Category: Middle East

Turkey leads the Muslim world
Ankara has healed relations with and between its neighbours. But it cannot bring itself to be diplomatic with Israel
- Stephen Kinzer
  
  guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 27 October 2009 17.00 GMT
  
  Article history
This week’s visit to Iran by the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is to be warmly welcomed. Turkey is playing a highly positive new role in the Middle East. It seeks to be a conciliator, a mediator, a peacemaker. Reaching out to Iran is an ideal way for it to play this role.

Turkish leaders have spent several years pursuing a goal they call “zero problems with neighbours“. They have been highly successful. Turkey is on good terms with Greece, Bulgaria and Iraq. As for Syria, with which it almost went to war a decade ago, visa requirements have been abolished, and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted in Aleppo earlier this month that the two countries share “a joint destiny, a joint history and a joint future”. This came just days after Turkey’s highly promising breakthrough with Armenia, under which their border is to be reopened and diplomatic relations restored after a 16-year break.

Now Turkey is moving to a second, even more ambitious stage of its regional policy: “no problems between neighbours.” Its leaders realise that Turkey’s future prospects depend on regional stability, and are actively seeking to resolve disputes in the neighbourhood. Because of its size, its economic power, its history and its well-developed though still incomplete democracy, Turkey is uniquely placed to be both a model and a broker.

For most of Turkey’s modern history, the Muslim world has seen it as an apostate. Atatürk’s reforms pulled it so far from Islam that it seemed to have no religious legitimacy. Besides, it was perceived as Washington’s lackey, stigmatised by its embrace of American policies that many Muslims found abhorrent.

Neither of those objections applies to Turkey today. It is governed by pious Muslims and has its own foreign policy. Its leaders are warmly welcomed in many places where, in the past, they would not even have cared to visit.

Under other circumstances, Egypt, Pakistan or Iran might have emerged to lead the Muslim world. Their societies, however, are weak, fragmented and decomposing. Indonesia is a more promising candidate, but it has no historic tradition of leadership and is far from the centre of Muslim crises. That leaves Turkey – which, by happy coincidence, is eager to play this role.

One dark spot, however, has emerged to blot this happy picture. Turkey has begun to distance itself from Israel. This month it cancelled its participation in a joint military manoeuvre with the Israeli defence forces. Its leaders speak out angrily against Israeli policies – most notably prime minister Erdoğan, who at this year’s Davos conference denounced Israel’s invasion of Gaza as a “crime against humanity”. One of the region’s most important relationships is fraying.

Turkish leaders are allowing emotion to affect their attitude toward Israel. They are understandably angry over Israeli misdeeds. If Turkey is to be a bridge among nations, though, it cannot afford gratuitously to alienate any. The United States has brought itself much grief by isolating Iran; it would be just as foolish for Turkey to reject Israel.

Like Iran, Israel is a pariah in many circles, and is frozen out of Middle East security arrangements. This is bad for all parties. Pushing Israel into a corner, or making Israel feel that it is alone and friendless, does not serve the cause of peace.

Turkey has a history of excellent relations with Jews, and was one of the first countries to recognise Israel. Turning its back on that legacy, as it has apparently begun to do, contradicts its new diplomatic role as a broker of compromise. The contribution Turkey can make by playing that role is far greater than the feel-good effect of lashing out emotionally at Israel’s excesses.

For Turkey to strengthen ties with Iran is good – as long as it does not turn its back on the United States. For it to cultivate relations with Hamas and Hezbollah is also good – but not if it breaks with Israel. Turkey shows unique promise as a regional peacemaker. To play that role, however, it must follow a cardinal rule that the US has for years ignored: shape foreign policy according to national interest, not emotion.
October 31, 2009
Turkey: An Ally No More

by Daniel Pipes
Jerusalem Post
October 28, 2009

the Middle East Forum, headed by Daniel Pipes

The foreign ministers of Turkey and Syria met in Aleppo in October 2009.

“There is no doubt he is our friend,” Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, says of Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even as he accuses Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman of threatening to use nuclear weapons against Gaza. These outrageous assertions point to the profound change of orientation by Turkey’s government, for six decades the West’s closest Muslim ally, since Erdoğan’s AK party came to power in 2002.

