Iraq’s Constitution, Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories
Brendan O’Leary and David Bateman, UPenn
. org/docs/ pdf_files/ OLeary_Paper. pdf
POWER POINT PRESENTATION (PAY ATTENTION TO MAPS)
. org/docs/ pdf_files/ OLeary_SLIDES. pdf
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Iraq’s Constitution, Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories
Brendan O’Leary and David Bateman, UPenn
. org/docs/ pdf_files/ OLeary_Paper. pdf
POWER POINT PRESENTATION (PAY ATTENTION TO MAPS)
. org/docs/ pdf_files/ OLeary_SLIDES. pdf
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Published: August 4, 2008
Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk has been a political tinderbox-in-waiting that was largely ignored as war-fighting took precedence. Now that violence is way down, Iraqi leaders have no excuse not to peacefully decide the city’s future. Their failure to do so has already raised tensions and could further shred Iraq’s fragile social fabric — and unleash more bloodshed.
Kurds who run the semiautonomous region of Kurdistan should not be allowed to unilaterally annex Kirkuk, which they regard as their ancient capital but is also home to Turkmen and Arabs. They were promised a referendum in the Iraqi Constitution, but no durable solution can result without the participation of all groups. Overconfident Kurds and their American supporters have not been looking seriously for compromise.
The problem came to a head two weeks ago when Iraq’s Parliament passed a law again postponing a referendum on Kirkuk (it was supposed to be held by the end of 2007). The law contained a measure diluting Kurdish power in the area’s provincial council.
The Kurds believe the referendum will endorse making Kirkuk and surrounding areas part of Kurdistan — giving them more oil revenue and furthering their goal of independence — while Turkmen and Arab leaders want the city to stay under the central government.
Kurdish parliamentarians boycotted the session, resulting in the election law being declared unconstitutional. Another session on Sunday dissolved without reaching a quorum; lawmakers were to try again on Monday.
The problem is not just with the Kirkuk referendum. If the Kurds continue to hold the election law hostage, provincial elections now expected in early 2009 will also be stymied. These elections are crucial to Iraq’s political stability and reconciliation efforts because they will give minority Sunni Arabs a chance to be in government for the first time since they boycotted the 2005 elections. Sunnis who played a key role fighting with American forces against Iraqi insurgents are already embittered by the failure of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government to hire enough of them for promised security jobs.
Compromises on Kirkuk are theoretically possible, but only the U.N. seems to be seriously trying to find one. That’s baffling, since no one, other than the Iraqis, has more vested in keeping the lid on violence and on tension with Turkey and Iran than the United States.
Iraqis proved their post-Saddam political wheeling-and-dealing skills when they adopted budget, amnesty and provincial powers laws earlier this year. It’s worth testing whether horse-trading on the crucial but deadlocked oil law and other contentious issues like minority rights and redistribution of powers could produce a Kirkuk deal all ethnic communities could live with.
If Iraqi leaders cannot settle the matter, they might consider putting Kirkuk and its environs under United Nations administration as was done with Brcko after the Balkan wars. The imperative is to ensure that Kirkuk’s future is not drawn in blood.
by Aliza Marcus
New York: New York University Press, 2007. 349 pp. $35
Reviewed by Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2008
Most writers on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, best known by its Kurdish language acronym, the PKK, substitute advocacy for accuracy, so their books about the PKK tend to have limited practical use for policymakers. But Marcus, a former international correspondent for The Boston Globe who spent several years covering the PKK, has done important work in Blood and Belief. While sympathetic to her subject—the substitution of “militant” for “terrorist” grates—she retains professional integrity and does not skip over inconvenient parts of the PKK narrative such as its predilection to target Kurdish and leftist competitors rather than the Turks; the patronage it has received from the Syrian government; and the important role of European states and the Kurdish diaspora in its funding.
Blood and Belief has four sections: on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s life and the PKK’s beginnings; the PKK’s consolidation of power; the civil war; and the aftermath of Öcalan’s 1999 capture.
The Kurds inhabit a region that spans Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and Marcus does not let national borders constrain her analysis. Events in Iraq—such as the squabbling between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani—influenced Öcalan, who concluded that he should tolerate no dissent. “We believed in socialism, and it was a Stalin-type of socialism we believed in,” one early PKK member relates.
Steeped in Kurdish and Turkish history, Marcus provides better context than many other journalists who have tackled this subject. The PKK took hold, she shows, largely because of the weakness of the Turkish state in the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Turkish government barely functioned. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military restored order. But when Barzani offered the PKK shelter in northern Iraq, the group remained beyond reach, allowing it to plan and launch a full-scale guerilla war against Turkey. Marcus concludes that the group’s continued survival in Turkey is because, at some level and among some constituents, it remains popular; its support is not all driven by intimidation as some Turkish analysts claim.
