Category: Iraq

  • Where in the world is Angelina Jolie?

    Where in the world is Angelina Jolie?

    jolie2 small

    Football watching and frolicking in the fall weather on Saturday is for mortals.

    For Angelina Jolie, Saturday is all business.

    She took a trip to Baghdad to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. As a special envoy for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jolie advocates for refugees around the world. On Friday, she told the Associated Press that with winter approaching, she’s concerned about the plight of hundreds of thousands of Syrians forced to flee their homes.

    Later Saturday, Jolie planned to fly to Irbil to meet Kurdish officials and will visit a Syrian refugee camp. According to CNN, Jolie has recently visited refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to highlight suffering and the need for international humanitarian assistance.

    Brad Pitt, meanwhile, will soon begin promoting his latest film, Killing Them Softly, which is out Nov. 30.

    via Where in the world is Angelina Jolie?.

  • Big military forces gather around the Mediterranean

    Big military forces gather around the Mediterranean

    Средиземное море

     


     

     

    GULNARA INANCH,

     Director of Information and Analytical Center Etnoglobus (ethnoglobus.az), editor of Russian section of Turkishnews American-Turkish Resource www.turkishnews.com,

      

    Mete62@inbox.ru

     

     

    Syria’s shooting down Turkish jet over Mediterranean Sea and Syria’s invasion of Turkey’s air space in its response may enable us to suppose that it may lead serious pressure in the region. Analyses of the situation show that great powers and regional powers observe the situation not over Syria, but also there is struggle for the Mediterranean Sea.

     

    Late reaction of theUSto the incident, restrained behavior of officialAnkaraand parties’ waiting for behavior of other party under the present circumstances is the sign that either there is confidential agreement within NATO or it is the attempts of provocation ofTurkey.

     

    AlthoughAnkaradenies that Turkish F4 phantom jet was shot down over Syrian territorial waters, it admits that they were shooting photos consequently confirming its intentional occurrence near the bodies ofSyriawhich received war threads.

     

    According to Israeli open source military intelligence website DEBKAfile, Turkey’s military jets commit daily espionage flights over the Syrian’s water. Syria’s www.dampress.net resources says that on the incident day two jets were flying over the Syrian territorial waters one of which left the territory following shooting down another’s. There is also contradictory thoughts weather the jets were belonging toIsrael orTurkey.

     

    The point is that in spite of political tension betweenTurkeyandIsrael, there is also news that intelligence bodies of these countries share news with each other and even there are bases of Mossad in the territories of Turkey to control Iran and Syria. Reports of the Southern Cyprus media that Israel and Turkey plan to carry out military drill in the territorial waters of the Southern Cyprus are another sign that Tel-Aviv and Ankara are together in behind-the-scenes agreements.

     

    In these days Deputy Prime Minister of Israel Shaul Mofaz admitting that Turkey is the regional power highlighted the importance of having strategic relations betweenTurkeyandIsraelwhich is a sign that relations between Tel-Aviv and Ankara should be normalized over the Syrian issue.

     

    Participation of Russia, China, Iran and Syria in the military drills with 90,000 troops, 400 jets and 900 tanks (initially there were reported that Russian navy entered Syrian territorial waters and there are military bases in the Mediterranean of NATO and basin countries) and existence of big military power in the region which worry the US, Israel and Turkey that is also natural.

    The reason of current tension withSyria, generally, one of reasons of “Arab Spring” is reconsideration of impact circle over the Mediterranean Sea.

    In this case, it is more important who will keepSyriaunder its impact following possible governmental changes inDamascus. The reason whyRussiais against any military operation to overthrow Bashar Assad government is not the intention of Moscowto preserve the present regime, but the real reason is that the person to replace Assad will not support Moscow’s interest.

     

    According to Russian officials, they had agreed for Libyan operation only as the West promised to impose no-fly-zone over Libya ply more serious policy in relation toSyria.

     

    Meanwhile, Russian president Vladimir Putin in his visit to Tel-Aviv discussingIranand Syrian conflict will try to find out the position of Israel, which is influential state in the region, however having safety thread following Arab Spring. Besides Russian president will try to clarify which position Israel will keep in these processes and project future steps.

