Turkish Forum

Category: Iraq

  • Surprise Visit to Iraq

    Surprise Visit to Iraq

    By Michael D. Shear

    Washington Post Staff Writer

    Tuesday, April 7, 2009; 10:07 AM

    ISTANBUL, April 7 — President Obama made a surprise visit to Iraq Tuesday afternoon, landing on Air Force One in Baghdad at 4:4map2 p.m. local time after concluding an eight-day overseas tour through Europe.

    The unannounced visit to a war zone was a closely guarded secret that
    was kept from many of the president’s staff and the press corps, which
    had been following him across the globe for the past week.

    It is Obama’s first visit to Iraq since becoming president and comes
    after he fundamentally altered the mission there, launching a 19-month
    drawdown of most combat troops by the summer of 2010.

    As a candidate, Obama had promised to end the war, which will have
    lasted more than 7-and-a-half years by the time most of the troops are
    gone. But as president, he has moved cautiously, saying that he had a
    responsibility as president to safeguard U.S. troops and Iraqis as
    American forces withdrew.

    “So some people might say, ‘Wait, I thought you were opposed to the
    war, why don’t you just get them all out right away?’ ” Obama told
    students at a town hall meeting in Istanbul just before he left for
    Iraq. “Well, just because I was opposed at the outset it doesn’t mean
    that I don’t have now responsibilities to make sure that we do things
    in a responsible fashion.”

    Obama’s last visit to Iraq came during the height of the
    presidential campaign in July. During that trip, which also included a
    visit to Kabul in Afghanistan, then-senator Obama met with senior Iraqi leaders, U.S. officials and military commanders.

    In a news conference in July, Obama rejected criticism from his
    Republican opponent that he was planning to ignore the advice of U.S.
    military leaders.

    “The notion is, is that either I do exactly what my military
    commanders tell me to do or I’m ignoring their advice,” he said at the
    time. “No, I’m factoring in their advice but placing it in this broader
    strategic framework . . . that’s required.”

    Since then, the security in Iraq has largely continued to improve, although six bombs ripped through Baghdad on Monday, killing more than three dozen people in separate incidents.

    In America, the political and military discussion has largely shift
    to Afghanistan, where security has worsened amid a resurgence of the
    Taliban and the al-Qaeda terrorists who U.S. officials say are hiding
    on the border with Pakistan.

    Two weeks ago, Obama announced a broad new policy on the region, saying
    he would send 17,000 additional combat troops to Afghanistan, largely
    drawn from the slow decrease in troops expected in Iraq.

    The policy counts on fresh support from America’s European allies to
    provide help in training a new Afghan police force and in building the
    political and social structures that can help change the dynamic in the
    war-torn country.

    Allies this week largely refused to provide additional combat troops for the mission there. But the leaders of France, Germany, Britain and others did offer strong endorsements of a new and more aggressive approach to defeating terrorism in the region.

  • Pentagon unveils large cuts to defence budget

    Pentagon unveils large cuts to defence budget

    Tim Reid in Washington

    A contract to provide President Obama with a fleet of new helicopters that had been awarded in part to the British company Westland was scrapped last night amid swingeing cuts to the Pentagon’s weapons programmes. 

    Robert Gates, Mr Obama’s Defence Secretary, said he was scrapping the contract to build a new generation of presidential helicopters as part of a “fundamental overhaul” of America’s weapons programmes aimed at cutting costs and scaling back on some of the military’s biggest and most high profile projects.

    Mr Gates also recommended a halt in production of the F-22 fighter jet, part of his new strategy to shift America’s defence priorities away from fighting conventional wars to the newer threats the US faces from insurgents and terrorists in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

    The moves will face stiff resistance on Capitol Hill, where the defence industry has enormous resources and influence and where many congressmen and senators will fiercely defend the military manufacturers in their states because of the jobs they provide.

    Within minutes of Mr Gates’s press conference, and the unveiling of his $534 billion budget proposal, Lockheed Martin, manufacturer of the F-22, warned of the huge layoffs if the fighter jet programme were ended. The defence Secretary said production of the jets, which cost $140 million each, would be halted at 187.

    The contract for a fleet of new “Marine One” presidential helicopters was awarded to the joint Italian/British venture AugustaWestland six years ago. Since then the contract for the VH71 helicopter, a 64ft (19 metre) aircraft that is meant to be able to deflect missiles and resist the electro-magnetic effects of a nuclear blast, has almost doubled in price to $11.2 billion (£7.7 billion), from its original price of $6.1 billion.

    Much of the current fleet of 19 presidential helicopters were built in the 1970s. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks it was decided that a faster and safer helicopter was needed. But in the current economic crisis, Mr Obama wryly noted last month that his current helicopter seemed “perfectly adequate”.

