Kerry calls Turkish counterpart, asks for Ankara’s help in restarting Israeli-Palestinian peace process; Ankara turns down request.
US Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, March 1, 2013. Photo: REUTERS/Jacquelyn Martin/Pool
US Secretary of State John Kerry called his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu, last week, asking for help in restarting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Hurriyet daily reported on Saturday.
Turkey turned down the request citing bad relations between Ankara and Jerusalem and saying the responsibility to fix the murky relations between the two countries falls on Israel.
Relations between Jerusalem and what was once its only Muslim ally crumbled after Israel Navy commandos raided the Mavi Marmara ship in May 2010 to enforce a blockade of the Gaza Strip and killed nine Turks on board after they attacked the commandos.
“Turkey is always ready to do whatever it needs for a fair two-state solution based on the 1967 borders,” Davutoglu said during a joint press conference with Kerry in Ankara on March 1.
“If Israel wants to hear positive statements from Turkey, it needs to review its attitude. It needs to review its attitude toward us, and it needs to review its attitude toward the people in the region and especially the West Bank settlements issue,” the Turkish foreign minister said.
A Turkish official speaking to Hurriyet has accused Jerusalem of blocking attempts to restore relations with Ankara.
Kerry is scheduled to arrive in Israel to promote the peace process shortly after US President Barack Obama finishes his visit to Israel on Friday.
Reuters contributed to this report.
via US asks Turkey for help with ME peace process | JPost | Israel News.
Nuclear experts from Iran and six world powers head to Istanbul next week to discuss a revised international proposal that Iranian officials welcomed as a “turning point” at a meeting in Kazakhstan last month.
The U.S. team to the Istanbul talks, to be held March 18, includes two veteran State Department arms control negotiators, Robert Einhorn and Jim Timbie, as well as Jofi Joseph, an Iran director in the White House WMD shop, US officials told the Back Channel Thursday. Einhorn and Timbie previously attended technical talks with Iran held in Istanbul last July, along with then White House WMD czar Gary Samore, who left the administration in January for Harvard.
Iran’s delegation to the technical talks in Istanbul next week is expected, as last July, to be led by Hamid-Reza Asgari, a longtime member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, who multiple Iranian sources tell Al-Monitor is an Iranian intelligence officer who has been involved in Iran’s international arms control discussions for over a decade. Iran’s team to Istanbul last July also included Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
(A revealing detail on their dynamic comes from a late 2009 US cable, released by Wikileaks, and written by then US envoy to the IAEA Glyn Davies. It describes Soltanieh as having moved to shake US Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Poneman’s hand at a 2009 Vienna meeting, “necessitating Iranian Legal Advisor Asgari to pull him [Soltanieh] away from” the U.S. delegation, Davies wrote.)
American and Iranian officials had fairly extensive discussions at the last technical meeting in Istanbul last July, a senior US official, speaking not for attribution, told journalists at P5+1 talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan last month.
“There’s a little heightened hope that Iran will respond in a meaningful way when they meet,” Mark Fitzpatrick, a former State Department arms control official now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, told the Back Channel Thursday. “If Iran comes back engaging in the details…if they are talking the same language…it would be very much progress.”
President Obama, speaking on Wednesday ahead of his first presidential trip to Israel next week, said that the United States currently assesses it would be at least a year before Iran could manufacture a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so, and the United States and international partners had been intensifying efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution in that window because it would prove more durable.
“Right now, we think it would take over a year or so for Iran to actually develop a nuclear weapon, but obviously we don’t want to cut it too close,” Obama told Israel’s Channel 2 Wednesday, the Associated Press reported.
“So when I’m consulting with [Israeli Prime Minister] Bibi [Netanyahu], my message to him will be the same as before,” Obama continued. “If we can resolve it diplomatically, that is a more lasting solution. But if not, I continue to keep all options on the table.”
Arms control experts said calculating such a time line involves a complicated set of likely and unlikely assumptions. “If Iran decided today to build nuclear weapons, it would require years, not weeks or months, to deploy a credible nuclear arsenal,” Greg Thielmann, a former US intelligence analyst now with the Arms Control Association, told the Back Channel Thursday.
