Category: Iraq

  • Iraq presents a lesson from history

    Iraq presents a lesson from history

    As Britain prepares to pull its troops out of Iraq, former BBC Baghdad correspondent Andrew North looks back to a previous military campaign and considers whether history is destined to repeat itself?

    As the insurgency spread, the letters from the British diplomat in Baghdad grew bleaker.

    “We are in the thick of violent agitation and we feel anxious? the underlying thought is out with the infidel.”

    And then: “The country between Diwaniyah and Samawah is abandoned to disorder. We haven’t troops enough to tackle it at present.”

    A month later: “There’s no getting out of the conclusion that we have made an immense failure here.”

    In fact, this insurgency was in 1920, the uprising against the British occupation of what was then still Mesopotamia.

    The diplomat was Gertrude Bell, an energetic and passionate Arab expert who literally drew Iraq’s borders. “I had a well spent morning at the office making out the southern desert frontier of the Iraq,” she wrote in late 1921.

    ‘Mass of roses’

    But read her letters and diaries and you can easily imagine she’s describing events since 2003, as American and British forces lost control of the country they had invaded.

    The latest unhappy chapter in Britain’s involvement in Iraq is approaching its end, with the government likely to announce soon a plan to withdraw most of its forces over the course of next year.

    There are plenty of parallels with 90 years ago, says Toby Dodge, the widely-respected Iraq expert at London University’s Queen Mary College, but “in the run-up to the invasion, both in Downing Street and the Foreign Office, there was no sense of history whatsoever”.

    The hundreds of letters Bell wrote to her parents during her time in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, complete with requests for supplies of “crinkly hairpins”, are available to anyone via the internet.

    Born in County Durham, her papers are now held by Newcastle University’s Robinson library, which has been putting them online, together with her many photos.

    It is a record of a unique person, who also managed to find time to be an enthusiastic Alpine mountaineer and accomplished archaeologist, her first passion.

    But it was the creation of Iraq that would consume her most.

    There was a sense of elation when Britain took Baghdad from the Ottoman Turks in the spring of 1917 and a belief in the inherent rightness of the cause – much like the mood in the White House and Downing Street in April 2003 after the toppling of Saddam Hussein.

    “Baghdad is a mass of roses and congratulations,” Bell wrote, shortly after taking up her post as Oriental Secretary in the occupation administration. “They are genuinely delighted at being free of the Turks.”

    ‘Full-blown jihad’

    A few weeks before, the British commander Lt Gen Sir Stanley Maude had promised the people of Baghdad that: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.”

    Fluent in Arabic, Bell threw herself into her task of setting up a pro-British Arab government and was soon the main link to the country’s new politicians.

    Her instinct was to give the Arabs more independence than London wanted. For several years things proceeded peacefully. The slower communications of that time meant any dissension took longer to spread. Iraqi insurgents today have mobile phones. But dissension there was.

    She had misjudged the power of the leaders of the Shia majority, particularly their clerics.

    “There they sit in an atmosphere which reeks of antiquity,” she wrote dismissively to her mother in early 1920, “and is so thick with the dust of ages that you can’t see through it – nor can they.”

    By that summer, they were leading an uprising against the British, who found themselves insufficiently equipped to handle it.

    “We are now in the middle of a full-blown jihad,” she confessed to her mother a few weeks later.

    Burning villages

    As things fell apart, anger and opposition to the Iraq venture grew in London. But Bell didn’t shirk the blame. “The underlying truth of all criticism is? that we had promised self-governing institutions and not only made no step towards them but were busily setting up something entirely different.”

    Her letters capture too the contradictions of being an occupying power, however good it believes its intentions to be. “It’s difficult to be burning villages at one end of the country by means of a British army and assuring people at the other end that we really have handed over responsibility to native ministers,” she said in November 1920.

    A new government was created though, in spite of the insurgency – as in Iraq today. It did meet one of London’s goals – it was pro-British and in 1921, Iraq officially became a nation state.