Three events this past month reveal the extent of that change. The first came on October 11 with the news that the Turkish military – a long-time bastion of secularism and advocate of cooperation with Israel – abruptly asked Israeli forces not to participate in the annual “Anatolian Eagle” air force exercise.

Erdoğan cited “diplomatic sensitivities” for the cancelation and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu spoke of “sensitivity on Gaza, East Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque.” The Turks specifically rejected Israeli planes that may have attacked Hamas (an Islamist terrorist organization) during last winter’s Gaza Strip operation. While Damascus applauded the disinvitation, it prompted the U.S. and Italian governments to withdraw their forces from Anatolian Eagle, which in turn meant canceling the international exercise.

As for the Israelis, this “sudden and unexpected” shift shook to the core their military alignment with Turkey, in place since 1996. Former air force chief Eytan Ben-Eliyahu, for example, called the cancelation “a seriously worrying development.” Jerusalem immediately responded by reviewing Israel’s practice of supplying Turkey with advanced weapons, such as the recent $140 million sale to the Turkish Air Force of targeting pods. The idea also arose to stop helping the Turks defeat the Armenian genocide resolutions that regularly appear before the U.S. Congress.

Ministers of the Turkish and Syrian governments met at the border town of Öncüpınar and symbolically lifted a bar dividing their two countries on October 13.

Barry Rubin of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya not only argues that “The Israel-Turkey alliance is over” but concludes that Turkey’s armed forces no longer guard the secular republic and can no longer intervene when the government becomes too Islamist.

The second event took place two days later, on October 13, when Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem announced that Turkish and Syrian forces had just “carried out maneuvers near Ankara.” Moallem rightly called this an important development “because it refutes reports of poor relations between the military and political institutions in Turkey over strategic relations with Syria.” Translation: Turkey’s armed forces lost out to its politicians.

Thirdly, ten Turkish ministers, led by Davutoğlu, joined their Syrian counterparts on October 13 for talks under the auspices of the just-established “Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council.” The ministers announced having signed almost 40 agreements to be implemented within 10 days; that “a more comprehensive, a bigger” joint land military exercise would be held than the first one in April; and that the two countries’ leaders would sign a strategic agreement in November.

The cover of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book, “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position.”

The council’s concluding joint statement announced the formation of “a long-term strategic partnership” between the two sides “to bolster and expand their cooperation in a wide spectrum of issues of mutual benefit and interest and strengthen the cultural bonds and solidarity among their peoples.” The council’s spirit, Davutoğlu explained, “is common destiny, history and future; we will build the future together,” while Moallem called the get-together a “festival to celebrate” the two peoples.

Bilateral relations have indeed been dramatically reversed from a decade earlier, when Ankara came perilously close to war with Syria. But improved ties with Damascus are only one part of a much larger effort by Ankara to enhance relations with regional and Muslim states, a strategy enunciated by Davutoğlu in his influential 2000 book, Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (“Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position”).

In brief, Davutoğlu envisions reduced conflict with neighbors and Turkey emerging as a regional power, a sort-of modernized Ottoman Empire. Implicit in this strategy is a distancing of Turkey from the West in general and Israel in particular. Although not presented in Islamist terms, “strategic depth” closely fits the AK party’s Islamist world view.

As Barry Rubin notes, “the Turkish government is closer politically to Iran and Syria than to the United States and Israel.” Caroline Glick, a Jerusalem Post columnist, goes further: Ankara already “left the Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis.” But official circles in the West seem nearly oblivious to this momentous change in Turkey’s allegiance or its implications.

The cost of their error will soon become evident.

Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.

October 29, 2009
IRAN: NUCLEAR BOMBS ARE ILLICIT

Salihi said; “I am declaring this to the beloved Turkish nation that I do love dearly with all my sincerity. We are not producing nuclear bombs because that is illicit and is not to our benefit.”

LET US SUPPOSE THAT WE DO HAVE A BOMB WHERE ARE WE TO USE IT

It is profoundly illogical for Iran to produce a nuclear bomb. I am saying this very openly, without any hesitation: If Iran were to believe that producing a nuclear bomb would be to its benefit, it would produce it and would never keep it a secret. Iran would not be ashamed of that. But we have decided that it does not comply with the defence doctrine of our country. Let us assume that we do have a nuclear bomb, please recount to us where are we to use it? Are we going to go and hit Israel with it? Israel simlply means the USA. Who would be able to cope with the nuclear power of the USA? We are utterly reasonable people.

