Category: Israel

  • Leveretts shout, Israel and the lobby are pushing us to war with Iran

    Leveretts shout, Israel and the lobby are pushing us to war with Iran

    by PHILIP WEISS

    This smart piece on Netanyahu and the lobby pushing for Iranian war is savagely titled: “Who Will Be Blamed for a U.S. Attack on Iran?” Hillary Mann Leverett and Flynt Leverett make the distinction between the “Jewish community”‘s non-responsibility for the last disaster, Iraq, and the “pro-Israel intellectuals,” including Ken Pollack and the neocons (guilty). (Yes but how many precincts of the Jewish community gave these stupid ideas aid and comfort, including the Union for Reform Judaism?)

    The message of the Leveretts overall seems to be “Shout it from the rooftops now, while there’s still time. Israel wants the U.S. to attack Iran. This is Netanyahu’s wish, the wish of his government, above all, and of American Likud promoters and agents. And if it happens, the disaster will have been brought to us by Israel.” The boldface emphasis is theirs:

    At least in theory, Obama could say “no” to Netanyahu’s exhortations—but that “no” would become public knowledge within roughly 15 minutes of its ostensibly private delivery.  And, if our assessment of timing is correct, Obama’s “no” would become public knowledge as the President’s re-election bid is gearing up in a serious way.

    If Obama says anything other than “no” to Netanyahu, the United States will be committed to military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets.  A U.S. attack on Iran would almost certainly result in a much broader confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic—with residual U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq at high risk, the strategic outcomes from our military adventures in both of those countries in even deeper jeopardy, profoundly negative effects on the global economy, and international perceptions that reckless and “rogue” U.S. behavior in the strategically vital Middle East was an idiosyncratic feature of George W. Bush’s presidency forever shattered.  These eminently foreseeable consequences would have a devastating impact on America’s standing in one of the world’s most important regions.

    Some critics of the American invasion of Iraq argue that this decision reflected undue influence by Israel and parts of the pro-Israel community in the United States.  As individuals who served at the White House on the National Security Council staff in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, we saw no evidence that Israeli officials and leaders of the American Jewish community (as opposed to some pro-Israel intellectuals like the Saban Center’s Ken Pollack and neoconservative policymakers in the Bush Administration) goaded the United States into invading Iraq.  However, if Washington initiates war with Iran over the nuclear issue, it will be primarily in response to pressure from Israel and the more Likudnik parts of the pro-Israel community in the United States.  And those actors will bear a significant share of the blame for the consequences of that war.

    https://mondoweiss.net/2010/07/leveretts-shout-israel-and-the-lobby-are-pushing-us-to-war-with-iran/, 12 July 2010

  • The Consequences of Conflating Religion, Race, Nationality and Citizenship

    The Consequences of Conflating Religion, Race, Nationality and Citizenship

    Jewish National FundWritten by Joseph Schechla

    Much has been written, forgotten and written again over the past century on the subject of Zionism and Israel’s unique civil status categories and corresponding practices. For a person with a long life and memory, it may be surprising to find that the crucial distinction between nationality and citizenship in Israel is news to so many people concerned with the conflict and problem of Zionism. Understandably for observers not regularly engaged in the conflict, such as human rights treaty body members, the concept has been a revelation.1

    Why is this fundamental distinction, with its corresponding terminology, a new frontier for others, including many Palestinians long disadvantaged by the institutionalization and material consequences of that very distinction in practice?

    A partial answer may lie in the nature and history of anti-Zionism outside Palestine, which has experienced waves and currents since Jewish nationalism first sprang from its eugenic “primordial soup” in race-obsessed fin-de-siècle Europe.2 The Zionist notion that people of Jewish faith constituted a “race” offended emancipationist Jews first and foremost then. That quintessential premise of Zionist ideology and its colonial movement reverted to a presumed, albeit long-discredited, theory that was popular with Jew haters. They and other racists have always sought, conceptually at first, to assert a convincing distinction of the denigrated group so as to socialize the notion that they (the inferior lot) are not like us (self-acclaimed superior beings). The most ambitious racists have tried to invoke scientific – even genetic – criteria for their arguments.

    Monumental thinkers and activists, including the Jewish emancipationist Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), had already struggled intensely to rid Europeans of Jewish faith – and their neighbors – of the convenient falsehood that practitioners of Judaism formed a single, alien bloodline. Such intellectual contributions to debunking that racist notion include a long pedigree of biblical scholars, from Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918), who influenced Hebrew Union College President Rabbi Nelson Glueck (1900–71), who, in turn, mentored Rabbi Elmer Berger (1908–96), who later became the American Council for Judaism’s unwaveringly anti-Zionist executive director.

