Category: Iraq

Turkey won’t deport Iraq’s al-Hashemi

Turkey will not deport Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi despite an international Red Notice for his arrest issued by Interpol. In Iraq, Hashemi is accused of running a death squad.

In spite of being put on Interpol’s most wanted list on Tuesday, the Turkish government said on Wednesday it sees no reason to extradite the Iraqi Vice President, who is in Turkey for medical treatment.

“We will not extradite someone who we have supported since the very beginning,” Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency.

Bozdag also pointed out that Iraq was not cooperating enough in Turkey’s efforts to detain supporters of the Kurdish rebel group PKK, which carries out attacks inside Turkey from bases in northern Iraq.

Al-Hashemi is being tried in absentia in Iraq on charges of terrorism. He is being accused of guiding and financing death squads that targeted government officials, security forces and Shiite pilgrims.

Bozdag’s comments came a day after Interpol issued an international Red Notice for the arrest of al-Hashemi, one of Iraq’s top Sunni Arab officials, on suspicion of “guiding and financing terrorist attacks”.

Al-Hashemi, who has been in Istanbul since April 9, insisted in a statement posted on his website on Tuesday that he was not above the law and was ready to appear in court if his security and a fair trial could be guaranteed. But he also claimed that the charges were false and motivated by the Shiite-led Iraqi leadership’s animosity towards Sunni politicians.

ng/ipj (AFP, AP)

via Turkey won’t deport Iraq’s al-Hashemi | News | DW.DE | 09.05.2012.

May 10, 2012
Iraqi fugitive VP will return home: Turkey PM

Iraqi fugitive VP will return home: Turkey PM

May 8 2012 at 05:58pm

By SAPA

iol pic wld Tareq al-Hashemi

Reuters

Iraq’s fugitive Vice-President Tareq al-Hashemi.

Ankara, Turkey –

Turkey’s prime minister said Tuesday that Iraq’s fugitive vice president Tareq al-Hashemi would return home once he has finished treatment for his health, the Anatolia news agency reported.

Hashemi, who is being tried in absentia in Baghdad accused of running a death squad, has been staying in Turkey since early April.

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Hashemi was in his country for health reasons as well as for political contacts.

“I believe that he will return to his home country after completing the treatment for his health problems,” Erdogan was quoted as saying by Anatolia to journalists during the Turkish leader’s visit to Rome.

He also voiced support for the Iraqi leader concerning the legal case he was facing in Baghdad.

“As I said earlier, we’ve supported him and will continue supporting him on this issue,” said Erdogan.

The Sunni vice-president has sought refuge in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region after he was accused by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government of running death squads against Shiites Ä a charge he denies.

Erdogan’s remarks came after Interpol said Tuesday it had issued an international Red Notice for Hashemi’s arrest on suspicion of “guiding and financing terrorist attacks”.

“The Red Notice for al-Hashemi represents a regional and international alert to all of Interpol’s 190 member countries to seek their help in locating and arresting him,” the Lyon-based international police agency said. – Sapa-AFP

via Iraqi fugitive VP will return home: Turkey PM – World News | IOL News | IOL.co.za.

May 9, 2012
Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 84

May 3, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

The developments in Iraqi domestic politics, coupled with their regional implications, continue to drag Turkey deeper into Middle Eastern affairs, while its involvement in the Syrian conflict already occupies a large part of Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. The ongoing power struggle between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his opponents on the one hand, and the complicated relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq on the other have taken an interesting turn, creating reverberations for Turkey’s regional policies.

In the wake of the withdrawal of US forces, Maliki has moved to consolidate his power, threatening to undermine the delicate balance between various sectarian and ethnic groups. Maliki, who assumed his current post following a 2010 power sharing agreement, has failed to work toward national reconciliation. On the contrary, in this already fractured country, he has even undermined the governing coalition and also put Iraq on a collision course. His campaign against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who took refuge in Northern Iraq fearing for his life, crystallized the power struggle. The dispute grew into an impasse, with the increasingly harsher tone of the parties, engulfing Turkey (EDM, January 18). After spending some time in Kurdistan, Hashemi visited Saudi Arabia and Doha and later came to Turkey, effectively beginning his days in “exile.” Calling openly for Ankara’s support, Hashimi also furthered its involvement in his country’s affairs (Anadolu Ajansi, April 10).

