Category: Middle East

  • David Miliband’s regrettable expulsion of Israeli diplomat

    David Miliband’s regrettable expulsion of Israeli diplomat

    Telegraph View: Expelled Israeli understood to be the Mossad head of station.

    Whenever the British Government feels compelled to order a diplomatic expulsion, it is normally because a hostile foreign power, such as Russia, has been caught indulging in activity that threatens our national interests. It is, therefore, deeply regrettable that David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, yesterday ordered the withdrawal of a senior diplomat serving at the Israeli Embassy in London.

    The decision to expel the Israeli – understood to be the Mossad head of station – was taken following an investigation by the Serious and Organised Crime Agency into allegations that the Israeli secret service had used forged British passports for its operation to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a senior Hamas commander, in his Dubai hotel room in January. Although the investigation could not prove unequivocally that Mossad was responsible, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the passports had been forged by Israel, which was culpable, in the words of Mr Miliband, of a “profound disregard for the sovereignty of the UK”. This was compounded by the fact that the offence was committed by a country that is supposed to be our ally.

    While few will mourn the death of al-Mabhouh, who was wanted in Israel for the abduction and murder of two Israeli soldiers, there are many reasons to be concerned about a diplomatic rift between Britain and Israel. The two countries have co-operated closely on a number of important global security issues, particularly the potential threat posed by Iran’s illicit nuclear programme. Good relations between Israel and the West are essential if any significant progress is to be made in negotiating a lasting peace deal with the Palestinians. Israel should acknowledge Britain’s justifiable anger and reflect on its priorities.

    But the prospects for the resumption of normal diplomatic discourse appear remote so long as Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, is intent on adopting a confrontational attitude towards his allies. During his visit to Washington this week Mr Netanyahu has been unrepentant about his government’s decision to press ahead with building more settler homes in Jerusalem, even though the announcement provoked an angry response from the Obama administration. Mr Netanyahu’s critics in Israel, moreover, claim he has deliberately embarked on this course of action because he has no intention of making peace with the Palestinians. If that is the case, then Israel risks isolating itself even further – and that is not in the interests of the West and can only diminish the prospects of a lasting settlement.

    https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/7507392/David-Milibands-regrettable-expulsion-of-Israeli-diplomat.html, 23 Mar 2010

  • Armenian President To Visit Syrian Site Of 1915 Tragedy

    Armenian President To Visit Syrian Site Of 1915 Tragedy

    AC06DCD2 A1A0 4A52 A701 C9D71CA77870 mw270 sArmenian President Serzh Sarkisian

    March 24, 2010
    PRAGUE — Armenia’s President Serzh Sarkisian is due to visit an area of Syria that was the final destination in what Armenians consider the first genocide of the 20th century, RFE/RL’s Armenian Service reports.

    Sarkisian, who held talks on March 23 with Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, was scheduled to visit the northeastern city of Deir-el-Zor later today.

    The desert surrounding the city proved the final destination for hundreds of thousands of Armenians forced out of their homes in the final years of the Ottoman Empire nearly a century ago.

    Those who did not die en route met their death in camps such as Deir-el-Zor.

    In 1990, the Armenian community in Syria built a memorial complex there dedicated to the victims.

    For decades, survivors and descendants have been campaigning for the World War I-era mass killings to be recognized as genocide — a label Turkey rejects.

    On March 23, Sarkisian suggested in a newspaper interview that Turkey’s reluctance to unconditionally normalize relations with Armenia is only facilitating a broader international recognition of the killings as genocide.

    Sarkisian spoke to the Syrian daily “Al Watan” during an official visit that began on March 22.

    He was asked specifically to comment on a resolution recognizing the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks as genocide that was adopted by a U.S. congressional committee on March 4.

    “One thing is obvious to me,” he replied. “The longer the process of normalizing our relations [with Turkey] lasts, the larger the number of states adopting such resolutions may become.”

    Turkish leaders link the ratification of the normalization protocols with a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that would satisfy Azerbaijan.

    They also say that the genocide resolutions adopted by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee as well as Sweden’s parliament this month have further complicated Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.