The Istanbul experts level talks come as Iranian leaders have intensified debate on the pros and cons of direct talks with the United States in recent days, suggesting Tehran may be mulling whether to take President Obama up on the offer and under what conditions.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s official website this week posted previously unreleased photos of Iranian and American officials meeting in Iraq in 2007, as well as interviews with Iranian officials involved in the talks, Al-Monitor reported Thursday. Then US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker told Al-Monitor Friday that he found Tehran’s publication of the photos “interesting,” and said they were of meetings he attended in Iraq in 2007, when he served as the US envoy to Baghdad.
Two Iranian presidential candidates close to the Supreme Leader also weighed in on prospects for US-Iran talks in Iranian media interviews this week.
Ali Akbar Velayati, the Supreme Leader’s longtime foreign policy advisor and a former Iranian foreign minister, speaking to Iranian journalists Wednesday, “said that as long as Americans have not changed their behavior and methods of conduct with Iran, the stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain unchanged,” the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported Thursday.
But former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani said there were situations when the Supreme Leader would endorse talks with the Americans, as he has on certain occasions in the past.
“It is not the Supreme Leader’s view that Iran and the United States should not have negotiations and relations until the Day of Judgment,” Rowhani, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, was cited by Iranian media Thursday.
“If there is a situation where the country’s dignity and interests are..served, he will give permission for dialogue…as…negotiations have been held between the two countries on issues related to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the nuclear (issue),” Rowhani continued.
(Hamid-Reza Asgari, top right, a senior advisor in Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, is pictured with Iran’s envoy to the IAEA Ali Ashgar Soltanieh (left, with beard), attending a meeting in Vienna with French, Russian and American diplomats October 21, 2009. REUTERS/Herwig Prammer.)
Head of Representative Office of Lev Gumilev Center of Russia in Azerbaijan.
Director of Information and Analytical Center Etnoglobus (ethnoglobus.az), editor of Russian section of Turkishnews American-Turkish Resource websitewww.turkishnews.com
Spread and activity of Islam within the last 20 years is the result of globalization policy of the West, particularly the U.S. Its first phase started in the late 80’s of previous century following the collapse of the Soviet Union and activity of Islam in the region.
Different faith and trends of Islam which came to the territories of the Soviet Union from the Middle East and Persian Gulf became power acting against Russia during the Second Chechen War.
After withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan, Taliban regime took the control of most part of Afghanistan as a result of which Islam started to be spread in Middle Asia.
At the same time of opening of the geography of the Former Soviet Union to Islam, big area where the Muslims are settled have traditionally confronted with non-traditional Islam trends.
Later, as a result of events called as «Arab spring» and by intervention of the US and coalition forces, governments in power in Tunis, Yemen, Egypt and Libya were overthrown and Islamic forces seized the power.
In reality, when the U.S made a decision regarding government overthrow in the Middle East, it also caused the processes to be out of control in the region. After military intervention in Iraq, Iraqi regions mostly populated by Shias neighboring with Iran fell under the control of Iran.
Since national consciousness in Arab countries is as the same as religious, tribal consciousness, government overthrow in Arab countries through revolution by the West increased the religious senses of people as a result of which Islamic political parties found a way to the government. Arab countries with limited freedom, living in regimes with closed doors to democracy, linked the freedom with Islam and found it reasonable that political Islam seized the power.
Islamic forces, seizing the power following «Arab spring», contrary to all expectations, at least for the present moment, pursue moderate policy. The fact that new Egyptian government fights against Al-Qaida militants together with official Tel-Aviv in the borders with Israel is another proof of it. However, claims of Egypt’s new government regarding forming “Pan-Arab” empire with capital Quds by evaluating the country as influential state of the region allow us to think that all the processes are about to change towards radicalism.
US military operations in Iraq and governmental overthrow in the Middle East contributed to new phase of Islamic formation. Along with hardline Islam demonstrated by “Hamas” in Palestine and “Hezbollah” in Lebanon, victory of moderate pro–Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey brought changes to world’s political order. In 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran demonstrated the world specific management order formed by unity of secular and religious laws. Another country in the region claimed to be Islamic center is Saudi Arabia. Thus, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia joined in struggle to distribute their reputation sphere in Islamic world.
