Category: Middle East

Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 143

July 27, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Commenting on the recent controversial contacts between American diplomats and Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Turkey, Turkish government sources have confirmed that Ankara facilitated high-level talks, and maintains that the government in Baghdad was kept informed of these developments (Taraf, July 26). This highlights the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s earlier efforts to act as a peace broker between the conflicting parties to promote a comprehensive peace, and use its leverage in the region as an asset in its relations with the United States.

A representative from the political council for the Iraqi resistance told al-Jazeera that they held talks with American officials in Istanbul in March and May and signed a protocol on future talks. Although the spokesperson noted that these talks did not produce any practical results, he claimed that this document showed the acknowledgement of their legitimacy by the United States. The Iraqi government issued a written statement, describing the protocol as interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, and asking for a clear explanation from Washington and Ankara (New York Times, July 23). The State Department spokesperson acknowledged the meetings were part of American efforts to bolster political reconciliation, yet added that they took place with the knowledge of Iraqi officials. CNN also quoted an anonymous administration official who recognized the signing of “a protocol document with the group about logistics for the third round of talks” (www.cnn.com, July 24).

Although Iraqi government sources recognized such talks between American officials and Iraqi insurgents in the past, they were apparently troubled by the reported signing of a protocol. During Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to the United States, this development occupied a major part of his agenda. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari expressed his disappointment over this development. “How do you expect allies and friends of the government and the political process to meet and negotiate with parties that are accused of terrorism?” he asked. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she was informed about the talks only recently and argued that the State Department did not authorize the signing of a protocol. She gave assurances that Baghdad would be informed of such meetings in the future. In return, Maliki expressed his satisfaction with these guarantees (www.aljazeera.net, July 25).

As it later transpired, there was indeed a protocol, which was leaked to Iraqi Shiite newspapers (www.worldbulletin.net, July 24; Vatan, July 25). The protocol was signed anonymously by representatives from the American delegation, Iraqi resistance, and the Turkish delegation. Both sides recognized Turkey’s mediation efforts in future rounds of talks in the form of facilitating communication between the American delegation and the insurgents.

Speaking anonymously to the press, Turkish foreign ministry officials confirmed the talks had occurred, but emphasized that Turkey was playing a facilitator role and the initiative was undertaken by the American side. They expressed their surprise at the Iraqi government’s claim that they were not informed about the talks, noting that Maliki was aware of these developments before his trip to Washington (Taraf, July 26).

Indeed, Ankara has actively worked to integrate different Iraqi factions into the legitimate political processes in order to create a viable national system. As part of this policy, Turkey has had long-running relations with the Iraqi Sunni groups. Through its diplomatic initiatives, Turkey was instrumental in convincing the Sunni groups to participate in the December 2005 legislative elections in Iraq (Bugun, December 6, 2005). Likewise, Turkey is believed to have played a key role in convincing the Sunni groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda and former Baathist elements to resolve their differences and oppose al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities (ANKA, July 19, 2007).

Turkey’s connections with Sunni Arabs reportedly created anxiety among Shiite and Kurdish groups (Hurriyet, December 24, 2006). In the past two years, following a redefinition of Turkey’s Iraq policy, Ankara developed comprehensive ties with all Iraqi groups and formations in order to promote Turkey’s economic, energy and strategic interests in the country. The declarations issued following the meetings in February and April 2008 of the Turkish National Security Council laid the foundations of this new policy. Subsequently, Ankara first resumed dialogue with the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq in an attempt to resolve its own problems with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008). Moreover, Turkey also intensified its efforts to open dialogue with Shiite groups. Turkish diplomats and government officials met with Iraqi Shiite leaders and politicians, which culminated in the visit of the Iraqi radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to Istanbul in May of this year (EDM, May 5).