    By contrast, Yerevan has welcomed both resolutions.

    In other remarks to “Al Watan,” Sarkisian said that Azerbaijani territory currently held by Armenian forces could be returned in exchange for security and self-determination for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Sarkisian reiterated Yerevan’s long-standing policy of Armenian forces withdrawing from seven Azerbaijani districts around Nagorno-Karabakh in the event of an agreement on its final status.

    Speaking at a joint news conference with Sarkisian on March 22, Assad offered Syria’s help in establishing cordial relations between Armenia and Turkey for the sake of regional security and stability.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenian_President_To_Visit_Syrian_Site_Of_1915_Tragedy/1992548.html
  • Israeli diplomat ‘spy’ expelled over cloned UK passports

    Israeli diplomat ‘spy’ expelled over cloned UK passports

    Catherine Philp, Diplomatic Correspondent, and James Hider in Jerusalem

    A serious rift in relations between Britain and Israel opened yesterday after a criminal investigation uncovered “compelling” evidence that Jerusalem had cloned the UK passports used in the assassination of a senior Hamas operative in Dubai.

    Britain responded by expelling a senior Israeli diplomat, believed to be the Mossad station chief in London; imposing new travel advice, warning Britons of the threat of state-sponsored identity theft in Israel; and demanding a public assurance that Israel would never misuse British passports again.

    Israel’s Ambassador expressed his disappointment but said he was determined to “strengthen the firm foundations” of the relationship between Britain and Israel. The froideur only increased, however, when it emerged that David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, had cancelled his scheduled attendance at a reception marking the renovation of the Israeli Embassy yesterday.

    Instead, Mr Miliband told the Commons of the conclusion of the investigation by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (Soca) and denounced Israel’s behaviour as “intolerable” and displaying a “profound disregard for the sovereignty of the United Kingdom”.

    “The fact that this was done by a country which is a friend, with significant diplomatic, cultural, business and personal ties to the UK, only adds insult to injury,” he added. He said he had demanded a formal assurance that the fraud would not recur from Avigdor Liebermann, the Israeli Foreign Minister. The travel advice to be issued to British citizens would depend on the answer that he received.

    Diplomatic sources told The Times that the assurance would have to be public — in effect, forcing Israel to admit its involvement in the fraud and, by implication, in the assassination of Mahmud al-Mabhuh on January 19.

    Suspicions fell on Israel’s intelligence agency immediately after the killing, but they were reinforced when it emerged that all of the Western passport holders whose identities were used were also Israeli nationals. Mr Miliband said that Soca investigation had lead directly back to Israel and that no other country appeared to have been involved.

    “Given that this was a very sophisticated operation, in which high-quality forgeries were made, the Government judges it is highly likely that the forgeries were made by a state intelligence service,” he said. “Taking this, together with other inquiries, we have concluded that there are compelling reasons to believe that Israel was responsible for the misuse of the British passports.”

    The passports of Irish, German, French and Australian citizens were also used but those countries are yet to conclude their investigations.

    Israel said that it regretted the British move to expel the Mossad representative but, while the Government in Jerusalem was measured in its response, , MPs from the far Right denounced the British as untrustworthy “dogs”.

    “I think the British are behaving hypocritically,” Aryeh Eldad, of the National Union, an ultra-nationalist, pro-settler party, told Sky News. “Who are they to judge us on the war on terror?”

    Michael Ben Ari, another National Union MP, said: “The British are dogs but they are not loyal to us . This is anti-Semitism disguised as anti-Zionism”.

    , March 24, 2010

  • Iraq’s Kurds Lose Political Dominance In Kirkuk

    Iraq’s Kurds Lose Political Dominance In Kirkuk

    7C6C2F83 C29C 46A1 9D54 B511AE181244 w527 sTurkomans demonstrate in Kirkuk in 2006, demanding recognition of their ethnic group’s status in the disputed region.

    March 19, 2010
    By Charles Recknagel
    Before the March 7 parliamentary elections in Iraq, there was no question of who dominated politics in mixed-population Kirkuk — it was the two main political factions in the neighboring Kurdish autonomous region.