Besides, “Arab Spring” has turned the stable competitiveness into armed conflict between the Shia and Sunni Islam. Another reason is the increase of reputation of Iran in the areas settled by the Shias as a result of events that happened in the Middle East.
Location of the main parts of carbohydrates from Persian Gulf to Caspian Sea in the areas where the Shias live densely makes brain centers of Israel and USA to draw attention to this factor. As a result, the projects such as “the Shia Line”, “Combination of resources of Persian and CaspianBasins” has been made. This factor is one of the reasons of political processes in the Middle East caused by conflicts between the Shia and the Sunnis.
On another hand, the processes in the Middle East, especially the destiny of Syria, made reconsider the relations of Islam countries among them. It should be noted that, the effort to eliminate tension of recent years and the observance of warmness in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Non-Aligned Movement Summit held in autumn of the past year in Tehran are one of the factors certifying this thought. But, this obligatory attitude should not be considered as a break from struggle against the reputation in two regional powers in Persian Gulf and Islam world.
As there possibility of “Arab Spring”, which is now in Syria, is still remained for other Arab countries, to avoid it, Saudi Arabia demonstrates its desire to give to Iran its confidence breaking the coldness ice that continues for a long time.
From another hand, coming into power of Islam Parties instead of overthrown powers in Arab countries and increase of salafi trends’ influence strengthens the Saudi Arabia in the region and demonstrates its twofaced game against Iran. Clear threats are stated by Salafi leaders against the Shiism.
It should be stated that, “Arab Spring” caused protests by Alavis in Turkey and increase of inter-trends conflicts and allowed Al-Qaida to penetrate into this country.
Al-Qaida, supported by Saudi Arabia, struggling for reputation in the region with Iran, having taken advantages of spread of salafism in the region as a result of “Arab spring”, began to increased it’s reputation. This struggle is still in its initial phase. In the future, competition of Islamic trends, in fact, regional countries supporting these trends, will step into new phase.
By: Mohammad Noureddine Translated from As-Safir (Lebanon)
Demonstrators shout slogans during a protest against the government of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, in Istanbul, March 15, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Osman Orsal )
The Syrian crisis, since its outbreak two years ago, has formed a testbed for Turkey’s foreign policy, in light of all the headlines and theories concerning the relationship between the two countries brought forth during the few years that preceded the crisis.
About This Article
Summary :
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has sought to topple a regime standing in the way of its own regional hegemony, writes Mohammad Noureddine.
Publisher: As-Safir (Lebanon)
Original Title:
Turkey ‘Losing’ Even if the Syrian Regime Fell
Author: Mohammad Noureddine
First Published: March 15, 2013
Posted on: March 15 2013
Translated by: Kamal Fayad
While initial indications pointed to a change in Ankara’s relationship with Damascus early on in the crisis, the last two years have clearly demonstrated the nature of this transformation. They have revealed the new direction chosen by the Turks, as well as their biases and goals.
One can postulate the following, without any systematic order to the information given:
1. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reiterated that his country adopted its stance against the Syrian regime only after dozens of visits and many consultations, the last of which occurred in August of 2011. However, Ankara was, in parallel and less than a month after the crisis erupted, working to provide the Syrian political opposition with support, which was transformed later on into military support, as reflected in the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
2. Regardless of any distances and deadlines, Turkey chose to become a spearhead in the attempt to overthrow the Syrian regime, and served as headquarters for the FSA’s command. The first opposition council, the Syrian National Council (SNC), was also formed in Istanbul. Turkish territory was transformed into a corridor for all types of extremist militants, and a military supply and logistics base to those headed for Syria, according to all documented western reports and press articles.
3. Turkey also became the mastermind behind regional and international efforts to overthrow the Syrian regime; an example of which is Ankara’s brainchild, the Friends of Syria Conference. Furthermore, Turkey fully coordinated with the Arab League in order to isolate Syria and suspend its membership in the group. Turkish diplomacy also expanded great effort in international forums to obtain a Security Council resolution imposing a buffer zone, allowing foreign military intervention, and pressuring Russia and China to change their stance.