    The promised emphasis on budget paring is a reversal from the Bush years, which included a doubling of the Pentagon’s spending since 2001. Spending on tanks, fighter planes, ships, missiles and other weapons accounted for about a third of all defence spending last year. But Mr Gates noted more money will be needed in areas such as personnel as the Army and Marines expand the size of their forces.

    Some of the Pentagon’s most expensive programs would also be scaled back. The Army’s $160 billion Future Combat Systems modernisation program would lose its armoured vehicles. Plans to build a shield to defend against missile attacks by rogue states would also be scaled back.

    Yet some programs would grow. Gates proposed speeding up production of the F-35 fighter jet, which could end up costing $1 trillion to manufacture and maintain 2,443 planes. The military would buy more speedy ships that can operate close in to land. And more money would be spent outfitting special forces troops that can hunt down insurgents.

    Source:  Times Online, April 7, 2009

  • The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

    The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

     

    Author:

     
    Steven A. Cook, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

     

    April 2, 2009

    As President Obama arrives in Ankara, he will find a Turkish government eager to play an influential role in the Middle East. While Turkey has made important contributions to the region in recent years, its activism has been controversial in Washington. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed out of a contentious panel on the Gaza crisis at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, he injected additional controversy into Turkey’s diplomatic foray in the Middle East.

    The incident produced a torrent of criticism from some U.S. policymakers, analysts, and journalists who regarded the uproar in Davos as proof positive that Turkey, under Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, which is rooted in Turkey’s Islamist movement, had made the turn away from the West in favor of the radicals of the Middle East. Erdogan’s behavior at Davos, his seeming embrace of Hamas during Israel’s Gaza offensive, and his strong criticism of Israel, which at times veered into classic anti-Semitism, left observers wondering whether Turkey could continue to play a constructive role in the Middle East.

    The Prodigal Pasha

    Since the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) came to power in late 2002, Ankara has pursued a conscious strategy of reestablishing Turkey’s links with the former Ottoman domains to the south and the east. To be sure, there have long been Turkish diplomatic missions throughout the Middle East, but given Ankara’s foreign policy orientation, which placed a premium on relations with the West and the official secularism of the republic, Turkey was a marginal player at best in the Middle East. The AKP governments, first under Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and since early 2003 under Erdogan, embarked on an ambitious foreign policy–concomitant with their equally bold domestic political and reform program–that sought to secure Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union while simultaneously cultivating relationships with Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, and Tehran. Turkey’s effort to draw closer to both Europe and the Middle East reflected a belief within the AKP that its foreign policy needed to be normalized. Although Turkey’s almost exclusive orientation toward Europe and the United States might have been appropriate during the Cold War, when its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a paramount foreign policy fact, Turkey’s interests now demanded a multidimensional foreign policy.

    The Justice and Development Party’s approach was met almost immediately with skepticism in Washington.  The often testy negotiations between Washington and Ankara in late 2002 and early 2003 over the use of Turkish territory for the planned invasion of Iraq and the parliament’s subsequent inability to pass legislation giving U.S. forces permission to launch the attack from Turkey angered the United States.  Yet Iraq was just the first in a series of episodes where Ankara and Washington found themselves on opposite sides in the Middle East. In 2005, for example, as the United States sought to isolate Syria over Damascus’s alleged responsibility for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and its central role in funneling jihadis into Iraq, the Turkish government continued a policy of deepening its diplomatic and economic ties with the Syrians. After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in January 2006, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and other Turkish foreign ministry officials hosted Hamas’s external leader, Khaled Meshal, at AKP headquarters in Ankara. These developments came against the backdrop of improved relations between Ankara and Tehran and Prime Minister Erdogan’s periodic tough rhetoric that Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were tantamount to “state terrorism.”

    Ties Shift, Eyebrows Rise

    Each of these developments at first blush raises serious questions about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Ankara’s seemingly abrupt divergence from the Western consensus was disorienting to policymakers and other observers who concluded that Turkey could no longer be considered a reliable partner or play the “honest broker” role in Middle Eastern conflicts that Turkish officials coveted. Hosting Khaled Meshal, who is responsible for a fair number of both Israeli and Palestinian deaths, was clearly a mistake. Not only did the Hamas leader resist Turkish entreaties to recognize Israel and to renounce armed struggle, the encounter also angered Jerusalem and Washington–two strategically critical relationships for Ankara. Yet, it is important to note that with all the questions about who “lost” Turkey and whether Turkey is “tilting East,” there is nothing extraordinary about Ankara’s approach to the Middle East. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s tortured relationship with the European Union, and the security fallout from the invasion of Iraq, any Turkish government would likely pursue a foreign policy similar to that of AKP.  The Hamas episode aside, it is abundantly clear that Turkey’s Middle East policy is consistent with Turkey’s national interests, and importantly, one that Washington can leverage to advance its own regional goals.