Turkey’s facilitation of these talks builds on the AKP government’s efforts to maintain dialogue with all Iraqi groups and encourage them to resolve their differences, as well as insisting on the need for the United States to communicate with all groups in Iraq. In that sense, this policy complements Ankara’s earlier initiatives to facilitate dialogue between Syria and the United States and Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Such efforts reflect Ankara’s perceptions of Iraq, which it views as a future partner, and a gateway to the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey has developed deeper commercial and strategic ties with Iraq, as reflected in its desire to bring Baghdad into the Nabucco project. However, Ankara fears that if political reconciliation cannot be accomplished, especially in the wake of the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, the country might descend into chaos and instability, with potentially serious consequences for its own security. Therefore, Ankara wants to ensure a stable transformation of the country through a comprehensive dialogue among the various groups. As the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has expressed on numerous occasions, the key to stability in Iraq depends on strengthening the capacity of its national institutions. In Davutoglu’s view, national institutions such as the army cannot be based on factions, but need to be built on a national identity, which requires a comprehensive national reconciliation (www.dunyabulteni.net, September 22, 2008).

https://jamestown.org/program/ankaras-facilitator-role-reflects-turkeys-broader-objectives-in-iraq/

July 28, 2009
Now It’s a Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart

Safin Hamed/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

BALLOT POWER Regional elections go forward in Iraq, but not a referendum on Kirkuk’s status.

By ROD NORDLAND

Published: July 25, 2009

BAGHDAD — When Iraqis were drafting their Constitution in 2005, the parties could not agree on who would control Kirkuk, the prized oil capital of the north. They couldn’t even agree on who lived in Kirkuk, which is claimed by the region’s Kurds, but also by its Turkmen minority and Sunni Arabs. For that matter, they couldn’t even agree on where Kirkuk was — in Tamim, Erbil, or Sulaimaniya Province.

Skip to next paragraph

Related

Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census (July 24, 2009)

Times Topics: Iraq

So the Iraqis punted, inserting Article 140, a clause that called for a national census, followed by a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, all to be held by the end of 2007. What followed were a succession of delays, against a backdrop of sectarian violence and warnings that Kirkuk could blow apart the Shiite-Kurdish alliance that has governed Iraq since the Americans invaded.

Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, warned two years ago that if “Article 140 is not implemented, then there will be a real civil war.” He’s still waiting.

But so is the threat of civil war, which lurked quietly in the polling places this weekend as residents of Iraq’s Kurdish-dominated areas voted for their regional president and Parliament. Until the status of Kirkuk is clear, nobody really knows how much power those regional officials can wield within the national government, or even whether the Kurds will want to remain part of Iraq.

The problem with settling that is the Kirkuk referendum. There can’t be a referendum until Iraqis figure out who is eligible to vote in Kirkuk, which they can’t do until there’s a census. And any attempt to hold a census in this country may well end up, all by itself, provoking a civil war.

Even now, Sunnis don’t agree that they’re a minority of the nation, and that the Shiites are the majority, though it’s patently obvious. And in Kirkuk, everyone is in denial, one way or another.

Ethnically mixed and awash in oil, Kirkuk has always been something of a numbers game. There are 10 billion barrels of proven oil reserves — 6 percent of the world’s total and 40 percent of Iraq’s — all within commuting distance of downtown Kirkuk. Its fields, though half destroyed, still produce a million barrels of oil a day.

Both Turkmen and Kurds claim to be in the majority; the last reliable estimates, from a 1957 census, gave Turkmen a plurality in the city and Kurds a plurality in the surrounding district, with Arabs second in the countryside and third in the city. In the Saddam Hussein years, the Kurds declared Kirkuk part of their autonomous region of Kurdistan, but the dictator sent the army after the Kurdish guerrillas, known as pesh merga, and held onto the prize. He then set about Arabizing it, forcibly relocating families from the south while evicting Kurds and Turkmen alike.

After 2003, pesh merga troops quickly took control of Kirkuk as the Iraqi Army collapsed. Some local Arabs revolted, nurturing an insurgency that still festers. Others simply remained. Meanwhile, Turkmen appealed to powerful patrons in Turkey that they were undercounted and ignored by everyone, and Turkey came to their aid to make sure the Kurds didn’t get Kirkuk, which supplies much of Turkey’s oil. Only the presence of American troops has kept a lid on things; a brigade is still kept in Kirkuk.

And still there is no census. “The Iraqi government for the last three years, every year they say it will come this year,” says Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of Parliament.

