Category: Middle East

  • Enduring voices [Editor’s Column]

    Enduring voices [Editor’s Column]

    Andrew Silow-Carroll
    NJJN Editor-in-Chief
    April 9, 2009

    andrew-silow-carrollI was exchanging e-mails recently with a reader about a column I wrote defending endogamy — that is, marriage between two Jews. “A bigot is one strongly loyal to one’s own social group, yet irrationally and prejudicially intolerant or disdainful of others,” he wrote. “If this paper’s chief editor is not a bigot — as he hopes — after reading this [column], I’m left wondering what he thinks he is.”

    I don’t think I am intolerant of anything, unless you count lactose.

    But his question continues to nag at me: Why does any culture value its own transmission, and can I justify the Jewish obsession with continuity in an era of multiple identities and, the flip side, violent tribalism?

    In my defense, I quoted the work of K. David Harrison, a linguist who studies dying languages. According to his Enduring Voices Project, “Nearly 80 percent of the world’s population speaks only one percent of its languages. When the last speaker of a language dies, the world loses the knowledge that was contained in that language.”

    By extension, Judaism is a culture with a rich language — not just Hebrew or Yiddish but a language of ritual, of social norms, of worship, of behaviors that order its practitioners’ world — in short, a rich system of knowledge. To dedicate oneself to preserving that shows no disdain for other cultures. Consider: When colonial powers try to wipe away traces of an indigenous culture, we call it ethnic cleansing. When Jews seek other Jews in order to live as rich a Jewish life as possible, some call it bigotry.

    Soon after this exchange I came upon Ariel Sabar’s beautiful new book, My Father’s Paradise: A Son’s Search for His Jewish Past in Kurdish Iraq. Sabar’s father, Yona, is the world’s preeminent expert on Neo-Aramaic, the language he grew up speaking in the Jewish quarter of Zakho, a Kurdish market town in northern Iraq. The book traces Yona’s journey from Kurdistan to Israel to southern California, where he is a professor at UCLA.

    The book is an American-born, journalist son’s attempt to reconnect with a father he once dismissed as an awkward, hopelessly uncool immigrant. But it is also a rumination on language and Jewish culture, and the ways, and worth, of trying to preserve both.

    For perhaps 1,700 years and until the seventh-century rise of Arabic, Aramaic was to the Levant what English is to the modern world: its lingua franca. The language lives on in the Talmud, the Zohar, the traditional wedding ketuba, and other texts. You hear it in the Mourner’s Kaddish and the Kol Nidrei prayer chanted on Yom Kippur eve.

    But “lives” is a relative term — Aramaic began disappearing as a living Jewish language with the immigration of Iraq’s small Kurdish-Jewish community to Israel in the 1950s. Like Yona Sabar, Kurdish Jews made a lightning leap from the 18th century to the 20th, and the language barely made the crossing.

    Ariel Sabar recreates the lost Jewish world of Zakho, where his hard-working grandparents thrived as dyers and textile merchants. Israel is a shock, and Yona’s parents and grandfather are adrift in the ramshackle tent cities and slums built to accommodate the flood of new immigrants. As Kurds, they occupy perhaps the lowest rung on Israel’s strict ladder of ethnic hierarchy. (One of the book’s heroes is Itzhak Ben-Zvi, Israel’s second president, an Ashkenazi Jew who championed the study and preservation of “Oriental” Jewish cultures.)

    Out of this world Yona emerges as an unlikely scholar at Hebrew University with a rare distinction: fluency in a language that other scholars know only from the synagogue and dusty manuscripts. He soon lands at Yale and eventually becomes a lionized academic and teacher in Los Angeles. Writes Ariel: “Teaching Aramaic in America, I came to see, was how he sang God’s song in a strange land.”

    Ariel, meanwhile, grows up a typical California kid, embarrassed by his father’s eccentricities and distant from his plucked Jewish roots. Ariel marries a non-Jewish woman and, while he pledges to raise their son as a Jew, disappoints the family by refusing to have the boy circumcised.

    And here a reader is tempted to cluck his tongue and lament the withering of another branch on the Jewish family tree. But there is something cannier and more surprising going on in My Father’s Paradise. Ariel thinks long and hard about what we owe the past, and the future. He can’t live his father’s life, any more than his father can live in the dusty alleyways of Zakho. But he can tell the story of the Kurdish Jews, of Aramaic, and of his father’s heroic efforts to remember both.

