Turkish Forum

Category: Middle East

  • IRAN UPHEAVAL POSES DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE FOR ANKARA

    IRAN UPHEAVAL POSES DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE FOR ANKARA

    Yigal Schleifer 6/25/09

    Turkey seems to be searching for a proper response to the upheaval in Tehran. The Turkish public has greeted the crisis in Iran with a mix of indifference and confusion, while on the official side, Ankara is treading with extreme caution. Not wanting to possibly strain bilateral ties, Turkish officials are refraining from criticizing Iranian hardliners, or questioning the results of the country’s recent contested elections.

    “Iran has confused Turks,” Cengiz Candar, a political analyst and columnist for the daily Radikal, recently wrote. “They don’t know how they could deal with the situation in Iran, how they should react, or read [the situation].”

    The Turkish press has largely underplayed the story in Iran, for the most part offering scant coverage of what is taking place there. Some nationalist papers have accused those protesting the elections in Iran as being part of a Western plot to overthrow the Islamic Republic. A few outlets in Turkey’s Islamic press, meanwhile, have almost been dismissive of the protests in Iran, and the violent response to them. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

    At the same time, official statements coming out of Ankara have been cautious. “We must leave the discussion of the issue to the Iranians. We cannot intervene from the outside,” Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said in a recent interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel.

    Turkey’s liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has pursued a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy in recent years. As a result, contacts between Turkey and Iran have improved dramatically, with trade between the two countries last year reaching some $10 billion, up from $1 billion in 2000. Ankara and Tehran have also developed a certain degree of military cooperation in their mutual fight against Kurdish guerilla groups.

    In a recent column titled “Turkey Opts for Ahmadinejad,” Barcin Yinanc, a foreign affairs columnist for the English-language Hurriyet Daily News, suggested that for the sake of Turkish-Iranian relations, Ankara prefers “Ahmadinejad at the head of the Iranian government.”

    “Ahmadinejad is said to enjoy excellent relations with both President [Abdullah] Gul and Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan,” she wrote.

    “In fact, he is known to be an admirer of Erdogan, especially of his style — perhaps even more so after Erdogan walked off the stage during a meeting in Davos at which he had a harsh exchange of words with Israeli President Shimon Peres,” Yinanc continued. “But personal issues aside, Turkish officials believe the two countries enjoyed good relations during Ahmadinejad’s first term in office.” [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

    Erdogan and Gul were among the first leaders to congratulate Ahmadinejad, calling him a few days after his disputed landslide victory. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The quick congratulations offered by the Turkish leaders raised questions among Western and Middle Eastern diplomats about how closely the Turkish government had been paying attention to events in Iran, says Semih Idiz, an Ankara-based columnist with the daily Milliyet.

    “I think [the Turkish leadership] underestimated what was going on in Iran, and that is pretty strange considering we have a foreign minister who is supposed to be an expert in the region,” he said.

    Some analysts were especially surprised by some of the comments made by Davutoglu in his Spiegel interview, most notably when he said that “the emergence of very different interpretations of results after the election” in Iran should be taken “as a sign that the political process in Iran is very healthy.”

    Mustafa Kibaroglu, a professor of international relations at Ankara’s Bilkent University and an expert on Turkey-Iran relations, disputed the notion that Ankara’s actions in the wake of the Iranian elections reflected a lack of awareness.

    “I found it [the response] consistent with Turkey’s foreign policy behavior, in general, and AKP’s ’zero conflict’ foreign policy for the last six or seven years,” Kibarolglu said. “Turkey has always, at least on paper, promoted the principle that no country should interfere with another country’s affairs.”

    At the same time, Kibaroglu says, Ankara does not want to alienate Tehran. “Turkey needs to sustain and build the trust that is has developed in Iran,” he says. “Turkey, especially with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, only has one option, and that is the diplomatic option. Turkey thinks it may have a significant role, at some point, not at mediation, but maybe facilitating [discussions] between Iran and others.”

    He added that “Turkey still needs to be [seen as] an honest broker. If Turkey criticized the elections, it would raise serious questions in the minds of the Iranians if Turkey is still a friend.”

