Turkish Forum

Category: Iran

  • A New World Order

    A New World Order

    An end of hubris

    Nov 19th 2008
    From The World in 2009 print edition

    America will be less powerful, but still the essential nation in creating a new world order, argues Henry Kissinger, a former secretary of state and founder of Kissinger Associates

    Reuters

    The most significant event of 2009 will be the transformation of the Washington consensus that market principles trumped national boundaries. The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank defended that system globally. Periodic financial crises were interpreted not as warning signals of what could befall the industrial nations but as aberrations of the developing world to be remedied by domestic stringency—a policy which the advanced countries were not, in the event, prepared to apply to themselves.

    The absence of restraint encouraged a speculation whose growing sophistication matched its mounting lack of transparency. An unparalleled period of growth followed, but also the delusion that an economic system could sustain itself via debt indefinitely. In reality, a country could live in such a profligate manner only so long as the rest of the world retained confidence in its economic prescriptions. That period has now ended.

    Any economic system, but especially a market economy, produces winners and losers. If the gap between them becomes too great, the losers will organise themselves politically and seek to recast the existing system—within nations and between them. This will be a major theme of 2009.

    America’s unique military and political power produced a comparable psychological distortion. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union tempted the United States to proclaim universal political goals in a world of seeming unipolarity—but objectives were defined by slogans rather than strategic feasibility.

    Now that the clay feet of the economic system have been exposed, the gap between a global system for economics and the global political system based on the state must be addressed as a dominant task in 2009. The economy must be put on a sound footing, entitlement programmes reviewed and the national dependence on debt overcome. Hopefully, in the process, past lessons of excessive state control will not be forgotten.

    The debate will be over priorities, transcending the longstanding debate between idealism and realism. Economic constraints will oblige America to define its global objectives in terms of a mature concept of the national interest. Of course, a country that has always prided itself on its exceptionalism will not abandon the moral convictions by which it defined its greatness. But America needs to learn to discipline itself into a strategy of gradualism that seeks greatness in the accumulation of the attainable. By the same token, our allies must be prepared to face the necessary rather than confining foreign policy to so-called soft power.

    Every major country will be driven by the constraints of the fiscal crisis to re-examine its relationship to America. All—and especially those holding American debt—will be assessing the decisions that brought them to this point. As America narrows its horizons, what is a plausible security system and aimed at what threats? What is the future of capitalism? How, in such circumstances, does the world deal with global challenges, such as nuclear proliferation or climate change?

    America will remain the most powerful country, but will not retain the position of self-proclaimed tutor. As it learns the limits of hegemony, it should define implementing consultation beyond largely American conceptions. The G8 will need a new role to embrace China, India, Brazil and perhaps South Africa.

    The immediate challenge

    In Iraq, if the surge strategy holds, there must be a diplomatic conference in 2009 to establish principles of non-intervention and define the country’s international responsibilities.

    The dilatory diplomacy towards Iran must be brought to a focus. The time available to forestall an Iranian nuclear programme is shrinking and American involvement is essential in defining what we and our allies are prepared to seek and concede and, above all, the penalty to invoke if negotiations reach a stalemate. Failing that, we will have opted to live in a world of an accelerating nuclear arms race and altered parameters of security.

    In 2009 the realities of Afghanistan will impose themselves. No outside power has ever prevailed by establishing central rule, as Britain learnt in the 19th century and the Soviet Union in the 20th. The collection of nearly autonomous provinces which define Afghanistan coalesce in opposition to outside attempts to impose central rule. Decentralisation of the current effort is essential.

    All this requires a new dialogue between America and the rest of the world. Other countries, while asserting their growing roles, are likely to conclude that a less powerful America still remains indispensable. America will have to learn that world order depends on a structure that participants support because they helped bring it about. If progress is made on these enterprises, 2009 will mark the beginning of a new world order.

    Source: www.economist.com, Nov 19th 2008

    “New World Order” transmutes into “Age of Compatible Interest”

  • PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 7 March 26, 2009

    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Turkey, Iran, Terrorism, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas, Nihat Ali Özcan
    The United States Treasury Department added the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Parti bo Jiyani Azadi la Kurdistan – PJAK) to its list of designated terrorist groups on February 4. [1] Operating on the Iranian-Iraqi border under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), PJAK has sought to create an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran since its formation in 2004, though the relationship between Iran and the PKK dates back to the creation of the Islamic State of Iran in 1979. This development also highlights unique dynamics of the relationship between a terrorist organization (the PKK) and a state sponsor (Iran).  

