Category: Iraq

U.S. general wants to move troops to northern Iraq

By ADAM ASHTON

McClatchy Newspapers

BAGHDAD — The top U.S. general in Iraq wants to place more American soldiers along the fault line between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs, two groups who have appeared on the verge of civil war at times over the past year.

Gen. Ray Odierno has discussed his proposal with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, two leaders who have been at odds for the past year over how to determine which group should govern the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains near Mosul.

A spokesman for Multi-National Force Iraq said Monday that Odierno is proposing a temporary deployment that would not affect the planned withdrawal of American forces by Dec. 31, 2011.

The intent is to partner American soldiers with Kurdish-controlled peshmerga and Iraqi forces who answer to al-Maliki’s government in Baghdad “to prevent the disputed areas from being used as a seam.”

“If approved, this change in security posture would be a temporary measure to improve confidence in the security situation and pressure terrorist networks,” said the spokesman, who asked not to be identified as a matter of policy.

Resolving the dispute between Kurds and Arabs over Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains is one of the top remaining priorities for Americans in Iraq. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited the country last month and urged al-Maliki and Barzani to settle the matter before U.S. forces leave.

Al-Maliki’s Cabinet, meanwhile, has submitted a proposal that would give Iraqi voters a chance in January to hasten the withdrawal of American forces from their country by as much as a year, sending all remaining U.S. soldiers home by the end of 2010 instead of 2011.

The plan, en route to Iraq’s parliament, would set a national referendum on Jan. 16, giving voters a say on the security agreement that defines the pace of the drawdown.

That vote would take place on the same date that Iraqis choose their next parliament, their first national vote since 2005.

It’s not clear whether parliament will support the date, but it’s likely that Iraqis – exhausted by more than six years of war and occupation – would elect to send Americans home earlier if they had an opportunity to vote on it.

The pact took effect Jan. 1. Its key date so far was June 30, when American soldiers were required to leave their bases in cities and towns. Al-Maliki designated the date “National Sovereignty Day,” and it was celebrated with parties in the street.

That success could persuade Iraqis to support the withdrawal agreement, said Abdul Karim al-Samarrai, a prominent lawmaker from the Iraqi Islamic Party.

“The people now have a better idea about what the agreement holds for them, especially as they have seen the actual withdrawal of American troops from their cities. Maybe they have more faith in it,” he said.

About 131,000 American soldiers remain in Iraq. That number is expected to decline to 50,000 by next August.

The security agreement, drafted last fall between the Bush administration and al-Maliki’s government, says either side must give the other a year’s notice before changing the pact, meaning that the U.S. would have at least that much time to exit Iraq if voters reject the agreement.

Al-Maliki agreed to put the agreement to a vote to appease critics in parliament who insisted that all Iraqis have their say. The referendum was supposed to take place at the end of July.

The Ministry of Planning also announced a delay in another election-related issue Monday. It’s postponing a planned census because of fears that the results would stir violence in the northern provinces that are the focus of Odierno’s new security proposal.

The Kurdistan Regional Government wants to annex both areas. The census was supposed to be a step toward votes on whether the territories would join the semiautonomous Kurdish region or continue to be controlled by Baghdad.

Barzani’s government controls three provinces and views both Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains as essential parts of the Kurdish homeland.

Kurds grew especially sensitive to threats against the territories late last year when the central government deployed an army division near Kirkuk, an ethnically mixed province believed to have roughly equal populations of Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen.

Meanwhile, the Ninevah plains outside Mosul have seen some of the most violent attacks on civilians in recent weeks. More than 20 Yazidis, a religious minority, were killed Thursday. A village outside Mosul was leveled by two truck bombs Aug. 10, which killed more than 30.

(Ashton reports for The Modesto (Calif.) Bee. McClatchy Newspapers special correspondent Sahar Issa contributed to this report.)

August 18, 2009
Lessons learned and challenges to implementing indigenous people’s right to education.

Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Council of Human Rights

2nd Session / 10th – 14th August 2009
Switzerland – Geneva

Agenda Item 3: Lessons learned and challenges to implementing indigenous people’s right to education.

Date: 04 August, 2009
No: Sta.19-H0409

Title: Obstacles preventing the use of mother tongue in Iraqi Turkmen education

Iraq is well-known for its multiethnic multi-religious population; Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldea-Assyrians, Yazidis, Shabaks and Mandaeans comprise the rich cultural mosaic that is the Iraqi population.

The Turkmen represent the third largest ethnic group in Iraq after the Arabs and Kurds. Unfortunately, they are constantly marginalized and their population size has always been underrepresented for economical and political reasons.