    Ariel Sabar made his choices; you and I might make others. His book suggests the various ways we can embrace diversity while adding new chapters to the cultures we inherit.

    “Jews had carried a flame into the hills of Kurdistan, and they carried it out, still burning, 2,700 years later,” he writes. “My father touched another candle to it and brought it across continents. I didn’t want it to die with me. If my children ever feel adrift, unsure of who they are, I want that candle to still be burning.”

    Comment: [email protected]

    Source:  www.njjewishnews.com, April 9, 2009

  • Serious dialogue, and painful disagreements

    Serious dialogue, and painful disagreements

    Questions for… Imam Abdullah Antepli

    by Johanna Ginsberg
    NJJN Staff Writer

    April 23, 2009

    Imam Abdullah Antepli, first Muslim chaplain at Duke University and a strong advocate for Muslim-Jewish dialogue, will speak about Muslim responses to Gaza at Congregation Beth Hatikvah in Summit on Friday, April 24, at 8 p.m.  Photo courtesy Abdullah Antepli
    Imam Abdullah Antepli, first Muslim chaplain at Duke University and a strong advocate for Muslim-Jewish dialogue, will speak about Muslim responses to Gaza at Congregation Beth Hatikvah in Summit on Friday, April 24, at 8 p.m. Photo courtesy Abdullah Antepli

    Imam Abdullah Antepli is the first Muslim chaplain serving at Duke University in North Carolina, where he also teaches an introduction to Islam course in the divinity school. Antepli completed undergraduate work in his native Turkey and earned a master’s degree from Hartford Seminary in Connecticut, where he is a doctoral candidate. He is the founder of the Muslim Chaplains Association and a member of the Association of College and University Chaplains.

    He and Rabbi Amy Small of Congregation Beth Hatikvah, a Reconstructionist synagogue in Summit, co-teach a class at Hartford Seminary on the Abrahamic religions. On Friday, April 24, he will speak at Small’s synagogue at 8 p.m. on Responses to the War in Gaza.

    Ahead of the talk, he heaped praise on Small for inviting him to speak. “We are all in our cocoons, and the source of our information is biased. Not many people go out of their way to pay attention to what the other side is seeing,” he said in a recent phone conversation.

    NJJN: You seem to be the exception in your desire for Muslim-Jewish dialogue. Why is there so little, and what has made you the exception?

    Antepli: There is little going on in terms of Muslim-Jewish dialogue because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That conflict and its consequences go beyond that space, beyond 100 years. Without putting blame on anyone, because of that conflict, Jews and Muslims are divided. Fourteen hundred years of often good relationships went through the drains, forgotten by many Jews and many Muslims. It’s very tense. People are so wounded on all sides, and the wounds are very fresh.

    I grew up a victim of the divide. I grew up being taught about Jews and Judaism, all sorts of negative stuff. In southeast Turkey, that’s the information I received. It was as if Jews and Muslims first met over this conflict. Our hearts and minds were poisoned.

    God Almighty was merciful and did not allow me to live with this poison. He conducted me on a different journey. I met Jews when I lived in southeast Asia for eight years before coming to the United States. The first Jews I met were business people from Europe and the U.S. They were not religious, but we were able to establish friendships — human to human relationships.

    When I moved to the United States six years ago, I came to the Hartford Seminary, where the whole focus is on Abrahamic dialogue and interfaith dialogue…. I started taking classes and studied Torah, and I found that…ethically, morally, and spiritually Judaism and Islam are so similar; there’s an inevitable chemistry and attraction [between the people]. As someone who takes religion seriously, I was able to connect with Judaism, theologically and in the understanding of the worldview, in a very short while. That strengthened my sense of responsibility.

    NJJN: How do you discuss Israel and Gaza and related issues with Jewish groups? What are the challenges? How do you overcome them?

    Antepli: Gaza is a very difficult issue. Gaza is not good news whatsoever. It just provides another level of pain. Thank God, Baruch Hashem, my relationship [with the Jewish community at Duke] was very strong and already ongoing when the war began.

    But there are clear differences in the way we see Gaza. Having a strong relationship enables us to have painful conversations despite our significant disagreements.… This is the basic entry point for any serious dialogue. The Muslim community openly expresses its criticism and its anger and frustration toward the State of Israel’s policy on Gaza, but deliberately not toward Israel or Israelis in general. We have been able to criticize the way the situation was handled and the tragic situation in which innocent civilians were injured.