    The decision to designate PJAK as a terrorist group brought to the forefront the trajectory of Iran-PKK ties, which traditionally have oscillated between sponsorship and enmity. In this article, we will look at the ebb and flow of sponsorship-enmity dynamics between Iran and the PKK, and put this relationship into the context of regional developments.

    The PKK established contacts with Iranian Kurds who rebelled against Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then, the PKK’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has gone through several phases that can be analytically divided into five distinct periods. The first period (1980-1982) covers the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. The establishment of the Iran-Syria alliance and Iran’s war with Iraq marked the second era (1982-1988), during which a sponsorship relationship gradually took root. During the third period (1988-1997), Iran and the PKK redefined the sponsorship relationship to adjust it to the new geopolitics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fourth period (1997-2003) can best be described as controlled cooperation, during which the parties struggled to maintain a fragile partnership under the pressure of the rapidly shifting regional balances of power. During the fifth era (2003-2009), starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a rather adversarial relationship emerged between the parties, which occasionally turned into open confrontation.

    First period

    Initial encounters between the PKK and the Islamic Republic date back to the first years of the revolution. The Iranian Kurds, seeking to take advantage of the post-revolutionary turmoil and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, initiated a rebellion against Tehran. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, tasked some of his militants with establishing contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, which was leading the rebellion against Tehran at the time. Ocalan was reportedly urged by Jalal al-Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to engage Iranian Kurds. [2]

    The initial years of the PKK-Iran relationship were characterized by enmity, developing as they did under the shadow of the new Iranian regime’s Islamic credentials and the PKK’s Marxist agenda. Moreover, the possibility that the PKK might ignite a desire for independence among Iranian Kurds further exacerbated Iran’s suspicions of the PKK. However, subsequent developments replaced this short-lived period of ideological antagonism with a spirit of pragmatism dictated by changes in regional diplomacy that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a sponsorship-alliance relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Marxist PKK.  

    Second period

    The emergence of the Iran-Syria strategic alliance in 1982 had direct repercussions for Iranian-PKK ties as well. In response to the geopolitical shifts brought about by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, including the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, Tehran and Damascus were increasingly drawn towards each other. A shared interest of this new alliance was the undermining of two pro-Western countries in the region through subversive activities, namely Turkey and Israel. To do this, the Tehran-Damascus axis decided to support the PKK and Hezbollah. [3] Following this agreement, Iran dispatched its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon through Syria to train Hezbollah fighters. The PKK froze its ties to al-Talabani and signed a partnership agreement with Barzani. [4] This agreement allowed the PKK to relocate its militants in Syria to northern Iraq through Iranian facilitation.

    From Iran’s perspective, it had many incentives to engage in such a relationship:

    • Tehran and Ankara were involved in an enduring rivalry.

    • The Islamic revolution increasingly pitted Tehran against the secular regime in Ankara, adding an ideological fervor to the competition.

    • The close ties between Ankara and Washington exacerbated Tehran’s fears of Ankara. As part of American plans to contain the Islamic regime, some airfields in Turkish territory close to the Iranian border were expanded (Cumhuriyet, November 16, 1982). Moreover, the United States relocated some of the listening stations it had to withdraw from Iran to eastern Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Turkey.

    • Following the revolution, many supporters of the Shah’s regime, seeking to reach Western countries, first flew to Turkey. Revolutionary leaders were worried that these refugees, whose numbers were in the millions, could organize themselves in Turkey to undermine the new regime.

    • The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to world markets through Turkish territory brought extra revenue to Baghdad, helping it to finance its war against Iran.
     
    These pragmatic reasons led Iran to support the Marxist PKK in its efforts to undermine Turkey. Nonetheless, Iran always denied its support for the PKK, which was partly a reflection of the fact that Iran needed to maintain relations with Turkey (Cumhuriyet, May 3, 1987). For instance, it had to use Turkish territory to ensure a flow of logistical supplies to maintain its war against Iraq.
    Despite Tehran’s official denial of any support to the PKK, its sponsorship gradually increased towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As the senior partner, Iran exerted some limitations on the PKK. [5] The PKK could not attack Turkish targets within fifty kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border and would refrain from operating among Iranian Kurds. It also agreed to share the intelligence it gathered about Turkey and American bases there with Tehran. In return, Iran provided the PKK with weapons, medical assistance and logistical facilities. Through entering this relationship, the PKK gained access to a wider area of operability and eventually expanded its influence into the Turkish interior.
     