    Still, some critics of the government’s actions say its current Iranian policy, as realistic as it may be, may come at a cost. “There is no point to needlessly offending the Iranian powers-that-be since the safest bet is that they will manage to nip the green revolution at its roots,” Andrew Finkel, a columnist for the English-language newspaper Today’s Zaman, recently wrote. “At the same time, for the Turkish government to engage in such naked power politics is not a good investment for the future.”

     

    Editor’s Note: Editor’s Note: Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.

    Posted June 25, 2009 © Eurasianet

  • IRAN: AZERIS CAUTIOUS ABOUT SUPPORTING NATIVE SON MOUSAVI

    IRAN: AZERIS CAUTIOUS ABOUT SUPPORTING NATIVE SON MOUSAVI

    Shahin Abbasov 6/23/09

    Iran’s ethnic Azeri community numbers roughly 15-20 million, or almost a quarter of the country’s overall population. Most Azeris harbor deep feelings of resentment toward Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration in Tehran, and they are believed to have voted strongly for the aggrieved presidential challenger, Mir Hussein Mousavi, who is himself an Azeri from Tabriz. Even so, most Azeris remain unwilling to take an active part in the continuing battle for control of Iran’s social and economic agenda.

    Mousavi’s lackluster record on promoting civil rights for minority groups in Iran is the main reason why many Azeris are currently sitting on the sidelines. Iranian Azeris see little to gain from getting involved. Regardless of the outcome of the power struggle in Tehran and Qom, few Azeris expect that their quality of life will improve significantly.

    Yashar Hakkakpour, spokesperson for the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran, an unofficial organization based in Tabriz, explains that Azeri activists see no advantage to be gained from pushing for Mousavi, or opposing Ahmadinejad.

    “The Tehran-based organizations that back Mousavi do not report on the activists arrested in Azeri cities. Persian-language media ignores minorities. Why would Azeris support their cause?” asked Hakkakpour in a telephone interview from Van, Turkey. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

    “It does not mean that Azeris support the current regime,” he added. “They just do not see a big difference.”

    That situation, argues another activist, explains why the reaction to events by Azeris in Azerbaijan proper has been relatively muted. For example, there have been no pro-Mousavi protests staged outside the Iranian Embassy in Baku.

    One Tabriz-based Azeri cultural rights activist concurred with Hakkakpour. “We [ethnic Azeris] have decided not to interfere in the confrontation between the regime and Mousavi,” said the activist, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The activist pointed out that some prominent Mousavi backers today endorsed the use of coercive measures to contain Azeri protests in Tabriz and other cities in 2006. The protests erupted after an Iranian youth magazine published a cartoon in which an Azeri was depicted as a cockroach.

    While most Azeris may not feel inclined to publicly display support for Mousavi, some did take to the streets following the June 12 rigged presidential election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Media outlets in Azerbaijan reported that five people were killed and dozens injured in mass protests on June 13 and June 15 in Tabriz and Orumieh, the capitals of Iran’s East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces, respectively. [For additional information click here].

    In general, many areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities — not just East and West Azerbaijan, but also Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Khuzestan — have been quiet amid the post-election tumult in Tehran. Minority groups, including Azeris, Arabs, Kurds and Baluchis, have long resented systematic discrimination carried out by authorities in Tehran, in particular restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights. But they don’t see the present crisis as an opportunity to seek redress for their grievances.

    Hardliners in Tehran are doing all in their power to make sure ethnic minorities don’t become more active. The ethnic minority issue is a potential powder keg for Iran, and if it were to blow up at this time, it could completely alter the nature of the country’s power struggle. Just as hardliners have flooded Tehran with security forces, they have placed the regional capitals of ethnic minority enclaves under lockdown conditions. Hardliners also reportedly told the Mousavi camp that security forces would take drastic action if it appeared that the opposition was trying to stir up trouble among ethnic minority groups.