    Another important issue is that Syrian opposition was indifferent to shoot down of  Turkish jet and failed to take advantage of the situation. Silence of  Syrian opposition formed in the territoryof  Turkey and being provided with financial and military support by the West is natural, otherwise manipulators behind the curtain would have to appear.

     

    However,Turkey is not expected to start military operation against Syria or NATO to discuss the article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intending defense in case of military aggression against any member state. Once when Turkey deployed military force to the Cyprus, NATO had to exclude temporarily these two member states –Turkey and Greece as there was military tension between them.

     

    Turkey doesn’t need such provocation to deploy military force toSyriaand in case of necessity official Ankara has repeatedly carried out military operation within the territories of neighbor countries during pursuit of PKK terrorists.

     

    It is interesting that in Geneva during the meeting dedicated to Syria there was no clear note with regard to Bashar Assad’s leaving the power and clause on arm sale to the conflicting parties inSyria.

     

    As neither Russia, nor the US intend to begin open war, the situation will make the West delay the military operations in Syria. Consequently, Russia will support Bashar Assad, while the US the opposition as it was during 80th inAfghanistan which will lead the country to long civil war. If Assad has to leave the power, then Kremlin and White House will do its best to bring to power the one who is close to them.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

  • Why Won’t Turkey Stand Up To Iraq, US on Aiding PKK?

    Why Won’t Turkey Stand Up To Iraq, US on Aiding PKK?

    By: Melih Asik posted on Thursday, Jun 21, 2012

    The PKK crossed the Iraqi border into Turkey with 300 men and killed eight of our soldiers. The main opposition MP, Onur Oymen, asked the critical question:

    US President Barack Obama (R) shakes hands with Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan after a bilateral meeting ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul March 25, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Larry Downing)
    US President Barack Obama (R) shakes hands with Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan after a bilateral meeting ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul March 25, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Larry Downing)

    About this Article

    Summary:

    Melih Asik wonders why Turkey never holds Iraq and the US responsible for attacks from the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), even though they are based in northern Iraq. Recently, a PKK incursion into Turkey resulted in the deaths of eight Turkish soldiers. Turkish politicians, says Asik, act like they owe their positions to the US.

    Publisher: Milliyet (Turkey)

    Original Title:

    We Were Never Like This

    Author: Melih Asik

    Published on: Thursday, Jun 21, 2012

    Translated On: Thursday, Jun 21, 2012

    Translator: Timur Goksel

    Categories : Security Turkey Iraq

    When looking for those responsible for the Daglica attack, nobody remembers to accuse the Iraqi government, which is allowing the PKK to take refuge there. Why not? Prime Minister Erdogan criticizes Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki for his poor treatment of Sunnis. The two men occasionally engage in nasty exchanges, but Iraq’s harboring of the PKK is never mentioned. While Daglica was under attack, Erdogan was in Mexico with Obama discussing how to solve the Syrian crisis, not the PKK one.

    And our opposition party? Until today, it has never accused Iraq or the United States. Why not? Because they know the US stands behind the PKK and the Kurds. They don’t want to upset the US by accusing Iraq. They are behaving like politicians who owe their positions to the US.

    The PKK, knowing that it is supported by the US, Iraq and Barzani, naturally disregards Ankara’s gestures of peace. It is locked onto the idea of a Kurdish state, so they keep pounding Turkey.

    While we are strutting about with empty rhetoric on how we are the 16th strongest economic power in the world, how we are the regional leaders and how everybody is copying our model, the PKK continues to slap our faces.

    Imagine if somebody crossed the border into Israel and killed eight Israeli soldiers. The next day, Israel would level that country. And what does Turkey do?

    It has never been so impotent.

    via Why Won’t Turkey Stand Up To Iraq, US on Aiding PKK? – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East.

  • Turkey: A midwife for a Kurdish state?

    Turkey: A midwife for a Kurdish state?

    Ankara has willy-nilly helped the Kurdish genie escape from the bottle and it will be very difficult for Turkey to push it back inside.

    kurds

    Photo: REUTERS

    If there is one country that has helped build a Kurdish entity in Iraqi Kurdistan it is Turkey. This assertion seems paradoxical in view of Ankara’s traditional opposition to such an eventuality in Iraq and the well known pressures it applied on its allies, especially the United States, not to lend any support to the Kurds of Iraq because of the possible spillover effects on its own restive Kurds. Turkey’s new stance appears even more paradoxical against the backdrop of the latest upheavals in the region and their contagious effects both on its own Kurds and those of Syria.

