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Category: Middle East

Turkey and Iran’s Growing Alliance

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Iran last month symbolized a pivot toward Tehran and a shift in Ankara’s Middle East foreign policy. Declaring a desire to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Iran in combating terrorism, and driven by Turkey’s evolving policy toward Syria, Erdoğan’s trip highlighted Ankara and Tehran’s tendency to pursue mutual interests when their paths cross. This is significant in terms of its implications for the Syrian conflict and for the region’s landscape, as both countries have the ability to influence the course of future events throughout the Middle East.

History of Turkish-Iranian Ties

Turkish-Persian history was characterized by centuries of rivalry, which remains the case today as both powers seek to shape the Middle East consistent with their respective visions. The Turkish Republic oriented itself toward the West (and away from the Middle East) throughout the 20th century; Iran was therefore not a central focus of Turkey’s Cold War foreign policy. However, the Iranian revolution of 1979 did create tension, as Turkey’s ruling secular elite viewed Iran’s post-revolutionary regime as a menace. This perception was in part fueled by Ankara’s belief that Tehran sponsored terrorist groups in Turkey with the intention of exporting the Islamic revolution to neighboring countries. In turn, Iran’s post-1979 political order viewed Turkey as a threat to Iran’s post-revolutionary objectives, given its membership in NATO and secular ideology.

As Western powers and Sunni Arab states united behind Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had to pick its battles conservatively, therefore Tehran did not pursue a confrontational policy toward Turkey. At the same time, Turkey (which viewed the former Soviet Union and Iraq as graver threats than Iran) maintained a neutral position during the eight year war. This enabled both countries to preserve the status of their relationship and created options for each toward the other in the future.

Following the Gulf War relations began to thaw as Ankara and Tehran pursued cooperative measures to address the ‘Kurdish question’, which threatened both states’ territorial integrity. Bilateral relations blossomed after Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power in 2002. Iran welcomed the rise of an Islamist order in Turkey that stressed the importance of improving Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Over the past decade Turkish demand for Iran’s energy resources and Iran’s desire for reliable trading partners in light of the imposition of Western sanctions motivated the two states to enhance bilateral economic and business relations. Between 2000 and 2011 bilateral trade increased from $1 billion to $16 billion, and between 2002 and 2011 the number of Iranian firms based in Turkey increased from just over 300 to more than 2,000.

Despite this, regional politics limited the extent to which the rapprochement could develop. For example, as Erdoğan evoked the Palestinian cause in various corners of the Arab world, Tehran viewed this as a threat to Iran’s role as the main state sponsor of anti-Israel movements (such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Since then Turkey has been jockeying for influence in the region and Iran has continued to perceive this as a threat to its own influence.

The Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Bilateral Relations

The Syrian conflict brought unprecedented tension to the Turkish-Iranian relationship. Following its commencement in 2011, Turkey assumed that Bashar al-Assad would suffer a fate similar to that of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Moammar Gaddafi. Ankara soon abandoned efforts to broker a negotiated settlement between the Syrian government and the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated opposition, and by late 2011, Turkey aggressively sponsored the armed rebellion. Viewing Assad’s ouster as inevitable, Turkey tried to establish itself as a post-Assad Syria’s closest ally.

Syria has been Iran’s closest Middle Eastern ally since the Iranian revolution (Syria being the only Arab state to support Iran in the Iran-Iraq war). The Iran-Syria alliance has largely influenced the regional landscape ever since. Thus, Turkey and Iran became opposing stakeholders in Syria once Turkey decisively sided with anti-government forces. In recent years, Iranian officials have accused Turkey of sponsoring Salafist jihadist currents in Syria while Turkish officials have maintained that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) receives support from Iran. At Davos last month, Turkey and Iran’s foreigner ministers exchanged swipes at each other about the Syrian crisis’ sectarian dimensions.