    During the presidential election campaign, both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad promised to expand civil rights for Azeris. Ahmadinejad, who claimed to speak Turkish, promised to allow Azeri-language classes in universities and schools, the Tabriz source told EurasiaNet. Mousavi, meanwhile, promised to designate Azeri as Iran’s second official language and to grant greater financial autonomy to Azeri-populated regions.

    But few Azeris treated these campaign pledges as anything more than empty rhetoric. “Every election, candidates come to Tabriz, Orumieh and other cities and make similar promises. However, once they win the elections, they immediately forget their promises,” Hakkakpour said.

    “Mousavi during his entire career has never shown concern about [Azeri language rights and pressure on ethnic Azeris] and there were no signs he is willing to bring changes,” added Agri Garadagli, an Azeri activist now living in exile in Baku as the spokesperson for the South Azerbaijani National Awakening Movement.

     

    Editor’s Note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. He is also a board member of the Open Society Institute-Azerbaijan.

    Posted June 23, 2009 © Eurasianet

  • Nabucco, an American piece for a European orchestra

    Nabucco, an American piece for a European orchestra

    19:37 24/06/2009

    MOSCOW. (Alexander Knyazev, director of the regional branch of the Institute of the CIS, for RIA Novosti) – The European Union and Turkey plan to sign an intergovernmental agreement on the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project on June 25 in Ankara.

    Why such a romantic name?

    “Nabucco” is an opera by Giuseppe Verdi based on a biblical story about the plight of the Jews as they are assaulted and subsequently exiled from their homeland by the Babylonian King Nabucco (Nebuchadnezzar). It is also an enchanting story of love and struggle for power.

    The latter element of the story is probably the only thing in common between the opera and the gas pipeline project initiated by U.S. President George W. Bush and based on some European and post-Soviet countries’ non-love of Russia, as well as the global battle for elbowing Russia out of the Eurasian gas market.

    Since Nabucco is mostly a political product, Turkey’s efforts to use its transit location to its best advantage are perfectly logical from the viewpoint of its national interests.

    Turkey will host a major portion of the 2,050-mile pipeline, which is to bring gas supplies from Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe without using Russian resources or territory.

    A consortium of six countries – Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Germany – was set up to build the pipeline to Central Europe via Turkey and the Balkans. The shareholders will finance one-third of expenditure, with the remaining part to be covered by international financial and credit organizations.

    The more than 3,300-km pipeline has been estimated at 7.9 billion euros ($10.7 billion) and will have an annual throughput capacity of 31 billion cubic meters. It is to be completed by 2013.

    However, technical calculations show that it cannot be commissioned sooner than in 2015; and that given the high and stable energy prices. The project is burdened with political risks and will run across a difficult geographical terrain.

    Europe, in truth, is encumbered by problems with energy delivery routes.

    A small Polish oil pipeline running from Odessa to Gdansk via Brody in Ukraine has long been incapacitated by Chevron’s inability to supply oil from the Tengiz deposit in Kazakhstan.

    Poland, which has been trying to break its dependence on Russian energy supplies, should now heave a sigh of relief, since supplies via Belarus are likely to shrink. The same goes for Lithuania whose oil refinery, Mazeikiu Nafta, that used Russian oil, has been idling since last year.

    If this is the energy freedom they wanted, then the two countries are paying an excessively high price for it. Europe’s efforts to solve its energy problems without Russia by importing energy resources from Central Asia are counterproductive – this is a fact. And the same is true of the Nabucco project.

    On the contrary, Russia’s South Stream project will have the guaranteed amount of natural gas, and its capacity can be subsequently increased. A recent agreement between Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s Eni stipulates increasing it to 63 billion cubic meters annually. Besides, Nabucco is unlikely to be competitive compared to Gazprom’s project in terms of prices.

    The Russian gas export monopoly plans to pay for the South Stream construction and gas distribution and to sell gas to end users in Europe at attractive prices.

    Gas for Nabucco is expected to come from Turkmenistan and possibly Iran. However, Russia has an agreement with Turkmenistan under which it buys all of its export gas, and Russia and Iran may veto the construction of any pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea.

    This means that Nabucco can receive gas only from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz deposit, but the probability of this is undermined by tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan over the recent thaw in Turkish-Armenian relations.