Iraqi Turkmen live mainly in a region that stretches over a thousand kilometers from Telafer in the Northwest to Badra and al-Aziziyya in the al-Kut province in mid eastern Iraq. They populate the following provinces: Kerkuk, Mosul, Erbil, Salah al-Ddin, Diyala, Kut and Baghdad.

Although the federal constitution of Iraq guarantees the rights of all Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions, [1] these obligations have yet to see full implementation.

The Government of Iraq does not fully guarantee its obligations to recognize and guarantee rights under the international treaties that it has signed reflecting those principles (the right to accessible education, the need for cultural adaptation of education, and the right of indigenous peoples to establish and control their educational systems).

The Turkmen of Iraq have been denied education taught in their native language, since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921. In Erbil city, education in Turkmen was financed by the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) until 2005, when all possessions of the Turkmen political institutions were confiscated by Kurdish authorities. In other provinces Turkmen schools are founded by the local governmental education offices and the Iraqi Turkmen Front. These schools are still predominantly financed by the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a non-profit political organization. The total number of Turkmen schools exceeds 500 and is operative in most of Turkmen regions.

The political instability and state of insecurity after the 2003 occupation has exposed the indigenous peoples to brutal human rights violations; intimidations, marginalization and distortion of demography of their regions. [2-4] The right to provide education in the Turkmen native language meets many obstacles, as the revised Iraqi constitution promotes protection of such rights but vaguely formulate the terminology, which constitutes an important impediment. After occupation, the general political atmosphere adopted a new religious and ethnic strategy which inevitably influenced the constitution writing committee. Kurdish attempts to emphasize their ethnic role within Iraq can be considered the dominant factor that contributed to discrimination outlined in article 4 of the constitution. Article 4 differentiates Arabs and Kurds from other indigenous Iraqis. [1]

Article 4, first, The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions.

Article 4, Item 4 ambiguously refers to a notion which further complicates the use of mother tongue by the Indigenous peoples. It demands a population density to establish a language official in a region. This necessitates another authority to approve if a community has a population density in a region. In present nationalist atmosphere of the Iraq politics, making a decision in favor of the vulnerable Indigenous communities is not easy. Worth noting that the Iraqi Parliament endorsed Iraq’s obligation to the League of Nations in 1932 that Turkmen, in addition to other languages would be officially recognized in several Turkmen regions, such as Kerkuk, Kifri and Erbil. [5]

Article 4, fourth: The Turkmen language and the Syriac language are two other official languages in the administrative units in which they constitute density of population.

The Kurdish authorities claim vast Turkmen regions, where they dominate the administration in most of these regions. Relaying on ambiguous terminology in the constitution, the Kurdish authorities prevent the Turkmen language to be officially recognized. This hampers use of mother tongue in education. In the case of Kerkuk, despite the fact that this province is well known for its Turkmen nature, [6 & 7] the decision making Kurdish authorities refused to use Turkmen as an official language.[8] It took four years until the federal court approved Turkmen as an official language in Kerkuk, but still the application of the law is limited.

Turkmen schools and the critical difficulties

It was a huge mission to start education in Turkmen (Turkish) native language for such a large community. Millions of Turkmen spread hundreds of kilometers wide, require expert staff and governmental offices, professional teaching, and a plethora of resources most of which are denied due to administrative and financial restraints.

The two main factors deteriorate Turkmen education come from political conflicts and the Iraqi Ministry of Education’s refusal to make funds available. Large numbers of schools in Turkmen regions are still not able to use their mother tongue or it offer only one lesson in Turkmen language. The number of schools that provide all lessons in Turkmen is extremely small.

The difficulties of Turkmen education can be divided into three categories:

1. Schools in Kurdish Region

Erbil city and Kifri district are two historical Turkmen regions under the authority of Kurdish administration. Although Turkmen constituted more than half of the population in both these regions in the first half of 20th century, after continuous Kurdish migration, the percentage of Turkmen has now decreased to 1/3 of the Erbil population and 20% of Kifri city.

Turkmen schools in the Kurdish region were established in the mid 1990s by the Iraqi Turkmen Front. There are 15 Turkmen schools in Erbil city, 2 Kindergarten, 9 primary schools, 2 intermediate and 2 secondary. In Kifri there is one primary and one secondary school. All lessons are taught in Turkmen in these Kifri schools.

In 2005, the Kurdish authorities seized all of these schools along with 12 other factions of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, including a print house, a newspaper and local television and radio stations. The print house was closed since that time which increased the shortage of books in Turkmen schools.

The major difficulties facing these schools:

• These schools are administered by non-expert Kurdish staff who are not qualified in Turkmen language and/or Turkmen culture
• The school curricular is devised by Kurdish specialists
• Kurdish language is imposed on students from the first year of primary school
• Mainly, Kurdish history is studied
• The Syllabus is monitored by Kurdish supervisors
• Kurdish directors are appointed to these schools
• The content of the curricular, the explanatory drawings, and the activities are all reflect the Kurdish heritage and culture instead of Turkmen.