A date for a census is on the calendar — Oct. 24. But it is subject to ratification by Iraq’s cabinet, the Turkmen have announced that they will boycott it and Arabs in Kirkuk may well do the same.

One proposal for getting past this problem would be to hold a census everywhere but in Kirkuk. If that happened Kirkuk could end up, in effect, a disenfranchised province when the next general national elections are held in January.

Another suggestion is to hold a referendum on Kirkuk without a census, but that would invite a dispute about the validity of the results.

And then there’s the Lebanese solution, the one that so far seems likeliest: just do nothing. The last census in that sectarian hodge-podge of a country was in 1932; no one would dare hold one now, since the groups who would almost certainly lose representation — Maronite Catholics, Druze and Sunni Muslims — would simply go back to war rather than get counted out.

Already, the Kurdish regional government has been defying Baghdad and issuing contracts to develop its oil fields, including some in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government showed its displeasure by moving its 12th Division, some 9,500 troops, up to Kirkuk; there they have been provocatively patrolling into pesh merga-held areas and setting off a series of minor incidents recently.

“It’s very worrisome that these incidents continue to happen,” said Joost Hilterman, of the International Crisis Group. “Perhaps they will be contained, but the stakes are huge.”

For the moment, there are still plenty of American troops around to do the containing, but all American combat troops are due to pull out by next summer. That doesn’t leave a lot of time to broker an agreement, especially when no one is likely to really want it.

Abeer Mohammed contributed reporting.

Sign in to RecommendNext Article in Week in Review (7 of 9) » A version of this article appeared in print on July 26, 2009, on page WK4 of the New York edition.

July 27, 2009
Can Cyprus be a model for Middle East peace?

Analysis: Can Cyprus be a model for Middle East peace?

As he toured a series of European capitals in May, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told his audience at a dinner party in Rome that he believed Cyprus – which was divided between its Greek and Turkish citizens in 1975, after years of bloodshed – was a fitting model for ending the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Turkish soldier opens door in temporary wall by UN buffer zone on Turkish-Cypriot side of Nicosia. Photo: AP

“We’re interested in this,” Lieberman said. “In Cyprus, it was the same situation as in Israel. Greeks and Turks were living together, and there was friction and tension and bloodshed.”

Greeks and Turks did live together, for hundreds of years, on the island, but Ottoman and later British rule kept a lid on violence between the sides. When the British left in 1960, the groups united in what was then called the Republic of Cyprus.

But in 1963, the Turks were pushed out of that government, and the following 11 years were marked by incessant violence. The Turks say that Greek actions in their towns and villages constituted nothing less than a coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing.

On June 20, 1974, five days after a Greek Cypriot coup d’etat on the island, the Turkish army intervened – or invaded, depending on whom you ask – and pushed Greek forces back to the southern part of the island. A year later, the UN oversaw a population transfer – Greeks to the south and Turks to the north – completing the separation that lasts to this day.

And it was precisely this separation, Lieberman said, which had brought about peace and prosperity there. Now, he claimed in May, the Netanyahu government was basing its approach on the model provided by Cyprus.

But is Cyprus really a good example?

While the Greeks enjoy stability and international recognition, they continue to view the north as “occupied territory” that was “illegally invaded” by Turkey in 1974. Their motivation for a comprehensive agreement has been less robust than the Turks’, if only because they don’t need an agreement as much as do their neighbors to the north.

The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus goes unrecognized by every nation in the world except for Turkey, and has tough international restrictions on investors and developers that has local restaurants such as “Burger City” and “Pizza Hat” filling in for their original counterparts – since Burger King and Pizza Hut are not allowed to open branches, due to international embargoes.

Greece continues to use its EU membership and international weight to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from gaining international recognition, which would, first and foremost, allow the Turkish Cypriots to open their air and sea ports to international flights, a development that would render North Cyprus a formidable competitor for the island’s main source of income, tourism. As of now, every flight into the north must come from Turkey.

Greek Cypriots are unsatisfied with the current situation, but have a Western standard of living that allows them to wait, while Turkish Cypriots decry their international isolation as unbearable. And while both sides have been negotiating a comprehensive agreement for years, it remains unattainable, for now.