    Third period

    Concerned about the growing influence of the PKK among Iranian Kurds after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran changed its attitude towards the PKK and arrested some of its militants. [6] Nonetheless, this situation soon changed. Although Iran’s Kurdish population posed a challenge, it was not a vital threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Since the Sunni Kurds were a numerically small minority dwelling in the periphery of the Iranian political system, Iran regarded the problem as manageable. A more serious threat was presented by Azeri nationalism, especially after Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country. Turkey’s increasing profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia (backed by the United States) and the growth of Azeri nationalism within Iran became major issues of concern for Tehran, which found itself forced to restore its ties with the PKK. Indeed, a growing number of PKK activities during the 1990s took place mostly around Turkey’s northeastern and Caucasus borders. [7] In this way, Iran sought to hinder Turkey’s ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia and limit its influence in the region. One direct effect of this policy was that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had to be postponed for another nine to ten years. The intensification of PKK terrorist activities consumed much of Turkey’s energy, turning its attention inward.

    Fourth period

    In this stage, Iran gradually reduced its support to the PKK parallel to a declining threat perception. The Turkish-Iranian competition lost its intensity as Azerbaijan and Azeri nationalism were no longer perceived as major challenges. Similarly, Syria’s diminishing support of the PKK following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in Tehran reconsidering its ties to the PKK. Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach given that the regional balance of power was full of uncertainties. Last but not least, the 9/11 terror attacks and the Global War on Terrorism made Tehran more cautious as it sought to avoid being labeled as a sponsor of terrorism.

    Fifth period

    The Iran-PKK relationship, which started to deteriorate following the capture of Ocalan, turned into one of open confrontation in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The extensions of the PKK operating among the Iranian Kurds declared the founding of PJAK in 2004 (see Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006).  Drawing on its past networks, the PKK consolidated its power among Iranian Kurds within a short period. It capitalized on the legacy of Kurdish nationalism and resistance to Tehran introduced to the region before the local Kurdish movement was crushed by Iran, while building its own economic and political networks. To give PJAK a local character, some Iranian Kurds were recruited to its leadership cadres. Despite PJAK’s claim to the contrary, it operated under the PKK umbrella and sought refuge in the Kandil Mountain region. As an indication of these organic ties, militants recruited from Turkey were sometimes deployed in Iran, while militants of Iranian origin sometimes took part in PKK operations inside Turkey. [8]  

    The PKK’s growing visibility in Iran and an acquiescent American attitude towards the PKK presence in northern Iraq (which came to be perceived as a de facto rapprochement between Washington and the PKK) pitted Iran and the PKK against each other. PJAK has increasingly engaged Iranian military personnel since 2003 in a bid to gain media attention. In response, Iran has occasionally shelled PJAK positions in the Kandil Mountain region. There were also unconfirmed reports from Kurdish sources of cross-border operations by Iranian security forces in September, 2007 (Today’s Zaman, August 24, 2007; McClatchy, August 23, 2007). Like Turkey, Iran preferred to present PJAK as an extension of the PKK and lent support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In this way it sought to boost its own popularity among the Turkish public and to undercut Turkish-American ties.  

    Although the Bush administration added the PKK to the list of designated terrorist organizations, it was more tolerant toward PJAK, which led to allegations that America and Israel supported PJAK as a way to destabilize Iran. [9] Shortly after coming to power, the Obama administration designated PJAK as a terrorist organization controlled by the PKK. By this decision, Washington signaled that it would adopt a more principled approach in the fight against terrorism. This development also signifies a change in the American attitude towards the intricate relationships between Turkey, Iran and the PKK. Turkey welcomed the decision and saw it as the fruit of its new policy of building international coalitions to eradicate PKK terror, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States and northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Ankara’s satisfaction with the U.S. acknowledgment of PKK-PJAK ties (Anadolu Ajansi, February 6).

    The PKK, in contrast, increasingly feels that it is being encircled as a result of recent developments. PJAK officials condemned the U.S. designation and claimed that for over a year the United States already had a de facto policy of pleasing Turkey and Iran by intensifying pressure on PKK and PJAK. The organization noted that northern Iraqi authorities were also supportive of this new policy (Gundem Online, February 12; February 17). PJAK challenged the Obama administration, arguing that the terrorist designation would not deter their struggle.