In Turkish;

[ İran’ın nükleer programının asli sorumlusu, İran Atom Ajansı’nın (AEOI) yeni başkanı Dr. Ali Ekber Salihi, nükleer programla ilgili bütün iddialara cevap verdi. Salihi, “Çok sevdiğim Türk halkına bütün samimiyetimle açıklıyorum. Nükleer bomba üretmiyoruz çünkü hem haramdır hem de menfaatimize değildir” diye konuştu. ]

[ DİYELİM Kİ BOMBAMIZ VAR NEREDE KULLANACAĞIZ

* İkinci sebep nedir?
– İran’ın bir nükleer bomba üretmesinin son derece mantıksız olması. Çok açıkça, hiç çekinmeden söylüyorum: Eğer İran, nükleer bomba üretmenin ülkenin menfaatine olduğuna inansaydı bunu üretir ve katiyen saklamazdı. Bundan utanmazdı. Ama bunun ülkemizin savunma doktrinine uymayacağına karar verdik. Diyelim ki bir nükleer bombamız var, o bombayı nerede kullanacağız söyler misiniz? İsrail’i mi vuracağız? İsrail demek ABD demek. ABD’nin nükleer gücüyle kim baş edebilir? Biz son derece akıllı insanlarız. ]

Hürriyet

Link: https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2009/10/26/nukleer-bomba-hem-haram-hem-de-menfaatimize-aykiri/

October 26, 2009
Between the Hammer and the Anvil: An Exclusive Interview with PJAK’s Agiri Rojhilat

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 31

October 23, 2009 11:46 AM Age: 3 days

Featured By: Derek Henry Flood

Agiri Rojhilat

Agiri Rojhilat is one of the top seven members of the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane (PJAK) which is a part of the larger umbrella organization Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK) that includes the PKK. The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan portrays itself to be more of an armed democratization movement rather than a traditional national liberation movement for Kurdish sovereignty. PJAK says it is taking a stand in the name of all of Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities and it is much more than a Kurdish ethno-nationalist organization. Its expressed aim is to change the regime of the Iranian Ayatollahs to form an inclusive, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic participatory, federalized democracy in Tehran. Jamestown spoke to Rojhilat at the PJAK base in Qandil, northern Iraq.

JT: Can you tell our readers about PJAK’s internal political framework?

AR: Every four years we will have a congress that is made up of two-hundred delegates that from come from within our organization representing our women’s wing, youth wing and armed wing. This congress assembles itself in secret in Kurdistan. Because of the situation for Kurds in Iran, the elections for our congress cannot be held in the open. From the 200 assembled delegates, a thirty-person parliament is elected. Of those thirty elected, seven are chosen to form the coordination board of PJAK.

JT: How precisely are these elections conducted? Since your organization is not a legal party in Iran, they must be done clandestinely, no?

AR: The elections are done secretly. I want to let you know that we have over a million supporters inside Iran today. There is a lot of support for PJAK. But these elections cannot be perfectly [democratic] but of the secrecy in which they must be conducted.

JT: It has been reported that PJAK is very concerned about women’s issues and gender equality. What can you tell us about this aspect of your organization?

AR: I want to emphasize that women’s issues and women’s rights are paramount to our organization and we have a quota for female PJAK membership. Women are active at all levels of our organization. From the delegates to the parliament to the coordination board, we require a forty percent quota for females in PJAK. From top to bottom, we stress female participation in PJAK.

JT: Even participating in guerrilla attacks?

AR: Even fighting, yes.

JT: Do the PKK and PJAK conduct joint military operations or are their kinetic activities totally isolated from one another?

AR: What the PKK and PJAK have in common is that we both follow the ideology and philosophy of [imprisoned PKK leader] Abdullah Ocalan and we are both Kurdish parties. Let me explain this; there are four parts of Kurdistan since it was divided. Within both the PKK and the PJAK, there are Kurds from the different parts of Kurdistan. So within the PKK, there are Iranian Kurds and there are Germans and within PJAK there are Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan, but the PKK and PJAK are different groups with different political objectives.

JT: You are referring to diaspora Kurds from Germany or European Germans?