    In other words, Nabucco will have no reliable sources of natural gas in the near future.

    A pipeline partnership is unimaginable without stability and reliability, something the U.S. administration cannot ensure even to its taxpayers. And so, what does the U.S. administration have to do with the Nabucco project?

    Unlike the most naive part of the European establishment, the East European and other “democratic” media describe Nabucco not as a European economic or energy project, but as an American political venture.

    The chaotic chanting in support of the Nabucco project reminds me of the “Va, pensiero” chorus of Hebrew slaves from Verdi’s opera – beautiful yet altogether gloomy and hopeless.

     

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

  • Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

     

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 121
    June 24, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 23, the Turkish Parliament approved a motion that will authorize the government to renew the term of the Turkish peacekeeping force contributing to the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for one more year, effective from September 5. The parliamentary discussions preceding the vote demonstrate that differences remain between the governing AKP and the opposition parties in regards to their approaches to foreign policy.

    Reflecting its growing involvement in Middle Eastern politics, Turkey played an active role during the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. To pacify Lebanon following the Israeli military strikes, the U.N. Security Council enhanced the mandate of UNIFIL in August 2006 to undertake additional tasks, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping the Lebanese armed forces to expand its authority in the south (www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    European nations expressed an interest in fielding a peacekeeping force to prevent the destabilization of the entire region. Given the Turkish army’s experience in peacekeeping operations, and Turkey’s ties to both Israel and Arab nations, there emerged an expectation that Turkey could play a central role in this initiative. The participation of Turkey as a Muslim nation was seen as necessary in order to prevent the impression that the international force was seeking to impose a “Western” plan. It was even suggested that Turkey could lead the international force, on its own or jointly with France. Although Israel reportedly favored this idea, Hezbollah sources did not welcome it (Yeni Safak, June 25, 2006).

    Moreover, Turkish public opinion was strongly opposed to the participation of Turkish soldiers in such a controversial mission. Since this international force was perceived as a measure to contain Hezbollah, there were concerns that the Turkish forces might be forced to engage in armed conflict with Hezbollah militants, which might have complicated Turkey’s friendly relations with Arab states. Given the growing anti-American sentiments within Turkish society, this force was portrayed as an occupation force acting on behalf of Israel (Yeni Asya, August 14, 2006). Despite this domestic opposition, the government preferred to cooperate with the international community. It conducted a careful risk analysis, and the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul consulted other regional actors and the major political factions in Lebanon to gauge their reactions to any military deployment (Zaman, August 15, 2006; Aksam, September 3, 2006).

    As a compromise solution, Ankara agreed to contribute to the UNIFIL with non-combat units, and stressed that it would not participate in the demilitarization of Hezbollah. The Turkish Parliament approved the deployment in September 2006, following intense discussions. The opposition parties voted against the motion, but given its parliamentary majority, the AKP was able to obtain the necessary authorization (Turkiye, September 6, 2006). The Turkish contingent was deployed to Lebanon in October 2006 (Sabah, October 12, 2006), and the mandate of the force was renewed in 2007 and 2008. The Turkish armed forces have contributed patrol boats to the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and a military engineering company to assist the reconstruction efforts in Lebanon (www.tsk.tr; www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    As the mandate of the Turkish contingent expires in September, the government forwarded a motion to the parliament seeking an extension. Since the AKP’s recent foreign policy initiatives have encountered strong resistance from opposition parties, the fate of the motion was unclear. In another recent parliamentary debate, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), supported by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), literally waged a “war of attrition” to prevent the passage of a bill concerning mine clearance on the Turkish-Syrian border. The bill eventually passed after these delays, only after the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pressured the deputies from his party (EDM, May 21, 29, June 5).