    On the range of important issues from Iraq and Iran to Middle East peace, Turkey’s policies are generally consistent with those of the United States. The Turks have long sought a stable, federal Iraq. The flowering of relations between Ankara and Irbil, the seat of the Kurdish Regional Government, combined with considerable Turkish investment in northern Iraq mitigates a complicating factor in Washington’s Iraq policy. The situation in Kirkuk and the persistence of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) violence against Turkey remain flashpoints, but as the Turks and Iraqi Kurds develop closer ties, the magnitude of these problems diminishes, forestalling some of the most dire scenarios about Turkish military intervention that could unravel the progress that Iraq has made over the last eighteen months. In the context of improved Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations, the Kurdish president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, has called upon PKK terrorists to lay down their arms or leave Iraq. For the United States, Turkey is no longer the malevolent wildcard in the game of stabilizing Iraq.

    Iran, Syria, and Mammon

    Viewed from a U.S. standpoint, Turkey’s two most controversial relationships in the Middle East are Iran and Syria. While critics have often used these ties as clear indications of AKP’s Islamist worldview, Ankara nurtured relations with Tehran and Damascus in the late 1990s (before Justice and Development even existed) and early 2000s.  The Turkish leadership supports the Obama administration’s efforts to establish a dialogue with Tehran. From Turkey’s perspective, good bilateral relations with Iran and regional stability are critically important, not for ideological reasons, but economic calculation. Iran is the largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey only after Russia. Although the Turks would like to diversify their supplies and have plans to invest in large-scale renewable energy programs, in the short and medium term, Ankara will do all that it can to ensure its relations with both Tehran and Moscow remain cooperative and friendly.

    The exigencies of energy supplies are not bound up in Turkey’s relations with Syria, but there is a strong economic component to the relationship. Turkey’s predominantly underdeveloped southeast is closer to Damascus than to Kayseri, Ankara, or Istanbul. The Turks believe that increased bilateral trade serves two critical purposes–it promotes development in places like Cizre, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakir and provides a boost to the Syrian economy. The architects of AKP’s foreign policy make the argument that if Turkey’s neighbors prosper, they are also more likely to be pacific, ensuring Turkish security and providing a regional environment more conducive to peace. Turkey’s ties with Syria serve another geostrategic interest. In 2006-2007, some foreign policy analysts were seized with the idea that Damascus could be “peeled away” from its strategic relationship with Iran. Although it is unlikely that Damascus will easily relinquish its ties with Tehran, the Turks can play an important role in providing the regime of Bashar al-Assad with an attractive alternative to Iran. It is surely preferable to Washington for the Turks to be engaging in dialogue with the Syrians than for Assad to be speaking with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in isolation. Turkey’s ties with Syria have already paid dividends in the Middle East as Ankara sponsored indirect talks between Israelis and Syrians in 2008. Those negotiations did not produce an agreement and were halted over Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008, but by all measures the Syrians and Israelis made progress with the help of Turkish mediation.

    O, Jerusalem

    Perhaps Turkey’s most complex relationship in the Middle East is with Israel. While the two countries maintain close military and economic ties, relations have been decidedly uneasy. From the start, the Israelis perceived a Palestinian tilt in AKP’s approach to the Middle East and were wary of Ankara’s relations with Tehran. At the same time, the Israelis, by their own admission, have complete trust in Prime Minister Erdogan’s efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria. For their part, the Turks were concerned about reports that the Israelis were developing ties with both the Iraqi Kurds and an organization related to the PKK, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan or PJAK, which is battling Iran. Ankara also argues that Israeli actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip only undermine their efforts and those of others to broker peace. Relations between the two countries deteriorated during Israel’s Gaza offensive, yet recent reports that the Israelis have dispatched a senior foreign ministry official to Ankara may indicate that both governments are looking for ways to reestablish trust. If incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu places an emphasis on striking a deal with Syria, as many expect, Turkey will initially play a prominent role in bringing the two parties together and brokering their negotiations.