Apart from generating approximately 600,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey, enduring bombings and inflamed sectarian tension within its own Alawite/Alevi communities, the most damaging effect of the Syrian crisis on Turkey has been its demonstration of the limits of Turkish power in the Middle East. Prior to the Arab Awakening, the ‘Turkish model’ was hailed across the region as a prototype for blending moderate Islamic politics in a democratic framework. Numerous polls found that Erdoğan was the most popular political leader on the Arab street. But his anti-Assad stance was maintained long after it became clear that Assad was not going anywhere, which prompted many in the region to perceive the AKP as a pan-Sunni Islamist force intent on empowering the Muslim Brotherhood. As the Syrian conflict became a regional crisis, the AKP’s “zero problems with neighbors” approach to foreign policy lay in tatters.

Ankara’s evolving Syria strategy has become more focused on the economic and security threats posed by continued conflict in Syria. Turkey must address the menace posed by foreign Salafist jihadist militants that have established a presence on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border, and the ongoing financial burden of meeting the Syrian refugees’ needs in Turkey. Within this context, Turkey has an interest in pursuing more cooperative relations with Iran, which shares its concerns about al-Qaeda’s footprint in Syria and other corners of the Arab world, while supporting international efforts to negotiate peace in Syria.

Regardless of how the conflict between the Assad regime and its enemies unfolds, it is likely that al-Qaeda-linked groups will maintain a presence in areas of Syria, including villages situated several miles south of the Turkish-Syrian border. Recent developments in western Iraq also indicate that Anbar province may become the new hub for such al-Qaeda-linked militias, as the Assad regime maintains an upper-hand in Syria’s bloody stalemate. Either way, with a growing al-Qaeda influence across the Levant, Turkey and Iran have every reason to continue their effort to enhance a security partnership as economic ties deepen.

Turbulence Rekindles an Old Friendship

Turkey now looks to Iran as a partner that can help Ankara mitigate the risks posed by the Syrian crisis, despite their divergent political aims in the conflict. This cooperative dynamic was underscored by Turkey’s insistence that Iran participate in Geneva II, despite opposition from other governments and elements within the Syrian rebellion.

Economic factors unrelated to Syria are also driving this realignment. Erdoğan traveled to Iran with his ministers for economy, energy and development in the hope of pursuing lucrative contracts in the aftermath of sanctions being loosened on Iran. Tehran expects bilateral trade to increase from $20 to $30 billion next year. Ankara also views the potential opening of Iran to the West as a strategic opportunity to reduce the impact of Turkey’s own economic challenges, which threaten to reduce the AKP’s grip on power in an election year.

The extent to which the two states can re-establish a deep partnership will remain limited by NATO’s military platform in Turkey and other regional issues where Ankara and Tehran’s interests diverge. The ultimate question will be whether the two countries’ common ground will outweigh their areas of disagreement, and to what extent other players in the region — such as Israel and Saudi Arabia — will influence the future of Turkish-Iranian relations.

In the longer term Tehran knows that Turkey will play a key role in building potential bridges between Iran and the West. Ankara knows that if it seeks greater influence within all corners of the Arab world, including Shia populations, a cordial relationship with Iran is important. Additionally, as a resource poor country, Turkey will continue to value an energy partnership with Iran. Thus, while the regional landscape remains complex and in motion, Turkey and Iran have more to gain than lose by continuing to build stronger ties.

Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions, Senior Advisor with Gnarus Advisors, and author of the book “Managing Country Risk”. Giorgio Cafiero is a research analyst with CRS based in Washington.

Reprinted with permission from Eurasia Review.

February 22, 2014
Turkey’s Wrong Turn

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was in Brussels last week seeking to repair relations with Europe, but the first place to look for a solution is within himself. Once hailed as the leader of a model Muslim democracy, he has created a political disaster at home, transforming Turkey into an authoritarian state that poses dangers not just for itself but for its allies in NATO, including the United States.