AR: Both. Let me explain; there are Kurds from all four parts of Kurdistan participating in the PKK, diaspora Kurds as well as some Germans. All of these types of Kurds are also participating in PJAK as well but I want to stress that the PKK and PJAK are two different organizations with different aims and objectives.

I want to add something else. If the regime in Syria attacks Syrian Kurds, PJAK is obligated to have a reaction to such behavior. Despite the fact that PJAK operates primarily in Iranian Kurdistan, we feel we have a responsibility to protect Kurds from the other sectors of Kurdistan as well. There are not different kinds of Kurds. There is one Kurdistan and one Kurdish people.

JT: Is PJAK a purely Kurdish liberation movement or is its appeal more broad based within Iran?

AR: In our movement, there are several nationalities. We have Azeris, Baluchis as well as ethnic Persians fighting.

JT: What is the geographical scope of the insurgency you are mounting?

AR: We have guerrillas in place from Maku all the way to Kermanshah. Throughout Iranian Kurdistan we have over one million sympathizers.

JT: What is the size of PJAK’s current military force?

AR: Until now, we do not like to give out precise figures for this but we have over one thousand active guerrillas. Eighty percent of which are inside Iranian territory.

JT: How are the values and teachings of Abdullah Ocalan carried out by PJAK?

AR: Of course it is a matter of evaluating the philosophy of Abdullah Ocalan according to our specific needs. The PKK and PJAK are two different organizations and the situation in Turkish Kurdistan is different than in Iranian Kurdistan. We implement his teachings according to the needs of Kurds in Iran. Do we put everything exactly as Ocalan says into practice? Not necessarily. You cannot say exactly that whatever Ocalan says we put into practice…

JT: What can you tell us about how PJAK was founded?

AR: For about five or six years before 2004 when our organization was officially announced, we were having some meetings to decide about how to organize ourselves politically and improve the situation for Kurds in Iran.

JT: Can you answer the allegations that PJAK has received support in any form from the Central Intelligence Agency? Journalist Seymour Hersh and former CIA officer Robert Baer have stated the United States government is very likely aiding PJAK in its proxy struggle with the Iranian regime. Is there any truth to these assertions?

AR: It is not right that the CIA is helping PJAK. That is not the reality or right at all. Once we had a meeting with Americans in Kirkuk to discuss possible cooperation. Our friend Akif Zagros [a former member of PJAK’s seven person leadership council who the author was informed was killed in a flash flood] talked with them but the Americans said PJAK should abandon the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan and our brotherhood with the PKK if we want help from them. Akif Zagros told the Americans PJAK would not abandon the teachings of Ocalan or our friendly relations with the PKK. Because of the way the Americans approached the issue, shaheed Zagros left the meeting. Since the meeting in 2004, no other such meetings occurred.

JT: If the United States were to approach you again asking to work with your organization against the Iranian regime, but this time without such preconditions, what would be the reaction of PJAK’s leadership?

AR: We have nothing against the United States of America. We are not closing our doors to anyone. We are open to dialogue with everyone. We are open to America, Europe and still Iran for talks. We decide what is best for our people based on our own will. We decide democratically when, where and with whom we will engage in such dialogue. We do not want to be simply used against others…

JT: So PJAK does not want to be used in a proxy war even if its interests temporarily converge with an outside power?

AR: Until now, both the U.S. and the European Union approach Iran for their own benefit. Within these dialogues, the Kurds are always used and then thrown aside after we have served their purposes. Because of these failed policies, we do not accept these kinds of approaches.

JT: Why do you believe that the Americans put PJAK on the Treasury Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations?

AR: Last year, there was a small bit of rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran and the nuclear issue and then suddenly PJAK gets put on this terrorist-financing list. We know there are some political parties [in Iran] that get some support from the U.S. but we are a totally different kind of party. We have our own will and objectives.

JT: Out here in Qandil, I do not see any visible economy with which your organization can sustain itself. How is PJAK funded? Do you benefit from the Afghan opium trade? Do you receive donations from sponsors?

AR: Our economy is based purely on the Kurdish people living in Iran. We collect voluntary donations from the Kurdish people according to how much they are able to give within their relative means. To explain to you the level of support that we receive, the Kurdish people even bring their children to us to join our organization.

JT: Children of what age?