A parallel process concerned Iraqi Kurds. The KRG’s relationship to Baghdad is complicated over the status of the disputed city of Kirkuk and the conflict over revenues from the exploration of natural resources in the North. In the ongoing standoff, the leader of KRG, Masoud Barzani, supports Hashimi and has used the leverage he gained to further bolster his position in Iraqi domestic politics. Last month, Barzani suggested he could hold a referendum to redefine ties to Baghdad. In a move that further accentuated this trend, during his trip to the US earlier this month, Barzani urged Washington to reconsider its backing of Maliki. Then, Barzani visited Turkey to meet with Hashimi and Turkish leaders (Anadolu Ajansi, April 20).

Barzani’s visit also underscored the degree to which Turkey has readjusted its regional policies. After years of confrontation with the KRG, Turkey already moved to normalize its relations with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish leadership to solicit their backing for Ankara’s fight against the PKK. In the wake of the latest developments, Ankara has further moved toward Iraqi Kurds to cope with the challenges in Iraqi domestic politics.

In the region, too, Turkey faces a similar fluid environment. With the unfolding of the Syrian uprising, Ankara’s partnerships in the region have gone through a new reshuffling. Faced with Tehran’s support for the Syrian regime and its backing of Iraq’s Maliki, Turkey’s coordination of its policies with the Syrian opposition, Iraqi opposition and the Gulf countries raise interesting questions about the patterns of Ankara’s alignment.

These realignments lead some to suggest that Turkey has been drawn into sectarian groupings but the Turkish government rejects those claims. Ankara justified its support for the Syrian opposition on the principles of human rights and democracy, rather than any sectarian affiliation. In Iraq, Turkey again refrained from framing its support for the Sunni leader Hashimi in sectarian terms and instead underlined the divisive nature of Maliki’s policies.

However, such statements from Turkish officials have far from convinced the Iraqi leadership. Maliki, already critical of Turkey’s policy on Syria, reacted harshly to recent developments and, in a press release, accused Turkey of interfering in Iraqi internal affairs and acting in a hostile manner (Milliyet, April 21). Reflecting the new regional realignment, Maliki then paid a two-day visit to Tehran on April 22-23, where he met with key Iranian leaders. In his first visit after his reelection, Maliki expressed solidarity with the Iranian leadership and vowed to work in tandem on regional issues (www.presstv.ir, April 23).

Both Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan and Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a very strong reaction to Maliki’s remarks. On his way back from Doha, where he discussed Middle East issues with his regional counterparts, Erdogan called Maliki insincere and maintained that his oppressive policies threatened to divide Iraq. Suggesting that Maliki himself might have a sectarian agenda, Erdogan insisted that Ankara was in communication with all Iraqi groups including Shiite leaders (Sabah, April 22). The MFA’s statement also referred to Maliki’s attempts to monopolize power and exclude others as the basis of the current crisis in Iraq (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 21). Both countries summoned each other’s diplomats posted to the respective capitals over the developments.

To Turkey’s credit, concerns over Maliki’s course are indeed shared by a larger number of Iraqi actors, including Shiite groups. Increasingly, the inability of Maliki to build up coalitions with other groups and the weakening of the ties between Baghdad and the provinces, most notably Northern Iraq, are criticized by major Iraqi actors. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr also visited Northern Iraq for the first time, in an effort to establish bridges between the parties (Anadolu Ajansi, April 26).

For years, Turkey has worked to ensure a smooth political transition in Iraq. Ankara’s policy was based on the understanding that if national reconciliation cannot be achieved, it could deepen the fragmentation and pave the way for an independent Kurdish state, not to mention other damaging repercussions for regional peace. It was for this reason that Ankara supported the Maliki-led government, although its initial preferences after the Iraqi elections had been different. With the ongoing political crisis and tensions in the region, Turkey has increasingly found itself on the same page as the KRG.

For his part, Barzani apparently hopes to deepen his cooperation with Turkey to further consolidate his position in Iraq. This development inevitably raises speculations as to whether the Iraqi Kurds might press for independence or a greater degree of autonomy from Baghdad, which, ironically, will put Turkey in a difficult position. Given Ankara’s own concerns about an independent Kurdish state and the Kurds’ claims over Kirkuk, Turkey’s support for Barzani will be conditional and it will hardly be the midwife to an independent Kurdistan.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-drawn-into-iraqi-affairs/

May 4, 2012
Man whose WMD lies led to 100,000 deaths confesses all

Defector tells how US officials ‘sexed up’ his fictions to make the case for 2003 invasion

JONATHAN OWEN

A man whose lies helped to make the case for invading Iraq – starting a nine-year war costing more than 100,000 lives and hundreds of billions of pounds – will come clean in his first British television interview tomorrow.