    Ultimately, the challenge for Turkey is, first, whether it has the capacity to pursue an activist role in the region without undermining its other priorities, and second, the extent to which other regional powers want Ankara to play the role it intends. Thus far, the Turks seem able to balance their desire to be influential in the Middle East with other national interests in the Caucasus, Cyprus, and Europe. There is also a palpable sense in the Middle East that Turkish activism, while helpful at times, can nevertheless undermine the efforts of more traditional regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As Cairo and Riyadh seek Palestinian reconciliation, there is concern that Turkish activism will provide a way for Hamas to resist Arab pressure to come to terms with Fatah. Still, there is no question that Turkey can play a constructive role in the Middle East. It has gained the confidence of the regional players on most of the major issues of great importance. As a result, in an era of diminished resources for the United States, Turkey can be a critical ally in the pursuit of Washington and Ankara’s overlapping interests.

  • Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 60
    March 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iraq might be regarded as a turning point in Turkey’s Kurdish issue, perhaps more than its implications for improving Turkish-Iraqi ties (EDM, March 24). On the plane to Baghdad, Gul reportedly used the word “Kurdistan” to describe the Kurdistan Regional Administration (KRG) in Northern Iraq, in stark contrast to Turkey’s past political discourse. Although Gul later denied these reports, the discussions they triggered confirmed Turkey’s more nuanced approach towards the Kurds, as well as revealing the remaining obstacles.

    Consistent with Turkey’s recent policy of combating PKK terrorism partly through rapprochement with Baghdad and the local authorities in northern Iraq, Gul met the KRG Prime Minister, Nechervan Barzani, who reiterated that his administration will not allow the PKK to use Iraqi Kurdistan to carry out attacks inside Turkey. Barzani called on the PKK to abandon its violent campaign, although it is unclear how viable this will prove, since the PKK was not consulted at the outset. The KRG initiative is a response to the new geopolitical reality of Washington’s decision to withdraw from Iraq and the revitalization of Turkish-U.S. cooperation. The Iraqi Kurds believe that their chances of rapidly gaining independence have diminished, and continued antagonism against Turkey by covert support for the PKK’s activities could undermine their goal of establishing a viable administration within the region. Moreover, they recognize that closer ties with Ankara might stimulate the regional economy and benefit both parties.

    Gul now recognizes that a confrontational policy towards the KRG is no longer sustainable. Since 1991, the KRG has gradually evolved within northern Iraq, first enjoying de facto autonomy, and later gaining official recognition under the new Iraqi constitution. Ankara attempted to prevent this embryonic administration from developing into an independent Kurdistan, fearing this might strengthen the independence movement amongst Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Although in the 1990s Turkey maintained ties with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups in order to conduct operations against the PKK, it refrained from actions that implied an official recognition of the KRG. In the late 1990s, Ankara’s ties with the KRG started to fragment, particularly after the U.S. invasion in 2003 as this became an open confrontation. Equally, Iraqi Kurds intensified their support for the PKK, further alienating Turkey. Ankara prioritized maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdistan as the “red lines” of its Iraq policy, which was perceived as bullying by the Iraqi Kurds.

    Since 2003, Ankara has acknowledged the shifts within regional politics, and readjusted its policies accordingly. For instance, despite its initial opposition to a federal Iraq, Turkey has accepted the new Iraqi constitution which established a federal structure and consequently legitimized the KRG. Most importantly, Turkey decided to abandon pursuing coercive measures, and instead used its political influence and economic power to pacify the Iraqi Kurds (Radikal, November 3, 2005). Although the first signs of rapprochement appeared in 2005, the PKK’s resumption of violence poisoned these relations, reigniting tension between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds. When Turkey sought their cooperation against the PKK, Iraqi Kurds defied Ankara’s “pressures.” Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, himself of Kurdish origin, challenged Ankara by saying “We would not hand over any Kurd to Turkey, even a Kurdish cat” (Sabah, October 22, 2007). This new situation further delayed normalizing relations, which only finally transpired in late 2008 (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008).

    Gul’s groundbreaking visit to Baghdad overcame several historical taboos. He allegedly used the word “Kurdistan,” adding that this was the region’s official name in the Iraqi constitution. When this was reported, it made headlines in many Turkish newspapers (Radikal, March 24). Gul’s reference to the region as Kurdistan was interpreted as the strongest expression yet of the change in Turkey’s position on the Kurdish issue. Believing that it denotes a Kurdish desire for independence, Ankara has avoided using this term, and instead referred to the KRG as “the regional administration in the North of Iraq.” Gul’s remarks overshadowed his whole trip and invited criticism from domestic opposition parties claiming he had effectively renounced Turkey’s policy on the Kurdish issue, and undermined its fight against terrorism (Milliyet, March 25).

    On returning to Turkey, however, Gul denied these reports, and clarified his remarks by saying: “inside Iraq, according to their constitution, there is a regional Kurdish government in Iraq’s north. I also met their prime minister; these are very normal things” (Anadolu Ajansi, March 24). Journalists travelling with Gul were divided on whether he specifically used the term “Kurdistan,” though a majority claimed that he did (Hurriyet, March 26).

