Category: Middle East

Iran-Armenia pipeline expected online soon

YEREVAN, Armenia, May 19 (UPI) — Iranian gas supplies to Armenia through a 70-mile pipeline are expected to commence Friday, Iranian gas officials said while en route to Yerevan.

Reza Kasaeizadeh, the managing director of the National Iranian Gas Exporting Co., headed to the Armenian capital Yerevan on Monday to finalize gas agreements, Iran’s Petroenergy Information Network reports.

Russian, Armenian and Iranian officials inaugurated a final stage of a natural gas pipeline from Iran in December. Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisyan said the pipeline also serves as an alternative supply source should Russia disrupt energy transports through other routes.

The pipeline will bring 81 billion cubic feet of natural gas from Iran per year, about the same amount Armenia imports from Russia via Georgia. In exchange, Armenia will convert natural gas to electricity for exports back to Iran.

Kasaeizadeh said exports through the $220 million pipeline could reach 141 million cubic feet per day in the next two years, with a final capacity reaching 222 million cfd.

May 19, 2009
U.S.: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who’s the Greatest Threat of All?

Analysis by Daniel Luban and Jim Lobe*

WASHINGTON, May 10 (IPS) – A potentially major clash appears to be developing between powerful factions inside and outside the U.S. government, pitting those who see the Afghanistan/Pakistan (“AfPak”) theatre as the greatest potential threat to U.S. national security against those who believe that the danger posed by a nuclear Iran must be given priority.

The Iran hawks, concentrated within the Israeli government and its U.S. supporters in the so-called “Israel lobby” here, want to take aggressive action against Iran’s nuclear programme by moving quickly to a stepped-up sanctions regime.

Many suggest that Israel or the U.S. may ultimately have to use military force against Tehran if President Barack Obama’s diplomatic efforts at engagement do not result at least in a verifiable freeze – if not a rollback – of the programme by the end of the year.

Their opponents appear to be concentrated at the Pentagon, where top leaders are more concerned with providing a level of regional stability that will allow the U.S. to wind down its operations in Iraq, step up its counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan, and, above all, ensure the security of the Pakistani state and its nuclear weapons.

In their view, any attack on Iran would almost certainly throw the entire region into even greater upheaval. Both Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have repeatedly and publicly warned over the past year against any moves that would further destabilise the region.

Other key administration players are believed to share this view, including senior military officers such as Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Adm. Dennis Blair and Gen. Douglas Lute, the “war czar” whose White House portfolio includes both Iraq and South Asia.

The divide between these factions was on vivid display this past week, when Washington played host to two high-profile – and dissonant – events.

First, top U.S. and Israeli leaders were out in force at the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the powerful and hawkish lobby group, where attendees heard a steady drumbeat of dire warnings about the “existential threat” to Israel of an Iranian bomb and calls for increased sanctions – and occasionally even military force – against Tehran.

Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan were rarely mentioned at the conference, which instead stressed hopes for building a U.S.-led coalition against Tehran that would include both Israel and “moderate” Sunni-led Arab states.

But just as more than 6,000 AIPAC delegates fanned out Wednesday across Capitol Hill to press their lawmakers to sign on to tough anti-Iran sanctions legislation, the arrival of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari for summit talks with Obama and other top officials focused attention on the deteriorating situation in both countries.

The surface cordiality of Karzai’s and Zardari’s visits masked the fact that the U.S. has grown increasingly worried about the ability of either leader to combat their respective Taliban insurgencies.

Most indications are that the Obama administration, including Obama himself and Vice President Joe Biden, sides with the Pentagon, at least for now.

But the AIPAC conference, which was attended by more than half of the members of the U.S. Congress and featured speeches by the top Congressional leadership of both parties, served as a reminder that Iran hawks within the Israel lobby have a strong foothold in the legislative branch, and may be able to push Iran to the top of the foreign-policy agenda whether the administration likes it or not.

Obama pledged during the presidential campaign that he would give AfPak – which he then called the “central front in the war on terror” – top priority, and, since taking office, he has made good on that promise.