    How is one to explain these paradoxes? First let us have a quick look at the facts on the ground. Since the 1991 Gulf War and much more so after the 2003 Gulf War Turkey has turned itself, slowly but surely, and against its better judgment, into the lifeline for Iraqi Kurdistan, which is led by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the euphemism for a Kurdish state in the making.

    The slow change in Ankara’s policy towards the KRG was not due to any altruistic considerations but for very pragmatic, down to earth ones. Immediately after the 1991 Gulf War and the crushing of the Kurdish uprising which ensued, Turkey was confronted with the problem of a million Kurdish refugees on its border. Unwilling to burden itself with another million Kurds, Turkey devised with the Allies the “Provide Comfort” project for the fleeing Kurds to enable them to go back to their homes.

    This plan, together with “the no-fly zone” where the Iraqi army could not act against the Kurds, as well as the ruptured relations between Ankara and Baghdad due to the war, set in motion the schizophrenic relations that would develop between Turkey and the KRG.

    On the one hand Turkey was extremely apprehensive of the possible contagious effects of the KRG on its own Kurds, hence Ankara’s attempts to thwart any political and diplomatic gains by the KRG. On the other hand Ankara did its best to reap the fruits of its relations with the emerging entity, one of the most important of which were economic gains. This approach turned the Kurdistan Region into a huge investment area for Turkish companies whose number reached around 900 by 2012 and amounted to half of the companies acting in the KRG.

    To this list one should add other large business, cultural and social ventures which turned the KRG into an undeclared Turkish sphere of influence. The net result was that no less than seven percent of Turkish exports went to the KRG.

    Ankara’s thirst for oil and gas and the pressure brought to bear on it to stop importing from Iran go a long way to explain the surprising pipeline deal it cut with the KRG on May 20, 2012, without the approval of the central government in Baghdad. If it materializes, the deal, which envisaged the building of two oil pipelines and one gas pipeline from the Kurdistan Region to Turkey, might give further boost to Kurdish aspirations for independence.

    Interestingly, the Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Taner Yildiz, declared on that occasion that “Turkey should also be considered as the Regional Kurdish Government’s gateway to the West.”

    A second important aim for developing these relations was the hope that the KRG would help in solving Turkey’s own acute Kurdish domestic problem, namely the ongoing attacks which the armed Turkish Kurdish PKK continued to launch against Turkish state targets.

    However, Ankara’s hope that the KRG would fight against, or at least contain the PKK, whose bases are found in Iraqi Kurdistan, was not fulfilled. The third and perhaps most important consideration was Ankara’s need to attune itself to the region’s changing geostrategic map, which pushed it to act according to the dictum “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.”

    The geostrategic considerations gathered momentum in the past two years due to several developments, all of which impacted negatively on Turkey’s environment and its foreign policy configurations.

    Before analyzing these changes it must be stressed that the stance of the AKP government toward the Kurdish domestic issue as well as towards the KRG underwent slow transformation, which distinguished the AKP from earlier Kemalist governments.

    The geostrategic changes were quite drastic, including the “Arab Spring,” which accelerated the collapse of the Turkish-Iranian-Syrian axis. Furthermore, the revolution in Syria not only turned Ankara and Damascus into sworn enemies once again but also raised the specter of the influx of Syrian refugees. Worse still, it opened the Pandora’s box of Syrian Kurds and their possible collaboration with their brethren in Turkey, not to speak of the PKK card which Damascus started to employ once again against Ankara.

    The withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq in November 2011 and the vacuum left thereby was another very worrying development for Turkey, as it enhanced its competition with Iran for filling this vacuum.

    Lastly, one should note the deteriorating relations between Ankara and Baghdad against the background of the Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry in the region, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s growing tilt toward Iran and his support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, as well as the growing personal antipathy between Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Maliki.

    All this weakened Ankara’s “commitment” to the almost sacred notion of Iraqi unity and emboldened it in its bilateral ties with the KRG, the most challenging of which for Baghdad was the oil pipeline deal mentioned above.

    Turkey’s changing policy towards the KRG and its president Masu’d Barzani found its expression on the symbolic level as well.