    But with the vote count from Kirkuk city and its surrounding Tamin Province about 80 percent complete, it is clear that the political landscape is dramatically changing.

    The partial vote count shows the secular Al-Iraqiyah coalition and the Kurdistan Alliance in a virtual tie, with the balance between them shifting by only wafer-thin differences as the vote tally rises.

    If the current balance holds, it means that the divided province’s Turkoman and Arab populations will have a much louder political voice than before. That in turn could complicate Kurdish hopes of one day incorporating oil-rich Kirkuk into their autonomous region.

    Turkoman politicians in Kirkuk make no secret of the fact that they competed in the parliamentary contest precisely with that goal in mind.

    United Against Kurdish Ambitions

    Hicran Kazanci head of the foreign relations department of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, tells RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service that Turkoman candidates enlisted in a variety of coalitions for the March 7 race. But he says they all agree on one thing.

    “Despite the fact the Turkomans went into the election with different coalitions, on major and essential subjects they are united,” Kazanci says. “For example, about the future status of Kirkuk, all of them are united in opposition toward annexing Kirkuk into any federation. And they are united in making Turkoman one of Iraq’s official languages.”

    4B03E0EF 796B 4139 A0FF 6550F9DD1A8D w270 s

    A map Iraq’s ethnic makeup

    Turkoman and Arab politicians made up the vast bulk of Al-Iraqiyah’s candidates in the local race, coming for the first time under a single political umbrella in the divided province. That is in sharp contrast to much of Kirkuk’s recent history, where the three main population groups — Kurdish, Turkoman, and Arab — have all competed against each other.

    In the years immediately following the United States’ toppling of Saddam Hussein, both Turkomans and Arabs boycotted attempts to form a provincial government. They expressed anger over what they said were Kurdish efforts to appropriate the province de facto after moving Kurdish peshmerga fighters into the area to support the U.S. invasion.

    The Turkomans and Arabs only agreed to take part in the running of the province after a power-sharing deal in 2008. Under that deal, the provincial governor is a Kurd while his two deputies are an Arab and a Turkoman.

    But Kirkuk’s provincial parliament is still disputed after Arabs and Turkomans largely stayed away from the first election in 2005, handing the Kurds a majority. The Iraqi government excluded Tamin Province from the January 2009 provincial elections due to fears of sparking sectarian unrest.

    Given this background, the fact that this month’s elections for deputies to the national parliament went peacefully in Tamin Province is a major surprise. To ensure security, the Iraqi police fielded 56 mobile patrols in Kirkuk city on election day, while Kurdish peshmerga also spread out less obtrusively across the provincial capital.

    Simira Balay, a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq, says the Kurdish coalition was caught unawares by the election results, after it “had expected to dominate the election, but it seems the Kurdish vote split among a number of Kurdish parties, including Goran.” She says Kurdish bloc “now is neck and neck with the Iraqiyah list, which got most of the Turkoman and Arab vote.”

    The Kurdish coalition comprises the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Goran, a recently created Kurdish opposition party, scored well in recent elections by running on an anticorruption platform.

    Resolving Kirkuk Issue

    In the aftermath of the elections, Kurdish political leaders — like their Turkoman counterparts — are stressing unity in their position over Kirkuk.

    The Kurds see the city as the natural and historic capital of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. And they insist upon holding a referendum in the province to determine its future status.

    “The issue of Kirkuk is [already] in the Iraqi political arena to be solved in accordance with Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution,” says Rizgar Ali, the Kurdish head of Kirkuk’s provincial council.

    Major steps under Article 140 include resolving property disputes created by Hussein’s policy of “Arabizing” Kirkuk, the holding of a census and conducting a referendum to decide the province’s future status.

    To date, progress on all these steps has been painfully slow. Most property disputes remain unresolved and unrest in northern Iraq has prevented a census. The referendum, originally planned for no later than the end of 2007, has slipped accordingly.

    That limbo is unacceptable to the Kurds, who are sure to use their full representation in the Baghdad parliament, including deputies from the Kurdish region, to continue to press for swift implementation of Article 140.