AR: Normally eighteen. You must understand that Kurdish society is very different than the West. Because there are so many operations to suppress us, Kurdish society has turned inward. This stress from the outside strengthens our communities. We have some recruits that are under eighteen, maybe sixteen, but they are not participating in our military operations. Where we are from in Iran, there is a very large youth population and our party sees a lot of potential in them as we consider ourselves a young party. The Islamic Republic of Iran has three elements it uses in the destruction of our youth. Firstly it encourages and facilitates drug use among them. Secondly, it employs the Basij [militia] system and tries to brainwash our young people to be against the U.S. and Europe, saying, “We [Iran] stand for Islam and therefore the U.S. and E.U. are our enemy.” Thirdly, the regime systematically imprisons and tortures them in order to annihilate us and discourage them from joining PJAK or supporting the Kurdish freedom movement.

JT: Can you be more specific about how the guerrilla movement is financed?

AR: For example, certain Kurdish people that have relations with PJAK come and visit us. They pledge to sponsor maybe fifty or one hundred guerrillas from top to bottom for an entire year. They buy everything for them and it is their way of supporting their own freedom struggle. All of this is done through voluntary sponsorship.

About the drug question you brought up, Iran has very special policies in regard to this matter. They encourage Kurdish youth in Iranian Kurdistan to use drugs and the percentage of addiction among our youth has been increasing. The Iranian state wants our young people to remain outside the political framework of the country. Let me give you an example of how this policy affects our people. Recently, a mother came here from Iran asking us to help her deal with her son who was badly addicted to drugs and she felt powerless to do anything about it. She said she could not turn to the Iranian state for help and came to us because she felt that by joining PJAK, [her son] could shake his addiction. We told her “bring your son to us. We can help him.”

JT: PJAK does not profit from the transit of Afghan narcotics through its territory?

AR: There have been clashes with police in Iran with Sunni groups who are fighting the Islamic regime in Baluchistan and Khorosan. Sometimes these police die. From time to time, we also have clashes between our armed wing and regime elements. When some pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards] die, the regime says it is because of bandits involved in the drugs trade. They describe clashes with PJAK as banditry and try to link us to the drugs. Iranian authorities do not like to mention the name PJAK after some pasdarans die, just referring to us as bandits. These Iranians are not dying because of the drugs trade. They are being killed because they are oppressing Sunnis and Sunnis in these provinces are fighting the regime. If you come back to me on another visit, I can provide you with names of those in the regime that are involved in the drugs trade.

When the Iranian regime prepares its annual budget, it does not have enough money to sustain itself and so it supplements governmental coffers with money from the transshipment of Afghan narcotics. The drugs are shipped across Iranian territory under the supervision of Ettela’at (Iranian Intelligence: Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-e Eslami – VEVAK) to Orumieh (provincial capital of West Azarbaijan Province). From Orumieh they are sent to Hakkari Province in Turkey where they are shipped under the supervision of the MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati – Turkish intelligence) and from Turkey these drugs reach Europe. Both Iran and Turkey may employ some Kurds as part of their trafficking apparatus but the trafficking is state organized by both countries’ intelligence services.

Can you imagine this high volume of drugs coming into Turkey from Iran without the Turks’ knowledge? It would be impossible. Turkey has many checkpoints. How could they not know about all of these drugs passing through their territory?

JT: Is PJAK a 100% independent organization that exists without the support of international actors?

AR: Yes that is completely right. I will stress that we have not so far [received] any international aid or weapons from anyone. We are an independent organization.

JT: There has been a lot of speculation [surrounding] your leader Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi’s visit to Washington in the summer 0f 2007. Can you comment on it?

AR: As you can see Haji Ahmadi is not here for comment. Whatever I say is on the record as a PJAK official. As the president of PJAK, he is available to have dialogue with anyone. He can visit different countries and meet with different people. Yes, he did visit Washington, as it was within his power to do so. He has the power to do such things. But I want to reiterate that until now we have not received support from any outside powers…

JT: What is PJAK’s attitude toward the Turkish-Iranian military alliance?