    Barzani’s April visit to Turkey was a case in point. While in the past Ankara treated Barzani as a mere “head of tribe,” in this most recent visit it accorded him a welcome befitting a head of state, thus turning him into one of its important allies in the region. Moreover, in this visit Barzani reiterated publicly the Kurds’ right to self-determination but, interestingly enough, Turkish officials and the media chose to turn “a deaf ear” to this declaration.

    Turkey is facing now a Kurdish problem on all three fronts, which has multiplied its dilemmas but which has moved it, so it seems, to adopt a flexible and non-conventional policy: Embracing the KRG so as to contain its own Kurds and Syria’s as well. Should Turkey decide to give Barzani the green light, he would not hesitate to go the extra mile and declare independence. One thing is certain: Turkey has willy-nilly helped the Kurdish genie escape from the bottle and it will be very difficult for Ankara to push it back inside.

    Prof. Ofra Bengio is head of the Kurdish Studies Program at the Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University and author of The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State within a State.

  • Iraq Warns Kurds Against Striking Oil Deal With Turkey

    By Palash R. Ghosh

    The central government of Iraq warned the Kurdish-ruled semi-autonomous region of northern Iraq that it must obtain Baghdad’s approval for any oil export deals signed with Turkey.

    Kurdistan Regional Government Natural Resources Minister Hawrami speaks with Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz during a joint news conference in Arbil.

    On Sunday, Iraqi Kurdistan unveiled an agreement to sell oil through Turkey into the international markets, thereby leaving Baghdad completely out of the loop. The Kurdish oil minister Ashti Hawrami said Iraqi Kurdistan will construct a huge 1 million barrel per day pipeline over the next 12 months through which oil and gas will be carried through Turkey.

    “We envisage the building of a new pipeline taking Kurdistan’s oil, particularly the heavier component part to Cihan,” Hawrami said at a conference with Taner Yildez, the Turkish energy minister.

    Baghdad believes such an arrangement contravenes Iraqi laws, while Kurds assert they can sign any contract regarding their natural resources according to the terms of the constitution.

    Since 2003, the Kurds have entered into dozens of gas and oil deals, all of which have been classified as “illegal” by the authorities in Baghdad, who have also blacklisted the companies involved, including Exxon Mobil Corp. (NYSE: XOM), from doing business in Iraq’s southern oilfields.

    “We have no problem with any deals, but they have to be according to the Iraqi constitution and laws that govern relations between Baghdad and the Kurdish region,” said Ali al-Moussawi, an adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

    Earlier, the Kurds and the central Iraqi government entered into a deal under which Kurdistan would transport its oil to Baghdad, which would then sell it on the international market (with each side taking half of the revenue). However, in April, the Kurds cancelled this agreement, citing a payment dispute with Baghdad.

    But Hawrami insisted that there is no distinction between Kurdish oil and Iraq oil.

    “When we say oil from Kurdistan, it’s Iraqi oil,” Hawrami said.

    “There is no difference between Iraqi oil or Basra oil from Kurdistan.”

    A pact between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey was inevitable.

    “If you look at Turkey, which is the second-fastest-growing country in the world, its gas needs, which increase significantly every year, and then the price of oil, I think people realize that Turkey is looking to Iraq — particularly the Kurdish regional government — very carefully, because of economics, not because of politics,” Mehmet Sepil, chairman of Turkey’s Genel Energy, told al-Jazeera.

    Iraq is now Turkey’s second-biggest trade partner, although most of that trade is with the Kurdish region.

    According to the Kurdish government, there are about 143 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in the south of Iraq, while the northern (Kurdish) semi-autonomous region has about 45 billion barrels,.

    Meanwhile, any deals with Turkey will likely worsen already tense relations between Ankara and Baghdad.

    Maliki of Baghdad was also outraged recently when Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan hosted Tariq al-Hashemi, the Iraqi vice president who had been issued an arrest warrant by Baghdad for allegedly forming death squads. Hashemi has since escaped to Iraqi Kurdistan for refuge.

    via Iraq Warns Kurds Against Striking Oil Deal With Turkey – International Business Times.

  • Turkey Aims to Contain Iraq, Iran

    Turkey Aims to Contain Iraq, Iran

    iran.iraqA bitter rift with Iraq has exposed Turkey’s role in a wider Middle East power struggle, with Ankara acting to protect its stability and prosperity from an Iranian-Iraqi “Shiite axis” it fears in the wake of the US military withdrawal from Iraq.