    But nearly 10,000 Iraqis had died in the process. And that government – with the imported King Feisal I at its head – was inherently unstable, led by the minority Sunnis, with the Shia majority excluded – the model by which Iraq would subsequently be governed by Saddam Hussein.

    The Shias have today reversed that perceived injustice – as they dominate the current government – although through an arguably more open process than in the 1920s.

    But their experience under the British is etched into their collective soul in a way that will condition Iraqi politics for many years yet. The other day in Baghdad, I was talking to a senior Shia figure who referred simply to “1920” as he explained his political outlook. And now it is the Sunnis who feel disenfranchised.

    Sleeping tablets

    Gertrude Bell died in the Iraqi capital in 1926 after taking an overdose of sleeping tablets. The last few years of her life she had returned to her original love of archaeology – setting up a museum that still stands – after falling out of favour in the colonial administration.

    Many older Iraqis still talk affectionately of the woman they called “Miss Bell”, despite her controversial record.

    She’s buried in a small date-palm fringed Christian cemetery in central Baghdad.

    The sprightly caretaker started working there in 1955, in the time of the last British-backed king, Feisal II, surviving the coups, dictatorships and chaos that have followed.

    Fighting has often engulfed the area around the graveyard in recent years. The British and Americans should have learnt “from the experience of others, like Miss Bell, and the lessons from history,” says caretaker Ali Mansour. “Iraq has always been a difficult country.”

    With the reduced levels of violence, there is a view in the outside world that Iraq is now somehow fixed.

    But attacks still claim 10-20 lives every day. And Toby Dodge sees many similarities between the “unstable, unrepresentative” state the British left behind in the early 20th century and what has emerged today.

    “The Americans as far as we know will leave Iraq in 2011 with an unstable state and an unpopular ruling elite using a great deal of violence to stay in power,” he says.

    What would Gertrude Bell have made of all of this? She did foresee the outline of things to come. In late 1921, the increasingly powerful Americans were manoeuvring to sign their own treaty with the new Iraqi state: “Oil is the trouble, of course,” she spat. “Detestable stuff!”

  • Iraq Turkmen Participated in Turkic Forum in United Kingdom

    Iraq Turkmen Participated in Turkic Forum in United Kingdom

    Iraq Turkmen Participated in Turkic Forum in United Kingdom

    By Mofak Salman Kerkuklu

    On the 6th of December, the Turkmens of Iraq have participated in the Turkic forum in United Kingdom that was held at the Azerbaijani House, London, United Kingdom.

    The event was commenced with an introduction, networking and refreshments of Turkish food and Turkish cuisine and then the opening speech was started by Dr. Ali Tekin Atalar the Chairman of Azerbaijan House in UK by welcoming the Turkish participants from different countries to the Azerbaijan House and congratulating all the participant for their dedication and enthusiasm that have shown by making the effort to attend this most important meeting.

    After that, Dr. Ali Atalar started by given a brief an introduction about the Azerbaijan House in the UK. The Azerbaijani centre was officially opened its doors on the 14th of November with the aim of severing the Azerbaijani community that are living in UK. The Azerbaijani House has been established by the initiative of individual intellectuals, professionals and student living in UK. The organisation and Turkic Forum are strictly non political non profit making organisation and aiming to serve as a community centre, promoting culture activities and friendship between Azerbaijanis and host community.

    Azerbaijan Hose aims to become a registered charity at the earliest time possible. Dr. Ali Atalar also kindly stated looking forward to the support of Azerbaijani members and friends towards achieving this goal. Moreover, he revealed that Azeri people feel privileged by being able to tackle the initiative and establish this centre which can be considered as a first permanent home that has been established by a Turkic community in the UK.

    He sincerely hoped that this will motivate Azeri’s friends and brothers from the Turkic communities to establish similar centres. If more cultural centres are established by the Turkic community it would lead without doubt to a stronger community link and as a result of this a better service could be provided to our community. In addition to, in recent years huge numbers of Turkic speaking people getting together in London  have been organizing cultural events and looking for  opportunities to meet and interact with each other and members to enhance the Turkic cultural from different groups.