    Advocates of the emancipation of Jews as equal citizens living in democracy – a condition distinct and apart from assimilation3 – also include such notable figures as Berr Isaac Berr (1744–1828), Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), Johann Jacoby (1805–77), Gabriel Riesser (1806–63), and Lionel Nathan Rothschild (1808–79), who drew much of their philosophical inspiration from, and indeed were part of European Enlightenment. As Berger explains, the emancipationist tradition descending from Mendelssohn’s intellectual line sought not only to be free from anti-Semitism, whose proponents sought to characterize people of Jewish faith as a separate “race,” but also from the oppressive Jewish community leadership, exemplified by the stifling authoritarianism and ritualistic religiosity of the shtetl.4

    The emancipationist and, at once, anti-Zionist wave in North America drew on this liberal tradition to oppose the Zionist institutions, which embodied much of what the emancipationists in the “Old World” struggled against for centuries, especially the conflation of the Jewish faith with “race.” That Jewish emancipationist wave crested in the late 1960s, as Zionist myths and the power of Zionist institutions dwarfed the American Council for Judaism, the Reform Movement’s most important organized emancipationist anti-Zionist force. The Council was reduced to a mere shadow of its former self, and the affiliated senior advocates of anti-Zionism in that period, including Rabbi Henry Cohen (1863–1952), Judah Magnes (1877–1948), Rabbi Louis Wolsey (1877–1953), Rabbi Abraham Cronbach (1882–1965), Rabbi Morris Lazaron (1888–1979), Lessing J. Rosenwald (1891–1979), Moshe Menuhin (1893–1983) and Rabbi Elmer Berger, alas, have all passed away.

    At least a generation now has intervened since most of these anti-Zionist advocates deceased, and two generations have lapsed since the decline of the American Council for Judaism. While some of that history and its continuity are accessible on the current Council’s website,5 the enduring and most commonly identifiable Jewish anti-Zionist positions arise from either the Marxist or Orthodox traditions. The recent book by Shlomo Sand that exposes the constructed myth of a “Jewish people/nation”6 makes no reference to predecessor Elmer Berger, despite his prolific writing on the subject for half of the 20th Century.7

    Benefiting from the arguments of the emancipationist tradition, we can better understand the problem they found with the concept of a “Jewish race,” a “Jewish people” and/or, especially, “Jewish nationality.” The institutionalization of this concept, with its grave material consequences for the indigenous people under Israeli rule, reveals how the “Jewish race/people/nationality” concept violates a bundle of human rights of the Palestinian people. In the prophetic writing of Elmer Berger, for example, empowering and funding institutions set up to implement this constructed distinction can only be harmful to Jews and impede – even reverse – their emancipation in democratic countries. However, applied in a country of mixed population and in the context of colonization, where those Zionist institutions operate to privilege people “of Jewish race or descendancy,” it would also predictably harm the “non-Jewish” population.

    And so it has come to pass.

    It Harms Jews

    As the Jewish emancipationists teach us, “Jewish nationality” is a concept arising from Zionist ideology that has become enshrined in the charters of the principal Zionist institutions engaged in colonizing Palestine since the end of the 19th Century (World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency8 and Jewish National Fund9). Thus, even before the Zionist colonization project found resources and other means to colonize Palestine, the very codification of such a racialist concept, particularly by institutions populated and affiliated with Jews, could not have been more objectionable.

    It Promotes a Racist Classification of Jews

    For Jewish emancipationists, for centuries advocating common citizenship and nondiscrimination guaranteed by the democratic state, the notion of a “Jewish race,” as such, undermines the pursuit of equal status for all people of Jewish faith, or of any creed or color. Zionism creates an unwanted barrier between them and their neighbors. The creation of a race identity for Jews encourages stereotyping and seeks to provide a scientific basis for discrimination. While this concerned the emancipationist Jew directly, the promotion of a “Jewish race” also runs counter to more general efforts to combat the ideological falsehood of racism.

    In fact, humans are far more genetically similar than other species. They are all homo sapien sapiens, without subspecies. Any superficial differences manifest as a result of three possible processes: random mutations, natural adaptations to climate and environment, and personal selection. The last of these involves the physical mixing of new genetic material through procreation by otherwise distant partners brought together by choice, travel, migration, conquest or trade.

    The use of “race” as a means of justifying the exploitation of a human group or groups by others is inherently immoral. Such racism has been condemned by scientists, law makers and diplomats at the international level. A UNESCO statement following World War II, The Race Question, reflects the collaboration of leading natural and social scientists commonly rejecting race theories and a morally condemning racism.10 That consensus statement suggested, in particular, to “drop the term ‘race’ altogether and speak of ‘ethnic groups.’”11 In the post-Nazi era, “Jewish race” is an anachronism.

    It Claims to Act on Behalf of All Jews

    The concept of “Jewish race” incorporated in the charters of the Zionist institutions, thus, became coupled with the Zionist political program. The objective of colonizing Palestine to create a “Jewish national home” implied that such an enterprise was being carried out in the name of, and on the behalf of all people of Jewish faith. The Jewish objection to such a generalization was grounded in the value and fact of free will among individual Jews, regardless of the individual’s position on the colonization of Palestine. Open inquiry and debate has been a time-honored Jewish methodological tradition. The Zionist cry for all Jews to rally to the colonial project on the basis of an involuntary and immutable affiliation to a “Jewish race” was seen as alien and antidemocratic on its face. The conformism required by Zionist leaders, theories and institutions led to eventual bullying tactics against non-compliant Jews.12 For those with a deeper historical memory, that invoked life in the shtetl, from which so many sought to one day be free.