    [The war in Gaza] was counterproductive. It was done in the name of security, but it was a disservice to Israeli security. I do not think Israel is safer now.

    NJJN: What are the challenges you face as the first Muslim chaplain at Duke?

    Antepli: I face two sets of challenges: one internally, within the Muslim community, and one externally with the larger non-Muslim community on campus and beyond.… The 550 Muslim students, faculty, and staff at Duke are representative of the entire 1.3 billion Muslims in terms of their ethnic, political, psychological, and spiritual diversity. I am the chaplain for all of them. How do you create a Muslim community out of this diverse group?

    Externally, the main challenge is not unique to me; it’s the challenge facing all Muslims living in post-9/11 United States. A large part of the community bought the idea that Islam is violent and Muslims are terrorists. My arrival and strong presence was not good news for people with these stereotypical ideas about Muslims…. This was an issue for people of a very particular Christian background, and there was also criticism from some in the Jewish community, especially after the Gaza War. But the overwhelming majority of people have offered support and love and care.

    For more information about Imam Antepli’s visit to Congregation Beth Hatikvah, contact the synagogue at 908-277-0200.

    Comment: [email protected]

  • Statement on attack on the local Turkmeneli TV staffs: An outcome of unilateral domination in Kerkuk region

    Statement on attack on the local Turkmeneli TV staffs: An outcome of unilateral domination in Kerkuk region

    At 12 April 2009, the reporter (Mr. Umit Abdulla) and cameraman (Abbas Mohammed Hasan) of the local Turkmeneli TV (TERT) in Kerkuk city were organizing to report a book exhibition in the faculty of Law, Kerkuk University. They were attacked by a group of students from Kurdish student Union. Both the reporter and the cameraman were severely kicked and insulted and the camera was shattered. The Kurdish policemen and the Kurdish soldiers have only watched the offenses without interfering to stop the attackers.

    This attack on the local Turkmeneli TV (TERT) staffs in Kerkuk demonstrates clearly the unbalanced oppressive attitude of the Kurdish authorities and even activists in Kerkuk region.

    The oil rich Kerkuk region has been controlled since the 2003 occupation by Kurdish political parties supported by Peshmerga militias after occupation. Support of the occupier, resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds and manipulating elections has made the Kurdish parties dominate the political and administration system in the province and remain the only decision-makers at exclusion of the original inhabitants: Turkmen, Arabs and Chaldo-Assyrians.

    The security system is completely Kurdified, with the Iraqi army limited and the Kurdish militia distributed throughout the Kerkuk province. This has psychologically suppressed the non-Kurdish communities.

    The appointment of thousands of Kurds and the enrichment of half a million incoming Kurds with large sums of money, and the granting of large numbers of government contracts to Kurdish contractors who employ Kurdish workers has shifted the economic balance in favour of the Kurdish inhabitants.

    Having only recently left behind the tough guerrilla life, after decades in the harsh mountain regions, the Kurdish administration remains characterized by an authoritarian mentality, and lack of meritocracy. This has brought other burdens on the non-Kurdish inhabitants of Kerkuk in the Kurdified governmental offices.

    The politicized Kurdish education and information systems have since 1991 taught the Kurdish generations that Kerkuk province is their fatherland which has been usurped by other nations. This increased the animosity of particularly Kurdish youth and convinced them to have the region at any cost.

    Under such a biased condition:

    ü When the Iraqi government was totally absent in Kerkuk, the non-Kurdish Kerkuk population survived thousands of dramatic human rights violations since the occupation in 2003.

    ü The Kurdish political parties prevented the normalization in Kerkuk region and are now hindering the implementation of Article 23 which was, recently, enacted by the Iraqi parliament.

    To convince the Kurdish political parties to change their unconstructive attitude in solving of Kerkuk problem, the international community should withhold their support, assistance and cooperation with the Kurdish authorities.

  • Statement on KRG expansion plans

    Statement on KRG expansion plans

    Recent media reports about the political situation in northern Iraq expose an escalating conflict between the KRG and the Iraqi government. Several Kurdish leaders have expressed themselves in the media, going as far as saying there will be a war between Arabs and Kurds if the government continues to assert its authority in areas bordering the Kurdish dominated region.