The Turkmen education have been deliberately neglected by Kurdish authorities, consequently, registration of new students is currently significantly decreased and about to be terminated.

2. Schools under central government

This region includes immense Turkmen districts in Mosul, Kerkuk, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kut provinces. The schools in these regions are divided between two types:-

A. Schools which lecture in Turkmen language, and
B. Schools which lecture in Arabic, and provide one lesson in Turkmen language and literature.

The latter type of school exists in Kerkuk province, Erbil and Kifri city.

The major difficulties within these schools are that a large percentage of teachers and all school materials are not paid by the Iraqi ministry of education.

3. Shared difficulties by schools under both authorities:

• Absence of Turkmen education directorate in the Iraqi ministry for education and in the Education directorates of provinces, except Kerkuk province.
• The absence of cultural institutions. Consequently, there are no official authorities which publish books related to Turkmen.
• Insufficiency of teaching staff and facilities
• Shortage of experts and supervisors of Turkmen language and literature
• Many schools are old and needs renovation.
• Shortage of materials and resources: including books, science equipment, computer and internet facilities, photocopying facilities, temperature regulating systems
o For example, there are 148 schools in Telafer districts which study only Turkmen language and literature. The ministry of education doesn’t pay for 28 teachers. The shortage in the number of teachers is 35. In 2008, the students had received only 4000 school books from 35.000.

Turkmen education still could not be introduced into the large Turkmen communities in Diyala and Kut provinces, location of important and large Turkmen districts. These regions have been exposed to Arabic and Kurdish immigration for a long time. Aggressive assimilation policies have been practiced against Turkmen in these regions.

Demands:

The Declaration requires that “States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the outcome of this Declaration” (art. 38). This general mandate is further elaborated on in other provisions, with specific affirmative measures required from States in connection with almost all the rights affirmed in the Declaration.

1. The directorate of Turkmen education, without which Turkmen studies are impossible to organize, should be established in the Iraqi ministry for education and in the province’s directorate for education.

2. The Kurdish authorities should abandon their assimilation policies against Turkmen and return the Iraqi Turkmen Front buildings which were confiscated in 2005; particularly, the schools, Turkmeneli newspaper, and print house should be retuned to the Iraqi Turkmen Front.

3. The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples created pursuant to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 6/36 of December 14, 2007, has the mandate to “provide the Human Rights Council with thematic expertise on the rights of indigenous peoples […]”. In September 2008, the Expert Mechanism was given the more specific mandate of preparing a study on the lessons learned and challenges to achieve the implementation of the right of indigenous peoples to education. To that end, the Expert Mechanism was to request submissions from indigenous peoples’ organizations and civil society organizations (Human Rights Council Resolution 9/7). As part of this process the Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation (SOITM) presents this submission.

———————
1 Article 4 of the Iraqi federal constitution
2 Press Release of SOITM Foundation, “To the international community: The Iraqi people are in severe need of your help”, 13 July 2008, http://turkmen.nl./1A_soitm/PR.20-G1308a.doc
3 SOITM Foundation, “Kurdish authorities and Iraqi Indigenous populations: the suppression of Iraqi Yazidis”, 27 October 2008, http://turkmen.nl./1A_soitm/Rep.29-J2708.doc
4 SOITM Foundation, “Summary Violation of the human rights of the Iraqi Turkmen since the Establishment of the Iraqi State”, January 27, 2007, http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_soitm/Rep.9-A2707.doc
5 Arshad al-Hirmizi, “The Turkmen Reality in Iraq”, Publication of Kerkuk Foundation 2005, P. 16 http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_Others/EH2_english.pdf
6 David McDowall, “A Modern History of the Kurds”, (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, London & New York 1996), Page 329) and
7 Hanna Batatu, “The old social classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq”, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1978), p. 913
8 Iraqi Federal Court, Decision number 15/federal/2008 which was made on demand of Kerkuk province council, at 21/4/2008,

August 17, 2009
Urgent need to address Human Rights Abuses of Indigenous populations in Northern Iraq

Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Council of Human Rights

2nd Session
10th – 14th August 2009
Switzerland – Geneva

Agenda Item 4a: Implementation of the Declaration at the regional and national levels;

Date: 4 August, 2009
No: Sta.18-H0409
Title: Urgent need to address Human Rights Abuses of Indigenous populations in Northern Iraq

Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Iraq is currently facing a challenging chapter in its history. Establishing and enforcing rule of law, maintaining security and stability and ensuring the fundamental rights of its people, particularly the Indigenous peoples are protected are not easy tasks to achieve. Despite the relative stability established in northern Iraq, there remains a bleak human rights situation in the region that requires the urgent attention of the UN Human Rights Council.

