Turkish Forum

Category: Iraq

  • Joseph Biden’s view of the world’s hot spots

    Joseph Biden’s view of the world’s hot spots

    From correspondents in Washington

    Article from: Agence France-Presse

    BARACK Obama’s vice presidential pick of Senator Joseph Biden is widely seen as shoring up the Democratic Party ticket’s foreign policy credentials in the battle against Republican John McCain.

    Here are Senator Biden’s main positions on the world’s hot spots:

    IRAQ
    Unlike Barack Obama, who opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning – but was not in the Senate at the time of the vote – Senator Biden voted in favour of an October 2002 resolution authorising President George W. Bush to use military force in Iraq.

    Senator Biden however became a fierce critic of Mr Bush’s Iraq policy, saying that while the United States should eliminate Saddam Hussein, a unilateral invasion was “the worst option”.

    In 2006 he wrote that a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq was desirable by 2008, a position close to that of Senator Obama, who supports a withdrawal over 16 months starting the day he takes office.

    In a 2007 interview with The Politico, Senator Biden said he regretted voting for the war.

    He fiercely opposed the so-called “surge” of US troops to Iraq that Mr Bush ordered in early 2007.

    Senator Biden has proposed a plan to end the conflict by dividing Iraq into three largely autonomous ethnic regions – a southern Shiite region, a western Sunni region, and a northern Kurdish region – held together by a central government in Baghdad with limited powers.

    AFGHANISTAN and PAKISTAN

    Like Senator Obama, Senator Biden believes that the “real central front in the war on terrorism” is not Iraq, “but rather the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan”.

    “If we should have had a surge anywhere, it is Afghanistan,” Senator Biden said in a recent opinion article in the New York Times, because “Afghanistan’s fate is directly tied to Pakistan’s future and America’s security”.

    “The recent Pakistani elections gave the moderate majority its voice back,” Senator Biden wrote. “To demonstrate to its people that we care about their needs, not just our own, we must triple assistance for schools, roads and clinics, sustain it for a decade, and demand accountability for the military aid we provide.”

    Senator Biden also called for Mr Bush to fulfill a pledge for a plan for Afghanistan along the lines of the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.

    IRAN

    Also like Senator Obama, Senator Biden supports direct talks with Iran.

    “I believe the United States should agree to directly engage Iran, first in the context of the ‘P-5 plus 1’, and ultimately country-to-country, just as we did with North Korea,” Senator Biden said in an early July press statement.

    The ‘P-5 plus 1’ refers to the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany.

    “The net effect of demanding preconditions that Iran rejects is this: We get no results and Iran gets closer to the bomb,” he said.

    MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Biden is a strong supporter of Israel.

    “I am a Zionist,” he said in a March 2007 interview with the US-based Jewish cable television network Shalom TV. “You don’t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist.”

    He described Israel as “the single greatest strength America has in the Middle East”.

    He travelled with Senator Obama to Israel in late July, when Senator Obama promised strong support for Israel against the threat from Iran, and said he would strongly support the Mid-East peace process soon after he takes office.

    GEORGIA and RUSSIA

    Senator Biden travelled to crisis-plagued Georgia last weekend on a fact-finding mission.

    “I am going to Georgia this weekend to get the facts first-hand and to show my support for Georgia’s people and its democratically-elected government,” Senator Biden said before his trip.

    In mid-August, following the Russian military incursion into Georgia, Senator Biden said: “I have long sought to help Russia realise its extraordinary potential as a force for progress in the international community, and have supported legislative efforts intended to forge a more constructive relationship with the Kremlin.”

    However, Russia’s actions “will have consequences” on its ties to Washington, he said.

    “Russia’s failure to keep its word and withdraw troops from Georgia risks the country’s standing as part of the international community.”

    Source: www.news.com.au, August 24, 2008

  • Kurdish journalists under assault in Iraq

    Kurdish journalists under assault in Iraq

    Tue Aug 26, 2008 9:06pm EDT

    By Missy Ryan and Shamal Arqawi

    ARBIL, Iraq (Reuters) – Iraq’s northern Kurdish enclave may be a haven of relative peace and serenity but independent journalists there say challenges to the political establishment are being met with intimidation and threats.

    In the largely autonomous territory, streets are swept clean and people walk without fear — a stark contrast to the concrete walls and barbed wire that have defined life for most Iraqis in more than five years of war.