AR: Iran and Turkey have an alliance against us and [have worked] on joint military operations together for the past few years. Despite their differences, they are unified on the Kurdish issue. The alliance between Iran and Turkey is not purely a military one though, it is also now political…

Turkey is taking intelligence that it is receiving from the U.S. in regard to PKK positions here in Iraq and passing it on to Iran so they can attack PJAK. So Iran is now acquiring U.S. intelligence meant for Ankara in this Turkish-Iranian bilateral military strategy against the Kurds. Through this cooperation, we are attacked here in Iraq by Turkish warplanes while Iran fires Katyushas from the other side of these mountain ridges. We believe there are even Turks training members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps to fight Kurds inside Iran.

Additionally, I want to let you know that besides Iran’s increased alliance with Turkey, it is also greatly expanding its bases along the Iran-Iraq border. It says it is doing this to defend the Islamic Republic against a possible invasion by the United States. But what this effort is really meant to do in our view is to separate the Kurds and stop the flow of our movement across the border. From our observations, some of these expanded military bases look to be modeled on Israeli bases.

JT: What can you tell of your organization’s military strategy against Iranian forces?

AR: Iran and Turkey insist that the PKK and the PJAK are the same and this works very well for their own propaganda efforts. We are being shelled here. If you look beyond you, you can see the entire mountainside is burned from Katuysha fire. Our strategy is one of pure self-defense. We do not make offensive operations against the Revolutionary Guards. We defend Iranian Kurds and ourselves. We have a right to retaliate against the Iranian state as part of our self-defense policy. If Iran attacks our people, we will respond. Iran uses the death penalty and likes to hang people. If they will hang more of our friends, we have plans to retaliate directly… Our main work is political but we have to have an armed wing because Iran is not a truly democratic state and it does not allow people to organize themselves politically.

JT: What can you tell our readers about PJAK’s philosophy and ideological outlook?

AR: Our aim is a free Kurdistan and a democratic Iran.

JT: Are you speaking of creating an independent Kurdish state?

AR: What we are talking about now is not the changing of borders or the replacing of flags but creating an all-inclusive Iran.

JT: Does PJAK seek to overthrow the religious government of Iran?

AR: We do not oppose religion and we are in no way against the Islamic religion, nor do we have any animosity toward any other ethnic groups living in Iran today. Our goals are not limited to the freedom of Kurds. We wish for all the ethnic groups living in Iran to have their democratic rights.

JT: Do you seek a structure of parallel government for Kurds in Iran comparable to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq that has its own parliament and issues its own visas?

AR: Not at all. We would prefer to have much more participation in a democratized central government. To achieve this, we are trying to permeate Iranian Kurdistan with democratic values so that our people can improve themselves and organize themselves politically. We never want to impose cultural hegemony on others and would like to see Baluchis and Azeris organize themselves similarly as well.

JT: Do you believe that Iran is a Shia chauvinist regime that uses Khomenism and evangelical Mahdism similar to the way Turkey uses the notion of Turkism at the expense of its minorities?

AR: Yes, that’s right. Iran gives Kurds a degree of recognition but with other groups like Azeris, they practice a forced assimilation policy. Iran also practices a divide and rule policy to pit different groups against one another. There is discrimination against Sunnis as well…

JT: Does PJAK have a relationship with the Jundullah insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan Province?

AR: For us, yes, we have some relations with Baluchi people. However, we do not have a specific relationship with Jundullah. Baluchis have a special meaning for us because of their oppression by the Islamic Republic. Iran’s policy has been to make the Baluchis depend on the income from the transit of Afghan narcotics as well as depend on the Iranian state.

JT: Do you have any connections with Ahwazi Arabs in Khuzestan Province? There has been some unexplained political violence there.

AR: We do not have guerrillas there but we do have some indirect political relations.

JT: In closing, can you tell our readers what core principles drive PJAK’s internal dynamics?

AR: Our movement operates under three core principles: democracy, women’s rights, and ecology. We believe these three principles must be integrated into our everyday activities. Did you know that every year, it is required that every member of PJAK must plant two trees? PJAK strongly believes that understanding ecology improves people’s lives in the region where we are active. We have programs to help surrounding villages to acquire fresh water and PJAK also believes in helping to educate the people in our surroundings.

https://jamestown.org/program/between-the-hammer-and-the-anvil-an-exclusive-interview-with-pjaks-agiri-rojhilat/

October 26, 2009
‘Iran is our friend,’ says Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan

• We have no difficulty with Ahmadinejad – Erdogan
• Warning to Europe not to ignore Turkey’s strengths

With its stunning vistas and former Ottoman palaces, the banks of the Bosphorus – the strategic waterway that cuts Istanbul in half and divides Europe from Asia – may be the perfect place to distinguish friend from foe and establish where your country’s interests lie.