    It is difficult to substantiate what Gul said. He might have resorted to the use of official terminology within Turkey, in response to pressure from the nationalist opposition, or he could have been dissuaded by bureaucrats from using the controversial term. In any case, the incident illustrates domestic resistance to the new policy despite Ankara’s courageous diplomatic steps. Therefore, despite the optimistic mood that ensued after Gul’s trip to Baghdad, there are grounds to doubt that a solution of the Kurdish issue is imminent.

    https://jamestown.org/program/gul-denies-saying-kurdistan-during-iraq-visit/

  • In Iraq, 2 Key U.S. Allies Face Off

    In Iraq, 2 Key U.S. Allies Face Off

    Government Riles Sunni Awakening With Leader’s Arrest

    By Sudarsan Raghavan and Anthony Shadid Washington Post Foreign Service
    Monday, March 30, 2009; Page A01

    BAGHDAD, March 29 — A new and potentially worrisome fight for power and control has broken out in Baghdad as the United States prepares to pull combat troops out of Iraq next year.

    Iraqi soldiers take position after coming under fire following Saturday's arrest of Awakening leader Adil Mashadani in the Fadhil area of Baghdad. Fighting continued yesterday as troops swept into the district to arrest Sunni fighters.

    Iraqi soldiers take position after coming under fire following Saturday’s arrest of Awakening leader Adil Mashadani in the Fadhil area of Baghdad. Fighting continued yesterday as troops swept into the district to arrest Sunni fighters. (By Hadi Mizban — Associated Press)

    The struggle, which played out in fierce weekend clashes, pits two vital American allies against each other. On Sunday, Iraqi soldiers backed by U.S. combat helicopters and American troops swept into a central Baghdad neighborhood, arresting U.S.-backed Sunni fighters in an effort to clamp down on a two-day uprising that challenged the Iraqi government’s authority and its efforts to pacify the capital.

    But the fallout from the operation is already rippling far beyond the city’s boundaries. Both the Iraqi security forces and the Sunni fighters, known as the Awakening, are cornerstones in the American strategy to bring stability. The Awakening, in particular, is widely viewed as a key reason violence has dramatically dropped across Iraq.

    Many leaders of the Awakening, mostly former Sunni insurgents who joined hands with U.S. forces to fight the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, have long had a contentious relationship with Iraq’s Shiite-led government. But the weekend battles have sparked fresh frustration and mistrust of both the U.S. military and Iraq’s mostly Shiite security forces, according to interviews with Awakening leaders across the country.

    “The situation is now very fragile, and no Awakening member would remain silent over this injustice,” said Saad Abbas al-Luhaibi, leader of an Awakening group in Anbar province. The tensions raise concerns that uprisings could erupt in other Awakening-controlled areas — or that many Awakening fighters could return to the insurgency, allowing al-Qaeda in Iraq to fill the vacuum in Sunni areas.

    The clashes also opened a window onto the new military relationship emerging between the United States and Iraq, as well as the struggles Iraq’s government will probably face as it takes more control over security.

    The violence erupted Saturday minutes after Iraqi and U.S. troops arrested Adil Mashadani, the Awakening leader in Baghdad’s Fadhil neighborhood, on charges of committing sectarian crimes and terrorist acts.

    The U.S. military said in a statement Sunday that Mashadani was suspected of extorting more than $160,000 from Fadhil residents, orchestrating roadside bomb attacks against Iraqi security forces and having ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Concerned about the impact on other Awakening groups, the military stressed that Mashadani was not arrested because of his role in the Awakening. Mashadani’s deputies have denied the allegations.

    In response to the arrest, Awakening fighters took to the streets and rooftops, engaging in fierce gun battles with U.S. and Iraqi troops. At least eight Iraqi soldiers were injured; an additional five were taken hostage but were released Sunday morning, Iraqi security officials said.

    [Awakening Council leader arrested Saturday]

    By Sunday, Iraqi security forces and American troops had surrounded the neighborhood. Snipers peered from the roofs of buildings as Apache and Blackhawk combat helicopters circled in the overcast sky. Some dropped leaflets urging residents to hand over weapons; the handbills also stressed that there was a legal warrant for Mashadani’s arrest and that no residents were being targeted.

    Some Iraqi soldiers viewed the operation as a test of their preparedness to take over security after U.S. troops leave, as well as the government’s ability to exert authority.

    “This shows that we don’t need the Americans and that Awakening are not stronger than the government,” Sgt. Wisam Jamil said as he stood on a street swarming with U.S. and Iraqi armored vehicles.

