?” asks Shaked of the area currently described by Wikipedia as “an Israeli settlement and a city in the central West Bank.” That question is the subject of several thousand words of heated debate on a Wikipedia discussion thread.

    The idea, says Shaked and her colleauges, is not to storm in, cause havoc and get booted out – the Wikipedia editing community is sensitive, consensus-based and it takes time to build trust.

    “We learned what not to do: don’t jump into deep waters immediately, don’t be argumentative, realise that there is a semi-democratic community out there, realise how not to get yourself banned,” says Yisrael Medad, one of the course participants, from Shiloh.

    Is that Shiloh in the occupied West Bank? “No,” he sighs, patiently. “That’s Shiloh in the Binyamin region across the Green Line, or in territories described as disputed.”

    One Jerusalem-based Wikipedia editor, who doesn’t want to be named, said that publicising the initiative might not be such a good idea. “Going public in the past has had a bad effect,” she says. “There is a war going on and unfortunately the way to fight it has to be underground.”

    In 2008, members of the hawkish pro-Israel watchdog Camera who secretly planned to edit Wikipedia were banned from the site by administrators.

    Meanwhile, Yesha is building an information taskforce to engage with new media, by posting to sites such as Facebook and YouTube, and claims to have 12,000 active members, with up to 100 more signing up each month. “It turns out there is quite a thirst for this activity,” says Bennett. “The Israeli public is frustrated with the way it is portrayed abroad.”

    The organisiers of the Wikipedia courses, are already planning a competition to find the “Best Zionist editor”, with a prize of a hot-air balloon trip over Israel.

    Wikipedia wars

    There are frequent flare-ups between competing volunteer editors and obsessives who run Wikipedia. As well as conflicts over editing bias and “astroturfing” PR attempts, articles are occasionally edited to catch out journalists; the Independent recently erroneously published that the Big Chill had started life as the Wanky Balls festival. In 2005 the founding editorial director of USA Today, John Seigenthaler, discovered his Wikipedia entry included the claim that he was involved in the assassination of JFK.

    Editors can remain anonymous when changing content, but conflicts are passed to Wikipedia’s arbitration committee. Scientology was a regular source of conflict until the committee blocked editing by the movement.

    Critics cite the editing problems as proof of a flawed site that can be edited by almost anybody, but its defenders claim the issues are tiny compared with its scale. Wikipedia now has versions in 271 languages and 379 million users a month.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/18/wikipedia-editing-zionist-groups, 18 August 2010

  • World misses new report on mullahs’ nuclear capability

    World misses new report on mullahs’ nuclear capability

    GABRIEL: Master puppeteers

    World misses new report on mullahs’ nuclear capability

    By Brigitte Gabriel

    6:00 p.m., Friday, June 18, 2010

    Illustration: Free Gaza by Alexander Hunter for The Washington Times

    While world media and political attention is focused on the Israel-“Freedom Flotilla” incident, Iranian mullahs in Tehran are celebrating their brilliant war strategy in advancing their nuclear program. As world-renowned masters of the game of chess, Iranian mullahs can add “strategic marketing, public relations and media planning” to their resume.

    Iran, anticipating a damning report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealing Iran has more than 2 tons of enriched uranium (two warheads’ worth), had been actively working with Israel’s enemies to divert world attention away from the alarming findings. The IAEA report, released on May 31, the day of the raid, was virtually unreported by the media, as all eyes had turned to Israel and Gaza.

    Iran is manipulating operations in the Middle East and building alliances with like-minded jihadists driven by the same goal. Iran’s strategic operations surrounding Israel include setting up bases of operation and creating controlled and planned conflicts as part of a bigger strategy not only to suffocate Israel but also to distract the world community from its own nuclear development plans.

    Iran began building its base in Lebanon in 1982 with the creation of Hezbollah. By combining nearly 10 Islamic terror groups that shared the same ideology as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran created a proxy Iranian army on Israel’s northern border. After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Iran seized the opportunity to extend a helping hand to Hamas, a Sunni group that shares the Iranian Shi’ite leadership’s aspiration to wipe Israel off the map.

    As evidenced by weapons and material recovered from the ship MV Francop in November 2009, Iran is not a stranger to using the high seas as a way to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas.

    Iran has been working with North Korea, Syria, China and Russia and is actively courting Turkey to create a counterbalance to American power in the Middle East. A Russian submarine flying an Iranian flag docked in Beirut last month, where what is believed to be chemical weapons were unloaded by people wearing “hazmat” or chemical warfare suits. Syria, working with Iran, has supplied Hezbollah with Scud missiles able to reach all of Israel. Iran’s plans for Israel are as clear as the writing on the wall.

    This summer could easily reprise the war of 2006, when Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon opened a two-front confrontation against Israel, sparked by Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. The conflict dragged Israel into an all-out war with Lebanon, and Iran and Syria were content to pull the puppet strings.

    As a result of the flotilla incident, a Syrian television show already has called for suicide bombers to attack Israel; the head of the Palestinian Islamic council on Lebanon is calling for the kidnapping of Israelis; the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is calling for withdrawal from the Arab Peace Initiative; and the Muslim Union of Islamic scholars is calling for the cancellation of all peace agreements with Israel.

    And who is talking about the IAEA report of Iran having two nuclear warheads’ worth of enriched uranium? Virtually nobody.

    Score: Iran: 1, Israel/America/IAEA, 0.

    You can hear the laughter all the way from Tehran.

    The flotilla incident is nothing more than a spark in a larger web of explosives set and organized by Iran and is the first step toward accomplishing Iran’s ultimate goals. First, create whatever distraction is necessary, preferably one that inflames world hatred of Israel, to buy time to finish the bomb. Second, attain the bomb and become the Islamic superpower of the world, with the ability to wipe Israel off the map. This will usher in a new era of hegemony in the Middle East.

    The stakes are high, and time is running out. Western governments must stand together against Iran and the new axis of tyrannical power that is developing. While it is Israel that will soon face a nuclear-armed Iran, in the long term, it will be Europe and America facing an Iran capable of projecting its totalitarian ideology across the globe.

    Brigitte Gabriel is author of “Because They Hate” and “They Must Be Stopped” (St. Martin’s Press, 2006 and 2008). She is the president of ActforAmerica.org.

    © Copyright 2010 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

    Comments

    JohnMD1022 says:

    3 days, 15 hours ago

    Mark as offensive

    Don’t expect the Mohammedan in Chief to do anything to upset his brother Musselmen. It’s all OK with him. After all, they have just as much right to possess nuclear weapons as if they were legitimate, civilized nations. It makes no difference what they say. That’s just rhetoric. Under all the brusque talk Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is really a nice fellow and quite moderate. Methinks another round of obescience would be quite in order.

    Grand Mufti Barack Obama, Mohammedan in Chief, United Caliphate of America