Category: Iraq

  • Now It’s a Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart

    Now It’s a Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart


    Safin Hamed/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

    BALLOT POWER Regional elections go forward in Iraq, but not a referendum on Kirkuk’s status.

    By ROD NORDLAND
    Published: July 25, 2009

    BAGHDAD — When Iraqis were drafting their Constitution in 2005, the parties could not agree on who would control Kirkuk, the prized oil capital of the north. They couldn’t even agree on who lived in Kirkuk, which is claimed by the region’s Kurds, but also by its Turkmen minority and Sunni Arabs. For that matter, they couldn’t even agree on where Kirkuk was — in Tamim, Erbil, or Sulaimaniya Province.

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    Related

    Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census (July 24, 2009)

    Times Topics: Iraq

    So the Iraqis punted, inserting Article 140, a clause that called for a national census, followed by a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, all to be held by the end of 2007. What followed were a succession of delays, against a backdrop of sectarian violence and warnings that Kirkuk could blow apart the Shiite-Kurdish alliance that has governed Iraq since the Americans invaded.

    Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, warned two years ago that if “Article 140 is not implemented, then there will be a real civil war.” He’s still waiting.

    But so is the threat of civil war, which lurked quietly in the polling places this weekend as residents of Iraq’s Kurdish-dominated areas voted for their regional president and Parliament. Until the status of Kirkuk is clear, nobody really knows how much power those regional officials can wield within the national government, or even whether the Kurds will want to remain part of Iraq.

    The problem with settling that is the Kirkuk referendum. There can’t be a referendum until Iraqis figure out who is eligible to vote in Kirkuk, which they can’t do until there’s a census. And any attempt to hold a census in this country may well end up, all by itself, provoking a civil war.

    Even now, Sunnis don’t agree that they’re a minority of the nation, and that the Shiites are the majority, though it’s patently obvious. And in Kirkuk, everyone is in denial, one way or another.

    Ethnically mixed and awash in oil, Kirkuk has always been something of a numbers game. There are 10 billion barrels of proven oil reserves — 6 percent of the world’s total and 40 percent of Iraq’s — all within commuting distance of downtown Kirkuk. Its fields, though half destroyed, still produce a million barrels of oil a day.

    Both Turkmen and Kurds claim to be in the majority; the last reliable estimates, from a 1957 census, gave Turkmen a plurality in the city and Kurds a plurality in the surrounding district, with Arabs second in the countryside and third in the city. In the Saddam Hussein years, the Kurds declared Kirkuk part of their autonomous region of Kurdistan, but the dictator sent the army after the Kurdish guerrillas, known as pesh merga, and held onto the prize. He then set about Arabizing it, forcibly relocating families from the south while evicting Kurds and Turkmen alike.

    After 2003, pesh merga troops quickly took control of Kirkuk as the Iraqi Army collapsed. Some local Arabs revolted, nurturing an insurgency that still festers. Others simply remained. Meanwhile, Turkmen appealed to powerful patrons in Turkey that they were undercounted and ignored by everyone, and Turkey came to their aid to make sure the Kurds didn’t get Kirkuk, which supplies much of Turkey’s oil. Only the presence of American troops has kept a lid on things; a brigade is still kept in Kirkuk.

    And still there is no census. “The Iraqi government for the last three years, every year they say it will come this year,” says Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of Parliament.

    A date for a census is on the calendar — Oct. 24. But it is subject to ratification by Iraq’s cabinet, the Turkmen have announced that they will boycott it and Arabs in Kirkuk may well do the same.

    One proposal for getting past this problem would be to hold a census everywhere but in Kirkuk. If that happened Kirkuk could end up, in effect, a disenfranchised province when the next general national elections are held in January.

    Another suggestion is to hold a referendum on Kirkuk without a census, but that would invite a dispute about the validity of the results.

    And then there’s the Lebanese solution, the one that so far seems likeliest: just do nothing. The last census in that sectarian hodge-podge of a country was in 1932; no one would dare hold one now, since the groups who would almost certainly lose representation — Maronite Catholics, Druze and Sunni Muslims — would simply go back to war rather than get counted out.

