Category: Israel

  • U.S.:  Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who’s the Greatest Threat of All?

    U.S.: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who’s the Greatest Threat of All?

    Analysis by Daniel Luban and Jim Lobe*

    WASHINGTON, May 10 (IPS) – A potentially major clash appears to be developing between powerful factions inside and outside the U.S. government, pitting those who see the Afghanistan/Pakistan (“AfPak”) theatre as the greatest potential threat to U.S. national security against those who believe that the danger posed by a nuclear Iran must be given priority.

    The Iran hawks, concentrated within the Israeli government and its U.S. supporters in the so-called “Israel lobby” here, want to take aggressive action against Iran’s nuclear programme by moving quickly to a stepped-up sanctions regime.

    Many suggest that Israel or the U.S. may ultimately have to use military force against Tehran if President Barack Obama’s diplomatic efforts at engagement do not result at least in a verifiable freeze – if not a rollback – of the programme by the end of the year.

    Their opponents appear to be concentrated at the Pentagon, where top leaders are more concerned with providing a level of regional stability that will allow the U.S. to wind down its operations in Iraq, step up its counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan, and, above all, ensure the security of the Pakistani state and its nuclear weapons.

    In their view, any attack on Iran would almost certainly throw the entire region into even greater upheaval. Both Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have repeatedly and publicly warned over the past year against any moves that would further destabilise the region.

    Other key administration players are believed to share this view, including senior military officers such as Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Adm. Dennis Blair and Gen. Douglas Lute, the “war czar” whose White House portfolio includes both Iraq and South Asia.

    The divide between these factions was on vivid display this past week, when Washington played host to two high-profile – and dissonant – events.

    First, top U.S. and Israeli leaders were out in force at the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the powerful and hawkish lobby group, where attendees heard a steady drumbeat of dire warnings about the “existential threat” to Israel of an Iranian bomb and calls for increased sanctions – and occasionally even military force – against Tehran.

    Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan were rarely mentioned at the conference, which instead stressed hopes for building a U.S.-led coalition against Tehran that would include both Israel and “moderate” Sunni-led Arab states.

    But just as more than 6,000 AIPAC delegates fanned out Wednesday across Capitol Hill to press their lawmakers to sign on to tough anti-Iran sanctions legislation, the arrival of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari for summit talks with Obama and other top officials focused attention on the deteriorating situation in both countries.

    The surface cordiality of Karzai’s and Zardari’s visits masked the fact that the U.S. has grown increasingly worried about the ability of either leader to combat their respective Taliban insurgencies.

    Most indications are that the Obama administration, including Obama himself and Vice President Joe Biden, sides with the Pentagon, at least for now.

    But the AIPAC conference, which was attended by more than half of the members of the U.S. Congress and featured speeches by the top Congressional leadership of both parties, served as a reminder that Iran hawks within the Israel lobby have a strong foothold in the legislative branch, and may be able to push Iran to the top of the foreign-policy agenda whether the administration likes it or not.

    Obama pledged during the presidential campaign that he would give AfPak – which he then called the “central front in the war on terror” – top priority, and, since taking office, he has made good on that promise.

    He appointed a powerful special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, with a broad mandate to take charge of U.S. diplomacy in the region. Holbrooke, who met briefly with a senior Iranian official during a conference at The Hague in late March, has said several times that Tehran has an important role to play in stabilising Afghanistan.

    At the same time, Mullen, the U.S. military chief, has been virtually “commuting” to and from the region to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, Holbrooke noted in Congressional testimony this week.

    Given its preoccupation with AfPak and with stabilising the region as a whole, the Pentagon has naturally been disinclined to increase tensions with Iran, which shares lengthy borders with Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and could easily make life significantly more difficult for the U.S. in each of the three countries.

    But the new Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pushing the U.S. to confront Iran over its nuclear programme, and his allies in the U.S. have similarly argued that Iran should be a top priority.

