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Category: Middle East

  • The Turkish Dictionary

    The Turkish Dictionary

    Ghassan Charbel, Al-Hayat – 11/07/08

    The world lives in rhythm with Iranian blasts. When President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad does not issue his threats, Revolutionary Guard generals take over. The menu of threats is all too known: closing the Strait of Hormuz; targeting American ships; setting the Great Satan’s interests on fire; unavoidably abolishing Israel; eradicating the cancerous tumor and burning down Tel Aviv. With threats, come maneuvers, and when necessary, Iran announces testing a new generation of missiles. The message is clear: Iran has the means to translate its threats to actions and set fire to the region.

    The world was preoccupied with the Iranian missile serial, while Baghdad received Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on a visit both sides agreed on dubbing “historical”. Erdogan brought a message of hope to the Iraqis. He addressed them saying: “Be optimistic to cross this difficult phase and you will always find me by your side, God willing. The Turkish government and people will be standing by you.”

    It was remarkable to see, at the end of the talks,that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced the formation of the Higher council for Strategic Cooperation, aimed at organizing cooperation on all economic levels, combating terrorism, and handling water issues. Erdogan also added that both nations are working to let commercial exchange figures reach $25 billion. It was all talk of cooperation, investment and numbers. The Turkish prime minister also declared that he has received support from al-Maliki’s government and the Kurdistan Regional Government against the fighters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has resumed its violent activities inside Turkey.

    There is no doubt that the future of the Iraqi situation is a matter of concern for Turkey, with regards to its security and stability. It is likely that Turkey will be the biggest loser, in case Iraq slips into chaos. The reason is that a united Iraq guarantees confining the Kurdish dream within the Iraqi Kurdistan borders, whereas an Iraqi outburst would inevitably lead to the independence of this region and to turning it into a center that attracts Turkish Kurds. In this sense, it is worth noting that Ankara has a lot to gain from a united Iraq, whereas the Iranian role can only grow in a troubled Iraq, since the balances within a united Iraq prevent Tehran from pulling Iraqi strings at will.

    Turkey has no interest in a troubled Iraq, in which al-Qaeda settles to breed new generations of suicide bombers in certain parts of the country. It also has no interest in an Iraq, whose government does not exercise full control over its territories, which forces Turkey to occasionally organize disciplinary campaigns inside the Iraqi borders. Similarly, Turkey has no interest in an Iraq dominated by Iran, because that would disturb regional balances right at its borders. In this context, the visit can be viewed as an expansion of the scope of regional recognition that al-Maliki’s government enjoys, and also as an encouragement for it to adopt a national reconciliation policy that will enlarge, most of all, its scope of recognition among Arabs.

    In one of its facets, Erdogan’s visit to Iraq represents another step in Turkey’s efforts to contain the rising Iranian power in the region, efforts that are both calm and wise as they are carried out away from noise and emotional outbursts. This is evident from the fact that Turkey has not panicked or lost its nerve in front of its Iranian neighbor’s exercise of muscles, including its battle with the west over uranium enrichment.

    Turkey also assumes a more important role on another front. Erdogan’s government is playing a prominent role in hosting and mediating indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel on its territories. One can say that the successful transformation of these negotiations into direct talks sponsored by the US will represent a very serious attempt to establish peace in the Middle East and to contain the Iranian influence, which is reinforced by the atmospheres of confrontation. Of course, it is too premature to speak of an overt and explicit split between Syrian and Iranian calculations. However, the role Turkey is playing in the progress of the Syrian position is extremely important, given Turkey’s nature and its international alliances.

    From military participation in Afghanistan, to participating in the international forces in South Lebanon, to encouraging Syria to negotiate with Israel and support al-Maliki’s government, the gap between the Turkish and Iranian dictionaries seems vast. Resting on its Islamic roots and wearing Ataturk’s hat, Erdogan’s Turkey speaks the language of interests, figures, international law and realism, whereas Ahmedinejad scoops up firebrands from both the revolution and the dictionary of confrontation, while addressing the world with missiles.

    Source: Al-Hayat, 11/07/08

  • Stratfor – Is War With Iran Coming?

    Stratfor – Is War With Iran Coming?

    Stratfor

    Geopolitical Diary: A U.S.-Iranian Dance of Diplomacy

    The United States has raised the possibility of opening a diplomatic interests section in Iran. To avoid giving the impression that the idea was an unqualified U.S. position, State Department officials carefully leaked word of an ongoing debate about the plan to the press. But the news was not met with immediate denial by U.S. officials. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refused to rule the idea out — instead Rice said she preferred not to comment on internal U.S. deliberations.