Therefore, another problem with Lieberman’s argument is that Cypriots themselves view their situation as a temporary one. Separation is viewed as a means to achieving a final, comprehensive agreement, not the end of the conflict.

While that agreement has historically been viewed through the prism of federation, an increasing number of Turkish Cypriots are awakening to the reality that such a deal could see Greek Cypriots return to the Turkish part of the island en masse, effectively ending Turkish autonomy there through demographics – an Israeli equivalent to a one-state solution.

Speaking to The Jerusalem Post at a reception on Monday evening to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the 1974 Turkish “Peace Operation,” Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat said, “Maybe your foreign minister was referring to the fact that there has been no violence here since 1974.

“With that I agree with him. But the central goal in North Cyprus is federation.”

But when asked how Turkish demographic integrity would be maintained after federation, Talat said, “[Greek Cypriots] will be able to come here, but with restrictions. They will not be able to settle here freely.”

Not only are Cypriots’ wishes regarding their political fate different from those of Israelis and Palestinians, their conflict remains unresolved.

So could the Cyprus model be an example for Israel? And if so, is Lieberman referring to a 35-year-old military standoff as his vision for ending the conflict? Or is it simply a separation of two peoples, in which one is recognized, and the other is not?

Source: www.jpost.com, Jul 26, 2009

July 27, 2009
Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 141

July 23, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a one-day visit to Syria, which involved discussions on Turkey’s mediator role between Israel and Syria. Erdogan and the Syrian President Bashar Assad discussed bilateral relations, regional developments and Turkey’s peacemaking role in the region. Assad requested Turkey’s mediating services and Erdogan announced Ankara’s readiness to facilitate the Israeli-Syrian talks. They also agreed to initiate a “high-level strategic council” to bolster economic, political and cultural ties. Moreover, Erdogan addressed a large audience at the University of Aleppo, where he was warmly received. He praised the normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus and argued that there is a need to address other problems in the region. He called for the re-launching of Israeli-Syrian talks on the basis of the restoration of Syria’s rights (www.cnnturk.com, July 22).Turkish diplomats facilitated indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli delegations, which appeared to be the most viable effort in recent years. Following Israel’s offensive against Gaza in late December, its relations with both Syria and Turkey became more strained. Syria suspended talks with Israel to protest against Israel’s military action. Ankara’s growing criticism toward Tel Aviv and the severing of their bilateral ties also led to questions over Turkey’s role, as Israel’s government had reportedly lost trust in Ankara and questioned its future as an impartial peace broker (EDM, January 30). As a result, these indirect talks moderated by Turkey came to a premature end.

Erdogan’s visit came against the background of renewed international efforts to refocus on the stalled peace process in the Middle East. The United States and European countries have intensified their work recently to bring Israel and Syria to the negotiating table, but substantial differences remain between both parties. Syria wants to start negotiations on the precondition that the Golan Heights will be returned. Assad earlier maintained that the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was willing to return the Golan Heights in full. “Only when he declared this to Erdogan did we start the indirect talks,” Assad added. However, he blamed the breakdown in the talks on Israel’s unwillingness to commit to an agreement on the definition of borders. He also expressed his willingness to see a more proactive U.S. involvement in the issue (www.ynetnews.com, March 25).

U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell visited Israel and Syria in an effort to resume peace talks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered to start the talks without preconditions, meaning he would not “commit in advance to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.” Mitchell relayed this message to Assad, who rejected it and emphasized that the talks should start from the point at which they were suspended. Asad underlined that an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be the basis of any future talks. Whereas Assad conveyed to Mitchell his willingness to resume indirect talks under Turkish mediation, Netanyahu reportedly opposed this proposal by pointing to Ankara’s position during the Gaza crisis (Haaretz, June 21).

In contrast to Syria, Israel wants to avoid opening any talks based on the precondition of withdrawal. Moreover, the Israeli side constantly emphasizes that as long as Damascus does not end its support for Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel will have difficulties in commencing negotiations with Syria (Jerusalem Post, July 20).