“Curveball”, the Iraqi defector who fabricated claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, smiles as he confirms how he made the whole thing up. It was a confidence trick that changed the course of history, with Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi’s lies used to justify the Iraq war.

He tries to defend his actions: “My main purpose was to topple the tyrant in Iraq because the longer this dictator remains in power, the more the Iraqi people will suffer from this regime’s oppression.”

The chemical engineer claimed to have overseen the building of a mobile biological laboratory when he sought political asylum in Germany in 1999. His lies were presented as “facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence” by Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, when making the case for war at the UN Security Council in February 2003.

But Mr Janabi, speaking in a two-part series, Modern Spies, starting tomorrow on BBC2, says none of it was true. When it is put to him “we went to war in Iraq on a lie. And that lie was your lie”, he simply replies: “Yes.”

US officials “sexed up” Mr Janabi’s drawings of mobile biological weapons labs to make them more presentable, admits Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, General Powell’s former chief of staff. “I brought the White House team in to do the graphics,” he says, adding how “intelligence was being worked to fit around the policy”.

As for his former boss: “I don’t see any way on this earth that Secretary Powell doesn’t feel almost a rage about Curveball and the way he was used in regards to that intelligence.”

Another revelation in the series is the real reason why the FBI swooped on Russian spy Anna Chapman in 2010. Top officials feared the glamorous Russian agent wanted to seduce one of US President Barack Obama’s inner circle. Frank Figliuzzi, the FBI’s head of counterintelligence, reveals how she got “closer and closer to higher and higher ranking leadership… she got close enough to disturb us”.

The fear that Chapman would compromise a senior US official in a “honey trap” was a key reason for the arrest and deportation of the Russian spy ring of 10 people, of which she was a part, in 2010. “We were becoming very concerned,” he says. “They were getting close enough to a sitting US cabinet member that we thought we could no longer allow this to continue.” Mr Figliuzzi refuses to name the individual who was being targeted.

Several British spies also feature in the programme, in the first time that serving intelligence officers have been interviewed on television. In contrast to the US intelligence figures, the British spies are cloaked in darkness, their voices dubbed by actors. BBC veteran reporter Peter Taylor, who worked for a year putting the documentary together, describes them as “ordinary people who are committed to what they do” and “a million miles” from the spies depicted in film. He adds: “What surprised me was the extent to which they work within a civil service bureaucracy. Everything has to be signed off… you’ve got to have authorisation signed in triplicate.”

Would-be agents should abandon any Hollywood fantasies they may have, says Sonya Holt at the CIA recruitment centre. “They think it’s more like the movies, that they are going to be jumping out of cars and that everyone carries a weapon… Yes we’re collecting intelligence but we don’t all drive fast cars. You’re going to be writing reports; you’re in meetings so it’s not always that glamorous image of what you see in the movies.”

www.independent.co.uk, 01 APRIL 2012

April 3, 2012
Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 12

January 18, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

As Turkey struggles to avert crises involving its neighbors Syria and Iran, Iraq has emerged as yet another issue that needs immediate attention from Turkish diplomacy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent remarks critical of what he considered to be Ankara’s “interference” in Iraqi internal affairs threatens to worsen the already tense situation in the Middle East.

In an interview broadcast by state television, Maliki sent a stern warning to Ankara asking it to stop its interventions in Iraqi domestic affairs. Maliki maintained that Turkey had acted as though it ruled Iraq, and went on to claim that the current path taken by Ankara might invite disaster and civil war in the region. He warned that if Turkey continued the same rhetoric, it might suffer repercussions from its actions, because it also has different sects and ethnic groups (Anadolu Ajansi, January 13).

Maliki’s inflammatory rhetoric was triggered by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks in the previous week. Both in his conversation with Maliki and in his public addresses, Erdogan urged the Iraqi leadership to take swift measures to reduce tensions in Iraq, which were caused by an arrest warrant being issued for the Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10). Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Hashemi, a leading Sunni politician, shortly before the withdrawal of US forces on the grounds that he was leading a death squad targeting Iraqi politicians. Fearing for his safety, Hashemi escaped to northern Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan regional government. The clampdown on Hashemi and other Sunni ministers triggered a new wave of attacks against the Shiites, raising questions about the sustainability of the fragile coalition government, as well as the future of the country as a unified entity.