    Israel’s Basic Law: Law of Return (1950), while defining a nationality right of “return” (aliyah)13 reserved for Jews only, provides a definition of belonging to this category of persons – including citizens of Israel, or of other countries – as members of the Jewish “race” promoted in the Jewish National Fund (JNF) charter. The Law of Return specifies, for the purpose of that Law, that “‘Jew’ means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.”14

    Both Zionist leaders and institutions, as well as Israeli politicians, have interpreted support for practical Zionism (replacing the indigenous people of Palestine) variously as a “Jewish” obligation, and/or as an act of survival, self-preservation and even “national liberation” for Jews.15 Any specter of Jewish persecution potentially helps to make this Zionist argument convincing.

    Along with the concept of belonging to the Zionist project to colonize Palestine by virtue of some biological imperative also came the insistence that a “good Jew,” a “good Zionist,” should live in Israel, or at least support the Zionist project from other countries, if necessary. In the minimum, this could be accomplished by Jewish children everywhere dropping coins into JNF blue boxes to contribute to the colonization effort.

    In the legal dimension, Israel’s World Zionist Organization–Jewish Agency (Status) Law (1952), whose importance is discussed below, specifies that Israel is the state of the “Jewish people” and provides:

    The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist Movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose

    It Imposes a Foreign “Nationality” on Jews

    A practical feature of “Jewish nationality” is that Israel and its “national” (para-state) institutions, including the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (WZO/JA) and Jewish National Fund (JNF), apply this charter-based status to Jews living in many countries around the word. These institutions extend the Jewish “obligation” to support Zionism practically and financially, whereas the State of Israel is precluded, as is any foreign state, from interfering in the status of any citizen in a country outside its internationally defined state jurisdiction. The Zionist institutions, as Israeli state agents, nonetheless operate overseas programs to engage and recruit Jews in their own countries of citizenship to carry out “practical Zionism.”16

    In the 1960s, Reform Jews in the United States objected to the Zionists’ imposition of an unwanted second “nationality” and foreign state affiliation imposed by the WZO/JA. At their request, the U.S. Department of State issued a legal opinion in response to this unique case of foreign state intervention in the status of U.S. citizens. The legal position affirmed that the United States “does not regard [Israel’s extraterritorial] ‘Jewish people’ concept as a concept of international law.”17 The related legal battle led to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia forcing the U.S. Justice Department to register WZO/JA as foreign agents, instead of the tax-exempt charity status that they claimed to themselves.

    Since 1791, with the recognition of Jews as French citizens equal to other citizens in all rights and obligations, emancipation became the norm across Europe and the wider world. Israeli para-state institutions imposing “Jewish nationality” and promoting corresponding obligations on citizens of some fifty other countries where those institutions operate may be seen as threatening to undo over three hundred years of progress in the struggle for equal status of the Jew as citizen in a democracy. The concept of “Jewish nationality,” or belonging to a “Jewish nation” (le’om yahudi) also gives credence to the old anti-Semitic charge that Jews are disloyal to the countries in which they live. In this light, the “Jewish race/nationality” concept makes Jews outside Israel vulnerable to reprisal and charged of alien status. Moreover, these breaches of international legal norms on nationality vitiate the rights of other sovereign states by inciting their Jewish citizens to emigrate and pledge allegiance to a foreign country (Israel) and extending an additional alien civil status to them by claiming them as subjects under the legal jurisdiction of Israel.

    Also for Jews in Israel, the “national” institutions and corresponding legislation apply “Jewish nationality” to create irreconcilable distinctions in civil status with others living in the “Jewish state.” With unique privileges applying to “Jewish nationality” (le’om yahudi) that are denied to holders of mere Israeli “citizenship” (ezrahut), no one in Israel has the prospect of living in a state possessing the fundamental features of a democracy. A famous Israeli High Court case in 1971 affirmed that “there is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation…composed not only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry.”18 The President of the Court Justice Shimon Agranat explained that acknowledging a uniform Israeli nationality “would negate the very foundation upon which the State of Israel was formed.” Thus, for a Jew to reside in Israel is to negate the essential values of the emancipationist tradition, regardless of one’s position on the colonization project.

    It Harms Palestinians

    To interpret an Israeli law, or any Zionist document, it is necessary to know Zionist terms and their ideological meaning. While the “Jewish people” concept is essential to Zionist public law relations with Jews outside of the State of Israel, the Israel Government Year-Book (1953–54) recognized the “great constitutional importance” of the Status Law (1952): Not only did Israel’s first prime minister submit it for legislation as “one of the foremost basic laws,” but also clarified that “this Law completes the Law of Return in determining the Zionist character of the State of Israel.”19 The cornerstone of the discriminatory legal structure is the Status Law (1952), supported by two Basic Laws: the Law of Citizenship and the Law of Return.