    For the moment, the Iran hawks have mostly expressed muted – if highly sceptical – support for Obama’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran. But they have warned that this outreach must have a “short and hard end date”, as Republican Sen. Jon Kyl put it at the AIPAC conference, at which point the U.S. must turn to harsher measures.

    AIPAC’s current top legislative priority is a bill, co-sponsored by Kyl and key Democrats, that would require Obama to impose sanctions on foreign firms that export refined petroleum products to Iran.

    In recent Congressional testimony, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the administration would support such “crippling” sanctions against Tehran if diplomacy did not work, but she declined to say how long the administration would permit diplomatic efforts to play out before taking stronger action.

    While sanctions seem to be the topic du jour, the possibility of military action against Tehran remains on everybody’s mind, as does the question of whether Israel would be willing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities without Washington’s approval.

    In March, Netanyahu told The Atlantic that “if we have to act, we will act, even if America won’t.”

    Asked at the AIPAC conference whether Israel would attack Iran without a “green light” from the U.S., former Israeli deputy defence minister Ephraim Sneh joked that in Israel, stoplight signals are “just a recommendation.”

    By contrast, Pentagon officials have made little secret of their opposition. In late April, Gates told the Senate Appropriations committee that a military strike would only delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear capability while “send[ing] the programme deeper and more covert”.

    Last month, Mullen told the Wall Street Journal that an Israeli attack would pose “exceptionally high risks” to U.S. interests in the region. (Although the newspaper chose not to publish this part of the interview, Mullen’s office provided a record to IPS.)

    Similarly, Biden told CNN in April that an Israeli military strike against Tehran would be “ill-advised”. And former National Security Advisor (NSA) Brent Scowcroft, who is close to both Gates and the current NSA, ret. Gen. James Jones, told a conference here late last month that such an attack would be a “disaster for everybody.”

    For the moment, the top Pentagon leadership’s resistance to an attack on Iran appears to be playing a major role in shaping the debate in Washington.

    Gates “is a bulwark against those who want to go to war in Iran or give the green light for Israel to go to war”, said former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski last month.

    Others dispute the idea, proposed by Netanyahu in his speech to AIPAC, that the Iranian threat can unite Israel and the Arab states.

    “The Israeli notion making the rounds these days that Arab fears of Iran might be the foundation for an alignment of interest is almost certainly wrong,” wrote Marc Lynch, a professor at George Washington University, on the Foreign Policy website.

    “Nothing would unite Arab opinion faster than an Israeli attack on Iran. The only thing which might change that would be serious movement towards a two state solution [in Israel-Palestine].”

    *Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.

    Source:  www.ipsnews.net, May 10 2009

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.

  • UN report condemns Israel over Gaza war

    UN report condemns Israel over Gaza war

    tolA United Nations investigation yesterday accused Israel of “reckless disregard” for human life in using white phosphorus munitions that killed and injured Palestinians sheltering in a UN school during the Gaza war.

    The four-man UN panel, led by Ian Martin, a former head of Amnesty International, confirmed that smoke projectiles containing white phosphoros had twice struck UN premises, causing two deaths.

    The UN board had a limited mandate to investigate the nine worst attacks on UN premises and vehicles during the war earlier this year.

    It found the Israel Defence Forces responsible for seven of those attacks, including one it described as a “direct and intentional strike into UN premises” that killed three young men at a UN school in Asma.

    The UN panel blamed “a Palestinian faction, most likely Hamas” for one attack using a homemade Qassam rocket on a UN warehouse at the Karni crossing, saying the rocket was probably aimed at Israel but fell short. It was unable to establish responsibility for the ninth incident.

    In the highly publicised case of the shelling of the UN’s Jabalia school on January 6, panel-members demanded that Israel apologise for falsely claiming that it was responding to Hamas mortar fire when it attacked, killing up to 40 people in the vicinity and injuring seven people inside.

    Israel also wrongly claimed Hamas had fired from a UN field office it hit with artillery fire, the panel said.

    “These allegations were untrue, continued to be made after it ought to have been known that they were untrue, and were not adequately withdrawn and publicly regretted,” the panel said.