The latest turmoil has its roots in a political war between Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party and his former close allies who follow Fethullah Gulen, a moderate Islamic scholar who lives in Pennsylvania. The tensions erupted into the open last month with a corruption probe that led to the resignation of four government ministers and threatened to ensnare Mr. Erdogan’s family. The prime minister called the probe a “coup attempt” and blamed a “secret organization” within the judiciary and police directed by the Gulen movement and serving “foreign powers” like the United States and Israel. The government has since purged hundreds of police officials and prosecutors and sought to assert control over the judiciary. It also drafted legislation expanding the government’s power to appoint judges and prosecutors, further breaching judicial independence, and has prevented journalists from reporting freely. All the while, Mr. Erdogan has spewed endless conspiracy theories and incendiary rhetoric, even hinting at American treachery and suggesting that the American ambassador might be expelled.

The probe and Mr. Erdogan’s reaction may well be politically motivated. There are important local elections in March. But Mr. Erdogan should be insisting that the probe be fair and transparent, not trying to derail it. His ruthless ways and his attempt to crush dissent are not new, as the crackdown against demonstrators during protests last June showed. Such actions trample on democratic reforms demanded by the European Union as part of Turkey’s bid for union membership, which may be more in peril than ever, and are increasingly at odds with the ground rules for NATO members.

Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, was right when he said in Brussels that the Europeans must demand that Turkey return to the rule of law. The Obama administration also needs to send a strong message about the damaging course Mr. Erdogan is pursuing. Whether Turkey nurtures its hard-won democracy, which has contributed to its impressive economic growth, or turns authoritarian is as critical to regional stability and to its NATO allies as it is to Turks.

The New York Times, 27, JAN.2014

A VERSION OF THIS EDITORIAL APPEARS IN PRINT ON JANUARY 28, 2014, IN THE INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES.

January 28, 2014
Syrian Official: Turkey Responsible for Adra Massacre

TEHRAN (FNA)- A Syrian information official blamed the US and its regional allies, especially Turkey, for the massacre of the people in Adra where militants have slaughtered tens of civilians.

Head of Syria’s Information Ministry’s Center for Studies and Research Maladh Maqdad told Al Alam on Tuesday that Turkey is responsible for killing of Syrian people in Adra at the hands of militants who entered Syria’s soil by support of Turkey and received weapons through Turkish borders.

Al-Nusra Front militants, Al-Qaeda’s main branch in Syria war, attacked Adra in the Reef Damascus governorate last week and started executing civilians, some of them family by family.

It is not clear how many people have been killed in the town since access has been limited but some media reports indicate more than 80 people have been killed while the number is feared to be much higher.

Terrified survivors of the attack have been describing horrible atrocities carried out by the extremist in Adra.

Since the start of the war in Syria, the United States has shown that it is the leader of a coalition which is fighting against Syria, by managing its allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey and by the diplomatic and media coverage it has been giving in support of the war, Maqdad said.

“It was the united states that established the ‘free Syrian army’ and provided logistic and military support for it, and prevented the rebels to cooperate with (Syrian President) Bashar al-Assad when he proposed them to put down their arms and get amnesty and sit for talks,” he added.

The Syrian official said, Turkish government is acting under US supervision and is trying to overthrow the Syrian government and destroy Syria through sending arms for the militants with the help of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

He further noted that Ankara is facing criticism for its policies toward the crisis in Syria from parliament and people.

A new UN report said Turkey transferred more than 47 tons of arsenals to Syria militants.

The crisis in Syria started in March 2011, when pro-reform protests turned into a massive insurgency following the intervention of western and regional states.

The unrest, which took in terrorist groups from across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, has transpired as one of the bloodiest conflicts in recent history.

According to the United Nations, more than 120,000 people have been killed and millions displaced due to the turmoil that has gripped Syria for over two years.

via Farsnews.

December 18, 2013
Turkey’s popularity dives in MENA region poll

Turkey’s popularity dives in MENA region poll

Country’s approval in the region decreases significantly, especially in Egypt and Syria, Turkish think-tank study shows.