    Israel’s Basic Law: Law of Return (1950) effectively establishes a “nationality” right for Jews only. Under the Law of Return,20 only Jews are allowed to come to areas controlled by the (civilian or military) Government of Israel to claim the “super-citizenship” status of “Jewish nationality” [le’om yahudi], while acquiring their new civil status in Israel through “return.” This notion of a “Jewish national” who “returns” for the first time from some other domicile country to Palestine is majestically ideological and wholly unique, even among other colonial-settler states.

    The criteria for acquiring citizenship under Israel’s “Citizenship Law,” amending Section 3A in 1980,21 disqualify the majority of Palestinian families who fled from their homes in the 1948 ethnic cleansing, effectively blocking their rightful status as citizens – and nationals – in their own country, where Israel is the de facto successor state. Thus, the title of the “Law of Return” is bitterly ironic, as it allows for the “return” of individuals who never lived in Israel before, and – supported by other legislation – prevents the actual return of people who had been residents in the land.

    Already in January 1949, the new Government of Israel signed over one million dunams of Palestinian land acquired during the war to the parastatal JNF to be held in perpetuity for “the Jewish people.” In October 1950, the state similarly transferred another 1.2 million dunams to the JNF.22 In 1951, a JNF spokesman explained how, necessarily, JNF “will redeem the lands and will turn them over to the Jewish people—to the people and not the state, which in the current composition of population cannot be an adequate guarantor of Jewish ownership.”23

    In September 1953, the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Properties executed a contract with the Israeli Development Authority, transferring the “ownership” of all the Palestinian refugee lands under his control to the latter. The price (not value) of these properties was to be retained by the Development Authority as a loan. At the same time, the Custodian conveyed the ownership of the houses and commercial buildings in the cities to Amidar, a quasi-public Israeli company founded to place Jewish settler/immigrants.24 Thus began a practice that forms and unbroken pattern of continuing dispossession to this day.

    Three months before that 1953 transaction, the Jewish National Fund also executed a contract with the Development Authority, whereby the Authority sold 2,373,677 dunams of “state land” and lands held by the Authority to the Jewish National Fund. The JNF completed the deal just after the Authority concluded its transaction with the Custodian. As a result, this Palestinian property came under the possession of the JNF, which claimed to own over 90% of the total territories that fell under the control of the state of Israel. These properties are referred to as “national land,” a subtle but important distinction, meaning that it be limited to exclusive use by (Jewish) “nationals,” whoever and wherever they may be, and foreclosed to the indigenous people, whoever and wherever they may be, including the actual private and collective owners.25

    To understand how “Jewish nationality” operates in practice to discriminate against non-Jewish “citizens” of Israel, especially the indigenous Palestinian ones, one must appreciate that the Zionist para-state institutions that authored the concept and enshrined it in their charters, are also the same guardians of “Jewish nationality” privilege. This is particularly institutionalized in economic fields, most clearly activities involving land, housing, public services and development.

    Israeli laws related to these fields of human activity, and even many aspects of commerce, give special policy and implementation status to the WZO/JNF and/or JA; that is, by applying those institutions’ chartered principle of benefiting exclusively persons of “Jewish race or descendency.” For Jews in Israel, the emancipationist dream of living free in a democratic society is shattered and, so far, unregenerate.

    Many of the current stories of deprivation of the Palestinian people derive from the institutionalized application of this concept of “Jewish race/people/nationality.” The plight of the Palestinian refugees, the analogous case of the internally displaced persons since 1948, the continuum of land confiscation inside 1948-incorporated territories, the nonrecognition and poverty of the Naqab Bedouin villages and other contemporary human rights violations involve application of a superior “Jewish nationality” status at the expense of Israeli “citizens.” Worse affected are those other indigenous people who, as refugees, are unable to enter their country. The damages, costs and losses to the indigenous Palestinian people are material consequences of the Zionist ideological and institutional system by default as well as by design.

    Conclusion

    The emerging literature related to the question of “nationality” and “citizenship” in Israel generally acknowledges the distinction between the two types of civil status. However, that analysis does not always apply the normative framework of international public law and social justice, codified in human rights standards. Instead, the explanations are more likely prefaced with the assumptions of Zionist ideology, derived from longing to be separate, if not to be free.26

    In the light of the ground-breaking work of post-Zionist historians, and the recent work of Ilan Pappé and Shlomo Sand, now may be the time to rediscover also the earlier generation of emancipationist, anti-Zionist commentators who addressed the hazards of “Jewish race/people/nationality” and the operations of their mother institutions generations before us. These Zionist concepts and their implementation afflict both people of Jewish faith and Palestinians victims everywhere. Implementing “Jewish nationality” extraterritorially also affects the rights of states and citizens in other countries where the Zionist para-state institutions operate. In that sense, at least, besides our sharing one species, we are all related.

    Endnotes
    ————-

    . Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Concluding Observations: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.27, 4 December 1998, paras. 11 and 35; CESCR Concluding Observations: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.90, 23 May 2003, p. 18; “Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 14 June 2007, paras. 15–23.