    Already, the Kurdish regional government has been defying Baghdad and issuing contracts to develop its oil fields, including some in Kirkuk. The Iraqi government showed its displeasure by moving its 12th Division, some 9,500 troops, up to Kirkuk; there they have been provocatively patrolling into pesh merga-held areas and setting off a series of minor incidents recently.

    “It’s very worrisome that these incidents continue to happen,” said Joost Hilterman, of the International Crisis Group. “Perhaps they will be contained, but the stakes are huge.”

    For the moment, there are still plenty of American troops around to do the containing, but all American combat troops are due to pull out by next summer. That doesn’t leave a lot of time to broker an agreement, especially when no one is likely to really want it.

    Abeer Mohammed contributed reporting.

  • Kurdish leaders are drunk with power

    Kurdish leaders are drunk with power

    by Michael Rubin
    Daily Star (Beirut)
    July 1, 2009

    On June 12, Iranians voted for a president. While the Islamic Republic may not be a democracy, its leadership has always looked to the polls to bestow popular legitimacy. Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, chairman of the Guardian Council, for example, said just two days before the election: “The enemies have always tried to question the legitimacy of the regime by trying to reduce public participation in elections … The people must blind the eyes of the enemies by vast participation in elections.” Iran’s desire for elections, however, does not extend to accepting their results. Outraged, millions took to the streets across the country, some chanting “Death to the Dictator.”

    Iranians, however, may not be the only ones to take to the streets to protest election fraud this summer. On July 25, Iraqi Kurds will vote in long-delayed regional elections. For the first time, the major political figures – Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Massoud Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader, and Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani – face serious local opposition.

    In the wake of Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Iraqi Kurds rose up against Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical rule. Rather than allow Saddam’s helicopter gunships to massacre the civilian population, the United States, France, Turkey and Great Britain created a safe-haven in northern Iraq. The following winter, Saddam withdrew Iraqi officials from what would become Iraqi Kurdistan, believing he could starve the Kurds into submission. It did not work. The Kurds organized elections. Almost a million people voted. Barzani edged out Talabani, 45 to 44 percent, with smaller parties splitting the remainder. Power sharing was not always smooth: Both leaders like to command; both became addicted to power. So long as Saddam remained a threat, Kurds tolerated abuses. Since Saddam’s fall, however, impatience at the failure to reform has grown.

    While the Kurdistan Regional Government could once describe itself as a democratic beacon in the region, today such depictions lack credibility. Seventeen years after its first election, Iraqi Kurdistan is at best as democratic as Egypt or Iran, and worst akin to Syria or Tunisia. Corruption is rife. Barzani uses the government budget as a family slush fund, for example donating hundreds of millions of dollars from public coffers to allow a relative to win a 2007 bid to operate an Iraq-wide cell phone company. Few profitable businesses – oil, finance, industry or trade – can operate without either silent partnership with or outright payment to the Barzani or Talabani families.

    Nepotism is also rife. Barzani, for example, appointed his son to head the region’s intelligence service, the dreaded Parastin, which Amnesty International has accused of torture. While free media have become an engine for democracy in the rest of Iraq, the Kurdish security services threaten, harass, and in some cases even kill independent journalists.

    The people of Iraqi Kurdistan say they have had enough. Noshirwan Mustafa, Talabani’s one-time deputy, has joined the former KDP secretary general to form a rival election list. Two prominent Islamic parties have joined with secular counterparts to create an additional reform list. Both challenging lists are polling well.

    Barzani and Talabani are worried. Rather than allow open election lists as in the rest of Iraq, the Kurdish leaders insist that party lists be closed, a way of preventing voter repulsion at examples of nepotism or those known to be abusive of power. As the rival lists, the Change List and the Service and Reform List, have gained traction, the Kurdish security forces have threatened and roughed up opposition candidates. Party officials have told apolitical bureaucrats that they will lose their jobs if they do not support Barzani and Talabani. There is widespread belief that KDP and PUK officials have compromised the Independent Higher Election Commission’s regional offices after KDP security forces visited and, in some cases, arrested opposition candidates within hours of their filing theoretically confidential candidacy papers.