    No major discussions emerged over the governmental motion extending the mandate of the Turkish contingent, which might be related to its forces not encountering any serious issues thus far. The CHP continued to approach the UNIFIL from a skeptical perspective. The CHP speaker maintained that the UNIFIL’s mission is not limited to the provision of humanitarian services and ensuring regional stability alone. Rather, its purpose is to provide conditions for a future military operation to “eliminate Hezbollah and… act as a shield to protect Israel in the event of such an operation.” He also maintained that despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s rhetoric on mending fences with Turkey, he has not been sensitive to Turkey’s interests in the Middle East, most importantly regarding the PKK issue. The MHP speaker praised the achievements of the Turkish force, but restated his criticism of the policies pursued by other international actors toward the Middle East. The opposition parties failed to oppose the government’s motion, but demanded that it act more assertively to protect Turkish interests vis-à-vis international actors -in particular the United States. In his address to parliament, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey’s contributions to Lebanon has to be discussed in the context of its new strategy of contributing to global and regional peace. Davutoglu maintained that, both through its soft power and military capabilities, “Turkey is playing an order instituting role” in its region (www.tbmm.gov.tr, June 23).

    Nonetheless, the parliamentary discussions highlighted the underlying divisions between the AKP and the opposition parties, over their positions on how to harmonize Turkey’s regional policies with those of other global actors. The opposition maintains a deep-rooted skepticism toward the agendas of international actors in the Middle East. In contrast, the AKP considers Turkey’s cooperation with the international institutions and Western nations as complementary to its own regional policies. As the AKP strives to promote the country’s regional power status, it triggers suspicions among some circles in the West that view this new policy as a departure from Turkey’s Western orientation. However, on the domestic front, the AKP’s concern not to challenge the interests of international actors, exposes it to criticism for failing to adequately protect its national interests. How Davutoglu manages this “double-challenge,” might prove a major test of his skills as a geostrategist.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-and-opposition-remain-divided-over-foreign-policy/
  • Israel’s New Ambassador to the U.S.

    Israel’s New Ambassador to the U.S.

    Calls Armenian Killings “Genocide”

    By Harut Sassounian

    Israel’s new Ambassador to the United States, Michael B. Oren, is a firm believer in the veracity of the Armenian Genocide, despite his government’s denialist position on this issue.

    Prior to his ambassadorial appointment, Oren repeatedly confirmed the facts of the Armenian Genocide in his writings. In the May 10, 2007 issue of the New York Review of Books, he wrote a highly positive review of Taner Akcam’s book: “A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility.” The review was titled: “The Mass Murder They Still Deny.”

    In his most recent book, “Power, Faith and Fantasy,” Oren made dozens of references to Armenia and Armenians, including lengthy heart-wrenching descriptions of the mass killings before and during the Armenian Genocide. Here are some of the most striking quotations from his book:

    “The buildup of Ottoman oppression and Armenian anger erupted finally in the spring of 1894, when Turkish troops set out to crush a local rebellion, but then went on to raze entire villages and slaughter all of their inhabitants…. Some 200,000 Armenians died — 20 percent of the population — and a million homes were ransacked. ‘Armenian holocaust,’ cried a New York Times headline in September 1895, employing the word that would later become synonymous with genocide.”

    Oren then went on to establish that more than a century ago, similar to today’s acrimonious political tug-of-war over the genocide recognition issue, the Armenian atrocities seriously affected U.S.-Turkish relations. He wrote: “Maintaining amicability with Turkey would prove complicated, however, because ties between the United States and the Porte [Sultan] had long been frayed. The perennial source of friction was the oppression of Armenian Christians. Though a band of modernizing Young Turks, many of them graduates of Roberts College, had achieved power in Istanbul in 1908 and promised equal rights for all of the empire’s citizens, barely a year passed before the slaughter of Armenians resumed. Some thirty thousand of them were butchered by Turkish troops in south-central Anatolia.”