    . Melanie A. Murphy, Max Nordaus Fin-de-Siècle Romance of Race (New York: Peter Lang, 2007).

    . As explained in Elmer Berger, The Jewish Dilemma (New York: Devin-Adair, 1945).

    . Elmer Berger, A Partisan History of Judaism (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951), pp. 79–97.

    . Access the American Council for Judaism website at: http://www.acjna.org/acjna/default.aspx. See also Thomas A. Kolsky, Jews against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism, 1942–1948 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

    6. Shlomo Sand; translated by Yael Lotan, The Invention of the Jewish People (London and New York: Verso, 2009).
    7. For example, Part I: “The Myth of `a Jewish People`,” Part II: “Zionist Nationalism,” and Part III: “For Free Jews in a Free World,” in Elmer Berger, The Jewish Dilemma (New York: Devin-Adair, 1945); “Where did Jews and Judaism Come From?” and “The Dilemma of Nationality Versus Religion,” in Elmer Berger, A Partisan History of Judaism (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951).
    8. Constitution of the World Zionist Organization (2007), Articles 2 and 3.
    9. Memorandum of Association, Article 3(a).
    10. The Race Question (Paris: UNESCO, 1950), at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000128291_eng. The original statement was drafted by Ernest Beaglehole, Juan Comas, L. A. Costa Pinto, Franklin Frazier, sociologist specialised in race relations studies, Morris Ginsberg, founding chairperson of the British Sociological Association, Humayun Kabir, writer, philosopher and Education Minister of India twice, Claude Lévi-Strauss, one of the founders of ethnology and leading theorist of cultural relativism, and Ashley Montagu, anthropologist and author of The Elephant Man: A Study in Human Dignity, who was the rapporteur.
    11. Ibid., para. 6.
    12. As recounted in such diverse sources as Neturai Karta, “Zionism and Judaism – Let Us Define Our Terms,” at: https://nkusa.org/AboutUs/Zionism/index.cfm; Paul Findley, They Dared to Speak Out : People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 3rd edition 2003); and Alfred M. Lilienthal, Zionist Connection II: What Price Peace? (New Brunswick NJ: North American Publishers, 1982).
    13. Aliyah, in Hebrew, means immigration of Jews, and oleh (plural: olim) means a Jew immigrating, into Israel.
    14. Definition 4B. Section 4A addresses the rights of members of family of a Jew under the Law of Return, which also include immigration as a nationality right. However, it does not necessarily confer membership in “Jewish nationality.” This amounts of an exclusion from “Jewish nationality,” in effect, particularly for non-Jewish spouses of Jewish nationals and descendents of male Jews only but enjoying the right of immigration as “return” extended to them. The Law of Return Article 4(a) provides “The rights of a Jew under this Law and the rights of an oleh under the Nationality [sic] Law, 5712-1952, as well as the rights of an oleh under any other enactment, are also vested in a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion.” It is important to note by example here that the official English-language version of the Law of Return quoted here includes the falsely translated title of the Law of Citizenship and Entry into Israel, as if it were the legal basis for a nationality right. It is not.
    15. “French Jews ‘must move to Israel’,” BBC News (18 July 2004), at:
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3904943.stm
    16. “Practical Zionism,” Zionism and Israel – Encyclopedic Dictionary, at:
    17. Letter of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot to American Council for Judaism’s Executive Vice President Rabbi Elmer Berger, reprinted in W. Thomas Mallison, Jr., “The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute the ‘Jewish People’ Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International Law,” 32 The George Washington Law Review 5 (1964), p. 1075.
    18. Tamarin v. State of Israel (1970) 26 P.D. I 197.
    19. Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events (18 November 1949), at 1069–70, cite in “Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine,” written statement submitted by North-south XXI, E/CN.4/2001/NGO/18, 16 January 2001.
    20. Law of Return, cited in Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel (1998).
    21. “A person born before the establishment of the State is entitled to Israeli citizenship if the following five conditions are met:
    He did not become an Israeli citizen under any other provision of the law.
    He was a Palestinian citizen before the establishment of the state.
    On 14 July 1952 he was a resident of Israel and registered in the Population Register.
    On the day the amendment came into effect he was a resident of Israel and registered in the Population Register.
    He is not a citizen of a country listed in the Prevention of Infiltration Law.”
    22. The first JNF acquisition totalled 1,101,942 dunams: 1,085,607 rural and 16,335 urban; the second amounted to 1,271,734 dunams: 1,269,480 rural and 2,254 urban. Abraham Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode,1956), pp. 107–110.
    23. Jewish National Fund, Report to the 23rd Congress, 32–33, emphasis in original, cited in Lehn and Davis, op. Cit., 108.
    24. Jiryis, 1973
    25. Jiryis, 1973
    26. Don Handelman, “Contradictions between Citizenship and Nationality: Their Consequences for Ethnicity and Inequality in Israel,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1994); Baruch Kimmerling, “Between the primordial and the civil definitions of the collective identity: Eretz Israel or the State of Israel,” in Erik Cohen, Moshe Lissak, and Uri Almagor, eds., Comparative Social Dynamics: Essays in Honor of S.N. Eisenstadt (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 262–83; Baruch Kimmerling, and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People (New York: The Free Press, 1993); Erik Cohen, “Citizenship, nationality and religion in Israel and Thailand,” in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 66–92; S. N. Eisenstadt, The Transformation of Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985).
    ,
  • UK envoy’s praise for Lebanon cleric draws Israel anger