He appointed a powerful special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, with a broad mandate to take charge of U.S. diplomacy in the region. Holbrooke, who met briefly with a senior Iranian official during a conference at The Hague in late March, has said several times that Tehran has an important role to play in stabilising Afghanistan.

At the same time, Mullen, the U.S. military chief, has been virtually “commuting” to and from the region to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, Holbrooke noted in Congressional testimony this week.

Given its preoccupation with AfPak and with stabilising the region as a whole, the Pentagon has naturally been disinclined to increase tensions with Iran, which shares lengthy borders with Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and could easily make life significantly more difficult for the U.S. in each of the three countries.

But the new Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pushing the U.S. to confront Iran over its nuclear programme, and his allies in the U.S. have similarly argued that Iran should be a top priority.

For the moment, the Iran hawks have mostly expressed muted – if highly sceptical – support for Obama’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran. But they have warned that this outreach must have a “short and hard end date”, as Republican Sen. Jon Kyl put it at the AIPAC conference, at which point the U.S. must turn to harsher measures.

AIPAC’s current top legislative priority is a bill, co-sponsored by Kyl and key Democrats, that would require Obama to impose sanctions on foreign firms that export refined petroleum products to Iran.

In recent Congressional testimony, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the administration would support such “crippling” sanctions against Tehran if diplomacy did not work, but she declined to say how long the administration would permit diplomatic efforts to play out before taking stronger action.

While sanctions seem to be the topic du jour, the possibility of military action against Tehran remains on everybody’s mind, as does the question of whether Israel would be willing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities without Washington’s approval.

In March, Netanyahu told The Atlantic that “if we have to act, we will act, even if America won’t.”

Asked at the AIPAC conference whether Israel would attack Iran without a “green light” from the U.S., former Israeli deputy defence minister Ephraim Sneh joked that in Israel, stoplight signals are “just a recommendation.”

By contrast, Pentagon officials have made little secret of their opposition. In late April, Gates told the Senate Appropriations committee that a military strike would only delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear capability while “send[ing] the programme deeper and more covert”.

Last month, Mullen told the Wall Street Journal that an Israeli attack would pose “exceptionally high risks” to U.S. interests in the region. (Although the newspaper chose not to publish this part of the interview, Mullen’s office provided a record to IPS.)

Similarly, Biden told CNN in April that an Israeli military strike against Tehran would be “ill-advised”. And former National Security Advisor (NSA) Brent Scowcroft, who is close to both Gates and the current NSA, ret. Gen. James Jones, told a conference here late last month that such an attack would be a “disaster for everybody.”

For the moment, the top Pentagon leadership’s resistance to an attack on Iran appears to be playing a major role in shaping the debate in Washington.

Gates “is a bulwark against those who want to go to war in Iran or give the green light for Israel to go to war”, said former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski last month.

Others dispute the idea, proposed by Netanyahu in his speech to AIPAC, that the Iranian threat can unite Israel and the Arab states.

“The Israeli notion making the rounds these days that Arab fears of Iran might be the foundation for an alignment of interest is almost certainly wrong,” wrote Marc Lynch, a professor at George Washington University, on the Foreign Policy website.

“Nothing would unite Arab opinion faster than an Israeli attack on Iran. The only thing which might change that would be serious movement towards a two state solution [in Israel-Palestine].”

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.

Source: www.ipsnews.net, May 10 2009

May 15, 2009
Al-Sadr’s visit to Turkey- end to Iran’s influence in Iraq

Azerbaijan, Baku, May 5 /Trend News, U.Sadikhova, R.Hafizoglu/

The visit of the leader of Shiite resistance of Iraq Muktada Al-Sadr to Turkey will strengthen Al-Sadr’s position as a political leader and weaken the influence of Iran on the Shiite party of Iraq, experts say.

“With his position, Al-Sadr showed that he moved from the level of a religious figure to the political level, Turkish leading analyst on the Middle East, Mustafa Ozcan told Trend News in a telephone conversation from Istanbul. – Al-Sadr seeks to strengthen in the internal policy of Iraq, therefore, it is not excluded that he wants to weaken the influence of Iran.