    Furthermore he stated that he had many wonderful groups of people, Turkmens from Kerkuk, Tatars from Kazan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmen from Turkmenistan, Uzbek, Bulgarian Turks, Kazakhs, Uigurs and many more. All groups are very enthusiastic and anxious to meet regularly, support each other and express their culture. Finally he has expressed his gratitude and thanks to Mr Şener Sağlam, the President of the Federation of Turkish Associations UK. Who is one of the most active members in organizing this event in London, being one of the most diverse and multicultural cities in the world which is home to a huge variety of ethnic communities. Within this hustle and bustle these communities attempt to represent their culture and traditions and act as a platform to lobby for their respective countries of origin while trying to overcome many difficulties and problems this great city brings.

    Turkish Cypriot and Azerbaijani communities have identified needs amongst the various Turkic communities for raising cultural awareness and cultivating friendship and solidarity between different Turkic groups living in Britain. Our aim is to build a strong community in the UK by working on specific projects such as creating media organisations, opening cultural centres and  libraries, organising various events, meetings and forums so that common cultural traditions and languages can be shared and celebrated.

    It is a fact that a strong and organised community can contribute far more to society in Britain and as a result gain more support from local authorities and government. It would therefore make sense to unite our strength and abilities, to share our experiences and knowledge, to work together on various opportunities and thus obtain more successful results.

    When we take into account that there are many other Turkic communities like Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens from Turkmeneli, Turkmen from Turkmenistan, Kyrgyz but a few, we can identify a huge potential. If we can succeed in bringing together all these related groups into one big and powerful Turkic family then whenever necessary we can move and act together as one and be far more effective in achieving our aims within the UK.

    It is for this reason that we have come together to organize the “Cultural Forum of Turkic Communities in Britain” as the first step. We wish to meet and share ideas so as to find ways to direct our activities and that will lead us to become one of the most influential communities in Britain. Moreover, Mr Levent Hassan highly contributed in the translation into English language and the discussion that was held during the event in order to facilitate the understanding the meaning of the discussion to participatents who did not speak the Turkish language.

    Moreover, Mr Altan Ataturk, the representative of the Republic of South Azerbaijan gave an introduction Azeri population and he had revealed the suffering and oppression of the Azeri on the hand of the Iranian government and also explained the culture and language similarity between the Azeri population in the Republic of South Azerbaijan and other Turkic Estates.

    The meeting also has covered the discussion of the election of management committee, representative’s committees, Auit committee and Nevruz celebration committee. The Turkic Forum event was extremely fruitful and beneficial for all the participants and considered as a stepping stone for bring all Turkic spoken people together and working as team under one umbrella. The goal and the objective of the Turkic forum can be fully utilized for lobbying for the cultural and political right for Turkic people whom are residents in the United Kingdom.

    The established Turkic forum would greatly enhance the integration of the Turkish into the British society especially by contributing with a rich Turkish culture from various Turkic countries.

     

    Mofak Salman Kerkuklu

    ireland

  • Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 23
    December 8, 2008 03:25 PM Age: 44 min
    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism, Turkey
    By: NIhat Ali Ozcan and Saban Kardas
    Turkey had high hopes its cross-border operations in the winter of 2007-8 would eliminate the threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – PKK). The ability of the PKK to strike back in the spring and summer of 2008 through staggering attacks raised questions about the effectiveness of Turkey’s strategy. The PKK survived the Turkish winter offensive and endured heavy weather conditions without losing its operational capability, thanks to its safe havens in northern Iraq. This situation led to a reevaluation of Turkey’s policies. Boosting the dialogue between Turkey and northern Iraqi authorities has emerged as the new approach to the solution of the PKK problem.

    The center of gravity for the PKK problem has shifted to the political and diplomatic realm, and will remain so in the coming months. Unlike the relative calm in the area of military operations in rural southeastern Turkey, the political debates continue unabated and will intensify further as municipal elections approach. The PKK also has been a subject of Turkey’s international and regional diplomatic initiatives (see Terrorism Focus, November 19). We will analyze the AKP government’s new openings in domestic and foreign policy and the PKK’s response to the new political setting.