    Still, about 60 Kurdish journalists were killed, threatened, attacked, or taken to court in the first half of 2008, says the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

    Last month, Soran Mamahama, a 23-year-old writer for Livin magazine, published in the Kurdish town of Sulaimaniya, was gunned down outside his home in Kirkuk, a week after his report linking security officials to prostitution rings.

    In the past few years, many other Kurdish journalists have been beaten, jailed, threatened with death or simply hassled by the authorities while doing their job.

    “In Kurdistan there is no freedom for journalists. I have proof of that — the most recent proof was Soran,” says Hemen Mamand, a young radio reporter in Arbil who wears a small likeness of Che Guevara around his neck.

    “We don’t know who killed him, but we do know that the government didn’t care,” said Mamand, who himself was threatened when he wrote a story about an alleged case of corruption linked to Kurdish President Masoud Barzani’s powerful KDP party.

    While the rest of Iraq was mired in chaotic, bloody civil strife following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Kurdish north aggressively promoted its image as “the other Iraq” — a place of stability, prosperity and above all, security.

    The last decade has seen a scrappy independent press emerge to challenge the region’s two dominant political parties. But that has coincided with a “marked deterioration in press freedom” and spates of attacks, said Joel Campagna, who headed a CPJ mission to Kurdistan last year.

    “NO PROBLEMS HERE”

    CPJ and Amnesty International have launched campaigns to draw attention to such events and pressure Kurdish authorities to hold those who are threatening journalists to account.

    “The recent incidents have really stripped off the veneer and revealed it’s not much different than other parts of Iraq,” Campagna said.

    Although violence has dropped sharply, Iraq remains the world’s most dangerous place for the press, with more than 130 journalists killed working there since 2003.

    Many reporters in Kurdistan see themselves as most at risk when they report critically about Kurdish security forces, government officials or political parties.

    They say Barzani’s KDP party, based in Arbil, and the PUK, its historic rival, controlled by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and based in Sulaimaniya, wield near-total control of their respective Kurdish domains.

    “In Kurdistan, there isn’t really a political opposition. So the government thinks that journalists are the opposition,” said Rebin Rasul Esmail, who until 2004 was a senior editor for Hawlati, a leading independent newspaper.

    In 2006, men tried to abduct his wife, fellow journalist Azhen Abdul Khaleq, off the street. The couple believed the attack was related to Abdul Khaleq’s reporting on officials’ attempts to sexually assault female journalists.

    Kurdish officials categorically reject suggestions they strong-arm the press or look the other way when violence occurs.

    They paint a picture of a feckless, ill-trained media that traffics in unsubstantiated reports and personal attacks.

    “The problem, you know, with our journalists, they think they are free to say anything and do anything,” State Interior Minister Karim Sinjari said in an interview. “Somebody tells them something, and they make a story.”

    Asked about attacks or intimidation of the press, Arbil Governor Nawzad Hadi Mawlood said only: “No problems here.”

    Sinjari pledges to protect reporters and investigate crimes, but says he can do nothing if journalists fail to report them.

    “NO RED LINES”

    Reporters acknowledge the Kurdish media often fails to properly source reports or back up assertions. It’s also an open secret that many reporters are on government and party payrolls.

    “Journalists are a big part of the problem,” the former editor Rasul Esmail said.

    Others blame the government for starving the press of information, leaving reporters little choice but to cast about for leads or trust disgruntled insiders.

    Kurdistan’s parliament may soon resume debate on a new press law some hope will encourage a more mature, thriving press.

    An earlier version of the law laid down fines of up to $8,400 for reports about people’s private lives that “insult” them — even if true — or “stain common customs and morals”.

    Facing a widespread outcry, President Barzani rejected the draft law.

    A U.S. official in Arbil said the draft caused concern because it “could be used to stifle free expression”. “A free and independent press will make an important contribution to democratic development” in Kurdistan, he said.

    Ahmed Mira, editor of Livin magazine, is awaiting the results of a probe into his colleague Mamahama’s death.

    Mira is no stranger to intimidation. In 2007, he was seized from his home and thrown into solitary confinement after he wrote an article calling into question Talabani’s health. Talabani is in his 70s and had heart surgery this month.

    Still, Mira promises his magazine will not be cowed.