Fred Hof, an adviser to Mitchell, also held talks in the region last week, but reportedly he could not convince the two parties to change their positions (Hurriyet Daily News, July 22). Since that trip came on the eve of Erdogan’s visit, the Turkish press speculated that Hof was gauging the parties’ interest in Turkish mediation (Sabah, July 20). Mitchell is also scheduled to visit the region later this week (www.state.gov, July 20).

It is difficult to establish whether Erdogan’s visit was indeed planned in accordance with American diplomatic contacts, but there is a growing convergence between Turkish and American initiatives. Since Mitchell’s visit to Turkey (EDM, March 2), the need for coordinated action between Ankara and Washington toward the Middle East has been emphasized by both sides. During his visit to Turkey, President Barack Obama also acknowledged Ankara’s role in the region and heralded a new era of cooperation between the two countries, which he called a “model partnership” (EDM, April 7).

However, such abstract titles require more concrete definition, and Ankara perceives its mediator role as a means to revitalize its relations with Washington and give substance to the new era of partnership. Through its new openings in the Middle East, Ankara has developed important diplomatic assets to address the challenging issues in the region. As one Turkish scholar, Bulent Aras, points out, through its constructive role in the Palestine and Syria issues, Turkey can not only facilitate a solution but also make the “model partnership” a reality (Sabah, May 27).

For Ankara, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, among other factors, depends on the resolution of Israel’s twin problems with the Palestinians and Syria, and the integration of Damascus within the international community. In Ankara’s view, given Damascus’s deep rooted connections and leverage in the region, Syria holds a key role for developing stability in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. For instance, in Ankara’s view, without resolving Israeli-Syrian relations in a manner that is agreeable to all parties, and ending the diplomatic isolation of Damascus, it will not be easy to limit the perceived influence of Iran over Damascus.

How Israel will respond to Turkey’s renewed mediation offer remains to be seen, particularly considering that Erdogan appeared to support Damascus’s position on the restoration of Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Since his appointment as Obama’s special envoy to the region, Mitchell has held talks with Turkish officials and heard Ankara’s perspective and concerns on this issue. It will be interesting to observe if he will now exert pressure on Tel Aviv to give the Turkish mediation efforts another chance.

https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-offers-turkish-mediation-in-israeli-syrian-talks/

================================

ONE MINUTE’E RAGMEN TURKIYE’NIN KAPISINDA
Thursday, 23 July 2009 08:30
ISRAIL’DEN TURKIYE’YE YENI RICA

El Vatan Gazetesi, Turk Diplomatlarina Dayanarak “Israil’in Turkiye’den Suriye ile Gorusmelerinde Araci Rolunu Yeniden Ustlenmesini Istedigini” Yazdi.

Israil’in Turkiye’den Suriye ile gorusmelerde araci rolunu yeniden ustlenmesini istedigi one suruldu.

Katar’da yayimlanan El Vatan gazetesi, Turk diplomatlarina dayanarak Israil’in, Turkiye’den Suriye ile gorusmelerinde yeniden araci olmasini istedigini” yazdi.
El Vatan, Turk diplomatik kaynaklarina dayandirdigi haberinde Basbakan Recep Tayyip Erdogan’in, Suriye-Israil gorusmelerinde yeniden aracilik yapmaya baslamasi yonunde aldigi taleplerin Kudus’ten kaynakladigini belirtti.

Israil basinina da yansitilan haberde Erdogan’in Suriye ziyareti sirasinda Devlet Baskani Besar Esad’a Turkiye’nin yeniden aracilik yapmasi icin talepler aldigini anlattigi belirtilirken, Erdogan’in Esad’a bu yondeki mesajlarin icerigi konusunda bilgi verdigi kaydedildi.

Bu arada ayni kaynaklarin, Erdogan’in Turkiye’nin, Gazze operasyonunun ardindan Israil ile iliskilerinde ortaya cikan krizi asmayi basardigini, Suriye ve Israil’in Ankara’nin araciligina guvenmeyi surdurdugunu soylediklerine de dikkat cekildi.