    Preparing for the Winter

    PKK activity in Southeastern Turkey has declined considerably with the approach of winter. Most PKK militants are getting prepared to cope with the harsh winter conditions; some have withdrawn to their safe havens in northern Iraq, while others are moving to higher elevations where they have traditionally sought shelter in hidden caves. The PKK militants will need to survive through the winter with minimum mobility, living on the limited amount of food they were able to store during the summer. The Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri – TSK) has also called back most of the commando units from the region; most will be stationed in their barracks, preparing for new offensives in the spring. The TSK will most probably continue to use high-tech winter equipment to carry out its special operations. The level of armed activity in the region may remain low over the next few months as the PKK shifts to attacks in urban areas, like its December 1 attack on the Istanbul offices of the  Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) (Milliyet, December 3). The key question is whether Turkey will be able to quell the PKK threat through political openings and prevent new attacks next spring and summer.

    Turkey’s Dialogue with the Northern Iraqi Regional Administration

    The PKK has taken advantage of the mountainous terrain of northern Iraq and used the region as one of its encampment areas since 1983. This situation has had direct implications for Turkey’s relations with northern Iraq’s majority Kurdish population. The main determinant of the nature of this relationship has been the changing balance of power in the region. Despite the historic importance attached to Turkey’s recent dialogue with the Kurdish authorities in Iraq, such cooperation is not a political taboo. Turkey worked closely with Kurdish peshmerga forces and conducted joint operations against the PKK throughout the 1990s. However, the dynamics of regional politics over the last couple of years changed this picture drastically. Growing American influence in the region following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in the severance of ties between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds’ newfound partnership with the United States heightened the Kurds’ perception of their relative power in the region, resulting in a rather daring and at times confrontational attitude toward Turkey. Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq did not refrain from increasing tensions with Turkey when Turkey protested the Iraqi Kurds’ lenient attitude toward the activities of PKK guerillas in northern Iraq (Radikal, October 22, 2007).

    Within Turkey, the image of northern Iraq’s Kurds as the sponsor of the PKK has created a domestic constituency against any sort of dialogue with the Kurdish authorities, thus contributing to the hostile environment. Relations between Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds are nevertheless going through a new period of optimism lately, after hitting several low points over the last year. The Turkish media abandoned its policy of bashing Jalal Talabani (President of Iraq and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – PUK) and Massoud Barzani (President of the Kurdistan Regional Government – KRG – and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – KDP). Barzani has since adopted a softer language toward Turkey. There are signs the pragmatism of the 1990s might be returning.

    Developments on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border lay behind these changes. On the one hand, the anticipated changes in America’s Iraq policies in the wake of the U.S. presidential elections and new developments in Iraqi domestic politics have forced the Kurdish groups to re-evaluate their uncooperative attitude vis-à-vis Turkey’s demands. On the other hand, the growing consensus within the Turkish security establishment on the need to cooperate with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq has facilitated changes in Turkey’s policies.

    The Impact of the US-Iraqi Security Accord

    The U.S.-Iraqi security accord requiring the United States to pull out from Iraq by 2011 has important implications for the PKK and the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The KRG is uneasy about the growing power of Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. In a post-American Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership will not only lose the political leverage they obtained through alliance with the United States, but will also have to calculate the possible risks of a civil war scenario. To hedge their bets against these future uncertainties, Iraqi Kurds have reasons to be on good terms with Turkey. [1] The Kurdish leadership has come to realize that the key to normalization with Turkey is abandoning their tolerance of the PKK by limiting the group’s freedom of movement in areas controlled by the KRG. Recent developments indicate a consensus between the Turkish government and the Barzani administration to increase their grip on the PKK. The question may no longer be whether to fight the PKK together, but how.

    The Trilateral Permanent Security Commission

    Although the first signs of a possible Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish rapprochement emerged during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington in October 2007, the AKP government took concrete steps toward normalization only recently. Here one has to note the crucial role played by the TSK’s decision to support establishing relations with the Kurdish administration.