    “There are no red lines. There is no censorship for any subject published in Livin,” he said.

    (Additional reporting by Sherko Raouf in Sulaimaniya; Editing by Catherine Evans)

  • GÜLEN, KÜÇÜK, AND THE EDUCATION OF SOUTH KURDISTAN

    GÜLEN, KÜÇÜK, AND THE EDUCATION OF SOUTH KURDISTAN

    Asagidaki yazi Kurt kokenli bir siteden, ilginc aciklamalar var..
    MeltemB
     

    Saturday, August 23, 2008

     

    “Gulen gave a new decree and a new kind of mobilization to assimilate Kurds and to steal their minds by injecting religious ideology and by causing them to sell their birthright.”
    ~ Aland Mizell.

    At the beginning of the month, I posted some news about the Ergenekon gang that had been published in Taraf. At the time, I mentioned that the nexus of the Ergenekon indictment could be found in a weirdo named Tuncay Güney:

    It would appear, however, that the lies surrounding the issue of “The Antidote” stem from Tuncay Güney, a one-time, small-time journalist in whose possession the original Ergenekon documents were found in 2001. Güney has been linked to Fethullah Gülen and Gülen’s Samanyolu TV. Güney claims to have brought the photos of Öcalan and Perinçek to MİT. He claims to have taken a bribe of $15,000 to PKK in order not to shut down Gülen’s schools in Hewler, although how PKK would have had any control over anything in Hewler is a huge question. Perhaps the KDP took the bribe by introducing themselves as PKK members? Güney also claıms to have delivered money from Fethullah Gülen to ultra-fascist Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu so that he could establish the BBP. 

    Zaman has some additional weird tidbits about Güney:

    “Meanwhile, in an interview with the Yeni Şafak daily, Tuncay Güney, a former journalist whose ties with various secret services, both domestic and international, have been documented, stated that Kurdish separatist terrorism would come to an end if the Ergenekon gang wanted that to happen. Güney, who now lives in Canada and works as a rabbi, has suspected ties to the group. Güney came to prominence when the first documents related to the Ergenekon gang were seized on his computer in a 2001 police raid.

    “Güney, currently a rabbi at the Jacobs House Jewish Community Center in Toronto, praised Ergenekon prosecutor Zekeriya Öz for having “done a great job” so far in the investigation, although he expressed doubts that the operation would be very successful in the end. “However, they are very close to the end and I think it is very difficult moving on further from this point. There is no power in Turkey that can stop Ergenekon,” he said, expressing doubts that the investigation will bring about the collapse of the crime group.”

    A check of YouTube reveals that Güney does, in fact, appear to be a member of an Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto, although he now denies any connection with Fethullah Gülen, as his appearance on Mehmet Ali Birand’s 32. Gün indicates. If the first Ergenekon documents were found in Güney’s possession, why has he not been indicted? Did he cut a deal and, if so, what kind of deal was it? Is his life now, in an Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto some kind of strange “witness protection” program?

    Now, there’s more from Güney on the connectıon between the Ergenekon gang, Fethullah Gülen, and Gülen’s schools in South Kurdistan, from Milliyet:
    Küçük knows Gülen for a long time 

    Güney, in his statement in 2001, claims that he and Mehmet Demircan, an important name in Fethullah Gülen’s movement, spent intense efforts to gain Küçük into the movement and that the two [Gülen and Küçük] knew each other for a long time.

    Tuncay Güney’s statement in 2001, which he gave to Istanbul police, is one of the most fundamental pieces of evidence that Ergenekon prosecutor Zekeriya Öz, is working on. In this statement, Tuncay Güney gave a detailed explanation of Fethullah Gülen’s movement. In the Ergenekon indictment’s 442nd file, there are interesting claims that Güney made. Here, Güney claims that, since the 1970s, Fethullah Gülen knew retired Brigadier General Veli Küçük, who is under arrest in the Ergenekon case, from the right-wing National Struggle Movement (MMH). Güney explained that he learned that Küçük and Fethullah Gülen knew each other for a long time, while he and one of Gülen’s prominent members, Mehmet Demircan, made efforts to gain Küçük to the movement.