Turk diplomatik kaynaklarinin, barisin saglanmasinin Suriye, Israil, ABD’nin yanisina Turkiye icin bir ihtiyac haline geldigini ifade ettiklerine isaret edilen haberde Ankara’nin, dort turu yapilan, Israil ile Suriye arasinda dolayli gorusmelerde dogrudan muzakerelere gecilmesi icin gerekli temeller atildigi, bu nedenle Kudus ile Sam arasinda barisa daha kolayca varilabilecegine inandigi da ifade edildi.

Cabalarin yeniden baslanmak istemesinde diger bir faktorun de Suriye’de faaliyet gosteren buyuk Turk sirketlerinin kalici istikrara olan ihtiyaclarinin da oldugu one suruldu.

July 23, 2009
Did Israel Sign a Deal With Turkey to Import Water?

by Zalman Nelson

(IsraelNN.com) A letter sent by the Israeli non-profit group for ethical government, Ometz, to State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss, calls for a review of a 2004 deal to import 50 million cubic meters of drinking water of from Turkey’s Mangabey River. According to Ometz, Israel paid an undisclosed deposit on the 20-year agreement, which comes with an option for five more years, but the project never began.

Israel’s dwindling water supply, which prompted the Water Authority’s recently launched “Drought Tax” on high water use, has brought to light the water importing-deal signed with Turkey.

“Due to the tremendous water shortage and the increased fines imposed on Israeli citizens, Ometz is calling for a review of the water agreements signed between Israel and Turkey. Israel has already paid unknown amounts for the deal, but there is no water,” wrote Ometz Director Aryeh Avneri.

According to the letter by Ometz, the terms of the agreement established a sale price of up to $1 per cubic meter of water: 13-18 cents per cubic meter and 60-80 cents per cubic meter for import and distribution. Given Israel’s water needs, an estimated 50 million dollars a year was to be paid to Turkey. While a deposit was apparently paid, the letter alleges that the deal was never launched.

The water deal was signed by the foreign ministers of Israel and Turkey and called for the importation of 50 million cubic meters of drinking water, says the letter. “Carrying out this agreement is the duty of Israel’s Water Commission and Turkey’s Water Authority (DSI), and the governments of Israel and Turkey bear collective responsibility for ensuring that all agreements are followed.”

Ometz’s letter challenges that the deal failed to establish a timetable for delivery and failed to appoint a director for the project.

“We turn to you and request a full investigation into this signed agreement to import water, why this program has still not yet started, and what amount of money, if any, remains to pay to begin importing,” Ometz wrote Lindenstrauss.

Water tax
The water tax imposes an NIS 20 fine per cubic meter of water on families containing four or fewer members who use more than 30 cubic meters of water in two months. Exceeding the quota cost NIS 8 per cubic meter prior to the tax. Families with more than four members get an additional three cubic meters per family member.

The tax went in to effect retroactively on July 1 and was criticized by local government councils who said that citizens will be unable to limit water usage. Others criticized the tax on the grounds that the added revenues do not return to the water industry, but rather are drawn into the Finance Ministry’s bank account.

Source: www.israelnationalnews.com

July 23, 2009
Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 138

July 20, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

On July 16-17, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited Turkey to hold talks on Middle East peace initiatives and discuss bilateral relations with Turkey. Abbas met President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. This came amidst speculation that he had supported the Greek Cypriot position on the Cyprus issue. On July 8-9, Abbas met the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias. The two leaders supported each other’s stance on international issues. Citing Greek media sources, the Turkish press maintained that Abbas had expressed his support for the Greek Cypriot position on the Cyprus issue (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 9). Some Turkish media outlets interpreted this attitude as a betrayal and disrespect for Turkey’s earlier support for the Palestinian cause. “Abbas stabbed [Turkey] in the back,” one nationalist newspaper claimed (Yeni Cag, July 10).

The Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Palestinian Ambassador, Nabil Maarouf, following such news coverage on the issue. Maarouf told Turkish officials that he had investigated the reports by contacting Abbas’ spokesperson and other Palestinian officials. Maarouf said that “Abbas did not make those statements. As a matter of fact, this issue was not even on the agenda. [Palestinians] were never involved in the Cyprus issue and will maintain this attitude” (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 10). On the same day, Maarouf issued a separate statement in which “he reiterated his remarks at the ministry, [and added that] Abbas’ visit to Cyprus was planned one year ago” (Today’s Zaman, July 13). Nonetheless, a statement issued by Christofias after meeting Abbas read: “I wish to warmly thank President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority for their firm and consistent stance in supporting the struggle of the people of Cyprus and the position of the Republic of Cyprus both within the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Arab world in general, as well as internationally” (www.mfa.gov.cy, July 9).