In the end of last week, former Head of Mahdi Army, Al-Sadr, who has resisted the U.S. presence in Iraq, discussed with the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Rajap Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara the question of establishing stability in Iraq, as well as the upcoming elections in Iraq in December 2009, TRT Russian website reported.

Al-Sadr’s visit to Turkey was the first public appearance of the leader of the Shiite resistance since 2007, supporters of whom – “sadrities” – took 28 out of 275 seats in the Iraqi Parliament.

Al-Sadr was the top of the list of persons searched by the USA after a series of explosions, organized by his supporters in the Iraqi cities. He also opposed the agreement on security between Baghdad and Washington, envisaging the stay of the American troops in the country by the end of 2011.

Analysts believe that Al-Sadr is interested in strengthening ties with Ankara, which maintains the same attitude towards all political and religious groups in Iraq.

Al-Sadr supported preserving the unity of Iraq and non-division of the country into autonomies, said Joost Hiltermann, an analyst on the Iraq policy.

“The forces inside Iraq that save a stronger central state and the national Iraqi identity are more eager to meet with neighboring states that also saver to Iraq staying as a single country,” Hiltermann, deputy director of the Middle East program at the International Crisis Group, told Trend News in a telephone conversation from Istanbul.

He said that it is not excluded that this visit is directed against some Iraqi Shiites, who focused on the decentralization of Iraq.

Analysts regard al-Sadr’s position as his move from the category of religious leaders to the political category, given the dissolution of the religious Shiite movement Mahdi Army, which is based in major cities Mosul and Kerbala.

Ozcan believes that al-Sadr wants to create a political party like the Lebanese Shiite party Hezbollah.

Al-Sadr’s interest in the upcoming elections in Iraq and the presence of 30 supporters in parliament show a desire to strengthen its position as a political leader, experts said.

His visit to Turkey will help to join the ranks of political leaders of Iraq, to which Ankara maintains a neutral attitude, said a leading analyst for the Middle East Husni al-Makhally.

“Visit [Al-Sadr], in Sunni country [Turkey] is very important to most of Iraq’s internal problems,” al-Makhally told Trend News over phone from Istanbul.

He did not rule out that the visit is aimed at weakening Iran’s influence in Iraq, which is among the Shiite political and religious factions.

Iran has close ties with Shiite communities Kerbala and Najaf, and also liaises with the Government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the Shia by the origin and leader of Al-Dawa party.

Sadrities seek to weaken Iran’s influence and consider communications between Baghdad and Ankara as important relations with Tehran, believes al-Makhally.

Mustafa Ozcan also does not exclude that the United States welcome the visit of al-Sadr to Turkey, as it puts off Iran from the internal politics of Iraq.

Al-Sadr himself is not enthusiastic about the influence of Iran, and therefore wants to put an end to Iran’s influence on domestic politics of Iraq “-said Ozcan.

In March, President of Turkey Abdullah Gul traveled to Iraq – for the first time over 33 years of relations between the two countries. Ankara, receiving Sadr after President Gul’s visit to Baghdad, once again proved how important it for political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq

Do you have any feedback? Contact our journalist at: [email protected]

Source: news-en.trend.az, May 5 2009

May 10, 2009
The Ottoman Revival

Foreign Policy dergisinin son sayisinda Turkiye ve Osmanli gecmisi uzerine enteresan bir makale yayinlandi. Ingilizce versiyonu asagiya kopyaliyorum umarim keyifle okursunuz.

En iyi dileklerimle, Akin Aytekin [[email protected]]

One clear day in February, when Ali Babacan visited Yemen, his hosts brought him to a centuries-old, mud-brick building outside Sanaa, the Yemeni capital. There, about a dozen tribal leaders were waiting for the Turkish foreign minister with curved daggers drawn. If Babacan was at first startled, he soon realized that he was being greeted in a way once reserved for newly arrived Ottoman governors-complete with drums and a traditional dance that had probably not been performed for a Turkish official in almost a century.