4. Turkey put its full weight behind efforts to remove the Syrian regime from both Syrian and regional maps. It raised the slogan of “all or nothing,” and wagered on the Syrian regime quickly falling, as was the case in Egypt, Tunisia and later on Libya. Ankara thus became the timekeeper, setting deadlines for the toppling of the regime, in a psychological attempt to bolster the chances of it actually falling. This one way bet, which did not take into account the possibility of failure, led Turkish diplomacy into an impasse, which drove it to espouse even more extremist views instead of reassessing its calculations.
5. It has become clear that one of the biggest mistakes in Ankara’s policy failure toward Syria was due to a lack of foresight by Turkish foreign policy theorists, and their inability to correctly read the state of Syrian internal affairs and the country’s balance of power. Ankara also failed to properly take into consideration Syria’s regional position and role, as well as Russia and China’s foreign policy leanings, the battle to shape the balance of the new world order, and Syria’s importance in that battle. The strength of the regime’s position both internally and abroad thus slipped Turkish leaders’ minds.
6. As a result, risks materialized that Turkey did not expect; first among them being the rise of sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Alawites inside Turkey, the increase in military confrontations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in addition to the emergence of a new Kurdish dynamic in the north of Syria, which formed the basis for Turkish threats to militarily enter Syrian territory in order to neutralize the Kurdish menace.
7. One of the most earth-shattering results was the rapid disintegration of Davutoglu’s “Zero Problems” policy, which was adopted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and barely lasted a few years. Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis Syria led to a deterioration of its relations with all neighboring countries, starting with Syria, Iraq, Iran, some Lebanese factions, and all the way to Russia.
8. The Syrian crisis revealed the presence of double standards within Turkey. Ankara subsequently explained its Zero Problems slogan as having to do with peoples and not regimes; yet this slogan was never raised in support of the Bahraini people’s revolt.
9. It has become evident that Turkey’s foreign policy aimed, through its desire to topple the Syrian regime, to kill several birds with one stone. The first aim was to transform Turkey into the preeminent player on the regional scene. Ankara believed that overthrowing the Syrian regime would pave the way toward weakening the Iraqi regime in preparation for it also being toppled, which would be followed by a strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon, after which the Iranian Islamic revolution would be more easily contained and the Iranian regional role greatly reduced. Davutoglu’s speech in front of the Turkish Parliament on Apr. 27, 2012, was very important to understanding Ankara’s desire to monopolize power in the region at the expense of all Arab partners.
The second aim behind toppling the Syrian regime was to pave the way toward the reestablishment of the Ottoman-Seljuk empire that Erdogan never stops talking about, and cannot deny because his speeches were documented in sight and sound on a large number of occasions.
10. Ankara committed an unforgivable sin when it painted itself as part of the Sunni axis in the region, thus negating all the slogans characterizing the Turkish political model as being secular and democratic. The ideological, ethnic and sectarian motives behind the Turkish role also came to light in its differentiation between factions of the Syrian opposition. It embraced the Islamic movements affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, while shunning secular and Kurdish factions inside and outside Syria.
11. The Syrian crisis also drove Turkey closer to NATO, giving the latter an opportunity to deploy its missile defense system and then the Patriot system on Turkish soil. Turkish officials began considering their country’s border to be an extension of the borders of other NATO countries. Turkey unprecedentedly began favoring its affiliation with NATO over any other consideration, including the fact that it is an Eastern, Muslim country. This, in itself, was an important and dangerous transformation that no other Turkish regime in history ever attained.
12. Turkey sacrificed all previous relationships with its neighbors and destroyed the trust upon which these neighboring countries relied to accept past Turkish policies of openness towards the Syrian crisis. Turkey thus took on the guise of a country that interfered in the internal affairs of others, by demanding the resignation of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and effectively participating in efforts to overthrow the Syrian regime.
The Zero Problems policy was therefore transformed into the policy of overthrowing any regime with which Turkey did not agree. This too was a dangerous development in the Turkish role, which, in the past, drove it to be contented with allying itself with the West and Israel, only to now become a party to the internal conflicts of all nations.
