Turkish Forum

Category: Iraq

  • Iraqi-Kurd MP lashes out at ‘Turkish interference’

    Iraqi-Kurd MP lashes out at ‘Turkish interference’

    A petroleum well at an oil refinery near Kirkuk

    SULAIMANIYAH, Iraq (AFP) — An influential Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament on Saturday accused Turkey of undermining the influence Kurds have gained since the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

    “Turkey has manoeuvred to create an anti-Kurdish (Iraqi) parliament,” Mahmoud Othman told a press conference in Sulaimaniyah, one of the main cities of the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq.

    “It is behind the adoption of article 24 of the electoral law as it is trying by all means to reduce the gains made by the Kurds after the fall of Saddam Hussein,” he said.

    Iraq’s parliament proposed under article 24 of the election bill a deal that will share power equally between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen in the oil-rich Kirkuk region, a move bitterly opposed by the Kurds, given their numerical superiority.

    Othman did not elaborate on how he thought Ankara had managed to influence Iraqi MPs to write a clause in the electoral bill, though Kurds have long complained of Turkish efforts to undermine them through alliance with ethnic Turkmen and Sunni Arabs.

    Saddam placed Kirkuk outside the Kurdish region, which has behaved essentially as an independent entity since 1991.

    But Iraqi Kurds, many of whom see Kirkuk’s oil wealth as vital to the future viability of their region, have called for the city to be placed within the autonomous region.

    Kirkuk has a large population of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, as well as Turkmen, making for a fragile ethnic mix.

    The failure to find a solution to Kirkuk has forced the postponement of local elections in Iraq initially scheduled for October 1.

    Othman also singled out the United States and Britain, claiming they had played negative roles.

    He said the US had “not reacted” to Turkish attempts to push the bill through parliament while Britain had pressured the Kurds to accept the demands of the Arabs and Turkmen.

    Turkey, which once ruled Iraq for 400 years, sees itself as the traditional protector of the Turkmen community who, together with the Arabs, complain of being bullied by the Kurds.

    With its own large Kurdish minority in the south, Turkey has viewed the increasing independence of the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region with deep misgivings.

    Source: AFP, 10.08.2008

  • Iraq’s Constitution, Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories

    Iraq’s Constitution, Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories

    Iraq’s Constitution, Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories
    Brendan O’Leary and David Bateman, UPenn
    . org/docs/ pdf_files/ OLeary_Paper. pdf

    POWER POINT PRESENTATION (PAY ATTENTION TO MAPS)
    . org/docs/ pdf_files/ OLeary_SLIDES. pdf

     

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  • A Major Political Test for Iraq

    A Major Political Test for Iraq

    Published: August 4, 2008

    Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk has been a political tinderbox-in-waiting that was largely ignored as war-fighting took precedence. Now that violence is way down, Iraqi leaders have no excuse not to peacefully decide the city’s future. Their failure to do so has already raised tensions and could further shred Iraq’s fragile social fabric — and unleash more bloodshed.

    Kurds who run the semiautonomous region of Kurdistan should not be allowed to unilaterally annex Kirkuk, which they regard as their ancient capital but is also home to Turkmen and Arabs. They were promised a referendum in the Iraqi Constitution, but no durable solution can result without the participation of all groups. Overconfident Kurds and their American supporters have not been looking seriously for compromise.

    The problem came to a head two weeks ago when Iraq’s Parliament passed a law again postponing a referendum on Kirkuk (it was supposed to be held by the end of 2007). The law contained a measure diluting Kurdish power in the area’s provincial council.

    The Kurds believe the referendum will endorse making Kirkuk and surrounding areas part of Kurdistan — giving them more oil revenue and furthering their goal of independence — while Turkmen and Arab leaders want the city to stay under the central government.

    Kurdish parliamentarians boycotted the session, resulting in the election law being declared unconstitutional. Another session on Sunday dissolved without reaching a quorum; lawmakers were to try again on Monday.

    The problem is not just with the Kirkuk referendum. If the Kurds continue to hold the election law hostage, provincial elections now expected in early 2009 will also be stymied. These elections are crucial to Iraq’s political stability and reconciliation efforts because they will give minority Sunni Arabs a chance to be in government for the first time since they boycotted the 2005 elections. Sunnis who played a key role fighting with American forces against Iraqi insurgents are already embittered by the failure of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government to hire enough of them for promised security jobs.

    Compromises on Kirkuk are theoretically possible, but only the U.N. seems to be seriously trying to find one. That’s baffling, since no one, other than the Iraqis, has more vested in keeping the lid on violence and on tension with Turkey and Iran than the United States.