    As has the Islamic Republic’s leaders, Iraqi Kurdistan’s leaders speak of democracy, but have become drunk with power, and disdainful of public accountability. As in Iran, Kurdistan Regional Government officials have amassed vast fortunes inconsistent with salaries. Today, ordinary Kurds refer to Barzani, his nephew, and his sons, as “little Saddams.” Actually, “little Rafsanjanis” might be as accurate. As in Iran, Iraqi Kurdish officials have also worked to constrain independent monitoring which might report on intimidation and interference before election day.

    As a consequence of all this, it appears that the Iraqi Kurdish people seek change. What remains to be seen, however, is if Iraqi Kurds will stand up for freedom and liberty as have the Iranian protestors, and if the Iraqi Kurdish security forces will, like their Iranian counterparts, use the point of a gun and midnight roundups to disenfranchise a deserving people.

    Michael Rubin, a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.

  • A CALL TO THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD

    A CALL TO THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD

    Turkistan Newsletter Mon, 22 Jun 2009 16:55:27
    Turkistan Bulteni ISSN:1386-6265
    Uze Tengri basmasar asra yer telinmeser, Turk bodun ilining torugin
    kem artati, udaci erti. [Bilge Kagan in Orkhon inscriptions]
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    A CALL TO THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD

    There has been another vicious attack on the peaceful Turkmen people of Iraq.  On Saturday June 21, 2009, a truck bomb exploded in the busiest center of the town of Tuz Khurmatu (pop. 15000), 10 miles south of Kerkuk, at noon, killing more than 75 and wounding more than 200.

    This has been the latest in the chain of attacks against the Turkmens in
    Telafer, Kerkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and Amirli. Those attacks are particularly
    are directed upon the armless and defenseless Turkmens who are not allowed by the governing circles in Iraq to have any defense forces, where others have. The Iraqi police and army failed to stop these attacks in past and it will not be able to achieve that in the future.

    We are asking the President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, the Prime Minister, Mr.
    Maliki and all political parties and members of the Iraqi parliament, to
    allow the Turkmens their right to defend themselves and form the law
    enforcement units of each locality from the local Turkmens.  In small communities, local police members, usually recognize outsiders, who might be suspected terrorists.

    We in the Union of the Diaspora Turkmens (UDT) ask all the free peoples and
    organizations of the world to help us by putting pressure from their side,
    upon the Iraqi government and the parliament to grant the Turkmens their
    right to defend themselves and form the law enforcement units of each
    locality from the local Turkmens.

    Otherwise these tragedies and the human suffering will continue.

    UNION OF THE DIASPORA TURKMENS
    (UDT)
    turkmencenter@yahoo.com

  • Some In Kirkuk Fear Kurds Will Replace U.S. Forces

    Some In Kirkuk Fear Kurds Will Replace U.S. Forces

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    June 18, 2009

    KIRKUK, Iraq — Turkoman and Arab politicians in the multiethnic Iraqi city of Kirkuk are concerned that Kurdish forces will fill the void after U.S. forces leave, RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq reports.

    Ali Mahdi, a spokesman for the Turkoman bloc on the Kirkuk provincial council, said that when U.S. forces withdraw on June 30 “we want the government to replace them with Iraqi forces from the middle and south because Kirkuk’s security forces are predominantly Kurdish.”

    Muhammad Khalil al-Juburi, a member of the provincial council’s Arab bloc, said that most of the Arab fighters fighting Al-Qaeda as members of the Awakening Councils “are stationed outside the city of Kirkuk and until all ethnic groups are fairly represented in the city’s security agencies and administration, we propose that Iraqi forces replace U.S. troops.”