    Hours after her statement, the official Iranian news agency said Iran was prepared, in principle, to consider the request if it is officially made by the United States. So, a week after word was leaked to The New York Times of Israeli maneuvers in preparation for a possible air strike on Iran, the Administration has opened a diplomatic door. 

    Currently, American affairs in Iran are handled by the Swiss Embassy, without U.S. diplomats present. Under full diplomatic relations, which this new deal still would not be, the United States would have an embassy and ambassador in Tehran, and the Iranians would have one in Washington. This is a step short of diplomatic recognition. U.S. diplomats would be present in Tehran — and Iranians in Washington — but likely working under the auspices of the Swiss and Pakistani Embassies, which house their respective interest sections presently. The United States has this sort of arrangement with Cuba. It allows diplomatic presence and representation without full recognition.

    Cuba is hardly a model of international warmth for the United States, but the question is trajectory. At the moment, there is no formal diplomatic presence in Iran. There would be if this were to happen. And that would obviously represent a major psychological shift in U.S.-Iranian relations. It is not that the Americans and Iranians don’t talk. Apart from direct meetings in Baghdad, the Iranians have high-level diplomats in New York. There have also been meetings, varying in degrees of formality, in Switzerland and other venues. In fact, the Americans and Iranians talk all the time, directly, indirectly and sometimes it appears in Haiku poetry. The idea that the United States and Iran don’t talk just isn’t true.

    The importance of this offer is not what it would yield, but that it was made. The United States took the first step, even if it did not take it irrevocably and no formal offer was made. The administration is being cautious. The Americans still recall how in 2003 they were embarrassed by the Iranians who rebuffed an offer by the United States to send help and a visit by a high-level U.S. delegation, including the elder George Bush, to the earthquake-ravaged city of Bam.

    Today the United States is not offering diplomatic exchanges. While it said it might offer them, the United States emphasized its division on the subject. U.S. diplomatic translation: “We’d like to exchange diplomats but if you say no, we never asked.” The Iranians quickly replied that if asked, they might agree. Iranian diplomatic translation: “Ask and we’ll say yes.” The speed of the Iranian response is telling. They were not surprised by the request. Their answer was ready. Which means, as one would expect, they were sounded out before.

    So on Friday it appeared that the world was on the verge of war between Israel and Iran, with the United States supporting Israel. By late Monday, the United States was proposing raising the level of diplomatic relations and the Iranians were indicating that they were open to it. In our mind this reinforces the idea that the careful leaking of putative Israeli war games was part of a “bad cop, somewhat better cop” routine, designed to work the Iranians psychologically. They were offered the choice between Israeli air strikes or improving diplomatic relations. The second offer sounded much better than the first.

    Setting aside the purple rhetoric on all sides, we have long believed that the Americans and Iranians were talking and actually working together in Iraq. The massive decline in casualties in Iraq is not simply due to U.S. military operations. The decision by the Iranians to rein in Shiite Iraqi militias had a significant impact on it. Indeed, in our view, the Iraq issue has always been more important to both countries than the nuclear weapon issue, and in Iraq, there has been progress.

    Both governments are urgently concerned with face. Neither wants to appear to be conceding anything to the other. When the Great Satan meets the Axis of Evil, no public compromise is possible. So all compromising is done privately. And that’s what makes this important. The tentative offer is very public and comes from the highest levels of government. It has been acknowledged officially. Now, this is the United States and Iran so anything public can collapse quickly. But the offer itself, no matter how it was couched, is extremely significant as is the response. In many ways we regard this as more significant than the Israeli exercises. 

  • A U.S.-Iranian Dance of Diplomacy – IS WAR COMING?

    A U.S.-Iranian Dance of Diplomacy – IS WAR COMING?

    STRATFOR Geopolitical Diary:

    The United States has raised the possibility of opening a diplomatic interests section in Iran. To avoid giving the impression that the idea was an unqualified U.S. position, State Department officials carefully leaked word of an ongoing debate about the plan to the press. But the news was not met with immediate denial by U.S. officials. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refused to rule the idea out — instead Rice said she preferred not to comment on internal U.S. deliberations.

    Hours after her statement, the official Iranian news agency said Iran was prepared, in principle, to consider the request if it is officially made by the United States. So, a week after word was leaked to The New York Times of Israeli maneuvers in preparation for a possible air strike on Iran, the Administration has opened a diplomatic door. 

    Currently, American affairs in Iran are handled by the Swiss Embassy, without U.S. diplomats present. Under full diplomatic relations, which this new deal still would not be, the United States would have an embassy and ambassador in Tehran, and the Iranians would have one in Washington. This is a step short of diplomatic recognition. U.S. diplomats would be present in Tehran — and Iranians in Washington — but likely working under the auspices of the Swiss and Pakistani Embassies, which house their respective interest sections presently. The United States has this sort of arrangement with Cuba. It allows diplomatic presence and representation without full recognition.

