Category: Iraq

  • Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     
    18/08/2008 14:49  (18:05 minutes ago)
    STRATFOR — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan. Read STARTFOR analysis. 

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    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
     
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
     
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
     
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
     
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
     
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Russia have every interest in avoiding.
     
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on MOSCOW ’s good graces.
     
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
     
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in MOSCOW and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi . During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows.
     
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
     
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
     
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
     
    Reprinted with permissions of STRATFOR.
    Strategic Forecasting, Inc., Stratfor, is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas. George Friedman is the founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the company.
     

  • USA : Calendar of Upcoming Anti-war Events

    USA : Calendar of Upcoming Anti-war Events

     

     

    Aug. 16 in Los Angeles: Demand immediate withdrawal of all troops from Iraq!


    Protest at the Republican and Democratic National Conventions
    January 20, 2009: Join thousands to demand “Bring the troops home now!”

    The ANSWER Coalition will be in the streets on Saturday August 16 in Los Angeles to demand an immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from Irag and Afghanistan and end to all threats and sanctions against Iran.

    The Aug. 16 demonstration will coincide with a presidential forum at Saddleback Church in Orange County. Both McCain and Obama will be speaking there.

    This important mobilization marks the start of an intense 5-month period of mass action. After Los Angeles this Saturday, there will be important demonstrations at the Republican and Democratic Party Conventions.

    On January 20, 2009, when the next president proceeds up Pennsylvania Avenue he will see thousands of people carrying signs that say US Out of Iraq Now!, US Out of Afghanistan Now!, and Stop the Threats Against Iran! As in Vietnam it will be the people in the streets and not the politicians who can make the difference.

    On March 20, 2008, in response to a civil rights lawsuit brought against the National Park Service by the Partnership for Civil Justice on behalf of the ANSWER Coalition, a Federal Court ruled for ANSWER and determined that the government had discriminated against those who brought an anti-war message to the 2005 Inauguration. The court barred the government from continuing its illegal practices on Inauguration Day. 

    The Democratic and Republican Parties have made it clear that they intend to maintain the occupation of Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and threaten a new war against Iran. Both Parties are completely committed to fund Israel’s on-going war against the Palestinian people. Both are committed to spending $600 billion each year so that the Pentagon can maintain 700 military bases in 130 countries. 

    On this the third anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, we are helping to build a nationwide movement to support working-class communities that are being devastated while the country’s resources are devoted to war and empire for for the sake of transnational banks and corporations.

    Join us in Los Angeles on August 16, in Denver on Aug. 25-28 at the Democratic Convention, in St. Paul at the Republican Convention between Sept. 1 and Sept. 4. And help organize bus and car caravans for January 20, 2009, Inauguration Day, so that whoever is elected president will see on Pennsylvania Avenue that the people want an immediate end to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and to halt the threats against Iran.

    From Iraq to New Orleans, Fund Peoples Needs Not the War Machine! 

    Calendar of Events 

    — August 16 in Los Angeles: End the War Now! Click this link for information.
    — August 25-28 in Denver: Protest the Democratic National Convention
    — September 1-4 in St. Paul: Protest the Republican Convention
    — January 20, 2009: Bring the Anti-War Movement to Inauguration Day in D.C. 

    A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition

    [email protected]
    National Office in Washington DC: 202-544-3389
    New York City: 212-694-8720
    Los Angeles: 213-251-1025
    San Francisco: 415-821-6545
    Chicago: 773-463-0311

  • Iraq Demands “Clear Timeline” for US Withdrawal

    Iraq Demands “Clear Timeline” for US Withdrawal

    by: Robert H. Reid, The Associated Press

        Iraq’s foreign minister insisted Sunday that any security deal with the United States must contain a “very clear timeline” for the departure of U.S. troops. A suicide bomber struck north of Baghdad, killing at least five people including an American soldier.

        Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told reporters that American and Iraqi negotiators were “very close” to reaching a long-term security agreement that will set the rules for U.S. troops in Iraq after the U.N. mandate expires at the end of the year.

        Zebari said the Iraqis were insisting that the agreement include a “very clear timeline” for the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces, but he refused to talk about specific dates.

        “We have said that this is a condition-driven process,” he added, suggesting that the departure schedule could be modified if the security situation changed.

        But Zebari made clear that the Iraqis would not accept a deal that lacks a timeline for the end of the U.S. military presence.

        “No, no definitely there has to be a very clear timeline,” Zebari replied when asked if the Iraqis would accept an agreement that did not mention dates.