    Iraqi soldiers conducted door-to-door searches in Fadhil with the help of informants, targeting Awakening fighters. At one entrance to the neighborhood, once an al-Qaeda in Iraq stronghold, men were dragged from their homes, blindfolded and placed into Humvees. An Iraqi intelligence official calmly crossed off names on a wanted list.

    Suddenly, a barrage of gunfire erupted.

    “They still think they are strong,” Lt. Ahmed Salah declared.

    Iraqi and American military officials insist that Mashadani’s arrest is an isolated incident. Still, the clampdown in Fadhil has provided a spark for anger that has been building for months, particularly since the government took responsibility for paying the Awakening fighters.

    In the Baghdad neighborhoods of Dora, Adhamiyah and Amiriyah, Awakening offices were closed. Nearly a dozen of their leaders had switched off their cellphones or declined to answer calls.

    “We are being chased right now by the government,” said Ihab Zubai, a spokesman for the Awakening in Amiriyah, in the west of the city. “We’re moving from place to place.”

    Awakening fighters across Iraq had the same list of complaints: They had gone without their $300-a-month salary for two, sometimes three, months; the government was trying to marginalize them; and their leaders were being arrested on dubious charges.

    “Not even God would accept this,” said Raad Saadoun, a militiaman leaning on his Kalashnikov rifle at a checkpoint in Adhamiyah, in northern Baghdad.

    At its height, the Awakening counted 100,000 fighters, who played a decisive role in bringing quiet to Baghdad, Anbar province and other regions. The government promised to bring a fifth of them into the security forces, but only a relative few have made the transition.

    In Dora, in southern Baghdad, fighters said the number was minuscule. Of 125 militiamen in one area, three became policemen, said Alaa Abdullah, a 30-year-old fighter. Half simply quit.

    “The Americans brought us here, organized us, then abandoned us,” he said.

    Abdullah, dressed in green camouflage, had tied a black scarf around his neck. “I am an Iraqi,” it read.

    But he acknowledged that patriotism would not feed the seven people in his family.

    He and other fighters complained that they often found themselves trapped between a mistrustful government and a vengeful al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had deemed them traitors. Fighters said the government has arrested as many as 11 leaders in the past four months in Dora. Since January, three other commanders had been assassinated, ostensibly by al-Qaeda in Iraq, they said.

    Some Awakening leaders said Mashadani, who was placed under arrest at a checkpoint, should have been taken into custody in a more dignified way. Others predicted more uprisings if Mashadani was not released.

    “Targeting the Awakening leaders is a red line, and we shall not allow anyone to cross it,” said Essa al-Rufai, an Awakening leader in the northern city of Balad.

    Special correspondents Zaid Sabah, Qais Mizher and K.I. Ibrahim in Baghdad and Saad Sarhan in Najaf and Washington Post staff in Kirkuk, Fallujah and Tikrit contributed to this report.

  • PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 7 March 26, 2009

    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Turkey, Iran, Terrorism, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas, Nihat Ali Özcan
    The United States Treasury Department added the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Parti bo Jiyani Azadi la Kurdistan – PJAK) to its list of designated terrorist groups on February 4. [1] Operating on the Iranian-Iraqi border under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), PJAK has sought to create an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran since its formation in 2004, though the relationship between Iran and the PKK dates back to the creation of the Islamic State of Iran in 1979. This development also highlights unique dynamics of the relationship between a terrorist organization (the PKK) and a state sponsor (Iran).  

    The decision to designate PJAK as a terrorist group brought to the forefront the trajectory of Iran-PKK ties, which traditionally have oscillated between sponsorship and enmity. In this article, we will look at the ebb and flow of sponsorship-enmity dynamics between Iran and the PKK, and put this relationship into the context of regional developments.

    The PKK established contacts with Iranian Kurds who rebelled against Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then, the PKK’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has gone through several phases that can be analytically divided into five distinct periods. The first period (1980-1982) covers the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. The establishment of the Iran-Syria alliance and Iran’s war with Iraq marked the second era (1982-1988), during which a sponsorship relationship gradually took root. During the third period (1988-1997), Iran and the PKK redefined the sponsorship relationship to adjust it to the new geopolitics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fourth period (1997-2003) can best be described as controlled cooperation, during which the parties struggled to maintain a fragile partnership under the pressure of the rapidly shifting regional balances of power. During the fifth era (2003-2009), starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a rather adversarial relationship emerged between the parties, which occasionally turned into open confrontation.