    UK envoy’s praise for Lebanon cleric draws Israel anger

    FrancesGuy
    Frances Guy has extensive experience in the Middle East

    Israel has criticised Britain’s ambassador to Lebanon for eulogising a recently deceased Lebanese cleric said to have inspired Hezbollah.

    Frances Guy wrote on her personal blog that Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah was a “decent man” who rated among the people she most admired.

    An Israeli spokesman said Ayatollah Fadlallah was “unworthy of praise”.

    The UK foreign office says it has taken down the blog after “mature consideration”.

    It said the comments reflected Ms Guy’s personal opinion, not official UK policy.

    Ayatollah Fadlallah, Lebanon’s top Shia Muslim cleric, died on Sunday at the age of 74. Thousands of people attended his funeral in Beirut and tributes poured in from all over the Arab and Islamic worlds.

    Two days ago, CNN sacked a veteran Middle East editor who wrote on Twitter that she “respected” the late cleric, saying that her credibility had been compromised.

    Controversial figure

    Ayatollah Fadlallah was customarily described as the spiritual leader of the militant movement Hezbollah when it was formed in 1982 – a claim both he and the group denied.

    Ms Guy, who has been ambassador since 2006, wrote on her blog that Ayatollah Fadlallah was the politician in Lebanon she most enjoyed meeting.

    “The world needs more men like him willing to reach out across faiths, acknowledging the reality of the modern world and daring to confront old constraints,” she wrote.

    Israel’s foreign ministry denounced the comments.

    “We believe that the spiritual leader of [Hezbollah] is unworthy of any praise or eulogising,” a spokesman told the Israeli newspaper, Yediot Ahronot.

    “If Hezbollah was firing missiles at London and Glasgow, would this leader still be called ‘decent’?” he added.

    Ayatollah Fadlallah was a controversial figure.

    He was revered as one of Shia Islam’s highest religious authorities and won support from many Muslims for his anti-American stance and his support for the Islamic revolution in Iran.

    He advocated suicide attacks as a means of fighting Israel, and has been linked to the 1983 suicide bombings that killed more 300 American troops at the US marine barracks in Beirut.

    But he condemned the 9/11 terror attacks and had relatively progressive views on the role of women in society.

    ‘Personal view’

    Hezbollah’s military wing is proscribed in the UK as a terrorist organisation.

    But Ms Guy, who has met with Hezbollah officials on several occasions, wrote that Ayatollah Fadlallah’s passing left Lebanon “a lesser place”.

    “When you visited him you could be sure of a real debate, a respectful argument and you knew you would leave his presence feeling a better person,” she wrote.

    “That for me is the real effect of a true man of religion; leaving an impact on everyone he meets, no matter what their faith.”

    The British foreign office said it had removed the blog post as it did not fully reflect the British government’s policy.

    “The ambassador expressed a personal view on Sheik Sayyed Fadlallah, describing the man as she knew him,” a spokesman told the BBC.

    “While we welcomed his progressive views on women’s rights and interfaith dialogue, we also had profound disagreements – especially over his statements advocating attacks on Israel,” he added.

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10572025, 9 July 2010

  • Review of Stephen Kinzer’s “Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future”

    Review of Stephen Kinzer’s “Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future”

    By John Lancaster

    By Stephen Kinzer

    Times. 274 pp. $26

    For the title of his new book, Stephen Kinzer borrows the latest diplomatic fad word — “reset” — in calling for a makeover of U.S. policy in the Middle East. I know what you’re thinking: Oh no. Not another book on — fill in the blank (American missteps in Iraq, the Israel lobby, Saudi oil politics, etc.). While Kinzer touches on several such themes, his main thesis is more provocative: The path to a stable Middle East runs not through Israel and traditional Arab allies but through Turkey and Iran. Therein lie the book’s strengths as well as its main weakness.

    First, its strengths: A former foreign correspondent for the New York Times, Kinzer argues persuasively that despite their very different governments — one friendly and free, the other hostile and theocratic — both Turkey and Iran are host to vibrant democratic traditions that make them natural long-term partners of the United States. He deftly interweaves the stories of the Iranian and Turkish democracy movements, whose roots are deeper than most Americans realize.