        Differences over a withdrawal timetable have become one of the most contentious issues remaining in the talks, which began early this year. U.S. and Iraqi negotiators missed a July 31 target date for completing the deal, which must be approved by Iraq’s parliament.

        President Bush has steadfastly refused to accept any timetable for bringing U.S. troops home. Last month, however, Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to set a “general time horizon” for a U.S. departure.

        Last week, two senior Iraqi officials told The Associated Press that American negotiators had agreement to a formula which would remove U.S. forces from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, with all combat troops out of the country by October 2010.

        The last American support troops would leave about three years later, the Iraqis said.

        But U.S. officials insist there is no agreement on specific dates. Both the American and Iraqi officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the talks are ongoing. Iraq’s Shiite-led government believes a withdrawal schedule is essential to win parliamentary approval.

        American officials have been less optimistic because of major differences on key issues including who can authorize U.S. military operations and immunity for U.S. troops from prosecution under Iraqi law.

        The White House said discussions continued on a bilateral agreement and said any timeframe discussed was due to major improvements in security over the past year.

        “We are only now able to discuss conditions-based time horizons because security has improved so much. This would not have been possible 18 months ago,” White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said Sunday. “We all look forward to the day when Iraqi security forces take the lead on more combat missions, allowing U.S. troops to serve in an overwatch role, and more importantly return home.”

        Iraq’s position in the U.S. talks hardened after a series of Iraqi military successes against Shiite and Sunni extremists in Basra, Baghdad, Mosul and other major cities.

        Violence in Iraq has declined sharply over the past year following a U.S. troop buildup, a Sunni revolt against al-Qaida in Iraq and a Shiite militia cease-fire.

        But attacks continue, raising concern that the militants are trying to regroup.

        The suicide bomber struck Sunday afternoon as U.S. and Iraqi troops were responding to a roadside bombing that wounded an Iraqi in Tarmiyah, 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Baghdad, the U.S. military said.

        Four Iraqi civilians were killed along with the American soldier, military spokesman Lt. Col. Steve Stover said. Two American soldiers and an Iraqi interpreter were among 24 people wounded.

        No group claimed responsibility for the blast but suicide bombings are the signature attack of al-Qaida in Iraq.

        “This was a heinous attack by al-Qaida in Iraq against an Iraqi family, followed by a cowardly attack against innocent civilians, their security forces and U.S. soldiers,” Stover said.

        Elsewhere, a car bomb exploded outside the Kurdish security department in Khanaqin, 90 miles northeast of Baghdad. At least two people were killed and 25 wounded, including the commander of local Kurdish forces, Lt. Col. Majid Ahmed, police said.

        First reports indicated it was a suicide attack. But the U.S. military later said the bomb was in a white truck filled with watermelons and that witnesses saw the occupants leave the vehicle just before the blast.

        Ethnic tensions have been rising in northern Iraq amid disputes between Kurds, Turkomen and mostly Sunni Arabs over Kurdish demands to annex the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into their self-ruled region.

        Sawarah Ghalib, 25, who was wounded in the blast, said he believed military operations under way south of the city in Diyala province had pushed insurgents into the Khanaqin area.

        “I did not expect that a terrorist attack to take place in our secure town,” Ghalib said from his bed in the Khanaqin hospital. “Al-Qaida is to blame for this attack. Operations in Diyala have pushed them here.”

        In Baghdad, six people were killed in a series of bombings on the first day of the Iraqi work week.

        The deadliest blast occurred about 8:15 a.m. in a crowded area where people wait for buses in the capital’s mainly Shiite southeastern district of Kamaliya. Four people were killed, including a woman and her brother, and 11 others wounded, according to police.

        A car bomb later exploded as an Iraqi army patrol transporting money to a state-run bank passed by in Baghdad’s central Khillani square, killing two people including an Iraqi soldier and wounding nine other people, a police officer said.

        Another Iraqi soldier was killed and five were wounded by a car bomb in Salman Pak, about 15 miles south of Baghdad, police said.

        ——–

        Associated Press writers Hamza Hendawi, Kim Gamel and Sameer N. Yacoub in Baghdad and Yahya Barzanji in Sulaimaniyah contributed to this report.

  • Turkey walks tightrope over Iran ties

    Turkey walks tightrope over Iran ties


    By Paul de Bendern
    Reuters
    Tuesday, August 12, 2008; 9:13 AM

     

    ISTANBUL (Reuters) – A visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Turkey on Thursday reflects a desire by the NATO member to remain on good terms with an unpredictable neighbor and secure future energy needs.