Turkey initially refrained from direct involvement in the unfolding crisis over the arrest warrant against Hashemi and exclusion of Sunnis from key government positions. It drew attention to the risks that the recent rift could escalate into sectarian conflict, with destabilizing effects for the entire region. It also maintained communication with the Kurdistan regional government to forge national consensus. Regionally, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also sought to mobilize a joint Turkish-Iranian response to address the Shiite-Sunni disagreements, which lie at the core of the ongoing crises in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq (EDM, January 10).

However, the recent spree of bombings in Baghdad prompted Erdogan to raise this issue publicly. Raising concerns about the inability of Iraqi political authorities to prevent bloodshed, Erdogan maintained that he has lost his optimism for the future of democracy in this country, as the government laid siege to the houses of coalition partners. Erdogan challenged Maliki to assume his historical responsibility and work to maintain the unity of Iraq, adding that those who instigate chaos with sectarian instincts would go down in history as devils. Echoing speculation that Iran might be behind the recent political crisis in Iraq, Erdogan also warned other countries endeavoring to exert influence in Iraq to act in a prudent and responsible manner (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10).

While Erdogan was trying to promote common sense on the part of his Iraqi counterparts, he also provided further ammunition to Maliki and his Shiite block that seem determined to take a stand against Turkey to bolster their position in Iraqi domestic politics. Following Maliki’s televised criticism of Ankara, the Turkish envoy in Baghdad was summoned by the Iraqi deputy foreign minister to be reminded of Iraq’s expectation that Turkey must avoid actions which could disturb good neighborly relations (Anadolu Ajansi January 16). In response, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara, who was told that Turkey found unacceptable the allegation that it is interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. It was only natural for Turkey to pursue the stability of its neighbors, according to Turkish foreign ministry officials (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 16).

This development is likely to invite a harsh response from the Turkish side in the days ahead, but it has already pleased Hashemi and his supporters. Reportedly Sunni politicians, who feel threatened by the government crackdown, were approaching Turkish officials to take a more effective role in order to thwart a sectarian conflict. Hashemi also expressed his debt to Turkey, adding that Erdogan had personally worked to support his cause in recent months. Reiterating his concerns about receiving a fair trial in Baghdad, he vowed not to return to the capital before his safety is ensured (www.ntvmnsbc.com, Today’s Zaman, January 16).

Clearly, this dispute raises many questions about Turkey’s Middle East policy. At one level it reignites the possibility of sectarian conflict in the region. Turkey has purposefully refrained from sectarian considerations in its foreign policy, and has sought to embrace all major groups, a policy which was most clearly observed in Iraq. When a violent civil war destabilized Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, Ankara played a major role in convincing the Sunni groups to withdraw their support from the insurgency and join the political processes in Baghdad. During the government vacuum that ensued after the Iraqi elections of 2010, Turkey again prioritized Iraqi unity and urged the al Iraqiyye list representing Sunni groups to work with the Maliki-led coalition.

As the risk of sectarian conflict may have increased in the wake of the Arab Spring, Turkey once again wants to spearhead preventive measures to avert such a scenario. In Iraq, while seeking to play a similar role and prevent further polarization and eventual partition of the country along sectarian lines, Turkey arguably runs the risk of being drawn into sectarian divisions, as the Sunni groups are obviously in search of an ally to balance Maliki’s bloc that interestingly is supported by not only Iran, but also the United States.

Also, this might have repercussions for the Turkish-US relationship. Despite its objections against the invasion of Iraq, Turkey worked closely with the United States, hoping that this would be the best way to prevent the country’s descent into chaos and total breakdown. In the process leading to the withdrawal of US forces, Ankara again coordinated its policy with Washington. However Washington’s support for Maliki, whose reckless show of force and exclusion of Sunni groups from government positions, might also expose new divisions between Ankara and Washington.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-works-to-prevent-sectarian-rift-in-iraq/

January 19, 2012
Iraq Accuses Turkey of Meddling

By JOE PARKINSON in Istanbul and SAM DAGHER in Erbil, Iraq

Iraq summoned Turkey’s ambassador on Monday to protest what it called Ankara’s meddling in Iraqi politics, the latest sign of a rising rift between Sunni Turkey and its Shiite neighbors.

Iraq’s government was angered by recent warnings from Turkish leaders that Sunni-Shiite tensions in Iraq could engulf the entire Islamic world, as well as by Turkey’s support for a Sunni rival to Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki.