Marcus impressively covers the civil war years (1984-99), and her narrative, combining dialogue and context, is rich and accessible. While many journalists and authors satisfy themselves with a single round of interviews, Marcus concentrates not on active PKK members, who she realizes do not enjoy the freedom to speak, but rather on past members, villagers, and family members whose accounts she cross-checks. She also incorporates Turkish language press accounts and interviews with Turkish officials.
It is unfortunate, though, that her coverage of PKK resurgence, between 1999 and 2007, is just thirteen pages long. An exploration of how Öcalan has retained control while in prison and where he and his henchmen might take the PKK has seldom been more relevant. One hopes that this new chapter of PKK history will become the basis for a sequel.
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Edited by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 336 pp. $65
Reviewed by Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2008
The reader of Kurdish Identity, published in 2007, will find himself reading such timely insights as former State Department Iraq coordinator Francis Ricciardone explaining that, “Of course, we have no relations at all with [Baghdad],” and former deputy assistant secretary of state David Mack writing that he understands both Kurdish aspirations and “the potential danger that a ruthless regime in Baghdad poses,” as though Saddam Hussein’s regime had not ceased to exist in 2003.
The collection of articles published by MacDonald and O’Leary, Kurdish experts at, respectively, Florida International University and American University, might have been useful to practitioners in April 2000, the date of the conference for which they were written, but the articles are now out-of-date.
Some chapters are useful to historians. Robert W. Olson’s essay on Turkish-Iranian relations between 1997 and 2001 capably reviews that period. Kurdistan Regional Government financial advisor Stafford Clarry’s analysis of the U.N.’s humanitarian program retains value because of his precision and attention to detail, all the more so in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program scandal, which he helped expose. Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.
The editors conclude with an essay updating the reader on world events. Both are academics well worth reading, but they provide no insights in this collection not already published elsewhere. Their comments in passing on the dire situation of Syrian Kurds, who do not enjoy equal protection under the law, raises the question why Kurdish Identity does not address this subject.
Had MacDonald and O’Leary reassembled their April 2000 conference participants to reconsider their contributions seven years later and analyze where they were right and wrong, Kurdish Identity would have advanced scholarship in a novel way. As it stands, however, their book offers too little and much too late, suggesting that academics live in a world of publish or perish with the content of those publications sometimes a secondary consideration.
As part of a long-term security agreement with Iraq, US forces could be stationed in Kurdistan. [sic.]
The Iraqi government and the head of northern Iraq’s regional Kurdish administration, Massoud Barzani, have suggested to military officials that US forces be permanently based in Kurdistan. [sic.]
Mr Barzani has said a permanent US military presence in the Kurdistan region would defend Iraq from internal and external risks.
On hearing the request, US Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama said it would be appropriate to redeploy US troops there in the future.
Mr Obama is known to believe troops stationed in the Kurdistan [sic.] area are not in any great danger.
There are currently no US airbases in Kurdistan, [sic.] although there are two Air Force facilities in neighbouring provinces.
The US military has denied any intention of building a US air base, but Kurdish sources have said if the US military decides to establish a permanent presence it will be closer to the Iraqi-Iranian border.
Source: BirminghamStar.com, 22nd July, 2008
If Washington were to pursue a military solution in its efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey – the only NATO country bordering Iran – must be a part of its planning. Likewise, if the United States and its European allies were to implement tighter economic sanctions against Iran, Ankara would have to play a key role because much of Iran’s trade with Europe goes through Turkey.
On the surface, Turkey seems to be on board with the West regarding Iran. But the Turkish position on Iran today looks much like the Turkish position regarding the buildup to the Iraq war in 2003. The specific factors that led to Ankara’s decision to oppose the war are re-emerging, building opposition to American plans to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, either through sanctions or military measures.
In 2003, the Turkish public had little awareness about the approaching Iraq war. At that time, the United States was using Turkey’s Incirlik air base to bomb Saddam Hussein’s air defenses. At the same time, Ankara was paralyzed by its internal struggle to preserve secularism within the government. If you read Turkish papers published back then, you would not guess that the United States was about to occupy one of Turkey’s neighbors and forever change their neighborhood.
Five years later – déjà vu. Turkey is once again stricken with political paralysis over the battle between secularists and the governing Justice and Development Party, or AKP. As a result, there is almost no coverage in the Turkish media on foreign policy issues, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Domestic tensions make it impossible for that issue to penetrate the debate. Perhaps Turks won’t even notice until Iran actually detonates a bomb.
Another similarity between today and the events of 2003 is that the AKP government is playing both sides to get away with doing nothing. As it negotiated with U.S. diplomats in 2003 about a joint front against Saddam, the AKP voiced antiwar rhetoric at home. Moreover, days before the war began, the AKP’s trade minister went to Baghdad to sign a multibillion-dollar trade deal with Saddam. In the end, the AKP-dominated Turkish Parliament voted to keep Turkey out of the war.
Now, once again, the AKP is playing both sides to shirk responsibility. While opposing U.S. military action, the party continues to spout its official line: “Turkey wants a nuclear-free Middle East.” Albeit a good start, this policy implies that Israel’s nukes are as much a problem as Iran’s would be – a stance that absolves Ankara from any real political obligations toward Europe and the United States on Iran. Moreover, at a time when the West is imposing sanctions, the AKP has signed a memorandum of understanding to invest $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars gas field – a move eerily similar to 2003.