    President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan have come under criticism at home and abroad for inviting Ahmadinejad, a visit that marks a diplomatic coup for the firebrand leader who has been shunned by European countries.

    Ankara has said his visit was necessary given the standoff between Iran and the West over Tehran’s disputed nuclear enrichment program, and offered to help resolve the dispute.

    But analysts said the trip was more about ensuring centuries-old ties during a period of global tensions.

    “Although Turkey doesn’t like the present regime it has always tried to keep Iranians both at bay and collaborate with them. It is an extremely delicate balancing act and it will continue to be so,” said Cengiz Aktar, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University.

    “The visit is all about controlled risks and the most important aspect is a gas deal with Iran, not the nuclear program because Turkey has little influence on that,” he said.

    Turkey and Iran share a border dating to a 1639 peace treaty.

    Ahmadinejad has been courting Turkey in the past few years as the United States has stepped up efforts to isolate Iran for failing to halt its disputed nuclear enrichment program. Washington sees the president’s visit as undermining such moves. Israel, another ally of Turkey, has also criticized the visit.

    Gul and Erdogan — both founders of the Islamist-rooted ruling AK Party — have pushed to boost Turkey’s position in the Middle East region, building greater ties with neighboring countries than previous governments.

    TRADE TIES

    Though Iran and Turkey are close geographically, historically and culturally, they have remained distant in policy and direction since the Iranian revolution in 1979.

    Turkey, which is seeking European Union membership, is also concerned at the repercussions were the United States or Israel to strike the Islamic Republic.

    “Ankara definitely does not sympathize with the ‘theodemocracy’ (theocracy-partial democracy) of Iran. … But not having a hostile attitude against Iran is important for Turkey’s domestic stability as well as its energy needs,” said Sahin Alpay, a columnist for conservative daily Zaman.

    Turkey is entirely dependent on energy imports to quench its increasing thirst for oil and gas as its industry expands. Iran is currently its second biggest supplier of gas after Russia.

    Bilateral trade reached $5 billion in the first half of 2008 and Turkey has pledged to invest $3.5 billion in Iranian gas production. Ankara and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding but are yet to sign a comprehensive agreement to invest in Iran’s South Pars gas field project.

    Part of that deal agreement may be signed on Thursday.

    Turkey is also a major transit route for goods between the European Union and Iran.

    Turkey, an officially secular but predominantly Sunni Muslim country, has long been wary over Shi’ite Tehran’s effort to export its style of Islamic Republic, its meddling in the region and its true intentions regarding its nuclear program.

    Iran has on the other hand resented Turkey’s Western orientation and reluctance to back Tehran against U.S. and EU pressure, now in the form of economic sanctions.

    News reports that Ahmadinejad did not wish to visit the tomb of Turkey’s revered founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Ankara have caused a stir. Protocol requires foreign leaders to visit the mausoleum and Turkish media said Gul had subsequently moved the trip to Istanbul to avoid a potential embarrassing moment.

    While tensions have simmered from time to time each country clearly recognizes they have mutual interests.

    Tehran’s help in tackling Kurdish separatists based in northern Iraq has also boosted bilateral ties with Turkey, to the dismay of Washington, which until recently offered little help in moving against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) bases.

    “Will the visit really help Turkey? I doubt it. It’s more beneficial for Ahmadinejad. He’ll get another 15 minutes in the spotlight when he unleashes his trademark attacks against Israel and the United States,” said a senior EU diplomat.

    (Editing by Mary Gabriel)

  • Iraq and Turkey: Regional cooperation will change the region

    Iraq and Turkey: Regional cooperation will change the region

     

    Agustos 12, 2008 tarihli bir TDN makalesi: Ilginize

     

    Tuesday, August 12, 2008

    While Iraq is in great pain because our eastern neighbor has decided to follow Saddam’s path to nihilism, our northern neighbor extends a hopeful hand of friendship, trust and promising prosperity

    Hussain SINJARI
      The last visit by a Turkish PM to our country was in 1990. Eighteen years later, a different Turkish PM comes to Baghdad. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is Islamic yet secular, a modern and open-minded leader who considers the sacred texts to be good for worshipping, more of cultural or spiritual values rather than to do with strategy, economics or the administration of the state. Moreover, he and his party do not interfere in the lifestyle of the people or their choices of belief. He and his party respect the individual freedoms of women and men.
      The government of our country did very well when it received our guest and his delegation in the most welcoming way Baghdad has ever seen so far. This visit made history when both sides signed “The Iraqi-Turkish High Strategic Cooperation Counci,” which is due to meet three times a year chaired by both PMs. The sectors of the cooperation are vitally important and include energy, military industry, security and politics.