And sitting in his grandiose headquarters beside the strait, long the symbol of Turkey‘s supposed role as bridge between east and west, Recep Tayyip Erdogan had little doubt about who was a friend and who wasn’t.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran‘s radical president whose fiery rhetoric has made him a bête noire of the west? “There is no doubt he is our friend,” said Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister for the last six years. “As a friend so far we have very good relations and have had no difficulty at all.”

What about Nicolas Sarkozy, president of France, who has led European opposition to Turkey’s bid to join the EU and, coincidentally, adopted a belligerent tone towards Iran’s nuclear programme? Not a friend?

“Among leaders in Europe there are those who have prejudices against Turkey, like France and Germany. Previously under Mr Chirac, we had excellent relations [with France] and he was very positive towards Turkey. But during the time of Mr Sarkozy, this is not the case. It is an unfair attitude. The European Union is violating its own rules.

“Being in the European Union we would be building bridges between the 1.5bn people of Muslim world to the non-Muslim world. They have to see this. If they ignore it, it brings weakness to the EU.”

Friendly towards a religious theocratic Iran, covetous and increasingly resentful of a secular but maddeningly dismissive Europe: it seems the perfect summary of Turkey’s east-west dichotomy.

Erdogan’s partiality towards Ahmadinejad may surprise some in the west who see Turkey as a western-oriented democracy firmly grounded inside Nato. It has been a member of the alliance since 1952. It will be less surprising to Erdogan’s secular domestic critics, who believe the prime minister’s heart lies in the east and have long suspected his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development party (AKP) government of plotting to transform Turkey into a religious state resembling Iran.

Erdogan vigorously denies the latter charge, but to his critics he and Ahmadinejad are birds of a feather: devout religious conservatives from humble backgrounds who court popular support by talking the language of the street. After Ahmadinejad’s disputed presidential election in June, Erdogan and his ally, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul, were among the first foreign leaders to make congratulatory phone calls, ignoring the mass demonstrations and concerns of western leaders over the result’s legitimacy.

Talking to the Guardian, Erdogan called the move a “necessity of bilateral relations”. “Mr Ahmadinejad was declared to be the winner, not officially, but with a large vote difference, and since he is someone we have met before, we called to congratulate him,” he said.

“Later it was officially declared that he was elected, he got a vote of confidence and we pay special attention to something like this. It is a basic principle of our foreign policy.”

The gesture will be remembered when Erdogan arrives in Tehran this week for talks with Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, that will focus on commercial ties, including Turkey’s need for Iranian natural gas. Ahmadinejad has voiced his admiration for Erdogan, praising Turkey’s recent decision to ban Israel from a planned Nato manoeuvre in protest at last winter’s bombardment of Gaza.

Since the election, Iran has witnessed a fierce crackdown on opposition figures that has resulted in activists, students and journalists being imprisoned and publicly tried. Detainees have died in prison, and there have been allegations of torture and rape. Some of those alleging mistreatment have sought refuge in Turkey.

But Erdogan said he would not raise the post-election crackdown with his hosts, saying it would represent “interference” in Iranian domestic affairs.

He poured cold water on western accusations that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, saying: “Iran does not accept it is building a weapon. They are working on nuclear power for the purposes of energy only.”

Erdogan has overseen a dramatic improvement in the previously frigid relations between Turkey and Iran, which was viewed with suspicion by the pro-secularist high command of the powerful Turkish military. Trade between the two countries last year was worth an estimated £5.5bn as Iran has developed into a major market for Turkish exports.

Erdogan’s views will interest US foreign policy makers, who have long seen his AKP government as a model of a pro-western “moderate Islam” that could be adopted in other Muslim countries. They will also find an audience with President Barack Obama, who signalled Turkey’s strategic importance in a visit last April and has invited the prime minister to visit Washington. They are unlikely to impress Israel, which has warned that Erdogan’s criticisms risk harming Turkey’s relations with the US.

Erdogan dismissed the notion, saying: “I don’t think there is any possibility of that. America’s policy in this region is not dictated by Israel.”