Not so long ago, top Turkish officials didn’t bother to visit Yemen, or for that matter most other countries in the Middle East. In the nearly 90 years since the founding of the modern Turkish Republic, its leaders have tended to equate the East with backwardness, and the West with modernity-and so focused their gaze primarily on Europe. Meanwhile, Arab countries, once ruled by sultans from Istanbul, looked upon Turkey with a mixture of suspicion and defensive resentment.

Today that’s changing. Not only is Turkey sending emissaries throughout the region, but a new vogue for all things Turkish has emerged in neighboring countries. The Turkish soap opera Noor, picked up by the Saudi-owned MBC satellite network and dubbed in Arabic, became a runaway hit, reaching some 85 million viewers across the Middle East. Many of the growing number of tourists from Arab countries visiting Istanbul are making pilgrimages to locations featured in the show. In February, Asharq Alawsat, a pan-Arab newspaper based in London, took note of changing attitudes in a widely circulated column, “The Return of the Ottoman Empire?”

This new mood started at home. Since it first came to power seven years ago, Turkey’s government, led by the liberal-Islamic Justice and Development Party, has taken a different approach to its role in the region. The mastermind of this turnaround-“neo-Ottomanism,” as some in Turkey and the Middle East are calling it-has been Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish prime minister’s chief foreign-policy advisor. In his 2001 book, Strategic Depth, he argued that in running away from its historical ties in the region, Turkey was also running away from political and economic opportunity. His strategy has paid off, literally, for Turkey. Trade with the country’s eight nearest neighbors-including Syria, Iran, and Iraq-nearly doubled between 2005 and 2008, going from $7.3 billion to $14.3 billion. And, from being on the verge of war with Syria a decade ago, Ankara is now among Damascus’s closest allies in the region.

The Ottoman past is also in the air in Turkey. At a recent government rally, one enthusiastic supporter unfurled a banner proclaiming the prime minister “the last sultan.” Moviegoers have been flocking to see a new spate of Ottoman-themed films, from The Last Ottoman, an action flick set during World War I, to Ottoman Republic, a comedy imagining daily life in modern Turkey if the sultans were still in charge.

Istanbul’s newest cultural attraction is the municipal-run Panorama 1453 History Museum, a granite-clad building just outside the city’s ancient walls that tells the story of the Ottomans’ conquest of Byzantine Constantinople. In the gift shop, visitors can buy everything from cuff links emblazoned with the sultans’ seal to a 1,000-piece puzzle showing Mehmet the Conqueror entering Constantinople on horseback.

On a recent visit, I met a group of head-scarved women who were taking in the sights and sounds of the museum’s main exhibit: a circular diorama depicting Mehmet the Conqueror’s victorious final assault on Constantinople’s walls. “This is beautiful, most beautiful,” said one 28-year-old schoolteacher with a big smile, as the sound of thunderous cannon fire played in the background. “We must know our history.”

Nationalism is nothing new in Turkey. Yet for much of the last century, it has meant rejecting the country’s Ottoman history. Today it means claiming it.

May 9, 2009
Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84

May 1, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.

May 8, 2009
An aspect of the misfortune to which Kerkuk region is exposed

An aspect of the misfortune to which Kerkuk region is exposed: Satellite Maps of 2002 is compared with maps of 2007

Date: May 05, 2009

No: Rep.9-E0509

In the early morning of Thursday 15 April 2009, the inhabitants of the oldest Kerkuk neighborhood, Musalla, were awakened by the sound of bulldozers destroying the wall and graves of the Seyyid Kızı part of the large Musalla Turkmen graveyard.[1] The Musalla graveyard is the oldest graveyard in Kerkuk and comprises thousands of graves including those of many celebrated Turkmen. Inhabitants flocked to the area, stopping the demolition before complaining to the police office. Nevertheless, about 15 graves were destroyed.

After investigation, it was found that an official contract was given by the chief of the Investment Commission of Endowments directorate of Kerkuk, a Kurd from Kerkuk, for the building of a commercial complex in that part of the graveyard.[2] The Commission director [3] is a Peshmerga Kurd brought from the province of Sulaymaniya during the distribution of senior posts between members of the Kurdish KDP and PUK political parties directly after occupation. The person who was given contract is a Kurd from Sulaymaniya province, too.