    A historic visit:

      We know this historic visit was the fruit of good efforts of both President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Nori al Maliki. It came after the obvious success on the ground of the latest military/security operations in different places in Basrah, Baghdad, Ramadi, Mosul and elsewhere where criminal gangs used to terrorize the civilians.

      The visit of Erdoğan could not possibly take place without this security success. The writer of this article is a witness to this improvement through a number of tours and walks during the day and night in Baghdad. In Abu Nawas, the famous Baghdadi avenue with cafes and restaurants on the bank of the River Tigris, universally known for its “mesguf,” or grilled fish, I was very surprised to see hundreds of families out there. A private security company, The Sandi Group, is in charge of the security of the place, checking cars, watching for terrorists and keeping order.

      Turkey is a semi-European country with its democratically elected parliament; free, independent and critical media; active and genuine civil society organizations; and the progress it has made in the fields of agriculture, industry, education, tourism or services. All of this and more shall help to create a unique regional cooperation between Turkey and our country, which has the largest oil reserve in the world and the best human resources in the Middle East. Yet, due to the long decades of dictatorship under which we wasted our national wealth on armaments, the liberation of Palestine, lies of propaganda and other destructive practices, our country is almost a wasteland. This is a sad reality but must be changed. To change it we need this kind of strategic regional cooperation to put energies together to rebuild and reconstruct.

      The Kurdish element:

      Along the Iraqi-Turkish border, the Kurdish people live. This existence could be of a great help and serve as “the bridge” between Turkey and Iraq. The armed insurgency must come to an end and people must follow civilized practices and methods to express themselves, demand rights and demonstrate grievances.  The “State” is not innocent and policies must be revised. And people listened to and cared for. 

      The Turkomen in Iraq and Arabs in Turkey are other examples that diversity could and should be an element for strength and wealth.

      While Iraq is in great pain because our eastern neighbor has decided to follow Saddam’s path to nihilism, our northern neighbor extends a hopeful hand of friendship, trust and promising prosperity.

    Basrah-Istanbul railway system:

      Here I come up with my proposal to both governments of Iraq and Turkey: Put as a top priority to run a most technologically modern and monumental railway between Basrah and Istanbul. And then a very modern highway for transport trucks and personal cars to connect Basrah to Istanbul. These two giant projects will attract large companies to invest while small businesses will flourish along the rail and the highway.

      In this way, Iraq will be linked to Europe via Istanbul and Turkey will be linked to the Gulf via Basrah.

      One does not need more than a glance to realize what a creation of wealth this should bring to the people of the two countries and for beyond — the Gulf and Europe.

      In our globalized world we need more “tolerancy diplomacy.” This new approach and concept means to find out common grounds according to mutual benefits regardless of differences in faiths, ideologies, ethnic or linguistic backgrounds. Iraq and Turkey and other states should explore the benefits of the acceptance of each other and recognition of each other’s rights. This is an application of the “The Turkish-Iraqi High Strategic Cooperation” to set an example for many others who are crippled by the evils of ideology.  

      ………

      Hussain Sinjari is an Iraqi commentator based in Baghdad and the president of Tolerancy International. (www.tolerancy.org)

       

    © 2005 Dogan Daily News Inc. www.turkishdailynews.com.tr

     

  • Dispatches From the Other Iraq

    Dispatches From the Other Iraq

    By Joshua Partlow,

    a Washington Post foreign correspondent who reported from Iraq from 2006-08
    Tuesday, August 12, 2008; Page C02

    INVISIBLE NATION

    How the Kurds’ Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East

    By Quil Lawrence

    Walker. 366 pp. $25.95

    In journalistic accounts of the Iraq war, the Kurds, if they are mentioned at all, tend to be used as a counterexample. Kurdistan [sic.] is a place of relative calm amid chaotic violence. Its construction boom highlights the economic wasteland elsewhere. Its politicians are stalwart partners of the United States in a country bristling under U.S. occupation. A Kurdish public relations campaign describes the region simply as “the other Iraq.”