Umut Uras Last updated: 04 Dec 2013 19:28

Turkish government has been critical of the military rule in Egypt and the Syrian regime [AP]

Turkey’s popularity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has shrunk over last three years, with particular sharp drops among the Syrian and Egyptian public, a field study conducted by a Turkish think-tank says.While 78 percent of respondents in the 16 countries subject to the study had a positive view on Turkey in 2011, the percentage declined to 69 percent in 2012 and 59 percent in 2013.

Conducting the research for the fifth time, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) made phone interviews with 2,800 people in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Tunisia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Yemen and Libya. Respondents were asked questions on their views on Turkey as well as issues related to the MENA region in general.

In Egypt, Turkey’s approval rate was registered as 38 percent in 2013, whereas the same data was 84 percent in 2012 and 86 percent in 2011. Syrians’ support for Turkey was 22 percent in 2013, dropping from an already low rate of 28 percent in 2012 and 44 percent in 2011.

Following the July coup that overthrew Mohamed Morsi, the former Egyptian president, Turkey’s conservative Justice and Development Party government has been an outspoken critic of the new regime, frequently bashing its crackdowns in public statements and expressing support for Muslim Brotherhood-backed Morsi. The countries recently expelled each other’s ambassadors.

Similarly, Ankara has stood against the regime in Damascus in the Syrian crisis, expressing support for the opposition, harbouring thousands of Syrian refugees and letting armed rebels using its territory in various ways.

Syrians think Turkey is ‘unfriendly’

Eighty-eight percent of those surveyed in Syria think that the Turkish government has been “unfriendly” towards their country, while the same rate is 68 percent in Egypt. In Iraq, 58 percent of the people polled gave answers in the same direction.

Iraq’s Shia dominated government and Ankara have had a thorny relationship for the last couple of years as a result of sectarian tensions and Ankara’s close ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. Baghdad and the KRG have been in dispute over sharing of oil wealth, land and other issues.

The decline recorded [in Turkey’s popularity] in the last three years is due to the turmoil in the region and Turkey’s related policiesDr. Sabiha Senyucel, TESEV director and writer of the report

Meanwhile, among the interviewees, 90 percent in Libya, 88 percent in Tunisia, 87 percent in Palestine, 80 percent in Gulf Cooperation Council countries (excluding Saudi Arabia), 79 percent in Saudi Arabia and 78 percent in Iran believe the Turkish government is “very friendly” to their country.

“The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East Survey has been conducted for the last five years. Popularity of Turkey was very high in 2009. The decline recorded in the last three years is due to the turmoil in the region and Turkey’s related policies,” Dr. Sabiha Senyucel, the director of the TESEV’s foreign policy programme and one of the writers of the report, told Al Jazeera.

While 64 percent of those polled think that Turkey’s influence on MENA politics is growing day after day, a decreasing number of people believe Ankara should play a larger role in the region – decreased from 71 percent in 2011 to 60 percent in 2011. Fewer believe Turkey can be a model for the region compared to the previous two years, the rate dropping from 61 in 2011 percent to 51 percent in 2013. The rate is particularly low in Syria, Egypt and Iran, with a significant drop in Egypt’s approval rating.

Respondents increasingly think that Turkey is pursuing sectarian policies, with data increasing compared to 2012 in all of the subject countries. Thirty-eight percent said Turkey had been following sectarian policies, an increase of 9 percent from last year. The rate is 54 percent in Syria and 45 percent in Egypt, both increasing significantly.

In comparison, 65 percent said Iraq, 62 percent said Syria and 61 percent said Iran had been involved in sectarian policies.

“Respondents generally think that regional politics have become increasingly sectarian. Turkey’s policies are also seen as more sectarian than last year. Although I personally do not think this is the case [Ankara pursuing more sectarian policies], Turkey being perceived this way does not help its image in terms of neutrality,” Senyucel said.