This is part of policy of the Kurdish political parties, who remain alone in administering Kerkuk since the occupation in 2003, to eradicate the Turkmen characteristics of the region in their attempts to Kurdify the province, control the huge oil reserve and annex it to the Kurdish region. The names of streets, bridges, villages and sub-districts were changed to Kurdish. The signboards inside governmental offices and hospitals were changed to Kurdish, even though a large part of the Kerkuk population cannot read it. Sculptures of prominent Kurds, such as, killed-Peshmerga militants, have also been erected on the streets.

In 2003, the first Kurds-dominated Kerkuk city council has dramatically Kurdified the administration, which was mainly distributed between the two Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK. Approximately 10,000 staff was appointed to Kerkuk governmental offices, of whom almost 80% were Kurds brought from Duhok, Sulaymaniya and Erbil. Security forces have been completely replaced by Kurds. They dominate the police system. Thousands of Peshmergas militants from other Kurdish regions are also distributed in Kerkuk province.

Kurdish political parties have also settled tens of thousands of Kurdish families in Kerkuk province. Kerkuk’s population, which was 870,000 at the day of occupation, became more than 1,300,000, [4] Moreover, more than 100,000 Arabs have either left Kerkuk or been expelled by the Kurdish Peshmerga militants. About thirty Arab villages in the south and south west Kerkuk was evacuated. The population of some Kurdish villages has been increased several-fold, for example, Kara Injir and Shuwan.

The incoming families have built on almost every piece of undeveloped land within Kerkuk city. [Table 1] Many large Kurdish neighborhoods and shopping centers have been erected, particularly to the east and north of Kerkuk city. [Map 1 and 2] The Kerkuk city area is increased about 20 km2 [Map 3]. These lands mostly belonged to Turkmen and also to municipality and government. The number of complaint cases which have been presented to the Property Claim Commission (PCC) in Kerkuk is about 40,000, about 80% of which are of Turkmen. The Kurdified administration of Kerkuk has continually hampered the decisions of the PCC. Today, about 20% of the cases are only completed. Many of those who win the decision of the PCC still could not get their lands.

UNAMI office in Kerkuk

The degree to which the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is involved in Kerkuk issues requires close monitoring of the situation in the province. Furthermore, UNAMI is going to make a historical decision on Kerkuk which is going to influence deeply all the Iraqi communities and the future of Iraq. Despite numerous calls for a UNAMI representation in Kerkuk from Arab and Turkmen groups, it was before about a year such a presence was established and it remains under resourced and challenged in meeting the requirements of the multifaceted Kerkuk crisis.

The UNAMI representative lacks a permanent staff, and staff members are frequently replaced with others and work only two or three days in a week. Rarely can two staff members be found at the same time. There is no bureau assigned for the UNAMI in Kerkuk. A room had been assigned to UNAMI staff during the meetings of the Kerkuk Article 23 Commission in the building of the Kerkuk governorate. At the time Arab and Kurd, but not Turkmen, translators were present – making Turkmen authorities worry about the accuracy of the translation of such historical negotiations.

Recommendations:

ü To the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

· Complete the institution of UNAMI office in Kerkuk and provide it with sufficient staff.

· Provide the office with experts in human rights, public relations, minority issues, urbanization engineers and international law.

· Provide a Turkmen – English translator

ü The Iraqi government

· Provide the requirements to the Kerkuk Article 23 Commission to enable the commissioners to realize their mission

· Realize the decision, which you made, to evacuate the governmental buildings in Kerkuk

· Replace Peshmerga militants with Iraqi army units throughout Kerkuk province

ü The Kurdish parties

· Abandon the inflexible policies to assist the solution of Kerkuk problem and facilitate the reconciliation processes which certainly quicken building of Democratic Iraq and establishment of regional stability.

ü The international civil society organizations: Human Rights Watch & Amnesty International

· Open offices in Kerkuk to closely observe the human rights situation and huge demographical changes [Map 1, 2 and 3] and publish regular reports

ü To the international community and authorities

· Actively support the decisions of Iraqi government and the Iraqi parliament, particularly, on Kerkuk, and provide or withdraw your support accordingly.