    Iraqis proved their post-Saddam political wheeling-and-dealing skills when they adopted budget, amnesty and provincial powers laws earlier this year. It’s worth testing whether horse-trading on the crucial but deadlocked oil law and other contentious issues like minority rights and redistribution of powers could produce a Kirkuk deal all ethnic communities could live with.

    If Iraqi leaders cannot settle the matter, they might consider putting Kirkuk and its environs under United Nations administration as was done with Brcko after the Balkan wars. The imperative is to ensure that Kirkuk’s future is not drawn in blood.

     

  • Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence

    by Aliza Marcus
    New York: New York University Press, 2007. 349 pp. $35

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    Most writers on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, best known by its Kurdish language acronym, the PKK, substitute advocacy for accuracy, so their books about the PKK tend to have limited practical use for policymakers. But Marcus, a former international correspondent for The Boston Globe who spent several years covering the PKK, has done important work in Blood and Belief. While sympathetic to her subject—the substitution of “militant” for “terrorist” grates—she retains professional integrity and does not skip over inconvenient parts of the PKK narrative such as its predilection to target Kurdish and leftist competitors rather than the Turks; the patronage it has received from the Syrian government; and the important role of European states and the Kurdish diaspora in its funding.

    Blood and Belief has four sections: on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s life and the PKK’s beginnings; the PKK’s consolidation of power; the civil war; and the aftermath of Öcalan’s 1999 capture.

    The Kurds inhabit a region that spans Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and Marcus does not let national borders constrain her analysis. Events in Iraq—such as the squabbling between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani—influenced Öcalan, who concluded that he should tolerate no dissent. “We believed in socialism, and it was a Stalin-type of socialism we believed in,” one early PKK member relates.

    Steeped in Kurdish and Turkish history, Marcus provides better context than many other journalists who have tackled this subject. The PKK took hold, she shows, largely because of the weakness of the Turkish state in the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Turkish government barely functioned. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military restored order. But when Barzani offered the PKK shelter in northern Iraq, the group remained beyond reach, allowing it to plan and launch a full-scale guerilla war against Turkey. Marcus concludes that the group’s continued survival in Turkey is because, at some level and among some constituents, it remains popular; its support is not all driven by intimidation as some Turkish analysts claim.

    Marcus impressively covers the civil war years (1984-99), and her narrative, combining dialogue and context, is rich and accessible. While many journalists and authors satisfy themselves with a single round of interviews, Marcus concentrates not on active PKK members, who she realizes do not enjoy the freedom to speak, but rather on past members, villagers, and family members whose accounts she cross-checks. She also incorporates Turkish language press accounts and interviews with Turkish officials.

    It is unfortunate, though, that her coverage of PKK resurgence, between 1999 and 2007, is just thirteen pages long. An exploration of how Öcalan has retained control while in prison and where he and his henchmen might take the PKK has seldom been more relevant. One hopes that this new chapter of PKK history will become the basis for a sequel.

     

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    Kurdish Identity

    Human Rights and Political Status

    Edited by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 336 pp. $65

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    The reader of Kurdish Identity, published in 2007, will find himself reading such timely insights as former State Department Iraq coordinator Francis Ricciardone explaining that, “Of course, we have no relations at all with [Baghdad],” and former deputy assistant secretary of state David Mack writing that he understands both Kurdish aspirations and “the potential danger that a ruthless regime in Baghdad poses,” as though Saddam Hussein’s regime had not ceased to exist in 2003.

    The collection of articles published by MacDonald and O’Leary, Kurdish experts at, respectively, Florida International University and American University, might have been useful to practitioners in April 2000, the date of the conference for which they were written, but the articles are now out-of-date.

    Some chapters are useful to historians. Robert W. Olson’s essay on Turkish-Iranian relations between 1997 and 2001 capably reviews that period. Kurdistan Regional Government financial advisor Stafford Clarry’s analysis of the U.N.’s humanitarian program retains value because of his precision and attention to detail, all the more so in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program scandal, which he helped expose. Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.

    The editors conclude with an essay updating the reader on world events. Both are academics well worth reading, but they provide no insights in this collection not already published elsewhere. Their comments in passing on the dire situation of Syrian Kurds, who do not enjoy equal protection under the law, raises the question why Kurdish Identity does not address this subject.

    Had MacDonald and O’Leary reassembled their April 2000 conference participants to reconsider their contributions seven years later and analyze where they were right and wrong, Kurdish Identity would have advanced scholarship in a novel way. As it stands, however, their book offers too little and much too late, suggesting that academics live in a world of publish or perish with the content of those publications sometimes a secondary consideration.

  • Kurds ask for US bases to be built near Iran border

    Kurds ask for US bases to be built near Iran border

    As part of a long-term security agreement with Iraq, US forces could be stationed in Kurdistan. [sic.]

    The Iraqi government and the head of northern Iraq’s regional Kurdish administration, Massoud Barzani, have suggested to military officials that US forces be permanently based in Kurdistan. [sic.]