“Turkey interferes by backing certain political figures and blocs” in Iraq, Mr. Maliki told The Wall Street Journal last month. “I believe Turkey is unqualified to intervene in the region’s flash points.” In a weekend interview with Arabic language Al-Hurra TV station, Mr. Maliki went further. “Unfortunately, Turkey is playing a role that could lead to a catastrophe or civil war in the region,” he said.

Iraqi officials were particularly angered by public Turkish comments on the case of Tariq al-Hashemi, Iraq’s Sunni vice president. Mr. Hashemi took refuge in Kurdish-ruled northern Iraq late last year, after the government accused him of leading death squads against Shiites.

But analysts say the rapid deterioration of relations between Ankara and Baghdad also reflects the wider conflicting interests of Sunni Turkey and Shiite Iran in the wake of the U.S. drawdown from Iraq and of the Arab Spring, now lapping at the borders of both Iraq and Turkey, in Syria.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu warned on the eve of a visit to Tehran earlier this month against the risk of a “Cold War” developing between Shiites and Sunnis across the Middle East.

“Tension is now rising between Turkey and Iran and it will be increasingly difficult to manage as it’s being aggravated by sectarian tensions. These problems are likely to be long-term; I don’t see an easy solution,” said Sinan Ulgen, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Baghdad’s concerns also have been fueled lately by fears that Syria’s uprising is developing into a Sunni insurgency that Mr. Maliki has said could spread “like a house on fire,” into Iraq. A fresh wave of violence has killed more than 200 Iraqis since the end of the U.S. military mission on Dec. 18.

Unlike Iraq, which is majority Shiite, Syria is about 75% Sunni, but it is governed mainly by a minority of Alawites, a Shiite sect. Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad’s Tehran-backed regime has expressed deep anger and distrust of Ankara due to its decision to provide haven to mainly Sunni Syrian rebels.

Turkey says its actions are purely humanitarian, made in the face of Syria’s brutal crackdown on protesters. It also denies any effort to meddle in Iraqi politics.

Turkish analysts say Ankara is a reluctant hard-power player in the region. for all its neo-Ottoman pretensions, Only a year ago, Mr. Assad was Exhibit A in Turkey’s “zero-problems-with-neighbors” foreign policy. That approach boosted relations and trade with neighboring Muslim regimes, while downgrading ties with former ally Israel. The Arab Spring, however, upended that policy as allies such as former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi were pushed aside and Shiite-Sunni tensions rose across the region. In a major change, Turkey agreed last fall to host a North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile-defense system, which was designed by the U.S. to contain Iran.

Turkish and U.S. diplomats say they now cannot remember a time when cooperation between Ankara and Washington was closer, after a period of significant strain in 2009-2010.

“When Prime Minister Erdogan came to Washington in 2009, he sounded almost like the ambassador from Iran. Now he sounds quite different…After a period of suspicion, Turkey and the United States have come closer together,” said Stephen Kinzer, a visiting professor of international relations at Boston University.

Turkish officials insist relations with Tehran remain strong.Turkey buys around 30% of its oil from Iran and is the second-largest consumer of Iranian gas, after Russia. Official data shows that Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Iraq in 2011 jumped by nearly 50% on the year to $11 billion, with much of the increase coming in the Shiite-dominated areas around Baghdad and in the South.

In an interview inside Iraqi Kurdistan this month, Mr. Hashemi said that while his political bloc had received advice from Turkey and others, it was no tool for outside powers. “I am not part of the Turkish geopolitical project,” said Mr. Hashemi. He criticized Mr. Maliki’s “conspiratorial” mind and said that his frequent visits to Turkey last year were mostly private.

Earlier, in October, a key aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini told Iran’s Mehr news agency that Turkey should radically rethink its policies on Syria, the NATO missile shield and promoting secularism in the Arab world. Otherwise, Ankara would face trouble from its own people and neighbors, he said.

Still there is little disguising the building tensions between Ankara and its Shiite neighbors, including Tehran.

In December, Ankara sought an explanation from Tehran after Hussain Ibrahimi, chief of the Iranian parliament’s national-security committee, told an Iranian newspaper that if Iran were to be attacked, its first retaliatory strike would be against the NATO missile defense radar in eastern Turkey.

Earlier, in October, a key aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini told Iran’s Mehr news agency that Turkey should radically rethink its policies on Syria, the NATO missile shield and promoting secularism in the Arab world. Otherwise, Ankara would face trouble from its own people and neighbors, he said.

via Iraq Accuses Turkey of Meddling – WSJ.com.

January 17, 2012