ü The Turkmen and Arab groups in Kerkuk

· Institute a well developed press office staffed with English speaking journalists to enlighten the international community about:

o Developments in Kerkuk issues, particularly, that of the Kerkuk commission

o The huge human rights violations since occupation, the dramatic demographic changes and the Kurdish domination of almost all power centers in Kerkuk

______________________________

References:

1. For centuries, Musalla graveyard is visited every Thursday by thousands of females of Kerkuk. Whilst such phenomenon shows the degree of importance which Kerkuk people give to the dead, at the same time, it is considered one of the very few social activities for females in such a conservative community.

2. Kurdish families had already built tens of houses at the east and north of Musalla graveyard.

3. It is well known that almost all the finances and lands which the directorate of endowments of Kerkuk province possesses have been donated by Turkmen.

4. The numbers of both the Kurds and the Turkmen, who had been exiled from Kerkuk province during the Arabification policies of Ba’ath regime, were 100,000 according to the United States Special Committee for Refugees and 120,000 according to the Human Rights Watch and the Kurdish parties. It should be known that a large number of the expelled Kurdish families were not born in Kerkuk, the came to Kerkuk from other Kurdish province.

Table No. 1. Estimated Turkmen, municipality and government lands which were appropriated by Kurdish militias and families after occupation

Numbers
Address

4.784.200 m2

Huge lands has been appropriated and built by Kurdish Peshmerga and Kurdish families:

ü 4.085.000 m2 Second Army Corps Complexes [Map No. 4 and 5]

ü 237.500 m2 Khalid Army center (Muasker Khalid)

ü 305.700 m2 East and North of Musalla Graveyard [Map No. 6 and 7]

ü 156.000 m2 Arasa Region

1,915 Houses
Houses of Army Corps opposite al-Hurriyya Airport:

ü 30 Houses (300m2 each house)

ü 30 Houses (300m2 each house)

ü 94 Houses (450m2 each house)

Officers Houses / opposite Army Corps:

ü 40 Houses (400m2 each house)

ü 23 Houses (400m2 each house)

Officers Houses / Hay al-Wasiti:

ü 122 Houses (400m2 each house)

Non commissioned Officer Houses / opposite Army Corps:

ü 124 Houses (170m2 each house)

ü 80 Houses (150m2 each house)

Army Flats / opposite Army Corps:

ü 48 Houses (170m2 each house)

The Houses of Military Bases / opposite al-Hurriyya Airport:

ü 39 Houses (600m2 each house)

ü 15 Houses (600m2 each house)

Houses of Store of foodstuffs

ü 120 houses

Houses built on 13800 M2 Lands facing Sahat al-Tayaran

ü 700 houses

Houses built near al-Shamal Garage in front of Suq al-Hasir

ü 200 houses

Houses built at the side of Gas al-Shamal and given to Kurdish families

ü 250 houses

21 buildings
Baath Party team Centers

ü al-Arapha (Nearby the Arapha market center) – 1 floor

ü Domiz Quarter / Behind the Dispensary by Kurdish Democratic Shabiba Union – 2 floors

ü Iskan Quarter by a Kurdish organization – 2 floors.

ü 7 Nisan by Kurdish families expelled from Kerkuk – 2 floors (300 m2)

ü Shahit Mahir Center by Kurdish Shabibat Babagurgur Center – 2 floors.