Sectarian conflict, extreme nationalism and a lacking democratic norms have hampered the reconciliation process in Iraq, particularly in northern Iraq. A state of insecurity after occupation has lead to a significant deterioration of human rights conditions of the indigenous populations of Iraqi.

Northern Iraq is a country with a mosaic of multi-ethnic and multi-religious communities. It consists of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldea-Assyrians, Yazidis and Shabaks. The non-Kurdish communities make up the majority of the population. Following the invasion of Iraq, the region was ruled by occupation forces and Kurdish Peshmerga militias. The subsequent administration established in northern Iraq has been disproportionally dominated by Kurdish authorities . Non-Kurdish groups are consistently alienated from political dialogue, with demographic and electoral manipulation having resulted in increased Kurdish domination of the region .

The mass in-migration of Kurdish families to regions, which have been historically populated by Iraqi indigenous populations, resulted in the increased marginalization of non-Kurdish populations, including the Turkmen, as well as significant demographic changes in the region. The peoples have since been subjected to assimilation policies, targeted violence and harassment.

Reports continue to indicate that non-Kurdish communities, their politicians and activists are being suppressed, intimidated, arrested, abused and in some cases executed . Some examples include:

Relating to those of Arab ethnicity, Dr. Sabri Aba Al-Jabbar, from Kerkuk, spoke out against Article 140 and was subsequently kidnapped and killed in late October 2007.4

Relating to the Turkmen, on 27 May 2009, Mr. Saleh Ibrahim was kidnapped by the security agents (Asayish) of KUP. He was exposed to severe torture before he was rescued. On 29 May 2009, Mr. Istabraq Yazaroglu’s home in Taze Khurmatu was subjected to gun shots. Yazaroglu is deputy of the chief of Turkmen Student Union. He played important role in defending Mr. S. Ibrahim. On 1 June 2009, a Turkmen shop was shot by Kurdish police Colonel Abdullah Kadir and his guards. Four were severely injured, the condition of two of them was critical. On 14 May 2009, two Turkmen were shot in the city of Tuz Khurmatu. Mr. Alaa Sabir Mecid was killed and Mr. Abd al-Hadi Kalandar Shahbaz was injured.

Regarding the Chaldeo-Assyrian community, they are frequently exposed to attacks and intimidations in the areas where the Kurdish soldiers dominate.5

The Shabaks of Nineveh face oblivion as a people, targeted politically by Kurdish authorities with claims on their land.6 Mr. Kadhim Abbas, from Shabak minority, who was a fierce opponent of the recent demographic changes in Mosul, was killed at July 13th, 2008.7

Yazidi politicians who are disloyal to the Kurdish authorities are unable to visit their constituencies for fear of assassination. Many Yazidi politicians and activists have been arrested, persecuted and intimidated. Relatives of the Yazidi activists out of Iraq are arrested and intimidated.8

These brutal actions go un-investigated and un-challenged by Iraqi Government authorities, United Nation Office and International human rights organizations. As such we are asking the United Nations to increase their attention and action against human rights abuses in northern Iraq.

Mr. President, while we recognize the harsh challenge of monitoring human rights in current-day Iraq it should be said that it is vital to remain vigilant about human rights situations when peace and stability are at their worst. Therefore in view of the above stated information, we urge the UN Human Rights Council to:

 Increase its monitoring of the human rights situation in northern Iraq, including:
o increased communication and bilateral cooperation between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Iraq;
o establishment of UNAMI offices in Mosul city, Nineveh plain, Tuz Khurmatu, Khanaqin and Mendeli regions
 Call upon all relevant Special Procedures Mandate Holders to include the following concerns when reporting back to the UN Human Rights Council in relation to the situation in Iraq:
o Adequate representation of all ethnic and minority groups in regional administrations;
o Impartiality of all police and military bodies in northern Iraq;
o Adequate consideration for all concerns brought forward by relevant stakeholders, including all ethnic groups such as the Turkmen, Chaldea-Assyrians, Yazidis, Shabaks and Arabs.

August 17, 2009
PKK Forces Await Orders from Imprisoned Leader Abdullah Ocalan

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 25

August 13, 2009 02:59 PM

By: Wladimir van Wilgenburg

Bozan Tekin, Vice President of the KCK

Reports indicate that Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), will release a “roadmap” for resolving Turkey’s decades-old Kurdish insurgency on August 15 (see Terrorism Monitor, August 6). Branches of the PKK continue to operate in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region both on the political and the military levels, despite Turkish military and diplomatic pressure. It seems that the political branch of the PKK is heavily restrained inside Iraq’s Kurdistan region, but military operations against the PKK are unlikely to resume in the near future.