    Cuba is hardly a model of international warmth for the United States, but the question is trajectory. At the moment, there is no formal diplomatic presence in Iran. There would be if this were to happen. And that would obviously represent a major psychological shift in U.S.-Iranian relations. It is not that the Americans and Iranians don’t talk. Apart from direct meetings in Baghdad, the Iranians have high-level diplomats in New York. There have also been meetings, varying in degrees of formality, in Switzerland and other venues. In fact, the Americans and Iranians talk all the time, directly, indirectly and sometimes it appears in Haiku poetry. The idea that the United States and Iran don’t talk just isn’t true.

    The importance of this offer is not what it would yield, but that it was made. The United States took the first step, even if it did not take it irrevocably and no formal offer was made. The administration is being cautious. The Americans still recall how in 2003 they were embarrassed by the Iranians who rebuffed an offer by the United States to send help and a visit by a high-level U.S. delegation, including the elder George Bush, to the earthquake-ravaged city of Bam.

    Today the United States is not offering diplomatic exchanges. While it said it might offer them, the United States emphasized its division on the subject. U.S. diplomatic translation: “We’d like to exchange diplomats but if you say no, we never asked.” The Iranians quickly replied that if asked, they might agree. Iranian diplomatic translation: “Ask and we’ll say yes.” The speed of the Iranian response is telling. They were not surprised by the request. Their answer was ready. Which means, as one would expect, they were sounded out before.

    So on Friday it appeared that the world was on the verge of war between Israel and Iran, with the United States supporting Israel. By late Monday, the United States was proposing raising the level of diplomatic relations and the Iranians were indicating that they were open to it. In our mind this reinforces the idea that the careful leaking of putative Israeli war games was part of a “bad cop, somewhat better cop” routine, designed to work the Iranians psychologically. They were offered the choice between Israeli air strikes or improving diplomatic relations. The second offer sounded much better than the first.

    Setting aside the purple rhetoric on all sides, we have long believed that the Americans and Iranians were talking and actually working together in Iraq. The massive decline in casualties in Iraq is not simply due to U.S. military operations. The decision by the Iranians to rein in Shiite Iraqi militias had a significant impact on it. Indeed, in our view, the Iraq issue has always been more important to both countries than the nuclear weapon issue, and in Iraq, there has been progress.

    Both governments are urgently concerned with face. Neither wants to appear to be conceding anything to the other. When the Great Satan meets the Axis of Evil, no public compromise is possible. So all compromising is done privately. And that’s what makes this important. The tentative offer is very public and comes from the highest levels of government. It has been acknowledged officially. Now, this is the United States and Iran so anything public can collapse quickly. But the offer itself, no matter how it was couched, is extremely significant as is the response. In many ways we regard this as more significant than the Israeli exercises. 

  • President Bush Meets with President Talabani of Iraq

    President Bush Meets with President Talabani of Iraq

    Wednesday, June 25, 2008

    President Bush met with President Jalal Talabani of Iraq and discussed the political, security, and economic gains in Iraq. Afterwards, President Bush participated in the National Security Advisor’s Meeting with the United Nations Security Council Permanent Representatives.

    “It’s been my honor to welcome a friend, President Talabani, back to the Oval Office. He is the President of a free Iraq. He is a man who’s been on the front lines of helping to unify Iraq and to help Iraq recover from a brutal regime — that of Saddam Hussein. I complimented the President on the progress that the government has made. I complimented the President on the fact that as security has improved, he and his fellow officials are reaching out to all aspects of society to help people realize the blessings of a free life.”

    President Bush Meets with President Talabani of Iraq

  • Iraqi Forces Mass Outside Southern City of Amara

    Iraqi Forces Mass Outside Southern City of Amara

    Monday 16 June 2008
    by: Andrew E. Kramer and Alissa J. Rubin, The New York Times

    Editor’s Note: This story describes a military operation by, “Iraqi forces”. Scant mention is made of support for the operation by US military forces. In fact the so called Iraqi military is organized, funded and often backed in operations directly by US military forces. This fact omitted by The New York Times is conspicuous by it’s absence. ma/TO

        Baghdad – The Iraqi Army continued to mass troops outside the southern city of Amara on Sunday and Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, offered a three-day amnesty and weapons buyback program to militants willing to surrender.

        Similar offers in the past few months have presaged other military operations, in Basra, the Sadr City slum of Baghdad and in Mosul in northern Iraq.