    In their comments Kurdish leaders fail to reflect the true nature of the areas bordering the KRG. In many of these so called disputed areas there are very few Kurds to be found. In the Nineveh plain for example the percentage of Kurds is at best 5 percent. Still, Kurdish leaders insist these areas be annexed to the KRG. In fact, the stretch of land bordering the KRG is mostly dominated by Turkmens and minorities such as Yezidies, Assyrians, Shabaks and Kakais. Instead of acknowledging this fact Kurdish political groups have launched a fierce campaign to describe minorities like Yezidies and Shabaks as Kurds, while carrying out different programs in an attempt to Kurdify these minority populations. While oppressed in the past, Iraq’s Kurdish political parties have grown to become themselves the new oppressors in Iraq- seen from the perspective of minorities.

    The Kurdish Peshmerga forces were successful in the help against Saddam Hussein as part of the Iraqi liberation movement, but today we note with sadness the transformation of the Peshmerga into a militia which is used to enforce Kurdish expansion plans in non-Kurdish settlements against the will of the inhabitants of these areas. The Peshmerga is today used to instil fear in minority communities in order to ensure compliance with KRG expansion scheme. Any referendum on the future of so called disputed areas carried out under Peshmerga presence will not be free and fair.

    From being a centre of stability the KRG has turned itself into the major source of instability in Iraq today. While most of Iraq is becoming increasingly secure for all Iraqis, including vulnerable non Muslim communities such as Assyrians and Yezidies, the expansion plans of the KRG threatens to destabilize Iraq, its neighbouring countries and severely affect the vulnerable minorities who live in the areas claimed by Kurdish groups.

    The undersigned organizations call on the KRG to refrain from all acts of violence and withdraw its forces from all areas outside the KRG. We also call on Kurdish leaders to respect the rights of minorities, to stop interfering in their internal issues and to stop describing Yezidies and Shabaks as Kurds.

    We hope the UN and the EU will hear the calls of Iraqi minorities for justice and respect of their rights in Iraq.

    April 4, 2009

    Assyria Council of Europe
    Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation
    Yezidi Human Rights Organization
    Shabak Democratic Assembly

  • Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 76
    April 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Following the restoration of his political rights, veteran Islamist politician and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, 83, returned to active politics, raising questions about the leadership of the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). Erbakan, the legendary leader of the National Outlook Movement (NOM) advocated a political Islamist platform in Turkish politics, and formed a succession of political parties since the 1970’s -training activists who became influential figures within Turkish political life. He skillfully mobilized the Turkish electorate behind his Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990’s and succeeded to rule the country in a coalition government between 1996 and 1997. His policies while in power irked Turkey’s powerful generals who perceived the RP as a direct threat to secularism and staged a campaign to force Erbakan out of power, known as the “February 28 process.” Erbakan was forced out of office, and subsequently the Constitutional Court closed down the RP in 1998, suspending political rights of Erbakan and other RP officials. The crackdown on Islamic social networks during the “February 28 process” led to a crisis within the Islamist movement, whereby the new generation questioned the platform and strategies of the NOM instilled by Erbakan. The split between the pro-Erbakan old-guard and the reformist wing became visible when the Constitutional Court shut down the WP’s successor Virtue Party (FP) on similar grounds in 2002. The two groups separated, with the reformists organizing themselves around the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power following a landslide election victory in 2002 and continues to rule Turkey. In contrast, the FP’s traditionalist offshoot, the SP, was defeated.

    Although he took over the SP leadership after his five-year ban came to an end in 2003, Erbakan faced political restrictions in another RP-related case. He was found guilty of forgery in the so-called “lost trillion case’ concerning the loss of more than one trillion Turkish Liras in Treasury grants to the RP. In addition to his political ban, he was sentenced to two years and four months, which he began serving under house arrest in May 2008. Citing Erbakan’s ailing health, in August 2008 President Abdullah Gul pardoned him, paving the way for the removal of his political restrictions (Today’s Zaman, April 6).

    Erbakan constantly expressed his opinions on political developments through his public appearances in the SP’s election rallies and other platforms. He acted as a vocal opponent of the governing AKP, criticizing it for following pro-Western policies and betraying the NOM spirit. After the restoration of his political rights in April, Erbakan’s press briefing in the SP headquarters was interpreted as marking his return to “active politics.” Despite his advanced age, he set himself an ambitious timescale for putting the SP on the political map, voicing the same anti-Western and confrontational discourse he had been advocating for decades (ANKA, April 10). Following his press briefing, Erbakan visited Iran, where he received a warm welcome from Iranian officials including President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Erbakan and Iranian leaders vowed to continue their struggle against “Western imperialism and Zionism” and pursue the establishment of a pan-Islamic union (www.saadet.org.tr, April 19; Hurriyet, April 20).