Graph for Turkey story [Al Jazeera]

Middle East issues

Across the MENA region, the UAE is rated first in terms of positive perceptions, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In 2011 and 2012, Turkey topped the ranking.

Among the respondents in 16 countries, 43 percent said the coup was good for Egypt, whereas 46 percent said it was a bad development for the country.

Meanwhile, positive views on the Arab Spring have decreased. Only 37 percent said that the process had been good for their country – the ratio was 52 percent in 2011 and 44 percent in 2012.

In 2012, economic problems had topped the list of the most important regional issues in all 16 countries except Iraq, while in 2013 political issues and security/terrorism issues were frontrunners in various countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia. In Iraq and Libya, the Western presence or threat is seen as the number one issue of importance.

When respondents were asked about the most pressing issue in their home country – instead of the whole region – economic issues still far topped the list with 39 percent followed by security/terrorism issues at 16 percent.

Economic issues remained the far highest national concern for Iranians at 86 percent while 54 percent in Libya and 30 percent in Syria think security issues or terrorism is the most pressing national problem.

Regarding powers outside the region, positive perceptions on Russia and China have increased. The percentage of people thinking these country’s governments are friendly to their country stand at 80 and 71 percent respectively.

Source:

Al Jazeera

December 5, 2013
‘The near future of Iraq is dark’: Warning from Muqtada al-Sadr – the Shia cleric whose word is law to millions of his countrymen

In a rare interview at his headquarters in Najaf, he tells Patrick Cockburn of his fears for a nation growing ever more divided on sectarian lines

Patrick Cockburn

The future of Iraq as a united and independent country is endangered by sectarian Shia-Sunni hostility says Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia religious leader whose Mehdi Army militia fought the US and British armies and who remains a powerful figure in Iraqi politics. He warns of the danger that “the Iraqi people will disintegrate, its government will disintegrate, and it will be easy for external powers to control the country”.

In an interview with The Independent in the holy city of Najaf, 100 miles south-west of Baghdad – the first interview Mr Sadr has given face-to-face with a Western journalist for almost 10 years – he expressed pessimism about the immediate prospects for Iraq, saying: “The near future is dark.”

Mr Sadr said he is most worried about sectarianism affecting Iraqis at street level, believing that “if it spreads among the people it will be difficult to fight”. He says he believes that standing against sectarianism has made him lose support among his followers.

Mr Sadr’s moderate stance is key at a moment when sectarian strife has been increasing in Iraq – some 200 Shia were killed in the past week alone. For 40 years, Mr Sadr and religious leaders from his family have set the political trend within the Shia community in Iraq. Their long-term resistance to Saddam Hussein and, later, their opposition to the US-led occupation had a crucial impact.

Mr Sadr has remained a leading influence in Iraq after an extraordinary career in which he has often come close to being killed. Several times, it appeared that the political movement he leads, the Sadrist Movement, would be crushed.

He was 25 in 1999 when his father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, a revered Shia leader, and Mr Sadr’s two brothers were assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s gunmen in Najaf. He just survived sharing a similar fate, remaining under house arrest in Najaf until 2003 when Saddam was overthrown by the US invasion. He and his followers became the most powerful force in many Shia parts of Iraq as enemies of the old regime, but also opposing the occupation. In 2004, his Mehdi Army fought two savage battles against American troops in Najaf, and in Basra it engaged in a prolonged guerrilla war against the British Army which saw the Mehdi Army take control of the city.

The Mehdi Army was seen by the Sunni community as playing a central role in the sectarian murder campaign that reached its height in 2006-7. Mr Sadr says that “people infiltrated the Mehdi Army and carried out these killings”, adding that if his militiamen were involved in the murder of Sunnis he would be the first person to denounce them.

For much of this period, Mr Sadr did not appear to have had full control of forces acting in his name; ultimately he stood them down. At the same time, the Mehdi Army was being driven from its old strongholds in Basra and Sadr City by the US Army and resurgent Iraqi government armed forces. Asked about the status of the Mehdi Army today, Mr Sadr says: “It is still there but it is frozen because the occupation is apparently over. If it comes back, they [the Mehdi Army militiamen] will come back.”