He insisted that the Turkey-Israel strategic alliance – which some AKP insiders have said privately is over – remains alive but chided the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, who he said had threatened to use nuclear weapons against Gaza.

The Guardian

October 26, 2009
Israel is in denial over Turkish rage
Turkey was shocked by Goldstone’s report on the Gaza conflict, but Israel is seeking other explanations for deteriorating ties
- Simon Tisdall
The apparent inability of Israeli leaders to see their actions as others see them – that is to say, to put themselves in other people’s shoes – may partly explain the depth of the outrage with which they greeted the Goldstone report on last January’s Gaza conflict. Prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems to have been genuinely taken aback by the UN inquiry’s hard-hitting conclusions, in particular its recommendations about the investigation of individual Israeli responsibility for possible war crimes.

What Netanyahu, former prime minister Ehud Olmert, opposition leader Tzipi Livni, defence minister Ehud Barak and rightwingers such as foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman viewed as a fully justified act of self-defence in the face of relentless Palestinian rocket attacks was seen by much of the world, despite Israel’s ban on media access, as an appalling, disproportionate assault on a defenceless civilian population. Gaza did enormous damage to Israel’s reputation and interests – but it is unclear, even now, whether this is fully understood in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Radically differing perceptions, running exclusively in parallel lines, also exacerbate touchy issues such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons arsenal and the apparent contradiction of denying Iran its nuclear “rights”. But sometimes, worlds collide.

An unexpected move by Turkey last week to postpone military exercises with Israel suddenly channelled conflicting versions of reality into a direct, head-on crash. Ankara’s decision was its way of expressing its continuing displeasure over Gaza. Prime minister Tayyip Erdogan fell out publicly with Shimon Peres, Israel’s president, over the issue at Davos in January. The row has been simmering ever since. But by dramatically wrecking the flagship exercises, which also involved the US and other Nato members, Turkey effectively forced Israel’s leadership to look at things from the other side’s perspective.

The picture thus produced is both instructive and discouraging. Secular Muslim Turkey is (or was) Israel’s best friend in the Middle East. Bilateral trade between the two countries is worth about $3bn a year; military co-operation, including Israeli arms sales, is long-established. Before Gaza, Turkey acted as mediator in talks between Israel and its old foe, Syria. Ankara also offered a link to sympathetic Arab states of the Gulf. Turkey’s economy is growing overall, as is its importance as an energy and commercial hub. In short, it was clear that Turkey was a uniquely important and influential ally.

Recognising the value of the link, some Israeli politicians tried to play down the rift, apparently hoping to patch things up. But others, including commentator Amir Oren, looked for different reasons to explain Turkey’s behaviour, refusing to believe Gaza could be the cause. “Erdogan is aiming for a large-scale reconciliation with old enemies: the Armenians, the Syrians, the Greek Cypriots and the Kurds. Israel is a burden for him, not an asset,” Oren said.

Other explanations included the assertion that Erdogan had imposed his will on Turkey’s weakened military, which in the past would have resisted his order to cancel the exercises. Meanwhile, Ofra Bangio, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University, told the Christian Science Monitor that Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy calculations were shifting as it strengthened its ties with Iraq, Syria and other leading Arab world countries and turned away from an unwelcoming European Union. “In Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s ideological framework, Israel doesn’t play a central role,” Bengio said.

A senior Israeli foreign ministry official, speaking to the Haaretz newspaper after an emergency meeting to discuss the crisis with Turkey, was even more pessimistic. “It may be that the reality has changed and that the strategic ties we thought existed have simply ended,” the official said. “Maybe we need to be the ones who initiate renewed thinking regarding our ties and must adopt response measures.”

On this analysis, Israel’s relationship with Turkey, valuable for so many reasons, may soon be a thing of the past – an avoidable outcome since the analysis looks fundamentally flawed. They’re not pretending; Turks really are upset about Gaza, as indicated by a much-watched Turkish television drama series depicting clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians that has further inflamed relations. The Turkish public was scandalised by January’s events and Turkey’s politicians have reacted accordingly, as politicians do.

But among Israeli leaders, the perception is different. Gaza, a justifiable action, cannot be accepted as the real reason for the row; so ulterior motives and complicated explanations are sought. Inhabiting a parallel world, they just don’t get it.

Source: www.guardian.co.uk, 22 October 2009
October 26, 2009