    In a section titled, “The most horrible crime in human history,” Oren wrote: “The first reports, from December 1914, told of anti-Christian pogroms in Bitlis, in eastern Turkey, and the hanging of hundreds of Armenians in the streets of Erzerum. Armenian men between the ages of twenty and sixty were being conscripted into forced-labor battalions, building roads, and hauling supplies for the Turkish army. The following month, after their defeat by Russian forces in the Caucasus, Turkish troops salved their humiliation by pillaging Armenian towns and executing their Armenian laborers. In the early spring, Turkish soldiers laid siege to the Armenian city of Van in eastern Anatolia and began the first of innumerable mass deportations. The slaughter then raged westward to Istanbul, where, on April 24, security forces arrested and hanged some 250 Armenian leaders and torched Armenian neighborhoods. Interior Minister Talaat Pasha informed the Armenian Patriarch that ‘there was no room for Christians in Turkey’ and advised him and his parishioners ‘to clear out of the country.’”

    Oren then exposed Turkey’s attempts to falsify history by pointing out that: “Most contemporary observers agree that the massacres were scarcely connected to the war, but rather represented a systematically planned and executed program to eliminate an entire people. Indeed, foreshadowing the Nazi genocide of the Jews twenty-five years later, Turkish soldiers herded entire Armenian villages into freezing rivers, incinerated them in burning churches, or simply marched them into the deserts and abandoned them to die of thirst…. By the end of summer, an estimated 800,000 Armenians had been killed and countless others forcibly converted to Islam.”

    After citing numerous eyewitness accounts of the mass killings, Oren concluded: “In all, as many as 1.5 million Armenians were killed in a genocide that the Turkish government would never acknowledge, much less regret.”

    While it is true that Michael Oren published this book before his assignment as Ambassador to Washington, his compelling position on the Armenian Genocide would hopefully make him refrain from following the footsteps of his predecessors who shamefully lobbied against the congressional resolution on this issue.

    The appointment of a staunch supporter of the truth of the Armenian Genocide as Israel’s Ambassador to Washington comes on the heels of a serious rift between Turkey and Israel following the Gaza war earlier this year. On that occasion, there were major manifestations of anti-Semitic statements and acts throughout Turkey, including anti-Israeli remarks by Turkish Prime Minister Rejeb Erdogan. His insulting words to Israel’s President Shimon Peres in Davos, Switzerland, antagonized Israelis and Jews worldwide. Even though Israel downplayed Erdogan’s offensive words, they did a lasting damage to Israeli-Turkish relations.

    The combination of an Israeli government that is less sympathetic of Turkey and the presence of Israel’s Ambassador in Washington who is a firm believer in the facts of the Armenian Genocide may facilitate the passage of the pending congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide.

  • A CALL TO THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD

    A CALL TO THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD

    Turkistan Newsletter Mon, 22 Jun 2009 16:55:27
    Turkistan Bulteni ISSN:1386-6265
    Uze Tengri basmasar asra yer telinmeser, Turk bodun ilining torugin
    kem artati, udaci erti. [Bilge Kagan in Orkhon inscriptions]
    <<>><<>><>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><

    A CALL TO THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD

    There has been another vicious attack on the peaceful Turkmen people of Iraq.  On Saturday June 21, 2009, a truck bomb exploded in the busiest center of the town of Tuz Khurmatu (pop. 15000), 10 miles south of Kerkuk, at noon, killing more than 75 and wounding more than 200.

    This has been the latest in the chain of attacks against the Turkmens in
    Telafer, Kerkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and Amirli. Those attacks are particularly
    are directed upon the armless and defenseless Turkmens who are not allowed by the governing circles in Iraq to have any defense forces, where others have. The Iraqi police and army failed to stop these attacks in past and it will not be able to achieve that in the future.

    We are asking the President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, the Prime Minister, Mr.
    Maliki and all political parties and members of the Iraqi parliament, to
    allow the Turkmens their right to defend themselves and form the law
    enforcement units of each locality from the local Turkmens.  In small communities, local police members, usually recognize outsiders, who might be suspected terrorists.

    We in the Union of the Diaspora Turkmens (UDT) ask all the free peoples and
    organizations of the world to help us by putting pressure from their side,
    upon the Iraqi government and the parliament to grant the Turkmens their
    right to defend themselves and form the law enforcement units of each
    locality from the local Turkmens.

    Otherwise these tragedies and the human suffering will continue.

    UNION OF THE DIASPORA TURKMENS
    (UDT)
    [email protected]