In the past five years, Mr Sadr has rebuilt his movement as one of the main players in Iraqi politics with a programme that is a mixture of Shia religion, populism and Iraqi nationalism. After a strong showing in the general election in 2010, it became part of the present government, with six seats in the cabinet. But Mr Sadr is highly critical of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s performance during his two terms in office, accusing his administration of being sectarian, corrupt and incompetent.

Speaking of Mr Maliki, with whom his relations are increasingly sour, Mr Sadr said that “maybe he is not the only person responsible for what is happening in Iraq, but he is the person in charge”. Asked if he expected Mr Maliki to continue as Prime Minister, he said: “I expect he is going to run for a third term, but I don’t want him to.”

Mr Sadr said he and other Iraqi leaders had tried to replace him in the past, but Mr Maliki had survived in office because of his support from foreign powers, notably the US and Iran. “What is really surprising is that America and Iran should decide on one person,” he said. “Maliki is strong because he is supported by the United States, Britain and Iran.”

Mr Sadr is particularly critical of the government’s handling of the Sunni minority, which lost power in 2003, implying they had been marginalised and their demands ignored. He thinks that the Iraqi government lost its chance to conciliate Sunni protesters in Iraq who started demonstrating last December, asking for greater civil rights and an end to persecution.

“My personal opinion is that it is too late now to address these [Sunni] demands when the government, which is seen as a Shia government by the demonstrators, failed to meet their demands,” he said. Asked how ordinary Shia, who make up the great majority of the thousand people a month being killed by al-Qa’ida bombs, should react, Mr Sadr said: “They should understand that they are not being attacked by Sunnis. They are being attacked by extremists, they are being attacked by external powers.”

As Mr Sadr sees it, the problem in Iraq is that Iraqis as a whole are traumatised by almost half a century in which there has been a “constant cycle of violence: Saddam, occupation, war after war, first Gulf war, then second Gulf war, then the occupation war, then the resistance – this would lead to a change in the psychology of Iraqis”. He explained that Iraqis make the mistake of trying to solve one problem by creating a worse one, such as getting the Americans to topple Saddam Hussein but then having the problem of the US occupation. He compared Iraqis to “somebody who found a mouse in his house, then he kept a cat, then he wanted to get the cat out of the house so he kept a dog, then to get the dog out of his house he bought an elephant, so he bought a mouse again”.

Asked about the best way for Iraqis to deal with the mouse, Mr Sadr said: “By using neither the cat nor the dog, but instead national unity, rejection of sectarianism, open-mindedness, having open ideas, rejection of extremism.”

A main theme of Mr Sadr’s approach is to bolster Iraq as an independent nation state, able to make decisions in its own interests. Hence his abiding hostility to the American and British occupation, holding this responsible for many of Iraq’s present ills. To this day, neither he nor anybody from his movement will meet American or British officials. But he is equally hostile to intervention by Iran in Iraqi affairs saying: “We refuse all kinds of interventions from external forces, whether such an intervention was in the interests of Iraqis or against their interests. The destiny of Iraqis should be decided by Iraqis themselves.”

This is a change of stance for a man who was once demonised by the US and Britain as a pawn of Iran. The strength of the Sadrist movement under Mr Sadr and his father – and its ability to withstand powerful enemies and shattering defeats – owes much to the fact it that it blends Shia revivalism with social activism and Iraqi nationalism.

Why are Iraqi government members so ineffective and corrupt? Mr Sadr believes that “they compete to take a share of the cake, rather than competing to serve their people”

Asked why the Kurdistan Regional Government had been more successful in terms of security and economic development than the rest of Iraq, Mr Sadr thought there was less stealing and corruption among the Kurds and maybe because “they love their ethnicity and their region”. If the government tried to marginalise them, they might ask for independence: “Mr Massoud Barzani [the KRG President] told me that ‘if Maliki pushes on me harder, we are going to ask for independence’.”