    First period

    Initial encounters between the PKK and the Islamic Republic date back to the first years of the revolution. The Iranian Kurds, seeking to take advantage of the post-revolutionary turmoil and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, initiated a rebellion against Tehran. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, tasked some of his militants with establishing contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, which was leading the rebellion against Tehran at the time. Ocalan was reportedly urged by Jalal al-Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to engage Iranian Kurds. [2]

    The initial years of the PKK-Iran relationship were characterized by enmity, developing as they did under the shadow of the new Iranian regime’s Islamic credentials and the PKK’s Marxist agenda. Moreover, the possibility that the PKK might ignite a desire for independence among Iranian Kurds further exacerbated Iran’s suspicions of the PKK. However, subsequent developments replaced this short-lived period of ideological antagonism with a spirit of pragmatism dictated by changes in regional diplomacy that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a sponsorship-alliance relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Marxist PKK.  

    Second period

    The emergence of the Iran-Syria strategic alliance in 1982 had direct repercussions for Iranian-PKK ties as well. In response to the geopolitical shifts brought about by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, including the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, Tehran and Damascus were increasingly drawn towards each other. A shared interest of this new alliance was the undermining of two pro-Western countries in the region through subversive activities, namely Turkey and Israel. To do this, the Tehran-Damascus axis decided to support the PKK and Hezbollah. [3] Following this agreement, Iran dispatched its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon through Syria to train Hezbollah fighters. The PKK froze its ties to al-Talabani and signed a partnership agreement with Barzani. [4] This agreement allowed the PKK to relocate its militants in Syria to northern Iraq through Iranian facilitation.

    From Iran’s perspective, it had many incentives to engage in such a relationship:

    • Tehran and Ankara were involved in an enduring rivalry.

    • The Islamic revolution increasingly pitted Tehran against the secular regime in Ankara, adding an ideological fervor to the competition.

    • The close ties between Ankara and Washington exacerbated Tehran’s fears of Ankara. As part of American plans to contain the Islamic regime, some airfields in Turkish territory close to the Iranian border were expanded (Cumhuriyet, November 16, 1982). Moreover, the United States relocated some of the listening stations it had to withdraw from Iran to eastern Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Turkey.

    • Following the revolution, many supporters of the Shah’s regime, seeking to reach Western countries, first flew to Turkey. Revolutionary leaders were worried that these refugees, whose numbers were in the millions, could organize themselves in Turkey to undermine the new regime.

    • The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to world markets through Turkish territory brought extra revenue to Baghdad, helping it to finance its war against Iran.
     
    These pragmatic reasons led Iran to support the Marxist PKK in its efforts to undermine Turkey. Nonetheless, Iran always denied its support for the PKK, which was partly a reflection of the fact that Iran needed to maintain relations with Turkey (Cumhuriyet, May 3, 1987). For instance, it had to use Turkish territory to ensure a flow of logistical supplies to maintain its war against Iraq.
    Despite Tehran’s official denial of any support to the PKK, its sponsorship gradually increased towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As the senior partner, Iran exerted some limitations on the PKK. [5] The PKK could not attack Turkish targets within fifty kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border and would refrain from operating among Iranian Kurds. It also agreed to share the intelligence it gathered about Turkey and American bases there with Tehran. In return, Iran provided the PKK with weapons, medical assistance and logistical facilities. Through entering this relationship, the PKK gained access to a wider area of operability and eventually expanded its influence into the Turkish interior.
     
    Third period

    Concerned about the growing influence of the PKK among Iranian Kurds after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran changed its attitude towards the PKK and arrested some of its militants. [6] Nonetheless, this situation soon changed. Although Iran’s Kurdish population posed a challenge, it was not a vital threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Since the Sunni Kurds were a numerically small minority dwelling in the periphery of the Iranian political system, Iran regarded the problem as manageable. A more serious threat was presented by Azeri nationalism, especially after Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country. Turkey’s increasing profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia (backed by the United States) and the growth of Azeri nationalism within Iran became major issues of concern for Tehran, which found itself forced to restore its ties with the PKK. Indeed, a growing number of PKK activities during the 1990s took place mostly around Turkey’s northeastern and Caucasus borders. [7] In this way, Iran sought to hinder Turkey’s ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia and limit its influence in the region. One direct effect of this policy was that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had to be postponed for another nine to ten years. The intensification of PKK terrorist activities consumed much of Turkey’s energy, turning its attention inward.

    Fourth period

    In this stage, Iran gradually reduced its support to the PKK parallel to a declining threat perception. The Turkish-Iranian competition lost its intensity as Azerbaijan and Azeri nationalism were no longer perceived as major challenges. Similarly, Syria’s diminishing support of the PKK following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in Tehran reconsidering its ties to the PKK. Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach given that the regional balance of power was full of uncertainties. Last but not least, the 9/11 terror attacks and the Global War on Terrorism made Tehran more cautious as it sought to avoid being labeled as a sponsor of terrorism.