    But it is likely that both the Turkomans and Arabs will use their new voice in the federal legislature to try to subject Article 140 to further negotiation.

    According to Rakan Said, the Arab deputy governor of Kirkuk, the election results “laid the ground for dialogue.” He adds that now there are “two parties to the issue of Kirkuk: one is Al-Iraqiyah and the other is the Kurdish coalition. So the platform [for dialogue] has become clear and without interference.”

    New Political Landscape

    Al-Iraqiyah, headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, ran on a nonsectarian, nationalist platform. Its success on the national level as a joint front-runner with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition has appeared to realign Iraqi politics by relegating sectarian- and ethnic-based parties to the background.

    With some 80 percent of the vote counted nationwide, the Shi’ite religious parties’ Iraqi National Alliance are in third place and the Kurdistan Alliance in fourth. Still, Iraqi parliamentary politics is all about making coalitions and in the past the Kurds have proved adept at playing the role of kingmakers.

    Whether the Kurdish parties can continue to do so now, or are relegated to a less prominent role, will directly affect Kirkuk’s eventual status. The Kurds want it to be part of Iraqi Kurdistan. And the newly empowered Kirkuk Turkoman-Arab bloc is just as determined to play the spoiler.

    Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans all claim the province around Kirkuk based on a long historical presence in the area.

    The Turkic-speaking Turkomans, who claim to be the second-largest group in northern Iraq after the Kurds, trace their presence to the time of the Seljuk Empire, when migrating Turkic tribes conquered a vast expanse of territory stretching from modern Iran to Turkey.

    Muhammad Tahir of RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service contributed to this report

     
    https://www.rferl.org/a/Iraqs_Kurds_Lose_Political_Dominance_In_Kirkuk/1988609.html
  • Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli Axis Revived

    Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli Axis Revived

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

    RELATED INFO

    https://www.turkishnews.com/ru/content/

    [email protected]

    The visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Baku on February 8-11, which has attracted so much comment and speculation, is a constituent part of Tel Aviv’s policy in the post-Soviet space.  An analysis of the results of this visit shows that the resonance arising from the Baku meetings of the Israeli minister serves only as a cover for the discussion behind the scenes of issues, which have strategic geopolitical importance.

    Azerbaijani and Israeli media in their discussion of these meetings devoted most of their attention to several questions, including the broadening of Azerbaijani-Israeli ties at a time when contacts between Ankara and Jerusalem are increasingly tense, Azerbaijani permission for Israeli use of the territory of the country in the event of military actions against Iran, and a mediating role of official Baku in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.  The links among these various issues become obvious upon close examination.

    As far as the first question is concerned, one should note that Israel and part of the Jewish lobby, which has spoken out against military actions in Iran, do not consider the territory of Azerbaijan as a place des armes for military actions against Iran.  Related to this and as part of an effort designed to restrain Iran, the United States and Georgia have signed an agreement on the use of Georgia’s territorial waters in the Black Sea if US military bases in the Persian Gulf are used for an attack on Iran.

    Correctly assessing the situation, Israeli political analysts understand that Azerbaijan will not under any circumstances agree to the use of its territory for an invasion of Iran but rather will do everything it can to prevent the beginning of military actions against its southern neighbor.  Any military invasion, be it a broad scale military action or surgical strike, would entail a humanitarian catastrophe (including an incalculable number of refugees from the northern part of Iran), a collapse of the economy, and a growth of terrorism in Azerbaijan.  These threats in turn are entirely capable of delivering a destructive blow to the security of Azerbaijan.  Consequently, official Baku cannot agree to such a step even in exchange for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    There is, however, a plethora of other issues that invite attention of Baku and Tel Aviv, as well as Ankara, and could hence serve as a solid foundation upon which the relations among the three could develop further.  Since Lieberman’s visit to Baku, there have been several extremely interesting events.  On February 16, Pinchas Avivi, the deputy director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and head of that organization’s Division for Central Europe and Eurasia, made a working visit to Ankara.  Not only did the two parties discuss bilateral relations, but they also touched upon the issues of cooperation and interaction in “third countries,” in particular those in the South Caucasus (Goldenstein 2010).  That suggests that the meeting in Ankara represented a continuation of the Baku negotiations.  The possibility of tripartite cooperation in dealing with the regional issues at a time when Turkish-Israeli relations appear to be in “conflict” is not fantastic if one comes to analyze more closely recent events.  Despite a certain public cooling in recent months, both countries have enough in common that cooperation with regard to regional issues is far from impossible.  As one Turkish official put it, “populism is part of contemporary politics,” but “Turkey was and remains a most serious guarantor of Israel’s security” (Oguz 2010).