    “All of them are strugglers for nationalism”

    When Tuncay Güney was detained in 2001 for by Istanbul police for fraud, he was working for Samanyolu TV, which is linked to the Fethullah Gülen movement. In the statement he gave to police while under interrogation, he pointed out that taking advantage of his position, he had the possibility to meet with important names in Fethullah Gülen’s movement.

    Within this framework, Güney mentions that he and Demircan tried to gain, the then active duty Veli Küçük, for the movement. “When we gain him, we will be more powerful in the eyes of Fethullah Gülen,” Güney says.

    Again, referring to Demircan, Tuncay Güney ascribed the information that Gülen knew Veli Küçük from the National Strugglers’ Movement. “Look at all of Fethullah Gülen’s members; they are all National Strugglers,” he said.

    Support for Gülen’s schools

    In his statement, Güney said that Veli Küçük helped Fethullah Gülen to open a school in Northern Iraq [South Kurdistan]. According to Güney’s statement, they had stopped in Diyarbakır, where they were on the way to Erbil, in order to open private Irbil Light College. There (in Diyarbakır), they called Veli Küçük to let him know they were there, thus Jandarma Regional Commander Eşref Hatipoğlu met them. Hatipoğlu sent Güney and Gülen’s members to Silopi in a military helicopter. From there, the group passed to Nehciban (there he means Neçirvan) and talked to Barzani and Talabani.

    “Veli Küçük’s teacher collared Erdoğan”

    Güney also made a statement about field officer Necabettin Ergenekon’s involvement with Gülen’s movement. According to Güney, Necabettin Ergenekon was Küçük’s teacher. According to Güney’s claims, Necabettin Ergenekon had talks with R. Tayyip Erdoğan, then the Refah Partisi (RP) Istanbul chairman. In one of these talks, Ergenekon caught Erdoğan by the collar and shook him. According to Guney’s statement, Erdoğan, in RP’s Tepebaşı office, was having a discussion with Necabettin Ergenekon about pan-Islamism. Then Ergenekon became nervous and grabbed Erdoğan by the collar saying, “This is bullshit, Tayyip; there won’t be pan-Islamism if there isn’t Turkism.”

    Güney said that the person who introduced him to Veli Küçük, was Veli Küçük’s teacher, Ergenekon. “The field officer in Izmit (Veli Küçük), is my student. I’ll take you and introduce you to him” said Ergenekon according to Güney.

    It was claimed that Küçük had named the Ergenekon organization after his teacher’s last name.

    He spied for Eymür about Gülen

    In his statement, Güney said that when he was in Fethullah Gülen’s movement, he was regularly informing MİT chairman Mehmet Eymür’s staff. Güney said, “When I was working there, Mehmet Eymür’s men would come and get information periodically . . . Besides this information, they were asking about the hot issues in the movement anyway.”

    In February, as war preparations against South Kurdistan were underway, Nêçîrvan Barzanî and the KRG gave the go-ahead for the foundation of a new Gülen university in Hewlêr. 

    There was no mention of anyone having given PKK a $15,000 bribe in connection with this Gülen enterprise, but that may be because any bribes would actually be given to the cehş of the KRG who are only too happy to contribute to the destruction of the Kurdish people for a price.

  • Turkey bows to the dark side

    Turkey bows to the dark side

    From the Los Angeles Times
    Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit is a sign that the West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Iran.

    By Soner Cagaptay

    August 19, 2008

    ISTANBUL, TURKEY — Praying in Istanbul’s Blue Mosque on Friday, I witnessed firsthand Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s international publicity coup.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit produced little in terms of substantive policy; the signing of a multibillion-dollar natural gas pipeline deal was put off. But Ahmadinejad got something just as valuable: a chance to spin his own image, court popularity and bash the United States and Israel.

    I’ve long been fond of the Blue Mosque because it is where, many years ago, I attended my first Friday prayers. Last Friday, though, I felt uncomfortable in the prayer hall, where I found myself in front of God but next to Ahmadinejad, who turned the ritual into a political show.

    Departing from established practice of having visiting Muslim heads of state pray in a smaller mosque in Istanbul, the government allowed Ahmadinejad to pray in the Blue Mosque, Turkey’s symbol of tolerant Ottoman Islam. With permission from Turkish authorities, he also allowed Iranian television to videotape him during the entire prayer, in violation of Islamic tradition, which requires quiet and intimate communion between God and the faithful. There was so much commotion around Ahmadinejad that the imam had to chide the congregants. Then, as he left the mosque, Ahmadinejad got out of his car to encourage a crowd of about 300 to chant, “Death to Israel! Death to America!”