    Fifth period

    The Iran-PKK relationship, which started to deteriorate following the capture of Ocalan, turned into one of open confrontation in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The extensions of the PKK operating among the Iranian Kurds declared the founding of PJAK in 2004 (see Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006).  Drawing on its past networks, the PKK consolidated its power among Iranian Kurds within a short period. It capitalized on the legacy of Kurdish nationalism and resistance to Tehran introduced to the region before the local Kurdish movement was crushed by Iran, while building its own economic and political networks. To give PJAK a local character, some Iranian Kurds were recruited to its leadership cadres. Despite PJAK’s claim to the contrary, it operated under the PKK umbrella and sought refuge in the Kandil Mountain region. As an indication of these organic ties, militants recruited from Turkey were sometimes deployed in Iran, while militants of Iranian origin sometimes took part in PKK operations inside Turkey. [8]  

    The PKK’s growing visibility in Iran and an acquiescent American attitude towards the PKK presence in northern Iraq (which came to be perceived as a de facto rapprochement between Washington and the PKK) pitted Iran and the PKK against each other. PJAK has increasingly engaged Iranian military personnel since 2003 in a bid to gain media attention. In response, Iran has occasionally shelled PJAK positions in the Kandil Mountain region. There were also unconfirmed reports from Kurdish sources of cross-border operations by Iranian security forces in September, 2007 (Today’s Zaman, August 24, 2007; McClatchy, August 23, 2007). Like Turkey, Iran preferred to present PJAK as an extension of the PKK and lent support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In this way it sought to boost its own popularity among the Turkish public and to undercut Turkish-American ties.  

    Although the Bush administration added the PKK to the list of designated terrorist organizations, it was more tolerant toward PJAK, which led to allegations that America and Israel supported PJAK as a way to destabilize Iran. [9] Shortly after coming to power, the Obama administration designated PJAK as a terrorist organization controlled by the PKK. By this decision, Washington signaled that it would adopt a more principled approach in the fight against terrorism. This development also signifies a change in the American attitude towards the intricate relationships between Turkey, Iran and the PKK. Turkey welcomed the decision and saw it as the fruit of its new policy of building international coalitions to eradicate PKK terror, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States and northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Ankara’s satisfaction with the U.S. acknowledgment of PKK-PJAK ties (Anadolu Ajansi, February 6).

    The PKK, in contrast, increasingly feels that it is being encircled as a result of recent developments. PJAK officials condemned the U.S. designation and claimed that for over a year the United States already had a de facto policy of pleasing Turkey and Iran by intensifying pressure on PKK and PJAK. The organization noted that northern Iraqi authorities were also supportive of this new policy (Gundem Online, February 12; February 17). PJAK challenged the Obama administration, arguing that the terrorist designation would not deter their struggle.

    Conclusion

    Iran is carefully observing developments in Iraq and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The next stage in the sponsorship-enmity cycle between Iran and the PKK will depend on Iran’s assessment of the changes in the regional balance of power and threats to its national security. To escape the pressures exerted by close coordination between Turkey, the United States and the Kurdistan Regional Government of northern Iraq, the PKK will have an incentive to redefine its relationship with Iran. Despite Iranian-PJAK border clashes, PKK leaders are already sending warm messages to Tehran (Gundem Online, February 24). Whereas playing the “Iran card” might increase the PKK’s bargaining power, Iran also has reasons to maintain the continued availability of the “PKK card.” Considering the ongoing uncertainty over the future of the region (especially northern Iraq) in the wake of a partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and discussions over the Iranian nuclear program, Iran might not want to see the PKK disappear from the game completely.

    Notes:

    1. www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg14.htm.
    2. Cemil Bayik, Parti Tarihi, Damascus, 1996, p.58.
    3. For the background of this relationship, see: Huccetulislam Hasimi Muhtesemi’s (former Iranian ambassador to Damascus) memoirs. Turkish translation: Dunya ve Islam, 1990, pp.53-64.
    4. Bayik, op.cit. pp.75,77.
    5. Abdullah Ocalan, Parti Tarihimiz Boyunca Disaridan Dayatilan Tasfiyecilik Uzerine (Damascus, 1991), p.17
    6. Bayik, op.cit. p.92.
    7. Reports submitted to PKK’s Fifth Congress, Damascus, 1995, p.283.
    8. For the personal records of PKK militants killed see: www.hpg-online.com/sehit/sehit_kunyeleri/2008_a.html .
    9. Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, denied those allegations; See www.cnnturk.com, June 30, 2008.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html

     
    https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/