At the end of the interview Mr Sadr asked me if I was not frightened of interviewing him and would not this make the British Government consider me a terrorist? Secondly, he wondered if the British Government still considered that it had liberated the Iraqi people, and wondered if he should sue the Government on behalf of the casualties caused by the British occupation.

independent.co.uk, 29 November 2013

November 29, 2013
Cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestinian Conflicts

Gulnara İnanch, director of «Etnoqlobus» (ethnoglobus.az ) International Online information analyses center, editor Russian sector turkishnews.com

Political processes occurring in the Middle East gave a new stimulus to geopolitical events. Arabic Spring, although contrasting, opened a new phase for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, it began to require new game conditions.

There have really been geopolitical times when partial or phase-by-phase solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict seemed to be possible. For example, in 2009 official Baku almost was able to get consent of world’s leading powers regarding liberation of 5 regions around Nagorno-Karabakh being under Armenian occupation. Armenian government also agreed for it instead hoping for softening of blockade from Azerbaijan side.

At that time, with the pressure of White House and European Union, Armenia-Turkey negotiations were underway. West wishing to exert influence on Russia through Armenia was insisting on opening of borders between Turkey-Armenia.

For implementation of this plan, military operations were to commence and Armenian military forces were to be driven out from the occupied territories. These operations would calm down Armenian nationalists thus persuading Armenian society about necessity of returning 5 regions. In that case, Armenian site would not loose their image while signing of treaty regarding solution of first phase of the conflict.(1)

That phase, much to our regret, was not completed. As the gas projects of Caspian Sea had not been defined accurately at that time, West and Russia postponed to use the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a tool for pressure.

Now there is new a chance, as we have already mentioned above, for phase-by-phase solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This time, along with West, East players also join the game. Azerbaijan, thanks to regulated and future intended policy, has become a new political and economic center not only in the region, but also in all over the world, including in the Islamic world.

While investigating current phase of the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we focus on two states having special relations with Azerbaijan – Iran and Palestine. In autumn 2012 UN General Assembly adopted a resolution regarding giving Palestine non-Member Observer State status as a result of which world community began to see Palestine as an independent state in the Middle East. It should be noted that the fact that Palestine, which had to be established as a state in 1947 along with Israel upon the Decision of United Nations, already is being recognized as a state amid “Arabic Spring”.

It should be noted that it is not accidental that Azerbaijan also voted for giving Palestine non-Member Observer State status in the United Nations. Official Baku has always supported establishment of Palestinian state and division of Quds.

After the visit of Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov to Ramallah in the spring of 2013, bilateral relations began to develop fast. Palestinian Foreign Minister has noted high reputation of Azerbaijan in several respected organizations such as UN Security Council, Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Non-Aligned Movement. (3) Thus, Ramallah has hinted its hopes for future support by Azerbaijan in the mentioned organizations.

Azerbaijan, for the purpose of helping Quds and Palestine, hosted the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Foreign Ministers‘ Conferences in June. In this conference Azerbaijan put forward initiative of providing aid in the amount of 5 million dollars to important facilities in Quds.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Palestine had never been so positive. Palestine-Azerbaijan relations give both sides mutual benefits from political, economic, trade and cultural point of view. Next year forum of Azerbaijani and Palestinian traders and businessmen will be held in Azerbaijan. (2)

Beginning from last year official Baku started to work for recognition and socialization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Islamic world aiming at recognition of status of Quds for Nagorno-Karabakh in the Islamic world. This issue was also on the agenda during Mammadyarov’s visit to Ramallah. In order to popularize this issue, Palestine may direct the attention of the Islamic world to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue thus achieving support of Islamic world in solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan.

On the other hand, by supporting Quds, it is possible to neutralize possible impact of world’s Armenian lobby living in Arabic countries on policy of these Arabian states.