13. The Syrian regime’s survival will be deemed an abject failure of the policies espoused by the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party. This is the reason for the latter’s unprecedented intensity in trying to prevent any compromise being reached with the regime and inciting against dialogue and for the continuation and intensification of military confrontations.
Despite that, the regime’s overthrow, if it did occur, would not be viewed as a victory for Turkey. For the matter goes beyond the survival of this or that regime to encompass the relationship and future of Turkey vis-à-vis the social, religious, sectarian, and ethnic components of society in the region. This relationship cannot be restored when one takes into account the events that transpired and the continued rule of the Justice and Development Party. The loss of confidence and the return of suspicion between Turkey and its immediate environs (as a result of the Syrian crisis), and between it and the outlying Arab world (Saudi, Emirati and other nations’ resentment for Turkey’s support to the Muslim Brotherhood regimes in Egypt and Tunisia) will form the biggest obstacle to Turkey recovering its natural place in the Orient.
Reports: Germans accuse Turkey of exporting items with ‘nuclear applications’ to Iran
BY: Adam Kredo
German prosecutors have accused Turkey of exporting to Iran nearly 1,000 items with “nuclear applications,” according to German and Turkish media reports.
German prosecutors allege Iran has established multiple “front companies” in Istanbul, accordingto Today’s Zaman, an English-language publication in Turkey. These illicit companies are believed to have shipped nuclear-related material back to Iran.
Kristen Silverberg, a former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, said Iran has a history of using front companies as a means to skirt sanctions.
“The Iranian regime has a long practice of using front companies” to evade sanctions and conduct illicit business affairs, Silverberg, who serves as president of United Against Nuclear Iran, a non-partisan advocacy group, told the Washington Free Beacon.
Iran has “really perfected the art of sanctions evasion, and we’ve seen them do that in response to every round [of sanctions], which is why it’s so important for the U.S. and its allies to identify the front companies and continue to sanction them and any country abetting them,” Silverberg said.
News of the nuclear exports comes just days after German and Turkish officials busted several Iranian smugglers suspected of transferring nuclear goods from India to Iran.
German and Turkish officials conducted raids in each country on Monday, capturing several Iranian suspects. Three other suspects remain at large.
“In 2012 German police detected that materials with nuclear applications obtained in Germany and India were transported to the Mitech company in Iran through Turkey by an Iranian national, Hossein Tanideh,” Today’s Zaman quoted the German report as saying.
Tanideh was captured in Turkey earlier this year.
“Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office, which is also the German branch of Interpol, informed its counterpart in Turkey about Tanideh’s dealings, and Tanideh was arrested,” according to the report.
German officials were reportedly able to trace Tanideh’s activities to back several of the Iranian front companies.
The investigation revealed that Tanideh was tied to several business owners who were exporting material to Iran.
“As part of the investigation, a thorough search was conducted at IDI, a foreign trade company owned by Tanideh,” Today’s Zaman reported. “Police raided the main office of the company in Bakırköy, İstanbul, and seized all the documents in the office.”
The seized documents showed that Tanideh and one of his business associates “sent the materials with nuclear applications they got from Germany and India to Mitech in Iran and declared them as plumbing parts and fixtures,” according to the report.
Turkish police are believed to have learned from these documents that 91 nuclear-related items were funneled from Germany to Turkey on multiple occasions before making their way to Iran.
Another 856 nuclear items were shipped from India to Turkey and then to Iran at various points, according to the report.
“Despite six years of sanctions Iran is still capable of procuring critically vital, made-in-Europe dual use technology for its nuclear weapons’ program,” said Emanuele Ottolenghi, a Germany-based senior fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
“Dozens of front companies still operate in Europe under the nose of local authorities,” he said. “The mushrooming of Iranian companies in Turkey is clearly related—obtaining export licenses to this NATO member state is relatively easy.”
By using Turkey as a conduit, “Iran is able to elude sanctions,” Ottolenghi explained. “European authorities must do much more to stop this traffic and demand much more vigilance from Turkey since, by now, there are more than 3,000 Iranian companies registered in Turkey.”