    The AKP government made its initial overtures last spring. Most significantly, following the decision of the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu – MGK) to enhance relations with “all Iraqi groups” in its meeting on April 24, a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor, met a team of Iraqi officials, including Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister and nephew of Masoud Barzani (Zaman, May 2). [2] The real impetus came with the second phase in early October. An official Turkish delegation composed of high-level representatives including Davutoglu and Murat Ozcelik (Turkey’s Special Envoy to Iraq), met Masoud Barzani in Baghdad (NTV, October 15). In the ensuing days, diplomatic relations improved significantly and areas of cooperation diversified. Turkish Interior Minister Besir Atalay visited Baghdad and held a tripartite meeting with representatives of the Iraqi central government and the United States on November 19, only a few days after the Iraqi-American security accord was agreed upon. The parties decided to establish a permanent commission to streamline Turkish, American and Iraqi efforts in fighting the PKK and to regulate Turkey’s access to Iraqi airspace and territory to carry out cross-border operations in northern Iraq (NTV, November 20). KRG representatives were included as part of the Iraqi delegation. By sending the interior minister, the Turkish government signaled its determination to recognize the Kurdish administration, but only as part of the central government (Radikal, November 23).

    PKK to Kurdistan Regional Government: Don’t spoil Kurdish gains

    PKK sources have been observing the KRG’s attempts to reorient its policies closely and with growing anxiety. They view this development as the main threat to the gains of the Kurdish nationalist movement. The collaboration of the Kurdish administration with the trilateral permanent commission is seen as a shortsighted move that is extremely damaging to the national cause. For the PKK, the only novelty of this new arrangement is its pitting the southern Kurds against the PKK, for the United States and Baghdad government have already worked with Turkey to eliminate the PKK (see Terrorism Focus, November 26). Therefore, the PKK criticizes the shift in Barzani and Talabani’s positions, as this will inevitably undermine the Kurds’ position in the region and in Iraq. From the PKK’s perspective, Turkey’s decision to initiate dialogue with the Barzani administration marks Turkey’s return to its old strategy of the 1990s, which in the PKK’s opinion is bound to fail (Gundem Online, November 30).

    More specifically, PKK sources are critical of the operations carried out by Barzani’s peshmerga militias. The PKK accuses Barzani’s peshmerga of limiting civilian movement in PKK-controlled areas and confiscating villagers’ excess food. The PKK militants depend on local food and the continuation of their freedom of movement in northern Iraq to maintain their logistical infrastructure. Tactically, the PKK seeks to settle civilians in proximity to its camping grounds in order to blend into the local population. Moreover, in case of Turkish airstrikes against these camps, the PKK might use civilian casualties to mobilize international public opinion against Turkey. Another PKK criticism takes aim at the KRG’s failure to protest TSK airstrikes against PKK positions (Gundem Online, November 30).

    PKK to Turkey: Put Your Own House in Order

    The representatives of Turkey’s Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP) have started to criticize Turkey’s rapprochement with Barzani. For instance, Selahattin Demirtas, deputy chairman of the DTP, criticized the AKP government’s willingness to speak with Barzani while at the same time refusing to talk to the DTP. For Demirtas, Barzani “is a party to the problem. He is an outside power,” whereas the DTP is a native force represented in Turkey’s Parliament. Demirtas also distanced the DTP ideologically from the KRG by labeling it a “feudal, conservative, rightist movement,” while the DTP represents a “democratic, pro-human rights and leftist movement” (Zaman, November 30-December 1).

    As the municipal elections approach, the competition between the governing AKP and DTP over winning Kurdish votes has heightened. In the midst of growing tensions caused by the exchange of fighting words between the representatives of the two parties, as well as violent demonstrations in streets, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin suggested that if imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the PKK militants to lay down their arms, the government might consider easing his conditions in the prison.