    But Layla Hassan, a member of the Kurdish bloc on the council, said the Turkoman and Arab concerns are “unfounded” and deploying Arab forces from the south would be “counterproductive.”

    She added that “such a move would be unconstitutional as Kirkuk is recognized by all parties as a disputed area.”

    U.S. forces have often been called on to mediate ethnic confrontations in the oil-rich region.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Some_In_Kirkuk_Fear_Kurds_Will_Replace_US_Forces/1757185.html

  • Turkish military officials praise Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq

    Turkish military officials praise Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq

    ANKARA, June 12 (Xinhua) — Turkey’s General Staff Headquarters Spokesman Metin Gurak said on Friday that a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between Turkey and Iraq would contribute to regional peace.

    Gurak, also the head of the Communication Department of the General Staff, said at a weekly press briefing in Ankara, “the memorandum of understanding signed by the two neighboring countries that have historical, cultural and traditional ties will contribute to peace in the Middle East that is still facing negative developments.”

    Turkish Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Hasan Igsiz and visiting Iraqi Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Nasier Abadi signed a memorandum of understanding on military training, technical and scientific cooperation in Ankara on Tuesday.

    Gurak said that the MoU would lay the legal groundwork for further agreements.

    “Our friendly relations based on brotherhood, mutual understanding and cooperation will further improve with this memorandum,” Gurak said.

    Ankara has sought close ties with Baghdad to enlist Iraqi support against the outlawed Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), whose members used northern Iraq as a base for launching attacks in Turkey.

    Turkish security forces conducted frequent operations against PKK militants in eastern and southeastern Turkey.

    The PKK took up arms in 1984 to create an ethnic homeland in southeastern Turkey. So far, some 40,000 people have been killed in the past two-decade conflicts.

    Turkey’s military forces have taken tougher actions against the PKK after the country’s legislature extended the government’s mandate to launch cross-border operations against the rebels in northern Iraq.

    Source: news.xinhuanet.com, 12.06.2009

  • Emergence of a New Middle East Alliance

    Emergence of a New Middle East Alliance

    Patrick Seale

    usWhile U.S. President Barack Obama makes history in Cairo this week, a new regional grouping is taking shape in the northern part of the Middle East which could turn out to be equally significant.

    Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria are developing trade, energy and security ties which signal a common will to shape their national destinies free from external – and especially Western — dictation. What are the factors driving this new grouping? They are numerous, and mostly specific to each country.

    Turkey – having faced disagreements and disappointments with the U.S. (over the Iraq war), with the European Union (over the slow pace of accession negotiations) and with Israel (over the Palestine question) — has developed an ambitious regional policy towards its Arab and Islamic neighbours.

    Turkey’s trade with Iran, which was a mere $1bn in 2000 rose to $10bn in 2008, and is projected to double to $20bn in the not too distant future. Turkey is planning to invest $12bn in Iran’s South Pars gas field – a policy strikingly at variance with the call by Israel and its American friends for additional sanctions against Iran. Some one million Iranian tourists visit Turkey each year, and millions more visit Iraq, especially Kerbala, the place where Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad was martyred in 680. His tomb is the Shi‘is holiest shrine.

    Syria’s strategic partnership with Iran is now 30 years old, and shows no sign of waning. The Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah axis is a geopolitical fact of life in the region and was widely seen, during in the Bush years, as the main obstacle to U.S.-Israeli hegemony. In contrast to his predecessor, Obama is now seeking to reach out to both Iran and Syria, but he is apparently not yet ready to recognise that Hizballah is an unavoidable actor on the Lebanese scene. If Obama’s ambitious Middle East peace plans are to be realised, a U.S. dialogue with both Hizballah and Hamas cannot be long delayed.

    Syria’s relations with Turkey – strained almost to the point of war in 1998 over Syria’s backing of the Kurdish PKK leader, Abdallah Ocalan — have improved dramatically. Two-way trade is flourishing. A straw in the wind was the recent Turkish decision to increase the flow of Euphrates water to Syria’s north-east, which has been badly hit by drought.