Another similarity is America’s failure to communicate with the Turks. In 2003, Turkish officials expected, in vain, that Secretary of State Colin Powell would come to Ankara to promise that the war against Saddam would not break up Iraq and create an independent Kurdish state.
Today, seasoned diplomats in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot tell from one day to the next how America is planning on dealing with Iran. And like in 2003, Ankara is waiting with crossed fingers for a high-level American statesman to explain Washington’s plans.
There is, however, one difference between 2003 and 2008: the role of the Turkish military. In the run-up to the Iraq war, bickering between the Turkish government and the military complicated matters for the United States. Neither the AKP nor the military wanted to be responsible for making the decision for their country to go to war. This thinking proved to be a fatal mistake for the military, rendering it irrelevant in Washington and powerless in Turkey.
After dropping out of the foreign policy debate in 2003, the military lost popularity, as was seen in the July, 2007 elections. Today it is in disarray.
This leaves the AKP in charge of major decisions regarding Iran. The AKP opposes both a military solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as well as non-military measures like strong economic sanctions. As a result of the AKP’s rapprochement with Tehran since 2003, the official line in Ankara is that “Turkey’s economic interests in Iran are too important to sacrifice.”
The latest American overture to Ankara, supporting Turkish efforts against the Kurdistan Workers Party, has not sufficed to change the government’s attitude. While Washington has allowed Turkey to target PKK terrorist camps in northern Iraq, Tehran, as a favor to Turkey, has upped the ante with Washington by actually bombing such camps.
If the United States was betting on Turkish cooperation against Iran, it might as well plan to navigate around the looming iceberg. It might already be too little too late for Washington to count on Turkey on Iran.
Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of “Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?”
AKRE, Iraq, May 24 (AFP) – Hajj Khalil is the last Muslim with Jewish roots in the Iraqi Kurdish village of Akre. One of his dearest wishes is to travel to Israel to apologise to his cousins for failing in his duties as a host when they visited him five years ago.
“In 2000, several of them came to see me and I didn’t even greet them, let alone invite them to stay. Despite the autonomy enjoyed by Kurdistan, Saddam Hussein had spies everywhere,” says Khalil Fakih Ahmed, a 74-year-old wearing the traditional Kurdish headdress.
In Akre, a large cluster of hillside houses some 420 kilometres (260 miles) north of Baghdad, near the border with Turkey, place names are one of the few reminders of the former Jewish presence.
The last Jews in the region left Iraq between 1949 and 1951, just after the creation of the state of Israel.
One block of houses is still called Shusti — or ‘Jewish town’ in Kurdish — but the old synagogue was destroyed long ago.
In the mountains overlooking the town lies a plateau called Zarvia Dji (Land of the Jews) where the Jewish community used to gather for celebrations.
“My grandmother converted to Islam when her husband died and my father had just turned 10,” Hajj Khalil recalls, sitting in his garden with his children and grandchildren around him.
“When the Jews left, we stayed because we had become Muslims.”
But in the streets of Akre, Khalil and his family are still called “the Jews”.
“If you ask for Izzat or Selim in the street, nobody will know who you’re talking about,” says the old man’s 19-year-old grandson. “But if you say ‘Izzat the Jew’, they’ll know immediately.”
According to the United Nations, some 150,000 Jews still lived in Iraq just after World War II, several thousand of them in Kurdistan.
Former Israeli defence minister Yitzhak Mordechai was born in Akre.
In 1999, Khalil’s cousin Itzhak Ezra, who lives in the northern Israeli city of Tiberias, arrived in Akre.
“We told the neighbours he was a Turkish trucker who needed a place to sleep. But Itzhak met an old friend who recognised him after half a century.”
“Luckily, his friend said nothing and the story was kept secret,” he says.
A few weeks after returning to Israel, the long-lost cousin sent a letter to thank Khalil for his hospitality.
“Saddam’s spies found out and arrested our brother-in-law who lived in Mosul,” southwest of Akre, says Saber, one of Khalil’s sons.
Saber went to see the intelligence services in an attempt to secure his relative’s release but was arrested and detained for a month in Baghdad.
“They interrogated me, I pretended to be illiterate and demented. Then they offered me a passport to go and spy for them in Israel before eventually releasing me,” Saber says.
Between 1991 and the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, some Israelis were able to reach this area in autonomous Kurdistan through the Turkish border. But Saddam retained intelligence agents in the region until the fall of his regime.
“When my cousins came to visit me” in 2000, “they didn’t understand why we would not meet them but I could not explain it to them. They were very offended and left,” Hajj Khalil remembers.
Since then, he has had no contact with his relatives. “My father is hoping to go and see them to resolve this misunderstanding,” his son Izzat says.
Source: www.kerkuk-kurdistan.com [sic.]