Iran sanctions experts questioned whether Turkish officials had quietly allowed these shipments to take place.
“The big question is: Did Ankara know about this procurement network before the Germans blew the lid off?” said Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Treasury Department.
Iran and Turkey continue to expand business ties.
“A good number of Iranian-financed firms have set up shop in Turkey recently,” Today’s Zaman reported. “In January this year, there were 28 Iranian-funded foreign companies established in Turkey, which ranked just behind German investors.”
Turkey has been implemented in a series of troublesome actions meant to skirt Western sanctions on Iran.
Turkey’s Halkbank, a majority state-owned lender, faced scrutiny for carrying out so-called “gold for oil” transactions with Iran. It is believed that Turkey traded more than 60 tons of gold in exchange for Iranian crude oil.
Regional reports have also indicated that Turkey may trade ships to Iran in exchange for oil in another scheme meant to skirt Western sanctions.
Turkey has also been suspected of funding the terror group Hamas, leading experts to wonder if the nuclear-export fiasco reveals a growing terrorism problem in Turkey.
These exports, “coupled with Halkbank’s gas for gold scheme, coupled with Hamas funding, coupled with Turkey’s failure for five years to comply with international standards for terror finance laws paints a very troubling picture of Turkey,” said Schanzer, who serves as vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Former Pentagon adviser Michael Rubin said these front companies appear legitimate but are actually tools of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
“The economic wing of the Revolutionary Guards runs a number of front companies for seemingly legitimate purposes,” Rubin said. “The Iranians can use these companies’ Turkish partners to access a lot of dual use technology that Iran could never import directly. That’s hard enough to keep track of under normal circumstances, but we’re saddled with a Turkish government that sees Obama’s professed friendship as evidence that they can literally get away with murder.”
This entry was posted in Middle East, National Security and tagged Germany, Hossein Tanideh, Jonathan Schanzer, Nuclear Iran, Today’s Zaman, Turkey. Bookmark thepermalink.
Turkish soldiers block a road to Cilvegozu border gate near the town of Reyhanli on the Turkish-Syrian border in Hatay province, Feb. 11, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Umit Bektas)
The legend goes that the Prophet Muhammad came all the way to the walls of Damascus, saw the luscious landscape and refused to enter the city, uttering “you can only enter paradise once.” Once you make a decision to intervene in another country, it is a game changer. This applies to Turkey’s Syria policy.
About This Article
Summary :
Turkey needs an exit strategy from Syria, writes Pinar Tremblay.
Author: Pinar Tremblay
Posted on : March 14 2013
The easiest answer to the question of what Turkey wants in Syria would be what any country wants from another:to cooperate with it and the region in a stable manner. Turkey and Syria already had a mutually beneficial friendship, to the point that Turks have decided to demand more benefits from this relationship. I am convinced that Turks want a Syria which would produce not more, but different benefits. Turkey is struggling to undo the damages of the Iraq war, hoping that if Iraq could be reversed from Sunni-minority rule to a Shia-dominant rule strong influence from Iran in the post-US pullout, Syria could evolve from Alawite-minority rule to a Sunni-majority rule with a deep Turkish influence.
Put bluntly, the conditions for Turkish objectives to be realized in Syria are the elimination of the Assad regime, its replacement by an Ikhwan (Syrian Muslim Brotherhood)-dominated government, good separation if not a total break from Iranian influence and a commitment to an alliance with Turkish leadership in the region, which will make certain demands on not only Israel but also Iran. If these objectives are achieved, Turkish power will expand well into Syria. As promising as this may sound, it gets messy as soon as we start questioning the meaning of certain terms.
Let’s start with the first condition, the removal of al-Assad regime. For the anti-Assad coalition, we can include the EU, the US, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon’s March 14 Bloc and GCC countries, mostly Saudi and Qatar. Going into the third year of civil war, the regime has been much more persistent than many pundits predicted. A few crucial factors contribute to this: a strong and still-loyal army, the regime’s much ignored expertise in puppeteering different armed and non-armed groups, multiple countries involved with different goals and different degrees of support to the many factions. The Syrian regime still seems to have a better handle on intelligence gathering and analysis than others. I utilize the concept of factionalism, rather than sectarianism, for the opposition groups because divisions go beyond sectarian lines in Syria. Hence, overlooking these factions may indeed invite further escalation of the conflict. Hazem al-Amine has highlighted the fragility of the relationship between anti-Assad coalition and Syrian opposition very eloquently.