    For example, Kinzer shows how recent anti-government protests in Iran are part of a continuum that dates at least to 1906, when popular fury toward a decadent monarchy led to the creation of Iran’s first parliament. Of particular interest is the story of Howard Baskerville, a young Princeton graduate from Nebraska who was teaching in Tabriz when the ancient city was besieged by royalist forces seeking to crush the new democracy. Baskerville sided with the democrats and died while leading schoolboys into battle in 1909. “Today Howard Baskerville is an honored figure in Iran,” Kinzer writes. “Schools and streets have been named after him. His bust, cast in bronze,” holds a place of honor in Tabriz. Who knew?

    The account is typical of Kinzer’s lively, character-driven approach to history. Mustafa Kemal — also known as Ataturk, the charismatic army officer who is regarded as the founder of modern Turkey — is depicted as an alcoholic and libertine whose conquests included a teenage Zsa Zsa Gabor, or so she later claimed. More substantively, Kinzer describes a ruler so bent on purging the Turkish state of religious influence that he ordered civil servants to shed their traditional fezzes in favor of Western-style bowler hats. In that and other ways, Kemal had much in common with Reza Shah Pahlavi, the rough-hewn soldier who seized power in Iran in 1921. Despite their autocratic styles, both rulers were relentless modernizers who promoted education and women’s rights — and in doing so, Kinzer argues, helped create the conditions that allowed democratic ideals to germinate. The two countries “developed national identities shaped by the Enlightenment as well as Islam,” Kinzer writes. “This was a new synthesis. It invigorated Turkey and Iran and set them starkly apart from the countries around them.”

    After decades of instability and military rule, Turkey, a NATO member, has capitalized on its democratic potential and has even moved haltingly toward membership in the European Union. For that, Kinzer assigns much credit to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, whose Islamist leanings belie the view that Islam and democracy are incompatible. “Democracy has become Turkey’s only alternative,” Kinzer writes. “Even pious Muslims recognize, accept, and celebrate this.”

    Iran, of course, is another story. That is at least partly the fault of the United States, whose role in ousting the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 forms an important part of Kinzer’s narrative (and the focus of one of his previous books). The coup restored the Pahlavi dynasty. It also set the stage for the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the decades of U.S.-Iranian enmity that have followed. But Kinzer still finds reasons for hope. Even now, he writes, “Iran is the only Muslim country in the world where most people are reliably pro-American. This pro-American sentiment in Iran is a priceless strategic asset for the United States.”

    Kinzer’s take on Iran and Turkey is fresh and well-informed, but he stumbles when he plays policymaker. His plea for a more conciliatory approach to Iran sounds a bit fanciful at a time of rising tensions over its nuclear program. And besides, haven’t we tried that already? Nor is there anything particularly new about Kinzer’s call for a recalibration of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia and Israel. For example, he is hardly the first to urge a tougher approach to Israel, a chorus that has only grown louder since Israel’s disastrous commando raid on a flotilla trying to breach its naval blockade of Gaza in May. In Kinzer’s view, it’s time for the Obama administration to “impose” a peace settlement on Israel and the Palestinians, but he doesn’t explain quite how it should do this, other than presiding over “a coercive version of the smoke-filled room.” After the riches of the book’s first half, I found myself wishing that Kinzer had dispensed with the think-tank musings (and bullet points) and stuck to his strengths as a journalist and historian.

    John Lancaster is a former Middle East correspondent for The Washington Post.

    https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070902109.html, July 11, 2010

  • Patrick Cockburn: The chronic failure of Israeli leadership

    Patrick Cockburn: The chronic failure of Israeli leadership

    President Obama was full of gushing goodwill towards Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during their summit in Washington this week. There was no mention of an extension to the moratorium on Israeli settlement building or the Israeli commandos’ attack on the Turkish aid flotilla bound for Gaza. In private, the White House and even the Israeli delegation were quick to say that Mr Obama’s climb-down had not been quite as humiliating as it looked, and assurances had been given that the moratorium would be quietly extended. But the President was at pains to reverse the cool reception Mr Netanyahu got during his visit to the White House in March when when he was not even allowed a photograph with Mr Obama, who kept him waiting while he had dinner with his family upstairs.

    The reason for Mr Netanyahu’s friendlier reception is obvious enough. Mr Obama needs every vote he can get in the mid-term Congressional elections in November when a third of the Senate and all the House face re-election. The Republicans have been seeking with some success to portray him as anti-Israel. Pro-Israeli lobby groups have been putting intense pressure on Democratic Senators and Congressmen to demand that the White House be more accommodating.

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    The outcome of the brief confrontation between Israel and the US is not surprising. With its collective mind focused on the upcoming elections, the White House is disregarding signs of disquiet from the US chiefs of staff and security policy establishment that Israeli ill-treatment of the Palestinians and excessive use of force in the region is turning Israel into a liability for the US. They warn that the US will not always give unstinting support to acts they see as irresponsible misjudgements, be it against the Turks on the high seas or Palestinians in Gaza and Lebanon.

    As in the past, such protestations have got nowhere. Israeli leaders remain protected by an all-purpose American insurance shielding them from the results of their mistakes. In fact, they do not even view these as mistakes, since Israeli propaganda portray idiocies – such as the use of elite troops trained to kill to thwart the Turkish peace activists – as reasonable decisions.