The PKK Waits for Ocalan’s Roadmap

The Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Civaken Kurdistan – KCK), the umbrella organization bringing together Kurdish militant groups and political branches in Iran (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane – PJAK), Iraq (Partiya Careseri u Demokrasiya Kurdistan – PCDK), Syria (Partiya Yekiti ya Demokratîk – PYD), and Turkey (PKK), is waiting for new orders from Abdullah Ocalan. The KCK’s Executive Council operates in the Haftanin, Metina, Zap, Gara, Avasin, Hakurk, and Qandil camps. The PKK also maintains a strong presence in the Mahkmur camp, which is controlled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR).

According to PKK member Roj Welat, the PKK’s series of unilateral ceasefires is not a new strategy born out of weakness. [1] During this period the guerrillas have refrained from carrying out offensive operations. Welat says it is a strategy to solve the Kurdish issue peacefully, although the Turkish state believes the PKK’s five unilateral ceasefires are a sign of weakness.

KCK vice-president and PKK general Bozan Tekin says they will support the roadmap to the end; “In fact we don’t know what this roadmap is, but Ocalan said he is working on preparing it.” Tekin says it might look like the Basque or Scottish democratic model. [2]

Tekin said the PKK wants its own protection force, the release of the PKK leader and freedom of politics and identity. The PKK is ready to form a Kurdish PKK unit within the Turkish military if a solution is reached. But if Turkey doesn’t accept Ocalan’s roadmap, “we are ready to defend our country till our last drop of blood.” Although Ocalan says he will remain silent if the state doesn’t listen to his “last roadmap for peace,” PKK members emphasize that Ocalan will remain the leader of the PKK and that it’s not a dead-end for the PKK-leader if his proposals are not accepted.

The PCDK Has More Problems with Iraq than the Kurdish Regional Government

Besides the KCK leadership and military forces that operate in the near-inaccessible mountains, there is also a political branch of the PKK that operates in Iraq and the Kurdistan region. This organization is called the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK), which tried to participate in the Kurdistan regional elections of July 25 with its political slate “Hiwa” (Hope). The logo of the list was a combination of the flag of the PKK and the logo of the legal Kurdish opposition party in Turkey, the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – Democratic Society Party).

The PCDK was banned by Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in June and is considered an illegal party in the Kurdistan Region. Najiba Omar, the female president of the Hiwa list, said they were informed by the IHEC that the list could not operate because the PCDK is not considered a legal party. [3] The Hiwa list believes that the KRG pressured IHEC to ban them.

The PCDK’s offices were also closed down in the provinces of Erbil and Sulaimaniya. According to Najiba Omar, “We cannot have offices in regions controlled by the KRG. We don’t have a problem with the Iraqi government, but with the Kurdish government.” While the PCDK is seeking support among Kurds, it cannot operate in KRG-administered regions; therefore the main headquarters of the PCDK is in Kirkuk.

The PCDK has other offices in Baghdad and Mosul while members operate from their own homes in the Kurdistan region. The PCDK also has party meetings and offices in villages near the border regions controlled by the PKK. Members of the party are not usually arrested, but after protests against the Hiwa list ban in June, some members were arrested for a short time.

The main aim of the PCDK is to change Kurdish society according to the principles of Abdullah Ocalan. The PCDK is suspicious of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which have dominated the region since 1991. The PCDK is also wary of the new Kurdish “Change list,” a reform party that separated from the PUK and received a number of seats in the new parliament. The Change list will also participate in the Iraqi elections and Kurdistan local elections and could become stronger within the Kurdistan region. However, the PCDK suspects them of being supported by outside forces and thinks they won’t change the policies of the KRG.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s PKK Policy

Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, Head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, says that the KRG will make sure that their territories are not used as a launching pad by the PKK. “For us it’s important to have good relations with our neighbours. We don’t want our people to pay the price, we want a peaceful solution.” [4]

The KRG says it has taken the following measures:

• Cordoning off the mountain areas on the border with Turkey to cut PKK supply routes.

• Stopping foreign and Kurdish journalists from visiting PKK camps near the border regions.

• Closing down offices of the PKK’s political fronts in Erbil and Sulaymaniya.

• Monitoring airports to ensure that no PKK personnel enter or leave the region.

• Preventing PKK demonstrations in KRG territory and curtailing their activities.

• Banning PKK-affiliated political parties.

• Sharing intelligence with Turkey and the United States.