    Erbakan’s return to politics has raised questions about the future leadership of the SP. Though his political socialization took place within the NOM tradition, the current party leader Numan Kurtulmus, a professor of economics, in many ways distinguished himself from traditionalists. Distancing himself from the doctrinaire outlook of the NOM cadres, Kurtulmus is known as a person who has embraced broader segments of society (www.cafesiyaset.com, December 16, 2008). He declined invitations from the governing AKP to join their ranks, and instead continued his political career within the SP, and eventually took on the challenging task of revitalizing the NOM tradition in Turkish politics. He overcame opposition from traditionalists and was elected as the new SP leader in October 2008 -succeeding Erbakan. He maintained his allegiance to Erbakan’s ideals but avoided being viewed as his caretaker (www.timeturk.com, October 22, 2008).

    Now that Erbakan has returned to the party, Kurtulmus’ position appears vulnerable. Kurtulmus was not present at the Erbakan press briefing, which triggered speculation that there might be an underlying leadership struggle within the party (www.habervitrini.com, April 11). Fuelling these rumors, Erbakan avoided telling reporters what his future role will be within the party. Kurtulmus ruled out such a contest, arguing that “we do not have a leadership problem. Mr. Erbakan does not harbor such goals… he has valuable views and we will continue to benefit from them” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 12).

    Alternatively, Erbakan might portray himself as an “intellectual guide” for the NOM, enabling him to exert influence over the SP. Though he may not assume the party chairmanship directly, given his personality, he is unlikely to disengage entirely from the SP and its policy making, not least for the purpose of consolidating his son’s position in the party. Since many analysts attributed the SP’s success in last month’s local elections to its new leader Kurtulmus, who was able to imbue a sense of dynamism through his moderate political discourse, the return of the old-guard Erbakan might damage the party’s future performance within Turkish politics.

     http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34886

  • Iraqi Sunnis Turn to Politics and Renew Strength

    Iraqi Sunnis Turn to Politics and Renew Strength

    18sunni.600 Jehad Nga for The New York Times Sheik Abdullah Humedi Ajeel al-Yawar, seen with his Arabian horses, mobilized tribes in January to help Sunni Arabs gain control of Nineveh’s provincial council.

    By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON and STEPHEN FARRELL Published: April 17, 2009

    RABIA, Iraq – Sheik Abdullah Humedi Ajeel al-Yawar says there is no hidden reason why he still flies the three-starred flag of the old Iraqi government from the towers and guard posts of his ranch near the Syrian border.

    Multimedia

    Iraq's Fault LineInteractive Graphic

    Iraq’s Fault Line

    0418 for clrSUNNImap The New York Times

    The Sunni political class has regained strength in Rabia.

    It is a practical matter, he explained. The Iraqi government has yet to come up with a permanent new design, so why change the flags until they do?

    But the sight of the flag and the confidence oozing from northern Iraq’s new Arab rulers send an unavoidable message: The old order has returned.

    In the first years after the invasion, Sunni Arabs, the minority that long ran Iraq and who make up the majority in the northwest, mostly stayed away from politics. Many joined or supported the insurgency as the American-allied Kurds took power by default, giving them a political and military ascendance out of all proportion to their numbers in Nineveh Province.

    But in the prelude to Nineveh’s provincial council elections in January, the tribes of the countryside led by the nationally ambitious Sheik Abdullah, and the urban Sunni Arab elite led by a polished businessman from Mosul whose brother already sits in Parliament, came back with a vengeance.

    Riding a wave of resentment against the Kurds – and openly trumpeting influence with insurgents – they came to control Iraq’s second most populous province, thus overseeing not only regional decision-making, but also the coffers and patronage that go with it.

    The return of this Sunni political class, some of them suspected of ties with Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, has come via the ballot box. But it prompts crucial questions: whether enfranchisement quickens ethnic healing, or whether the Sunni victors’ hard edge against the Kurds sets up future ethnic conflict.