    For Ocalan, the real solution is contingent on dialogue. Domestically, he called for the establishment of a “truth and reconciliation commission,’” similar to those established in other post-civil war societies. Only a democratic project at home could save the state and solve the Kurdish question and make Turkey a true regional power. Ocalan seeks to reach out to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani by asking him to get involved by using his status in the Socialist International to promote a democratic solution by mobilizing international actors. Ocalan, however, did not give up covert threats to Turkey; “Right now there is a condition of uprising. It might turn into a hurricane in spring” (Gundem Online, November 28).

    PKK commander Murat Karayilan noted the movement is in favor of a peaceful solution through dialogue but ruled out a unilateral ceasefire; “If the Turkish state comes out and says that it seeks dialogue, and ceases its operations, no bullet will be fired. We are not the attacking side, we are in defense … How can we lay down our arms? We survive thanks to our arms” (Gunderm Online, December 2). Karayilan criticized Erdogan for failing to live up to his promise to find a democratic solution to Kurdish problem by reverting back to the military option. Karayilan underlined that the PKK is prepared for a political solution but also remains vigilant to meet military challenges. He also paralleled Ocalan’s’ threats, by maintaining that if Turkey continues its military operations and fails to develop a settlement that recognized the role of the PKK, the group would abandon its defensive strategy of “low-intensity warfare” and elevate its armed campaign to offensive “medium-intensity warfare.”

    Karayilan, however, recognizes that the PKK is being pressed hard militarily. The mounting Iranian offensive on Kurdish positions along the Iranian-Iraqi border, conducted in coordination with Turkey’s airstrikes, has caused worries for the PKK. Karayilan has criticized Iran for supporting Turkey, citing the economic and energy cooperation between the two countries. He called on Iran to give up futile military measures, and embrace the Kurdish people’s demands for peace and dialogue (Gundem Online, December 2).

    Conclusion

    Through its diplomatic initiatives, the Turkish government may be hoping to worsen the conditions for the PKK during the winter, curbing its operational ability in the spring. In their rapprochement with Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds are driven by a concern to readjust to the new strategic reality of Iraq after an American withdrawal and the development of Iraqi domestic politics.

    The PKK leadership and the DTP are worried about the implications of Turkey’s diplomatic opening to Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. On the military front, the PKK claims to possess the military capability needed to resume its armed activities in Turkey. Through its sabotage attack against the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline on November 22, the PKK might have been sending a warning to both the Iraqi central government and the KRG about their decision to support Turkey.

    The PKK has sought to bring to the fore the argument that a real solution to the Kurdish problem requires the Turkish government to deliver political reforms, meaning it should recognize the PKK as a legitimate actor. In regards to electoral competition, the DTP and the PKK have started to invoke speculation that the Turkish government could use fraudulent techniques to manipulate the local elections. DTP deputies have emphasized this point as part of their election campaign.

    The AKP government came under criticism from pro-reform forces and international observers for abandoning domestic reforms and prioritizing a military solution to the Kurdish issue. It has sought since to use diplomacy and limited political openings to further curb the PKK’s military strength. The DTP, however, consistently calls for “true democratic openings” at home, without relinquishing PKK violence. The AKP is forced to engage in a delicate balancing act—on the one hand, it has to assume political responsibility for the armed struggle against the PKK’s terror campaign; on the other hand, it has to compete with the DTP in the democratic field. While the AKP realizes that tightening the military grip on the PKK may harm its electoral chances in southeastern Turkey, letting up on the PKK now risks more attacks in the spring and may harm the party’s prestige in the West.

    Notes

    1. Turkish analysts believe that a common understanding between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds about the future of Iraq is emerging. Some claim that in case of a civil war, Turkey might throw its support behind the Kurds. See Mete Cubukcu, “Turkiye’nin Irak’taki B Planinda Kurtler Var,” Referans, November 27.
    2. National Security Council Press Briefing, April 24, 2008. www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2008/24nisan2008.htm.