In February a tripartite U.S.-Turkish-KRG intelligence center was established in Erbil, Kurdistan’s political capital, to coordinate efforts and share intelligence in the fight against the PKK (Taraf, July 24). The KRG Foreign Minister says this does not mean that the KRG supports military action against the PKK but that the center only collects information on the PKK.

The Kurdistan government also supports the PKK’s ceasefire; Bakir says the government hopes the ceasefire “will help the peace process and [ensure] stability and we hope this will be maintained.” The KRG is against solving the PKK issue with military actions. “We don’t believe there is a military solution towards the PKK issue; there is no more need for violence or weapons.”

The PKK confirms that it is unlikely that the KRG will send forces to attack the PKK. “There is a red line among Kurds, that there won’t be another brother war [civil war] again. We don’t think this will happen. Kurds have learned from the past,” says KCK member Bozan Tekin. Tekin also denies claims that the PKK gets support from the KRG. “These are lies by Turkey to put pressure on the KRG.”

Independent Kurdish journalist Kamal Chomani says that the Kurdish government fears the PKK as a strong alternative and therefore tries to stop them from operating. [5] However, despite KRG measures, foreign and Kurdish journalists can still visit the PKK through “secret” roads and bypass KRG checkpoints.

The PKK also still manages to organize its own logistics, media campaigns, and support from surrounding villages, because the mountains are impossible to control without a massive deployment of Iraqi or Kurdish military forces. The PKK has checkpoints with PKK flags near the Qandil mountains.

Kamal Chomani says that even during the time of Saddam a complete mountain cordon was impossible. Chomani emphasizes that the triangular area with four borders was never controlled by any force. “This is a haven for rebel forces.”

Members of Peshmerga forces that fought against the PKK in the past confirmed that it would be very difficult to remove PKK forces from the mountains without many casualties. For the moment, the KRG seems more interested in controlling the regions it disputes with Baghdad than in the PKK camps in the border regions with Turkey and Iran.

The Central Government’s PKK Policy

Baghdad’s policy does not differ much from that of the KRG. Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh told a Kurdish newspaper that Iraq is not in favor of military operations against the PKK, nor does it want to close down the Makhmur refugee camp (Rudaw, August 6). “Iraq is against the PKK using its territory, but we don’t support Turkey in performing military operations against this party. We help the KRG to limit and decrease their presence inside Iraq and end their problem with Turkey.”

Although no PKK military forces are located in the territory controlled by the Iraqi central government, the political branch of the movement, the PCDK, has more freedom there than in the region controlled by the KRG. The PCDK headquarters was moved from Erbil to Kirkuk after the closure of PCDK offices in northern Iraq. PCDK official Najiba Omar says this is because, legally speaking, the Iraqi government cannot ban PCDK offices or activities in Iraq.

Assessing the PKK’s Future

The PKK indicates that they will renew their insurgency if the Turkish government does not listen to Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK wants the government to accept a Kurdish identity and release the PKK leader, which is unlikely.

The KRG has successfully curtailed PKK political activities in the Kurdistan region, but cannot eliminate the PKK’s border camps without starting military operations against the PKK, which does not serve their own interests. The KRG maintains the belief that the PKK is not a KRG problem, but an internal Turkish problem. It is unlikely, therefore, that the KRG will attack the PKK.

The Iraqi government might close down PCDK offices in its territory if pressured by the United States and Turkey, which would effectively leave the PCDK dysfunctional and cripple their level of support. The Kurdish and Iraqi governments will continue to share intelligence with Turkey, but will not support military operations against the PKK. The Iraqi army is not trained for counterinsurgency campaigns in the mountains nor does it have a sufficient amount of troops near PKK camps.

Therefore it is unlikely that the PKK will leave Qandil in the near future and will keep pressuring Turkey with attacks to solve the Kurdish issue. The PKK’s military forces and commanders will only leave the mountains if the PKK and Turkey reach a solution. Even the launch of Turkish military operations against the PKK inside Iraqi territory is unlikely to dislodge the PKK and will only result in more media attention for the PKK.

Notes

1. Author’s interview with PKK official Roj Welat in the Qandil mountains, August 5.
2. Author’s interview with PKK vice-president Bozan Tekin in the Qandil mountains, August 5.
3. Author’s interview with head of the Hiwa list, Najiba Omar, in Erbil province, Iraq, August 7.
4. Author’s interview with Falah Mustafa Bakir in Erbil, August 6.
5. Author’s correspondence with Kamal Chomani, a freelance journalist who writes for Livin magazine and the Kurdish newspaper Awena in northern Iraq, August 5.

https://jamestown.org/program/pkk-forces-await-orders-from-imprisoned-leader-abdullah-ocalan/