    Mr Barzani has said a permanent US military presence in the Kurdistan region would defend Iraq from internal and external risks.

    On hearing the request, US Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama said it would be appropriate to redeploy US troops there in the future.

    Mr Obama is known to believe troops stationed in the Kurdistan [sic.] area are not in any great danger.

    There are currently no US airbases in Kurdistan, [sic.] although there are two Air Force facilities in neighbouring provinces.

    The US military has denied any intention of building a US air base, but Kurdish sources have said if the US military decides to establish a permanent presence it will be closer to the Iraqi-Iranian border.

    Source: BirminghamStar.com, 22nd July, 2008

  • Turkish déjà vu

    Turkish déjà vu

    By Soner Cagaptay
    Friday, July 18, 2008

    If Washington were to pursue a military solution in its efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey – the only NATO country bordering Iran – must be a part of its planning. Likewise, if the United States and its European allies were to implement tighter economic sanctions against Iran, Ankara would have to play a key role because much of Iran’s trade with Europe goes through Turkey.

    On the surface, Turkey seems to be on board with the West regarding Iran. But the Turkish position on Iran today looks much like the Turkish position regarding the buildup to the Iraq war in 2003. The specific factors that led to Ankara’s decision to oppose the war are re-emerging, building opposition to American plans to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, either through sanctions or military measures.

    In 2003, the Turkish public had little awareness about the approaching Iraq war. At that time, the United States was using Turkey’s Incirlik air base to bomb Saddam Hussein’s air defenses. At the same time, Ankara was paralyzed by its internal struggle to preserve secularism within the government. If you read Turkish papers published back then, you would not guess that the United States was about to occupy one of Turkey’s neighbors and forever change their neighborhood.

    Five years later – déjà vu. Turkey is once again stricken with political paralysis over the battle between secularists and the governing Justice and Development Party, or AKP. As a result, there is almost no coverage in the Turkish media on foreign policy issues, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Domestic tensions make it impossible for that issue to penetrate the debate. Perhaps Turks won’t even notice until Iran actually detonates a bomb.

    Another similarity between today and the events of 2003 is that the AKP government is playing both sides to get away with doing nothing. As it negotiated with U.S. diplomats in 2003 about a joint front against Saddam, the AKP voiced antiwar rhetoric at home. Moreover, days before the war began, the AKP’s trade minister went to Baghdad to sign a multibillion-dollar trade deal with Saddam. In the end, the AKP-dominated Turkish Parliament voted to keep Turkey out of the war.

    Now, once again, the AKP is playing both sides to shirk responsibility. While opposing U.S. military action, the party continues to spout its official line: “Turkey wants a nuclear-free Middle East.” Albeit a good start, this policy implies that Israel’s nukes are as much a problem as Iran’s would be – a stance that absolves Ankara from any real political obligations toward Europe and the United States on Iran. Moreover, at a time when the West is imposing sanctions, the AKP has signed a memorandum of understanding to invest $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars gas field – a move eerily similar to 2003.

    Another similarity is America’s failure to communicate with the Turks. In 2003, Turkish officials expected, in vain, that Secretary of State Colin Powell would come to Ankara to promise that the war against Saddam would not break up Iraq and create an independent Kurdish state.

    Today, seasoned diplomats in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot tell from one day to the next how America is planning on dealing with Iran. And like in 2003, Ankara is waiting with crossed fingers for a high-level American statesman to explain Washington’s plans.

    There is, however, one difference between 2003 and 2008: the role of the Turkish military. In the run-up to the Iraq war, bickering between the Turkish government and the military complicated matters for the United States. Neither the AKP nor the military wanted to be responsible for making the decision for their country to go to war. This thinking proved to be a fatal mistake for the military, rendering it irrelevant in Washington and powerless in Turkey.

    After dropping out of the foreign policy debate in 2003, the military lost popularity, as was seen in the July, 2007 elections. Today it is in disarray.

    This leaves the AKP in charge of major decisions regarding Iran. The AKP opposes both a military solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as well as non-military measures like strong economic sanctions. As a result of the AKP’s rapprochement with Tehran since 2003, the official line in Ankara is that “Turkey’s economic interests in Iran are too important to sacrifice.”

    The latest American overture to Ankara, supporting Turkish efforts against the Kurdistan Workers Party, has not sufficed to change the government’s attitude. While Washington has allowed Turkey to target PKK terrorist camps in northern Iraq, Tehran, as a favor to Turkey, has upped the ante with Washington by actually bombing such camps.

    If the United States was betting on Turkish cooperation against Iran, it might as well plan to navigate around the looming iceberg. It might already be too little too late for Washington to count on Turkey on Iran.

    Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of “Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?”