Nationalist media outlets continued their criticism of Abbas, ahead of his visit (Yeni Cag, July 14). Abbas therefore tried hard to diffuse tensions in Ankara. During his joint press conference with Gul, Abbas firmly denied these claims, and described the media reports as groundless. He also responded to another allegation about himself, which was raised by Fatah sources last week. A Fatah official claimed that Abbas was involved in a conspiracy with Mossad and the CIA, which resulted in the killing of Yasser Arafat (www.israelnationalnews.com, July 14). These reports also led to an intensive debate in the Turkish media, ahead of the visit by Abbas (Milli Gazete, July 16). He reiterated his rejection of those accusations in Ankara, arguing that the document that allegedly supported those claims was circulating on Israeli websites (Hurriyet, July 18).

Gul emphasized Turkey’s official position that the two-state solution should be the basis of the efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue. He reiterated Ankara’s support for an independent Palestinian state, which would have East Jerusalem as its capital. He called on Israel to stop building new settlements and lift the blockade to allow for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the flow of humanitarian aid (www.tccb.gov.tr, July 17).

In response to one question, Gul expressed Turkey’s objection to a plan suggested earlier by the E.U.’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Solana maintained that if both sides could not reach a solution within a designated period, the U.N. Security Council should endorse the two-state solution and open the way for the recognition of Palestine by the international community (Jerusalem Post, July 12). Gul noted that Turkey would not support efforts for the resolution of the problem which were not approved by all sides. Gul maintained that imposing a non-consensual solution would not prove beneficial and might be harmful. Turkey is ready to support a roadmap toward a Palestinian state, provided that it comes as a result of consensus, Gul added (www.tccb.gov.tr, July 17).

Abbas also exchanged opinions with Davutoglu on the Middle East. They discussed specific areas in which Turkey could help the Palestinian administration. It was announced that Turkey will release part of the $150 million aid which it had pledged at the Paris conference to relieve the financial burden of the cash-strapped Palestinian authority. Abbas solicited Turkey’s help for building Palestinian state institutions and constructing infrastructure for education and health services as well as creating jobs. Toward this end, Turkey pledged to build a university hospital, a new industrial zone and a conference hall. Moreover, Turkey will help with the infrastructure of Palestinian television and support the foundation of a diplomatic academy in Palestine (Anadolu Ajansi, July 17).

Davutoglu also emphasized another important pillar of Turkey’s policy toward the Palestine issue: a permanent and sustainable solution to the problem can only emerge as a result of a consensus between the Palestinian factions. He asked Abbas to conclude the talks on the formation of a national unity government soon, and confirmed Ankara’s support for the dialogue between Palestinian groups mediated by Egypt. Turkey and the Palestinian authority also reportedly agreed to form a joint committee to discuss developments within the peace process (www.cnnturk.com, July 18). In a related development, Egyptian diplomatic sources mediating the talks between Hamas and Fatah reportedly asked the parties to reach a consensus on a unity government by August 25. Since the talks reached deadlock because of the parties’ refusal of an earlier proposal, the Egyptian side suspended their mediation efforts (Cihan, July 19).

Turkish officials managed to put the unpleasant news stories aside and “talk business” with Abbas, in an effort to make a contribution to achieving peace in the Middle East. Official statements demonstrated once again the underlying principles of Turkey’s approach to the Palestinian issue. In Ankara’s view, third parties should only play a facilitator role and refrain from excluding the major stakeholders. It is for these reasons that Turkey seeks to interject itself as peace broker between the Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand, and among the Palestinians on the other. Although those policies frequently lead to the criticism that Turkey is following a pro-Hamas position, Ankara appears determined to maintain dialogue with all parties and refuse any call to exclude Hamas.

https://jamestown.org/program/palestinian-president-abbas-visits-ankara/

July 21, 2009