ü al-Nakhwa by Congress for the Freedom of Kurdistan / 2 floor

ü al-Hay al-Askeri – 1 floor

ü al-Qadisiyya al-Ula on the main street – 2 (375 m2)

ü al-Qadisiyya al-Thaniyya – 1 (348.66 m2)

ü Martyr Aoda in al-Qadisiyya al-Thaniyya 1 (359.36 m2)

ü al-Hurriyya al-Ula – 2 floors

ü al-Hurriyya al-Thaniya – 1 floor

ü Hay al-Nasr al-Ula (412.5 m2)

ü Hay al-Nasr al-Thaniyya – 2 floors

ü Hay al-Hujjaj – 1 floor

ü al-Uruba Quarter – 1 floor

ü al-Shorja – 2 floors

ü Hay Girnata – 1 (800m2)

ü Sakr al-Arab – 1 floor

ü 1 Mart – 2 floors

ü Hay al-Nidaa – 2 floors

15 buildings
Government Buildings: (Few of these buildings were evacuated)

ü General Security Directorate/close to Kerkuk Secondary School–4 floors

ü Building of store of Ministry of defense – 1 floors

ü al-Qudus Fidaiyyi Saddam Center in Hay al-Nur al-Thaniyya – 1 floor

ü al-Mansur Security Directorate – 1 floor

ü Military Guest Hose / Atlas Street 1 (800m2)

ü Mandhuma al-Sharqiyya Lial-Istithmarat – 2 floors

ü Kerkuk Recruitment (Tajnid) Directorate – 1 floor

ü Arapha Security Office -1 floor

ü Kerkuk Inspection (Jawazat) Directorate by Kurdish al-Taakhi Association – 1 floor.

ü Iraqi Women Union by under the same name by the Kurdish authorities – 2 floors.

ü Security Unit of Kerkuk/close to Directorate of agriculture by Kurdish Islamic Association–2 floors

ü Center of Jerusalem Army by Center of Kurdistan Democratic Party – 2 floors.

ü Workers Union Syndicate by Kurdish Workers Union and Faculty of Science – 3 floors.

ü Northern Center of Ba’ath Party Organizations by Kurdish Democratic Organizations/ Faili Kurds Foundation – 2 floors.

ü Building of store of foodstuffs

265 shops
215 shops were distributed to the Kurds at the Garage al-Hawija

12 complexes
Government complexes:

ü Both Kerkuk Physicians and Engineering clubs were occupied by the Kurdish Parties.

ü The Officer Housing complexes, which is turned into Kurdish Students Union Center includes:

· Officer Hosting department

· Officers Club

· Officer Market

ü The historical large Kerkuk Barracks, were taken by the Kurds and used as Kurdish Cultural Center.

ü Gunpowder Stores – several buildings

ü Scutcher

ü Directorate of municipalities

ü Directorate for social welfare in al-Wasiti neighborhood

ü The old large prison of Kerkuk,

ü Military Police complex in the center of the City. ± 0.5 x 0.5 km

ü The large Olympic Sports Complex in al-Shorja neighborhood.

ü National Kerkuk al-Sharika Sports Complex which is about 7 x 5 km2

ü Kerkuk Sports and Youth Complex by the Kurdistan Shabiba Union. ± 0.5 x 0.5 km

New Neighborhoods
Neighborhoods built by Kurds

1. Several Neighborhoods along the eastern border of Kerkuk city, which is about 25 kilometers. [Photo 1, 2 and 8]

2. Hundreds of houses on both sides of Leylan Road

3. Northern boundary of the city is extended about 10 km

4. Baghdad Road neighborhood behind the Festival Stadium, a public land appropriated by Kurdish families where they built ±100 houses.

5. Houses built in Hay al-Qadisiyya and Hay al-Askeri Neighborhoods.

6. Along both sides of the road (± 5Km) between Shorja and al-Qadiaiyya neighborhoods

7. Hundreds houses at the eastern side of the Musalla graveyard [Map 8]

8. Fifty houses behind the residential apartments on the football stadium Seyyid Kizi in Musalla neighborhoods

9. Sixty houses behind the old industry school in Musalla neighborhoods

10. 59 houses were built near the mosque Ashra al-Mubashshara and military account headquarters

11. 110 houses behind the police houses and in front of al-Amal al-Shaabi distributed to Kurdish families

12. Twenty Luxury houses of Domis distributed to Kurds – Korya side

13. Two hundreds Luxury houses of Domis distributed to Kurds – citadel side

14. Large number sporadic pieces of lands were built by Kurdish families inside the city

Enlarge the Map

SOITM
www.turkmen.nl

May 6, 2009