  • Thankful in Turkey

    Thankful in Turkey

    Refugees

    by Robin Sparks

    I am up before the sun speeding in a taxi to the Istanbul airport to work with Iraqi refugees who are headed to, of all places, the United States, the country that I have voluntarily left behind. I am a refugee from America.

    Refugee: One who has crossed an international border and is unwilling or unable to return home because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

    Well, if I count all the rednecks in America including some who have been in power recently… Nah, I probably still wouldn’t qualify as a bonafide refugee, although I certainly feel like one.

    So who are these Iraqi refugees and why are they leaving, and why for the USA for god’s sake?

    They are Chaldean Christians, reputedly the world’s oldest religion, in existence since the first century. They constitute what remains of the original, non-Arabic population of the Middle East. All use Aramaic, the language spoken by Christ. Despite successive persecutions and constant pressures, Christianity has continued in Iraq since brought there allegedly by Thomas the Apostle.

    Before the toppling of Saddam Hussein, Christians and Muslims lived together peacefully in Iraq. Chaldean Christians were mostly middle and upper class professionals. But as a result of the US-led surge the struggle with al-Qaeda moved to the city of Mosul, the home of Chaldean Christians. In misplaced anger towards the West, Muslims have increased demands for Chaldeans to convert. Death threats, the looting of homes and businesses, kidnappings, bombings, and murder have become increasingly commonplace. This past March the Chaldean archbishop Paulos Faraj Rahho of Mosul was abducted and murdered. Numerous priests and deacons have been tortured and shot or beheaded. And at least 40 churches have been burnt to the ground.

    I am here today because the United States requires an American be present at the airport for a final identity check of all political and religious refugees headed to the United States. The job pays next to nothing and costs me a night’s sleep, but I come at least once per week because it pulls me from my ant hill into an experience that is raw.

    The 50 adults and children standing here tonight – next to all the belongings they will take with them contained in two bags per person, each weighing a maximum of 23 kilos – have waited for months, some for years for this day. It is 5 AM. They’ve been here since 2 AM after a six hour bus ride from various satellite cities throughout Turkey. Yet, they show no sign of exhaustion, only the palpable excitement of children the night before Christmas.

    Sweden has taken in the most Iraqi refugees – 40,000 – while the United States, which had only taken 1,608 by the end of 2007, has implemented a program for receiving up to 15,000 Iraqi refugees by the end of 2008. Around 500,000 people have fled Bush’s new Iraq and its violence, mass abductions and economic meltdown and most of them have been Chaldean Christians.

    Arim standing with his family of five says to me, “I did not want to leave Iraq. My life is there, my work as an English teacher. My home. My friends. But lately they are making it impossible for us to stay. When my daughter entered university to become a teacher like me, she was told to convert or she would be kidnapped and raped. It was then that we knew we had to go.”

    “Wouldn’t it be easier to simply convert to Islam?” I ask.

    “We would never do that. Our fathers, our grandfathers, their fathers, for 2000 years we have been there. We will die before turning our backs on our ancestors, our faith.”

    After hours in the checkout line shuffling through all the documents, checking passport photos with faces, police letters, sponsor letters signed, the group is ready to go.

    But wait. There’s a glitch.

    Someone notices that the photo on a security letter for one of the young men does not match the photo on his identity card. A government employee hundreds of miles away in the Turkish capital of Ankara has accidentally transposed photos. Calls are frantically made from cell phones, but government offices are not open at this early hour. The International Office of Migration employee tells the family finally that she is sorry. They will not be able to go.

    The mother collapses to the floor raising her hands in the universal sign of prayer and begs, “Please, please, help us. We have no money.” Her sons and her husband try to console her, veiling their own disappointment behind cultural machismo. The IOM employee continues trying to call offices that are not yet open. She cannot find a solution.

    After at least an hour of pleading and crying and desperate attempts to talk the IOM officer into letting them go, the family concedes that their worst fears have come true. The other passengers look on with a mixture of pity and relief as the family exits the airport slowly, the father and son holding up the mother by her elbows, daughters trailing behind, heads hung low.

    “Where will they go?” I ask the IOM personel. “I don’t know, ” she says her face a blank mask, and turns back to processing the remaining 44 refugees.