The next condition, breaking Syrian dependence on Iran — or curtailing Iranian influence on Syrian politics — also has some allure to the anti-Assad coalition. Yet the devil is indeed in details. While wishing for a Syria not imbued with Hezbollah and Iranian policies, the US would prefer not to see Syria fall into the hands of jihadists. Who would want Sinaization of the Golan Heights, especially when there is no central government to keep it in check? Here, Turkey proves to be a wild card.
So far, Turkey has deepened its relations with Hamas and many of the other Islamists groups in Gaza. Should we expect to see further fighting between Ikhwani and jihadi groups? Would a Syria under Ikhwan be a land more welcoming to armed groups? Would they be allowed to generate trouble on the Israeli border? If this scenario unfolds, wouldn’t Turkey and Israel clash in the power vacuum left behind the civil war?
Hence, leading from behind, the US government has to ensure all involved parties, particularly neighbors of Syria, continue to cooperate with the mission of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. The question of what shade of Sunni power under the vague umbrella of the “Friends of Syria” Turkey would like to see in Syria is a tricky one. Semih Idiz explained the intricacies of this quandary in his piece for al Monitor on March 12.
Right now, we can provide the generic answer of Ikhwan. Yet it is hard to gauge whether the post-civil war Syrian Ikhwan would be still in admiration of the Turkish Justice and Deveopment Party. The longer the civil war lasts, the more difficult it will be to predict the evolution of Ikhwan and other groups in Syria. Turkey has taken some missteps, making a re-evaluation of policy is essential. Andrew Parasiliti warned about some of these wrong steps as early as October. There is no guarantee that a Sunni or Arab government would not fall under the influence of Iran, with Hamas being one of the examples. With such a fragmented opposition, the quest for stability will be challenging.
Taking all these into consideration, here are a couple of steps the Turkish government may take for damage control:
Find ways to shorten the civil war. For example, lessen the anti-Assad rhetoric for a smoother transition period in Syria. A civil war is not a winner-take-all game if the players can negotiate a credible cease-fire. Keeping communication channels open with Iran and Russia and encouraging the opposition to compromise with the regime can help.
Strengthen Turkish-Syrian border security. Such a porous border can produce several layers of vulnerability. If penetrations from Syria to Turkey are not better scrutinized, major attacks will be inevitable in the near future. Careful vetting of the rebels is crucial, but insufficient with that high-risk border. I would not suggest a buffer zone, due to lack of international support for the idea and the Israeli experience in Lebanon between 1985 and 1990.
Accept and adapt to the recent condition of having another “weak state” on the border. Although a “weak state” might initially sound advantageous in realpolitik, it serves as an additional liability. Turkey needs to understand that it cannot solve Syria’s civil war alone. Therefore, Turkey must accept the undesirable task of managing the Syrian civil war with a focus on fragmented factions, rather than sectarian concerns. At the end of the civil war, Ikhwan might not be what Turkey prefers.
Prepare an exit plan. Turkey may never enter Syria with an official army, but the proxy war requires an end as well. An ambiguous Turkish presence in Syria cannot be sustained for long without serious payback. For example, a jihadist group may turn into a strategic issue for the southern border a decade later. Best to avoid grand words and grand approaches, which will most likely backfire.
In sum, Turkey has taken a major leap of faith in its foreign policy toward Syria. If its objective is to establish a regime that can cooperate smoothly, Turkey must first actively evaluate its own objectives. A well-managed crisis always presents good opportunities. The legend of Damascus says that you can only enter paradise once, yet it is wise to assume hell has wide-open gates.
Pinar Tremblay is a PhD candidate at UCLA in political science and an adjunct faculty member at Cal Poly Pomona. She has previously been published in the Hurriyet Daily News and Today’s Zaman. Follow her on Twitter: @pinartremblay.