August 14, 2009
Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 155

August 12, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanied by Zafer Caglayan, the state minister responsible for foreign trade, visited Iraq on August 11, as part of an emerging strategic dialogue between Ankara and Baghdad. Prior to departing for Baghdad, Davutoglu held a lengthy press briefing and outlined the contours of the country’s Iraq policy. He said that Iraq is going through a dynamic process and is on the verge of an important transition, and added that Turkey is willing to play a constructive role in this process. He summarized the major goal of his trip as “conveying [to the Iraqis] the principled attitude Turkey has been pursuing on Iraq’s security, peace and future, and reiterating that Turkey stands with the Iraqi people regarding any development affecting the future of Iraq” (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

In Iraq, he met his counterpart Hosyar Zebari and other Iraqi officials. During the joint press briefing with Zebari, he repeated his views about Iraq and the future of the region. He emphasized that Turkey’s relations with Iraq are based on four key principles: a common security area, high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence and peaceful coexistence on the basis of their common culture. He maintained that through unhindered cooperation in various areas, the two countries will shape the future of the region together.

Davutoglu said that as a reflection of this shared understanding, Turkey will assist Iraq regarding the provision of sufficient water from its dams on the Euphrates to meet the needs of Iraqi farmers. Zebari reiterated Iraq’s support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism. Turkey and Iraq, with the participation of the United States, have initiated a trilateral mechanism to coordinate measures against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The latest meeting in this process took place in Ankara last month (EDM, July 29). Zebari, an ethnic Kurd, pledged that the Baghdad government and the Kurdish regional administration in Northern Iraq will implement the findings of the trilateral mechanism.

Davutoglu’s visit occurred within the context of the recently launched “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” (HLSCC). This concept builds on the intensive diplomatic traffic, which began with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad in July 2008, and continued with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s visit to Turkey in March, and Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Baghdad in the same month and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Ankara in July.

The HLSCC is conceived as an inter-governmental forum to be co-chaired by prime ministers. As part of this process, eight ministers responsible for different fields (foreign affairs, interior, transportation, foreign trade, energy, development, health, and environment and forestry) will maintain communication at bilateral level to develop joint projects. The ministers will meet at least three times annually, while technical delegations will meet quarterly to develop joint action plans to be finalized by the annual prime-ministerial summits (www.orsam.org.tr, August 11). During his meetings in Iraq, Davutoglu also discussed preparations for the next HLSCC, expected to be held during Erdogan’s Baghdad visit in October.

Davutoglu believes that the flourishing ties between Turkey and Iraq under this format represent a new partnership model. The importance he places on this process reflects his view of Iraq as not only a friend and neighboring country with which Turkey shares a common destiny, but also an important strategic partner. Davutoglu explicitly acknowledges that through such channels of mutual cooperation, Ankara hopes to integrate the economies of Iraq and Turkey and create a common area of security (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

Meanwhile, the Turkish government also hopes to initiate a similar process with Syria (Cihan, July 23) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (EDM, July 13), as well as promoting a larger role for the Organization of Islamic Countries in the region (EDM, May 28). Through such cooperation schemes, Davutoglu wants to bolster relations among regional countries at governmental and societal levels, starting with Iraq and Syria, and turn Mesopotamia into a prosperous region. In this regard, Davutoglu confirmed in Baghdad that Turkey plans to institutionalize a trilateral mechanism between Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus based on its earlier meetings.

Ankara’s motivation in initiating the Turkish-Iraqi strategic dialogue process is varied, yet the most immediate concern appears to be related to the security situation in Iraq. Ankara realizes that the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq beyond the planned withdrawal of American forces might undermine regional stability, hence eventually posing a serious threat to Turkey’s security. The Iraqi national political system still remains fragile and if the various Iraqi groups cannot manage to form a workable political system, there is a risk that Iraq might descend into civil war. Turkey is one of the first countries that would be affected by any instability in Iraq, as demonstrated by its experiences of the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. Therefore, Davutoglu wants to engage the Iraqi factions to facilitate the formation of national institutions and ease the pain of the transition period, which, if mishandled, could destabilize the country and the entire region. Ankara’s ultimate objective in Iraq is to ensure that the country’s territorial integrity and political unity can be preserved during the transition period, so that regional peace will be maintained (EDM, July 27).