    Even without this behavior, any visit from a leader representing an authoritarian, anti-Western autocracy would have created controversy in Turkey just a few years ago. Not today. The ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government not only opened the Blue Mosque to Ahmadinejad but accommodated his refusal to pay respects at the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern, secular Turkey — a major violation of protocol for an official visit.

    In 1996, when Iran’s president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, refused to go to Ataturk’s mausoleum, snubbing Turkey’s identity as a secular pro-Western state, it led to a public outcry and sharp criticism of Iran. Relations soured. When the Iranian ambassador suggested a few months later that Turkey should follow Sharia law, he was forced to leave the country.

    This time, though, the AKP government has taken a different stance, playing down the diplomatic insult. It moved the meeting from the capital, Ankara, to Istanbul and labeled it a “working” meeting rather than an official visit. Yet all sorts of AKP officials flocked to Istanbul to meet with the Iranian president.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan asked the Turkish public to ignore the snub and instead “focus on the big picture.” It is the “big picture,” though, that is most disconcerting. By extending an invitation to Ahmadinejad, the first such move by any NATO or European Union member country, Turkey has broken ranks with the West. The West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Tehran.

    In the past, Turkey stood with the West, especially after the 1979 Islamist revolution in Iran. Also, Tehran gave refuge to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which carried out terror attacks in Turkey from bases in Iran. Since the Iraq war began, however, Iran has shifted tactics to win Turkey’s heart. While the U.S. delayed taking action, Iran actually bombed PKK camps in northern Iraq.

    Meanwhile, since the AKP assumed power in Turkey in 2002, bilateral visits with Iran have boomed; Ahmadinejad’s trip crowns dozens of visits by high-level officials. Trade has boomed as well, increasing from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion today. And even though the two countries didn’t formalize the deal last week, plans are still going forward for a $3.5-billion Turkish investment in Iranian gas fields — this at a time when the West is adopting financial sanctions against Iran to cripple Tehran’s ability to make a nuclear bomb. If there were any doubts about a Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, they were laid to rest last week: During Ahmadinejad’s visit, the two countries agreed to make 2009 an “Iran-Turkey year of culture” — marked by regular cultural and political programs and exchanges — to bring the two countries closer.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit also speaks volumes about the future of Turkish-U.S. ties regarding Iran. According to a recent opinion poll in Turkey, when asked what the country should do in the event of a U.S. attack against Iran, only 4% of respondents said Turkey should support the U.S., while 33% wanted to back Iran and 63% chose neutrality.

    As I shared the canopy of the Blue Mosque’s divine dome with Ahmadinejad, I could not help but ponder how far Turkish foreign policy has shifted since 2002. Before, Turkey picked allies based on shared values — democracy, Western identity, secular politics and the principle of open society — that appeared to reflect the Turkish soul. Iran has not become a pro-Western, secular democracy since 1996, nor have Tehran’s mullahs accepted gender equality or the idea of a free society. Yet Ankara has had a change of heart toward Tehran. Years from now, Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul will be remembered as the tipping point at which the West lost Turkey, and Turkey lost its soul.

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a visiting professor at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul.

  • Turkey: Suicide Car Bombing Injures 6 Police Officers

    Turkey: Suicide Car Bombing Injures 6 Police Officers

     
    August 19, 2008
    A suicide car bombing injured six police officers at a checkpoint in the southern Turkish province of Mersin on Aug. 19, Reuters reported, citing a report from CNN Turk. The bomber detonated explosives in his car after police began pursuing his vehicle and tried to stop him at the checkpoint. The six police officers were said to be slightly injured; the attackerʼs identity was not clear.
  • Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     
    18/08/2008 14:49  (18:05 minutes ago)
    STRATFOR — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan. Read STARTFOR analysis. 

    ADVERTISEMENT

     
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
     
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
     
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
     
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
     
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
     
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Russia have every interest in avoiding.
     
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on MOSCOW ’s good graces.
     
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
     
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in MOSCOW and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi . During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows.
     
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
     
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
     
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
     
    Reprinted with permissions of STRATFOR.
    Strategic Forecasting, Inc., Stratfor, is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas. George Friedman is the founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the company.