        This time, Mr. Maliki is preparing for an operation against the capital of a rural marsh region in southern Iraq, on the Iranian border, where Iraqi officials say a poisonous blend of militia lawlessness and weapons smuggling from Iran has created a chaotic situation.

        The city is also the capital of the only province in Iraq dominated politically by followers of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, a political rival for Mr. Maliki.

        In the city Sunday, traffic thinned on the streets. Those who did venture out in cars said they feared American air strikes.

        Some residents said the militiamen Mr. Maliki’s government is focusing on, and who Iraqi commanders say include leaders who fled from earlier fighting in nearby Basra, had again fled.

        Still, Iraqi army patrols were setting up checkpoints in the city Sunday and searching cars, some driven by residents moving to neighborhoods they believed would be safer during the anticipated fighting.

        “We are very scared of the waves of military moving into Maysan,” Abdul Ameer Abbas, a 41-year-old high school teacher, said, referring to Iraqi army troops who have been staging outside of town and in a sports stadium.

        Haider Karim, a 35-year-old Taxi driver, said the militiamen had already fled and that the civilians would bear the brunt of the military operation.

        “The security forces must follow these criminals wherever they go because they terrified innocent people,” he said. “We don’t want to be terrified again by the warplanes and troops.”

        The operation is the Iraqi army’s fourth this year to regain control over militia-dominated cities. Though disparate in their specific blend of violence and ethnic and sectarian divides, in all three cities the army has followed a template including offers of amnesty backed by military force.

        Mr. Maliki, in a statement, said militias in the city had three days to take advantage of the amnesty and surrender heavy weapons, such as rocket propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars and rockets. The government, he said, would “give the outlaws and the members of the organized crime groups a last chance to review their stance.”

        The statement also promised rewards for residents who reveal the locations of militia arms caches in the city.

        The Maysan province, rural and remote from Baghdad, lies amid vast marshes. The dozen or so tribes in the area have an independent streak; even Saddam Hussein could not force them into submission.

        After an uprising in the marshes after the 1991 Gulf War, Mr. Hussein sought to stamp out the way of life of the marsh Arabs, as they are known, by digging giant canals to drain the wetlands. Outside of Amara, the capital on the Tigris River, the province of about 920,000 people includes settlements built of reed huts.

        Meanwhile a spokesman for the movement loyal to Mr. Sadr clarified statements made earlier in the weekend that suggested that Sadrists would not participate in the upcoming elections.

        On the contrary, said cleric Lua’a Smaysim, the head of the Sadr movement’s political committee, Sadrists will run, but not under the Sadr banner. They will run as independents or possibly as part of other groups, he said.

        “We will participate in the next elections, but there is no Sadrist list,” said Mr. Smaysim. “We will participate as individuals. Also we will support a lot of independent nominations from another lists.”

        Mr. Sadr, a protean force on the Iraqi political scene, in recent days appeared to be redesigning his movement to avoid being affected by a new election law expected to be approved this month that will govern elections in the fall for provincial council members. The law will outlaw the participation of parties or movements that have an armed wing.

        The ban on parties that have militias is clearly aimed at Mr. Sadr’s followers because his movement is affiliated with the Jaish al-Mahdi, an armed group, said Saad al-Hadithy, a political science professor at Baghdad University.

        “Therefore the Sadr movement decided to participate in this election through individuals who represent this movement and still have loyalty to it, but who are using their own names,” he said. “Those independent politicians will say that they are independents, but they are related to the Sadr movement in one way or another,’ he said

        Some may participate by joining the new political alliance created by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaferi, also a Shiite, said Mr. Hadithy as well as Shiite politicians.” The Sadr movement declared that they will participate with new entities or with independent individuals and this of course is to avoid being banned from the next elections because of their militia, ” said Basim Sharif, a parliament member from the Shiite Fadhila Party,

        Mr. Sadr had announced on Friday that he was splitting his movement in two and that the political wing would no longer be involved in any military operations. By the end of the weekend, it appeared that when it came to fielding candidates, it would no longer carry the Sadr name.

        The Sadr movement has broad popularity among the poor and had been predicted to garner more seats in the upcoming provincial elections. Such an outcome would almost certainly mean fewer seats for members of Shiite parties loyal to Mr. Maliki.

        Recent operations by government forces in Basra and Sadr City have weakened Mr. Sadr, said a western diplomat who is closely watching the situation, but Iraqi political commentators say he remains a unique populist force in Iraq.

        “Most of the places targeted by the government military operations are widely popular with the Sadr movement,” said Mr. Sharif.

        “The government says that it’s not targeting a specific party but the most targeted is the Sadr movement because of its popularity and its resistance to the occupation.”

        ——–

        Suadad al-Salhy and Mudhafer al-Husaini contributed reporting from Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Amara.