    In “Invisible Nation,” the first thorough, book-length chronicle of the Kurds’ recent history and their role in the war, BBC reporter Quil Lawrence doesn’t deny these differences. But his brisk and engaging narrative makes clear just how tenuous — and anomalous — is this period of relative peace and prosperity for the Kurds of Iraq. They endured a genocidal campaign by Saddam Hussein and have been pushed to the corners of the four nations they primarily inhabit: Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. With a population of about 25 million, Lawrence notes, the Kurds may be the largest ethnic group in the world without an independent homeland.

    “So in a dearth of good news, why isn’t the United States crowing about this one great achievement in Iraq?” Lawrence writes. “Because Kurdistan’s [sic.] success could be cataclysmic. Like no event since the 1948 creation of Israel, a declared Kurdish state within the borders of Iraq will unite the entire region in opposition, from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf.”

    Facing such a hostile neighborhood, the Kurds who live in Iraq’s three northern provinces have tried to carve out a niche of near-autonomy just on the safe side of independence. Lawrence, who writes a sympathetic but balanced portrait of the Kurds, describes their leaders’ gradual transition from guerrilla fighters to statesmen, including how they were betrayed by their ostensible allies (such as Henry Kissinger and the shah of Iran, who effectively handed over the Kurds to Hussein in 1975) and how they often squandered their best opportunities. For example, the belated U.S. creation of a no-fly zone over Kurdistan [sic.] after the Gulf War helped protect the Kurds from Hussein — “Washington unwittingly had become the midwife to a de facto Kurdish state,” Lawrence writes — only to have the two leading Kurdish parties slug it out for years in sporadic civil war.

    “Invisible Nation” briefly traces the ancient history of the Kurds but really begins in earnest with their struggle for survival during Hussein’s vicious campaign against them in the late 1980s. The book continues through the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and into the time of the subsequent occupation, trailing off in 2006. The now-familiar themes of the Iraq war echo in the Kurds’ story as well. The intelligence, for one thing, rarely panned out.

    Before the invasion, the Bush administration claimed that al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militants were operating in Kurdish territory inside Iraq. But Lawrence shows those claims were riddled with errors and mostly wrong. While the militant group Ansar al-Islam operated in Kurdistan, [sic.] for example, no links to Hussein or al-Qaeda were proved. And the opening airstrike of the war, a failed attempt to kill Hussein in southern Baghdad, was the result of an elaborate but often ineffectual intelligence-gathering operation based in Kurdistan [sic.] and led by CIA informant Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Kasnazani, a Kurd and Sufi leader who was paid millions for his followers’ work as spies.

    In Kurdistan, [sic.] as elsewhere in Iraq, faulty U.S. planning had unintended consequences. Sometimes this benefited the Kurds. The Bush administration’s inability to persuade Turkey to allow a ground invasion of Iraq from the north prevented thousands of Turkish troops from accompanying U.S. troops and may have averted guerrilla war between the Turks and Kurds — something that “may go down in history as the luckiest thing that happened to America regarding Iraq,” Lawrence writes.

    The partnership between Americans and Kurds was far from easy, and many Kurdish officials have expressed exasperation over the years. Lawrence recounts how Iraq’s current foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, couldn’t even walk through the State Department doors as a Kurdish emissary during the Gulf War. On a visit to Washington in 1991, the best he got was a cup of coffee with junior staffers at a cafe around the corner from the State Department’s C Street headquarters. After the 2003 invasion, Lawrence says, there was considerable Kurdish frustration with Gen. David Petraeus, then a division commander in northern Iraq. Many Kurds were upset because Petraeus was working with their Sunni Arab enemies in Mosul and not giving Kurdish soldiers more control in what they saw as their territory.

    Lawrence, who has reported extensively in Kurdistan [sic.] over the past eight years, dwells less on how the Kurds have governed their territory in the later years of the war. He only alludes to the darker side of Kurdish rule: the seemingly unlimited power of the rival Barzani and Talabani clans over the population, the allegations of corruption among government officials, the mistreatment of Arabs living in Kurdistan. [sic.]

    But he succeeds in drawing lively portraits of the Kurds who have worked against terrible odds for the rights of their people. Their stories remind us how many of Iraq’s top politicians — President Jalal Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, Foreign Minister Zebari, to name just a few — endured prison torture, assassination attempts and long years of war on behalf of Kurdistan [sic.] and against the country they are now helping to govern. “There are short- and there are long-term deals,” Talabani says at one point in the book. And it is not entirely clear which kind the Kurds have entered into with Iraq.