Moreover, Turkey also has important commercial interests in Iraq, which again depend on preserving Iraq’s political stability. As Caglayan stressed, Iraq is Turkey’s fifth largest export market, and this year the bilateral trade volume is expected to reach $7 billion, making a 58 percent increase on the previous year. Turkey expects to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion by 2011. Turkish firms are involved in various infrastructure projects and Iraq is a popular destination for Turkish consumer goods. Turkish contractors have already secured several multi-billion dollar projects in Iraq (Cihan, August 11). Partnership in energy is also another engine of mutual cooperation, as reflected in Maliki’s attendance at the Nabucco Summit in Ankara last month. If Iraq can successfully manage the post-invasion challenges and embark on a steady path towards economic recovery (thanks to its oil and gas revenues), it might emerge as a major market for Turkish businesses, perhaps also aiding Turkey’s own economic recovery.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-economic-and-political-integration-with-iraq/

August 14, 2009
Kurdish mag sparks wrath by urging Jews to return

Dawood Baghestani, Iraqi Kurdish editor-in-chief of "Israel-Kurd", holds a copy of the magazine in Arbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region. The newly launched monthly magazine has caused a stir in northern Iraq after calling on Jewish Kurds to return to the region. (AFP/File/Safin Hamed)

by Abdel Hamid Zebari

ARBIL, Iraq (AFP) – A new magazine in Iraq’s Kurdistan region has caused furore among conservative Muslims with a rousing call for Jews to leave Israel — and come back to Iraq.

The magazine, “Israel-Kurd”, is the brainchild of Dawood Baghestani, the 62-year-old former chief of the autonomous northern region’s human rights commission.

The glossy, full-colour monthly in Kurdish and English has a lofty mission: to help solve the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict by convincing more than 150,000 Kurdish Jews living in Israel to return to Iraqi Kurdistan, Baghestani told AFP.

“The biggest reason behind the complexity of the Palestinian problem is the unjust practices of Arab regimes against the Jews — there are more than 1.5 million Jews originally from Arab countries in Israel,” Baghestani said.

“If the Jews had not been subject to an exodus, the Palestinians wouldn’t have been either,” he said, referring to the flight of 700,000 Palestinians from the newly created Jewish state in 1948 during the first Arab-Israeli war.

“If the situation in our new federal and democratic Iraq, and particularly in Kurdistan, becomes stable, then many Jews would want to return and reduce the number of Jewish settlements in Palestine.”

The latest edition of the 52-page magazine, which has a circulation of around 1,500 copies, features a woman draped in an Israeli flag on the cover.

Inside are stories about Kurdish Jewish traditions and photographs from the first half of the twentieth century, as well as arguments on how a return of Jews would help to build a wealthy and strong Kurdistan.

But many people in Iraq are not buying the argument.

“I’m suspicious. I don’t see the point of this kind of publication,” said Zana Rustayi, a representative of the Islamist Jamaa Islamiya party in the regional assembly.

“The Kurds are part of the Muslim nation, and Kurdistan is part of Iraq.”

Iraq has no relations with Israel, and the country was an implacable foe of the Jewish state under the regime of former dictator Saddam Hussein, who was overthrown by the US-led invasion in 2003.

A Sunni member of parliament in Baghdad, Mithal Alusi, was suspended from parliament and threatened with charges last year after visiting Israel for a conference. The decision was later overturned by the constitutional court.

Dawood Baghestani, Iraqi Kurdish editor-in-chief of 'Israel-Kurd', reads a copy of the magazine in Arbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region. The newly launched monthly magazine has caused a stir in northern Iraq after calling on Jewish Kurds to return to the region. Photo:Safin Hamed/AFP

Kurdistan does have a warmer history with the Jewish state, however. Many of the current crop of Kurdish leaders have visited Israel in past decades.

Jews lived in Kurdistan for centuries, working as traders, farmers and artisans.

But the creation of Israel and the rise of Arab nationalism in the mid-twentieth century dramatically altered the situation, spurring most of Kurdistan’s Jews to leave.

Baghestani — who has been to Israel four times, including on a clandestine trip in 1967 — denies that he works for the Israelis.

“What I am asking for is enshrined in the constitution: every Iraqi has the right to return to one’s homeland. Jews who were Iraqi citizens were subject to injustice,” he said.

“If every Arab country allowed the Jews to return, ensured their safety and gave them back their land,Palestinian refugees would be able to return to their territory because Israel would not need so much land.”

Mahmud Othman, a Kurdish Coalition MP in Baghdad, disputes this. He says that while relations with Israel may be a nice idea, such a move would not be pragmatic for a region ringed by other Muslim states.

“Kurdistan needs the Arabs. We are living in an Arab country and we are federal region within Iraq. We don’t need a relationship with (Israel), we need a relationship with Arabs, we need a relationship with Iran, we need to be close to Turkey,” Othman said.

“I haven’t heard of any Jews in Israel trying to return to Kurdistan. I think they’re better off there.”

Source: news.yahoo.com, Aug 12, 2009

Southern commander Zvika Zamir teaching a Kurdish fighter how to assemble a Galil rifle (1969)

Source: www.nrg.co.il, ג’קי חוגי | 10/8/2009

August 13, 2009