    The UN panel documented Israel’s use of white phosphoros munitions that hit the UN compound in Gaza City and the UN’s Beit Lahia school.

    Two children, aged 5 and 7, were killed by shards of projectile casings at the Beit Lahia school on January 5 and smoke from the burning white phosphorus injured others.

    “The firing by the IDF of projectiles containing white phosphorus in such close promixity to the school as to cause the death of two young children and serious injuries to others, as well as property damage, was highly negligent and amounted to reckless disregard for the lives and safety of those sheltering in the school,” an unclassifed 28-page summary of the 184-page report said.

    Israel’s deputy UN Ambassador, Daniel Carmon, called the report “biased” and “one-sided”.

    Source:  www.timesonline.co.uk, May 6, 2009

  • Israel must accept Palestinian state, Joe Biden says

    Israel must accept Palestinian state, Joe Biden says

    Vice-President Joe Biden placed America on a collision course with Israel on Tuesday, urging the new government to accept the goal of a Palestinian state and stop expanding Jewish settlements on occupied land.

    By Alex Spillius in Washington
    Last Updated: 11:16PM BST 05 May 2009

    U.S. Vice President Joe Biden at a media conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels Photo: AP

    Mr Biden used an address to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee – the leading pro-Israeli lobby group in the United States – to deliver a tough message to Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s new prime minister.

    “Israel has to work for a two-state solution,” said Mr Biden. “You’re not going to like my saying this, but not build more settlements, dismantle existing outposts and allow Palestinians freedom of movement.”

    Mr Netanyahu, by contrast, has not accepted the principle of a Palestinian state and his government plans to build more homes inside existing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. It has also refrained from removing any of the illegal settler outposts that Mr Biden mentioned. Meanwhile, hundreds of checkpoints scattered across the West Bank continue to restrict the freedom of movement of Palestinians.

    Mr Biden’s comments brought the differences between America and Israel into the open. They came ahead of Mr Netanyahu’s first official visit to Washington, expected later this month.

    The new prime minister, who leads a coalition government in which Right-wing parties have the most influence, told the AIPAC conference by satellite that he was ready to begin peace talks with the Palestinians “the sooner the better”. But Mr Netanyahu made no reference to the possibility of a Palestinian state.

    Instead, he outlined a “triple track” approach to peace, a strategy that emphasises political, economic and security schemes to resolve the conflict.

    On the economic track, Mr Netanyahu said Israel was prepared to remove as many obstacles as possible to advance the Palestinian economy.

    “I want to see Palestinian youngsters know that they have a future,” he said. “I want them not to be hostage to a cult of death, and despair and hate.”

    Privately, British officials predict that Mr Netanyahu will eventually accept the principle of Palestinian statehood, largely because of American pressure. But they believe he will hold out for a while in order to avoid being seen to give way easily.

    In his speech, Mr Biden was careful to call on the Palestinian Authority to “combat terror and incitement against Israel”. He stressed that the US would never abandon its commitment to Israel’s security. Mr Biden also sought to reassure Israel’s supporters that the administration’s conciliatory approach towards Iran was not open-ended and the goal of preventing the Islamic republic from acquiring nuclear weapons remained unchanged. “We are intensely focused on avoiding the grave danger … of a nuclear armed Iran,” said the Vice-President.

    Meanwhile, a United Nations inquiry was deeply critical of the Israeli army’s behaviour during the offensive in the Gaza Strip in January.

    It blamed Israeli forces for six of the nine incidents when UN buildings in Gaza were attacked, causing death and injuries to people sheltering inside.

    Source:  www.telegraph.co.uk, 05 May 2009

  • Kurdish Jewish History Arrives In Baltimore

    Kurdish Jewish History Arrives In Baltimore

    Kurdish-Jewish history preserved by author and son of an immigrant.