    They are checked through, documents combed repeatedly at checkpoint after checkpoint, and then the only remaining gateway is passport control where once approved, the refugees will be granted entry to the other side – the side of the airport full of glittering duty free shops and restaurants, a sort of paradise before getting on a plane to heaven. Even I, without an airplane ticket, am relegated to watching from outside the pearly gates.

    One by one each passes through the barrier after saying goodbye to family and friends on the other side that wave them on. Only one elderly woman remains, melded to a young adult man, her tear racked face glued to his, bodies entwined as if to imprint a memory.

    I’d been looking away all morning gulping down rising emotions and silently repeating the mantra: be professional Robin, be professional. But it’s useless now. The tears spill in a torrent and I gulp down sobs that rise up in my throat. I watch this mother saying goodbye for the last time to a son she will likely never see again.

    My son is in America.

    They pull apart as her name is called over the loudspeaker, and the aging mother goes through the gate that separates her old life from the new, turning to gaze one last time into the eyes of her son. At that moment she scans the crowd behind the barrier and her eyes lock onto mine. Unbelievably, she comes back to where I stand and reaches over the barrier to wrap her arms around me. We stand there, a woman whose name I do not know, whose language I do not speak, holding each other. And in this moment she knows me and I know her.

    And then she is gone along with the others to America.

    Today is Thanksgiving, and I will eat turkey in Turkey with American friends. I will celebrate Thanksgiving as never before, grateful that I am free to be here, precisely because I am an American. And I will never, ever complain about filing my taxes again.

  • ‘Secret’ provisions in U.S.-Iraqi pact

    ‘Secret’ provisions in U.S.-Iraqi pact

    BAGHDAD, Nov. 28 (UPI) — The Iranian Press TV, citing Iraqi media outlets, said it has uncovered several secret provisions in the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement.

    The Iraqi Parliament passed a measure Thursday that outlines the framework for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country by 2012.

    Among the claims, Press TV says the Iraqi Interior and Defense ministries, as well as intelligence operations, will remain under U.S. supervision for the next 10 years.

    The report also says U.S. personnel operating in the country are not subject to Iraqi laws.

    “All Americans are subject to immunity,” the Iranian report says.

    A leaked English-language version of the measure in Article 12 says Iraq has the “primary right” to prosecute those parties for “grave premeditated felonies” and other crimes.

    Press TV said the Iraqi media outlets note also that the U.S. military in Iraq will have the authority to establish prisons that will operate under their control.

  • A bloody day in the district of the Turkmen city of Tuz Khormatu

    A bloody day in the district of the Turkmen city of Tuz Khormatu

    On Thursday, 27th of November 2008, at about 4.30 pm. Mr. Abdulamir Huseyin Bektaş was a member of the Turkmen Municipal Council of Tuz Khurmato and Mr. Talib Ali was a member of the Supreme Islamic Council Representative in the village of Yengejeh which 4km west of Tuz Khormatu were assassinated by unknown gunmen.

    They died after their car was sprayed with bullets while they were leaving the Yengejeh village heading towards the Turkmen district of Tuz Khormatu.

    Their bodies were taken immediately to Tuz Khormatu hospital for identification. Then their bodies were transferred to Kirkuk for carrying out a post-mortem examination.

    In the meantime another set of unidentified gunmen cut off the road and seized a bus carrying workers travelling home from the poultry field which is located about 10 kilometres north of the of Tuz Khormatu. The gunmen immediately shot the bus driver and a worker. Both victims were Arabs from the district of Suleyman Bag.

    The gunmen were chased by the police and they were surrounded in a rural area near the village of Albu Sabah which is located about 5 km north of the district of Tuz Khurmato. Later on a statement was released by the chief police of Tuz Khormatu, Colonel Hussein Ali Rashid, “After an exchange of fire between the two parties, one of the gunmen blew himself up and the other terrorist was shot by the police. The rest of the terrorists managed to escape and 3 policemen were injured as a result”