    So far it does not look good. At the first Nineveh provincial council meeting on Sunday, the victorious Sunni list, Al Hadba, with 19 of 37 seats, froze the second-place Kurdish list out of all official positions.

    In return the Kurds, controlling 12 seats, threatened to boycott the council and even refuse to accept government services in areas where they dominate.

    The dispute has implications far beyond the northern fault line. Three hundred miles south in Baghdad, the central government led by Iraq’s majority Shiite Arabs must decide which presents the biggest threat: the political ambitions of Mr. Hussein’s once ruling Sunni Arab minority, or the territorial ambitions of the Kurdish minority who claim that some northern areas administered by Baghdad should rightfully be added to their three provinces, two of which border Nineveh.

    With national elections in less than 12 months, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who has competing centrist and Islamist constituencies, must also decide how far he can take reconciliation with the former ruling Sunnis. Tension rose last week when one of Mr. Hussein’s former top deputies called for the toppling of Mr. Maliki’s government and for the outlawed Baath Party to retake control.

    American officials here see reasons for optimism, that people who might have used violence in the past have turned to politics. Lt. Col. Guy Parmeter, commander of the American forces in the center of Nineveh, said he felt that fighting among Al Hadba and opposing groups was now less likely.

    “I think that any conflict between them, they’re going to stay in the dialogue phase,” he said.

    American officials acknowledged that Al Hadba was heavily influenced by the Baath Party. Three potential Hadba candidates were disqualified for past associations with the party, and the list’s leaders assert that former Baathists should be included in the government, while conceding that the party should remain banned. Sheik Abdullah points out that the tribes, the source of his support, pre-date the country, never mind one party.

    Others, and not only Kurds, are wary of Nineveh’s new rulers. More than one Sunni Arab sheik accused Al Hadba of being in league with violent extremists.

    “When the election was in Mosul four years ago, when somebody went to vote, the Islamic State of Iraq cut off his hand,” said Sheik Massoud Suleiman al-Sadoon, a tribal leader in Zumar. “Why this time did all the bad men say ‘Vote for Al Hadba?’ ”

    In his office in Mosul, Al Hadba’s leader, Atheel al-Nujaifi – just before he was installed as Nineveh’s governor – spoke of a willingness to make overtures to insurgents, or as he put it, people “who oppose the political system and might commit some kind of violence,” although he drew the line at reaching out to religious extremists and criminals.

    The lack of violence on election day, he explained, was not only a result of a security lockdown. His party contacted “influential people,” he said, to ensure that votes would be cast peacefully.

    The Kurds mutter that Al Hadba’s proximity to extremists could render irrelevant its stated intentions to rule broadly. The party’s constituency, they allege, will force it to uphold the extreme elements of its leaders’ rhetoric.

    “They have to balance their position between the reality of the Iraqi government, and to take orders from the darkness, from the groups who voted for them, who asked people to vote for them,” said Khasro Goran, the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Mosul.

    Kurdish political leaders argue further that the alliance of Arab tribal and urbane elite is a marriage of convenience arising from their shared antipathy to the Kurds.

    Mr. Nujaifi says that he has nothing against the Kurds and that he is not opposed to a federal solution to the question of Kurdish territorial claims. But he and Sheik Abdullah are unequivocal on one point: in an Arab-majority province with long-simmering land disputes, there is and will be no Kurdish land in Nineveh. But the coalition’s dynamic appears more complex than mere opposition to Kurdish expansionism.

    The near uniformity of the Sunni Arab vote in the north also comes from a sense, shared across ragged desert towns and mountain villages, that Kurdish rule failed in Nineveh – badly.

    Towns, only recently free of Sunni extremist control, have some of the worst rates of connection to the water network in Iraq, according to the United Nations. Electricity is lacking in most of the province, and unemployment is high.

    The severity of the problems is one reason Americans say Al Hadba will be forced to put pragmatism, and political survival, over ideology.

    Sheik Abdullah is frank about his readiness to further his already nascent ambitions into other provinces and dissolve Al Hadba if it does not deliver improvements. And Mr. Nujaifi’s campaign focused on installing competent administrators.

    Iraqis from the north, those from Mosul in particular, have long had a reputation for hardened survival instincts.

    “There isn’t a lot of change in Mosul society,” Mr. Nujaifi explained. “After we think that these problems are over, this society will return again as before. And that’s our image.”

    Atheer Kakan contributed reporting.