    Rochelle Eisenberg
    Staff Writer

    ariel-sabar

    When Ariel Sabar was growing up in Los Angeles, he was embarrassed by the exotic ways of his immigrant Kurdish-Jewish father, Dr. Yona Sabar. Dr. Sabar, a professor of Aramaic at the University of California-Los Angeles, was born and raised in the remote northern Iraqi village of Zakho.

    Years later, Mr. Sabar decided to travel to Zakho with his father. The result is “My Father’s Paradise: A Son’s Search For His Jewish Past In Kurdish Iraq” (Algonquin Books), winner of the 2008 National Book Critics Circle Award for autobiography.

    Next Thursday, May 7, at 7 p.m., Mr. Sabar will speak at the Center for Jewish Education, at 5750 Park Heights Ave., about his book as part of CJE’s “On The Same Page” initiative. The program was piloted two years to bring together Jewish adults to discuss books with Jewish themes.

    The BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMES spoke recently with Mr. Sabar. He worked as a journalist for 15 years, including three years as an investigative reporter at the Baltimore Sun.

    Why did you write the book?

    I was the consummate 1980s L.A. boy. I bought into the L.A. mythology. I boogie-boarded, bought my clothing at a surf shop. As I saw it through a boy’s eyes, my dad didn’t fit in. He didn’t know how to dress, he cut his own hair. I kept him at arm’s length

    The turning point in my life was the birth of my own son, Seth, in 2002. When you have your own kid, it changes your perspective of your relationship with your parents. I felt I was unfair to my own father.

    I also was drawn to the story about a forgotten-but-ancient group of Jews who were part of the oldest community of the Diaspora.

    What was your biggest surprise in Zakho?

    I heard that in Kurdistan (sic), the Jews and Muslims got along. I always was skeptical.

    People knew immediately we were Jews. The first thing the hosts said was, “Welcome to your home.” They invited us to drink tea and eat elaborate meals. There were still fond memories of Jewish life.

    Saddam Hussein tried to rename the Jewish quarter “the Liberated Quarter.” He didn’t want a trace. [After Saddam’s overthrow], my dad’s hometown went back to calling it “the Jewish Quarter.”

    What do you see as disheartening today between Jews and Muslims?

    People look at Iraq and read the headlines. There is this assumption that this was always the way, that they hated each other all the time. The story of the Kurdish Jews and the Jews in Iraq was that when the Israelites were exiled, they formed a pretty good pluralistic society. There were problems, but nothing of the scale of what was seen in Europe.

    What can American Jews learn from the history of the Kurdish Jews?

    What we can take away is the value of reaffirming our ties to our families’ histories. One of the themes of the book is that in the face of so much change, what can we hold on to? Make an effort to talk to grandparents, write down or video their stories and discus what it is about the past you want to preserve.

    Any stories from people you met on your book tours?

    Once or twice, a father of Mideastern background, in one case an Iraqi and in one case even a Kurdish Jew, said to me, “Now I have something to pass on to my child.”

    One son said, “I had no idea I had this history. I didn’t realize we had a rich past.”

    What also came out of the book tour were documents and memoirs that were given to me. I’ve became a repository of Kurdish Jews. I hope to maintain the e-mails and documents that people sent to me.

    What’s your next project?

    It was inspired by the story of how my parents met. My father was in his first year in New York and thinking of going back to Israel. America was not what it seemed. He sees a woman entering Washington Square park, taking photos of people who didn’t succeed in America. It reminded him of the Kurds in Israel. He talked to her and they got married four months later.

    I want to find other stories of people with strikingly different backgrounds, who happen to meet by chance in New York iconic public places.

    Anything else?

    A big Iraqi magazine wrote a four-page spread on the book. I have made friends on Facebook with Kurds in Turkey. An Arab radio station did a piece. The book is being translated into Hebrew, to be published later this year or early next year, and the Dutch have bought the rights to the book. You see the way the book is being received by all three faiths. It’s an affirmation.

    Source:  www.jewishtimes.com, May 1, 2009

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-syrian-security-cooperation-testing-turkish-foreign-policy/