Another factor in phase-by-phase solution of the conflict and achieving the status of the Islamic word’s problem for the Nagorno-Karabakh is Iran. During the visit of Ramiz Mehdiyev, head of Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan and Sheikh-ul-Islam Haji Allahshukur Pashazadeh, chairman of Caucasian Muslim Board (CMB) to Iran in April, focusing on Quds and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in the Islamic world and international community in parallel was discussed. Promises of Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mohsen Pak Ayin to protect any state supporting Palestinian people, on which both Iran and Azerbaijan have the same views, reconfirm the position of official Tehran on the conflict (4).

Iranian ambassador in his interview gave explanation on his view: «Iran wants to use its resources in the solution of the conflict. Official Tehran has prepared a plan for parties about solution of the conflict. In case of necessity, we will submit it.» (5)

As the geography of tension in the Middle East expands, Iran, for the purpose of establishment of stability and peace in the region, tries to achieve solution of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Tehran thinks that any kind of disorder of security in the region will have negative impact on Iran.

Both Baku and Tehran have the same views on OSCE Minsk Group’s insufficient activity in the solution of the conflict. Tehran also highlights that only regional states can be helpful in the solution of the conflict.

Statement by Supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei on the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is important from the point of Tehran: “Karabakh is the Islamic land … Karabakh and the issue of its belonging to Azerbaijan will be supported.

… No matter how times passes we will not forget the fact that Karabakh is the Islamic lands. Karabakh will be freed by the muslim Azerbaijani nation”.

Researches show that Iran is seeking the ways how to be involved in the solution of the conflict.

There are opportunities for Azerbaijan, Palestine and Iran to take advantage of the situations occurred in the world. Iran, in order to demonstrate that it is not going to be satisfied just with promises, holds events in Tabriz dedicated to the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict thus aiming at popularizing the Karabakh problem among the Azerbaijanis living in Iran in the level of Quds problem.

Iran has a chance to be involved in the solution process of the problem since it is cooperating with both conflicting parties. However, Iran will have to demonstrate that it is not the country supporting Armenia as it is widely thought in Azerbaijan and prove that words of Iranian Supreme Leader “we have the same blood running in the veins” are not just the word.

According to Azeri experts, Azerbaijan will ask Iran to impose economic sanctions against Armenia and if Iran fulfils Azerbaijan’s wish, Iran will be considered as a friend country in the view of Azerbaijanis. (6)

In this regard, thoughts that R.Mehdiyev stated in Iran characterize the intention of official Baku: «Azerbaijan considers Iran its older friend. Azerbaijan attaches huge importance to Iran’s support. We consider that our countries should be next to and support each-other. We think that it is reasonable to have strong and stable Iran in the neighborhood ». (7)

With Iran’s newly elected president Hassan Rouhani there are hopes all over the world on elimination of long lasting tensions with official Tehran. Because all the regional countries, including Azerbaijan gets its share from the tensions around Iran. In bilateral relations of Azerbaijan Iran is considered as sensitive guest which prevents official Baku to play open game in its foreign policy as a result of which we occasionally witness tensions between our countries.

Latest meetings in Tehran and Baku between Iranian and Azerbaijani officials enable us to think that relations between these countries are in new flat. Establishment of mutual confidence between our countries may allow Iran and Azerbaijan to join efforts in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Quds conflicts.

German chancellor Angela Merkel has cheered Iran’s proposal to be mediator in Syrian problem. France also would like to see Tehran among the mediators holding negotiations with Damascus. Telephone calls between the Iranian and US presidents after long year’s political stagnation, particularly, agreement achieved in Geneva on 23 November on Iran’s nuclear program allow us to believe in serious changes to occur in the region. In this case, in order to demonstrate that West is sincere to build amicable relations with Iran, it may involve Iran as a mediator in the solution of regional conflict, including in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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7. Azerbaijan in the world, ADA Biweekly Newsletter, vol 6,№ 14. jule 15, 2013

November 27, 2013