    Consequently, while some experts have hurried to bury the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkish military-political union, it is obvious that precisely this union and not individual states are capable of being a key geopolitical center and playing a defining role in the region.  And local conflicts, which are taking place in these countries, are considered not in isolation but as part of regional policies.

    This nexus also reflects Azerbaijan’s interest in playing a larger international role.  Indeed, many countries hope that it will.  In May 2009, for example, when Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov was in Washington, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Azerbaijan could take on itself greater responsibility and leadership in the resolution of important issues in the region of the South Caucasus.  She stressed that “Azerbaijan is a strategic location which is important not only for Azerbaijanis, but also for the region and the entire world,” including not unimportantly not only the Caucasus but the areas to its south. [1]

    Not surprisingly, therefore, during Lieberman’s visit to Baku, the two parties discussed in detail the possibility of Azerbaijan’s mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Baku’s growing interest in playing a greater role in the broader region to its south is also reflected in its continuous reluctance to open up its embassy in Tel Aviv.  Experts in Baku often cite relations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and with Iran as the reasons Azerbaijan has not taken that step, but the experience of Turkey and Israel suggests that in reality there is another reason at work: a desire, on the part of Baku, to demonstrate its respect for, and solidarity with, the Palestinians and the Islamic world more generally, something which will help increase the influence of Azerbaijan as a mediator in the Middle Eastern conflict.

    As the situation around the region heats up, the links between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Israel seem certain to become closer, and this axis is destined to bear a direct effect on the broader region for years to come.

    Note

    [1] See (accessed 25 February 2010).

    References

    Goldenstein, Alexander (2010) “Турция и Израиль сохраняют координацию по Кавказу” [“Turkey and Israel keep coordination on the Caucasus”], Izrus, 17 February, available at http://izrus.co.il/dvuhstoronka/article/2010-02-17/8651.html (accessed 25 February 2010).

    Oguz, Dzhem (2010) “Есть причины, вынудившие Турцию изменить отношение к Израилю” [“There are reasons that prompted Turkey to change its attitude to Israel”], Regnum, 11 February, available at (accessed 25 February 2010).

    source

  • Kuwaiti Amir planning to invest 3 billion USD in Turkey

    Kuwaiti Amir planning to invest 3 billion USD in Turkey

    The Kuwaiti Amir is planning to invest some 3 billion USD in Turkey.

    al Sabah

    The official consultant of Kuwait’s Amir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah in Turkey said the Amir was planning to implement three or four giant projects in Turkey, worth 3 billion USD.

    “We have made 1.5 billion USD of investments in Turkey in the recent three years,” Ugur Akkas, the chairman of the Sems Turk Kuwait-Turkey investment consultancy company, told AA correspondent.

    Akkas said they had mainly invested in immovables, some portfolio purchases in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB), and tourism.

    The chairman said they planned to invest the 3 billion USD on real estates, and they were focused on Istanbul.

    Akkas said the company was also interested in hydroelectrical power plants, and defined Turkey as a country that might become the food hub of the Gulf region in coming years.

    “We focus on the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) region in agriculture,” he said.

    Akkas said he thought they would increase their investments by 2012.

    Ugur Akkas also said Turkey was a favorite country after the world conjuncture had changed, and the Amir had turned his course towards Turkey and neighboring countries.

    Turkey’s trade volume with Kuwait is around 500 million USD.

    , 14 March 2010