    Syrian-Iraqi relations, marked by extreme hostility during Saddam Hussein’s rule, have also greatly improved. Last April, Syria’s Prime Minister Muhammad Naji Otri signed a wide-ranging agreement in Baghdad establishing a free trade zone and providing for cooperation in energy and education. Syria is to participate in the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk to Banias oil pipeline which passes through Syrian territory. Syria’s port at Latakia is to be expanded and road links to Iraq improved, to provide transit facilities for Iraq’s import- export trade. A train carrying 800 tons of steel left the Syrian port of Tartous on 30 May for Baghdad, the first rail freight trip between the two countries in decades.

    Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have a stake in Iraq’s future. Iran would clearly like Iraq to be a friendly neighbour under continued Shi‘i leadership. It wants Iraq to revive, but never again to be so powerful as to pose a threat as deadly as Saddam Hussein’s. Memories of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war are still too recent. Iran would probably prefer Iraq to develop into a federal state, and therefore relatively weak, rather than a strong unitary state. There are, however, no illusions in Tehran that Iraq, a major Arab country with a strong nationalist tradition, will ever consent to be an Iranian puppet.

    Whoever wins the Iranian presidential elections on 12 June – whether it is the conservative incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or his principal challenger, former premier Mir-Hussein Mousavi, a ‘moderate’ conservative backed by the main reformist parties – the main lines of Iran’s external policy are unlikely to change: close ties with Syria, Iraq and Turkey; opposition to Sunni extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan; support for Hizballah and the Palestinians; and continued uranium enrichment.

    What sort of Iraq, its neighbours wonder, will emerge from the slaughter, destruction and chaos of the past six years? Can a new regional balance be reached now that Iraq is again able to assert its national interests?

    It seems clear that Iraq has turned a corner. Violent deaths in May, at about 165, were among the lowest for any month since the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. Security is gradually returning, although still marred by horrendous suicide bombings. The Iraqi security forces – army, police, and intelligence — are steadily improving in size and efficiency. The recent conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States — with firm deadlines for the withdrawal of American armed forces — was an important expression of Iraqi sovereignty regained.

    But much remains to be done. Sunni-Shi‘i relations in Iraq remain tense, while Arab-Kurdish relations remain problematic; a hydrocarbons law has not yet been passed by parliament (although the central government has thought it best to turn a blind eye to the start of oil exports from the Kurdish region to Turkey.)

    War of Necessity, War of Choice, a recent book by Richard Haas contrasts the 1990 war to free Kuwait with the 2003 war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The first, he argues was a war of necessity, the second a war of choice — and a very bad choice at that. It had a catastrophic impact on America’s armed forces, on its finances and its reputation. The Iraq war killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, displaced millions, shattered the country’s infrastructure, released sectarian demons, and upset the regional balance to Iran’s great benefit.

    Haas, a former senior American official, is now head of the prestigious New York–based Council on Foreign Relations. His book makes clear that Saddam’s alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction was not the real motive for war. Pressure to attack Iraq came essentially from the civilian leadership at the Pentagon – especially from the then deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz – and from other neo-cons in Vice-President Dick Cheney’s office, whose geopolitical fantasy was to overthrow the main Arab regimes, as well as the mullahs in Iran, and restructure the entire area, so as to make it safe for Israel.

    The neo-cons’ opportunity came because of America’s perceived need, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to send a big message to the Arab world about U.S. military power. Haas’ book is likely to revive the debate about the role of Israel’s friends in Washington in pushing the U.S. into war in Iraq. It will provide Barack Obama with ammunition to resist Israeli pressure to attack Iran.

    The grouping of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria may not yet be a full-fledged alliance, but numerous common interests are pulling the four states in that direction. Not least is a concern about possible Israeli aggression – directed against Iran and Syria – and of continued uncertainty about the future course of American policy.

    Source:  www.daralhayat.com, 06 June 2009