    Turkey, a regional power bordering Iraq, Iran and Syria, long tried to play regional mediator.

    But the fallout wrought by Arab Spring uprisings and the US exit from Iraq have forced Turkey to make tricky adjustments by cutting old alliances and forming new ones, jettisoning its “zero problems with the neighbors” policy.

    That shift, coupled with a more aggressive diplomacy personified by an increasingly combative Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – has thrust Turkey into a regional strategic game pitting Gulf Arab states and Ankara against Iran.

    “What is really critical is the American withdrawal from Iraq, because that basically made Iraq a much more open playing field for the Iranians,” said Soli Ozel, a prominent Turkish academic and commentator.

    Turkish officials have been waging a war of words with Baghdad since December when Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki ordered the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tareq Al-Hashemi, based on allegations that he ran death squads.

    The row is symptomatic of Turkish anxiety that the country’s rising “soft power,” based on a booming economy and relative democratic stability ushered in by Erdogan after a long era of military coups, could be threatened by a nascent “Shiite axis” embodied by Iran and Al-Maliki’s Tehran-backed Baghdad government.

    “This is about an escalating power struggle in Baghdad combined with the regional conflict between Iran, Turkey and the Gulf Arab states being played out in Syria and Iraq,” said Hasan Turunc, a fellow at Oxford University. Turkey accuses Al-Maliki of sowing sectarian discord by trying to sideline his Sunni rivals – Al-Maliki also called on Parliament to remove his Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al-Mutlaq – and has warned of a regional Shiite-Sunni “cold war.”

    Al-Maliki says it is Ankara that is stirring sectarian tension, calling Turkey a “hostile nation” meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs. Erdogan and Al-Maliki have exchanged public insults and both countries have summoned each other’s top diplomats over the past few months in tit-for-tat maneuvers.

    Compounding tension, Turkish leaders have met publicly with Al-Hashemi, now sheltering in Istanbul after fleeing Iraq in December. Interpol is seeking the arrest of Al-Hashemi, who is being tried in absentia in Iraq. Al-Hashemi denies the charges.

    Ankara’s aversion to Al-Maliki is not new. Turkey, anxious to protect trade interests in Iraq amid fears that any renewed Iraqi sectarian war could wash over its borders, long strived to encourage a precarious balance between Iraq’s Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions.

    This was no better exemplified than by Erdogan’s trip to Iraq in March 2011 when he made sure to visit all three centers of power: Baghdad, Najaf and Arbil.

    But that balancing act, analysts say, ended after the US troop withdrawal from Iraq at the end of last year.

    Turkey has since publicly received the president of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, Masoud Barzani, and Al-Maliki’s rival and Iraqiya leader, Iyad Allawi.

    For its part, Iran has seen Turkey’s shift in orientation in toward its own backyard, a region it once deemed “backward,” as a more potent challenge to its aspirations to Middle East predominance than the old, purely pro-Europe Turkey.

    As with Iraq, Turkey has traditionally tried to mediate over Iran, particularly Tehran’s controversial nuclear ambitions.

    But friction between Turkey and Iran has mounted over their backing of opposing sides in Syria’s conflagration and Ankara’s assent to housing part of a NATO missile defense shield that the United States says is directed against the Islamic Republic.

    Some Iranian officials also objected to Turkey playing host to a revival of talks between the six global powers and Iran to head off confrontation over its shadowy nuclear program.

    The talks between Iran and Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States did go ahead in Istanbul in April but not before Erdogan lashed out at Tehran, saying the Iranians “lacked honesty” and were “losing their international prestige.”

    Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and now chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies think-tank, said Erdogan’s increasingly strident approach was aggravating strains in ties between Ankara and its neighbors.

    “It is his posturing that has led to crises with our neighbors. If he hadn’t approached matters in a polarizing, black-and-white fashion, we wouldn’t have lost the ability to manage these relationships,” Ulgen said.

    “Instead of being the last person to intervene, very often he is the first to react. What he says then becomes policy, and limits Turkey’s room for maneuver; it corners us and policy becomes ossified.” One entity that has profited from this regional power tussle is the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq.

    www.menafn.com

    via Turkey Aims to Contain Iraq, Iran.