    Since no errors are admitted, there is no reason not to repeat them. Worse, the Israeli political and military leaders go on holding their jobs despite an Inspector Clouseau-like ability to blunder. Mr Netanyahu and his Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, both behave with the swaggering arrogance of successful warlords, though their careers are littered with failed operations. The Turkish aid boat fiasco is not difficult to understand when it is recalled that it was Mr Netanyahu, when Prime Minister in 1997, who allowed Mossad to try to assassinate a Hamas leader in Amman by injecting a slow-acting poison into his ear as he left his office. The plan went wrong; two Mossad agents were captured and Mr Netanyahu was forced by King Hussein to supply the antidote to the poison and release Palestinian prisoners.

    Ever since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, Israel has been ruled by one of the stupidest and least responsible leaderships in the world. Their failings have been masked by propaganda and by Israel’s American insurance policy, but nothing else can explain Israel’s record of repeated failure in military and security operations. So much of Israeli politics revolves around manipulating the sense of threat felt by Israeli voters, that the capacity to deal with real threats is stultified.

    Contrary to Israel’s reputation for military prowess, the last time it won a war was 37 years ago, against Egypt and Syria in 1973. Israel’s long invasion of Lebanon in 1982 initiated an 18-year-long guerrilla war against Israeli occupation of the south of the country, which only ended with a precipitate Israeli withdrawal in 2000. All its military operations over the last 10 years have failed to achieve their aims.

    Political leaders are so often accused of stupidity that it is worth asking if they behave more foolishly in Israel than elsewhere. The main explanation is that Israelis believe their own propaganda and their supporters abroad adopt a skewed view of events as if it was an article of faith. Israelis, leaders and followers alike, acquire a wholly distorted picture of the world around them. Hubris breeds self-righteousness and arrogance that robs Israel of friends and allies and repeatedly leads its leaders to underestimate their enemies.

    Critics of Israeli actions, be they Israeli peace activists or members of the Turkish government, are demonised as supporters of terrorism. In this fantasy world sensible policies become difficult for leaders to devise and, if they do so, impossible to sell to voters. It is scarcely surprising that Israel’s only victories these days are won on the sofas of the White House.

    Deferred delight

    Turkey’s progress towards becoming a regional power in the Middle East moves nervously forward as it fends off allegations that it is “turning to the east”. It is surprising that its increased influence is so late in coming, given Turkey is more powerful than any of its neighbours, including Iran. Divisions within Turkey are deepening, not evaporating. The long battle between the mildly Islamic but democratic AKP party and its secular but authoritarian opponents is, if anything, hotting up. So too is the struggle between Kurdish guerrillas and the central government in the south east of the country. “The Turkish government displays a taste for moderation and mediation abroad that it seldom shows at home,” says one diplomat acidly.

    With the European Union on its sickbed, it is surprising anybody still wants to join it. Turkish enthusiasm has been ebbing fast. Its economy is expanding faster than many EU members. But the main reason for Turkey joining the EU is political rather than economic. Seeking EU membership has been a potent antidote to military coups, torture, arbitrary arrests and censorship of the media in recent years. This could all go into reverse if Turkey’s EU membership application is finally pronounced dead.

    p.cockburn@independent.co.uk

    https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/patrick-cockburn-the-chronic-failure-of-israeli-leadership-2020931.html, 8 July 2010

  • Methodists launch boycott over West Bank

    Methodists launch boycott over West Bank

    By Jerome Taylor, Religious Affairs Correspondent

    The Methodist Church today voted to boycott all products from Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories becoming the first major Christian denomination in Britain to officially adopt such a policy.

    The decision was made at the church’s Conference in Portsmouth, an annual gathering which decides Methodist policy. The official stance of the church, the fourth largest Christian denomination in Britain, will be to boycott any products made on Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Lay Methodists will also be encouraged to follow the church’s lead.

    The move will inevitably put Methodists on a collision course with Britain’s Jewish community. The Board of Deputies of British Jews had already expressed concern over a 50-page report which had been compiled by a Methodist committee and sent to all its churches before the conference explaining why a boycott was justified.

    In December, Defra introduced new advice on labelling, recommending that packaging of products imported from the West Bank should distinguish between Palestinian areas and Israeli settlements.

    Christine Elliott, Secretary for External Relationships, said, “This decision has not been taken lightly, but after months of research, careful consideration and finally, today’s debate at the Conference. The goal of the boycott is to put an end to the existing injustice. It reflects the challenge that settlements present to a lasting peace in the region.

    Ben White, campaign coordinator for ‘A Just Peace for Palestine’, said: “This is a clear show of support from Jews and Christians who understand that a real peace for both peoples requires justice. It stands in stark contrast to the disingenuous threat that listening to the call of Christian Palestinians and upholding international law and human rights will damage ‘inter-faith relations’ – on the contrary, inter-faith dialogue is not facilitated by ignoring serious questions about injustice.”

    https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/methodists-launch-boycott-over-west-bank-2014827.html, 30 June 2010