    Conclusion

    Iran is carefully observing developments in Iraq and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The next stage in the sponsorship-enmity cycle between Iran and the PKK will depend on Iran’s assessment of the changes in the regional balance of power and threats to its national security. To escape the pressures exerted by close coordination between Turkey, the United States and the Kurdistan Regional Government of northern Iraq, the PKK will have an incentive to redefine its relationship with Iran. Despite Iranian-PJAK border clashes, PKK leaders are already sending warm messages to Tehran (Gundem Online, February 24). Whereas playing the “Iran card” might increase the PKK’s bargaining power, Iran also has reasons to maintain the continued availability of the “PKK card.” Considering the ongoing uncertainty over the future of the region (especially northern Iraq) in the wake of a partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and discussions over the Iranian nuclear program, Iran might not want to see the PKK disappear from the game completely.

    Notes:

    1. www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg14.htm.
    2. Cemil Bayik, Parti Tarihi, Damascus, 1996, p.58.
    3. For the background of this relationship, see: Huccetulislam Hasimi Muhtesemi’s (former Iranian ambassador to Damascus) memoirs. Turkish translation: Dunya ve Islam, 1990, pp.53-64.
    4. Bayik, op.cit. pp.75,77.
    5. Abdullah Ocalan, Parti Tarihimiz Boyunca Disaridan Dayatilan Tasfiyecilik Uzerine (Damascus, 1991), p.17
    6. Bayik, op.cit. p.92.
    7. Reports submitted to PKK’s Fifth Congress, Damascus, 1995, p.283.
    8. For the personal records of PKK militants killed see: www.hpg-online.com/sehit/sehit_kunyeleri/2008_a.html .
    9. Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, denied those allegations; See www.cnnturk.com, June 30, 2008.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html

     
    https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/
  • KEYNOTE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY

    KEYNOTE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY

    KEYNOTE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AT THE EUROPEAN BUSINESS SUMMIT

    (BRUSSELS, 26 MARCH 2009)

    Distinguished Guests,

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    It is a great pleasure for me to participate in the Seventh European Business Summit. I am confident that, the Summit will provide to the business community yet another occasion to address important problems that face Europe, at present.

    Business people will better know that, the “fine line” between success and failure is the ability to shape perceptions according to changing conditions. I believe that the same applies to international affairs.

    To influence global developments, we should be able to renew our perceptions about political, social and economic challenges.

    The European Union was conceived by such visionary leaders as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman: They have changed the perceptions about the future of Europe by launching the idea of a united continent.

    This project started as a marriage of coal and steel. However, today, the same project has reached the dimension of a political, economic and social integration process. The dream of a “European Union” is today a reality.

    Furthermore, the European Union is now poised to be a major force to run world affairs in the 21st century.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    While the EU is now a global economic and political powerhouse, it is not immune to global challenges.

    Quite the opposite!

    The most immediate challenge the EU, together with the world community, faces is the recent global financial and economic crisis. This is a testing time for Europe. But Europe has faced other challenges in the past. It has always succeeded in overcoming them. Europe should be confident in its capacity to overcome today’s ordeal and emerge from it even stronger.

    The EU today draws its strength from the sense of common destiny, with its common values, policies and institutions. It is well equipped to face present challenges.

    I have no doubt that at the end, thanks to the truly European spirit of debate and compromise, we shall emerge from this crisis stronger than before. Such a debate has already started to produce creative ideas.

    The EU’s greatest achievements of the last decades, from the “Single Market” to “enlargement”, have all been the results of acting collectively and responsibly in an inclusive way. Today, the EU, employing the same principles and instruments, is finding the right path to its political and economic future.

    No one can claim that, in the face of today’s economic, political and social crises, an inward-looking, divided, weak or smaller EU would be better off.

    Distinguished Guests,

    Turkey, as an accession country, a member of the G-20, and the sixth largest European economy, is uniquely placed to work hand in hand with the EU to overcome the global economic crisis which started out in the financial markets.

    Turkey is ready to do its share in order to deal with this global economic crisis and to provide sustainable solutions. Indeed, Turkey went through such a financial crisis in 2001. We lost almost one fourth of our GDP. As a result, we made extensive structural reforms focused on strengthening the regulatory bodies. This proved to be an expensive but valuable lesson. At least today, our banking system is very sound.

    We all know that the basis of economic activity is transparency and trust. Therefore, while reforming the financial system, this basic tenet must be upheld. We share the consensus view that governments, central banks and the business world must engage in strong collective action in this direction.

    We must also stimulate economic growth while keeping inflation under control. Therefore, it is essential to support the real economy and at the same time promote social solidarity.

    We need to give much thought to a new global financial architecture based on supervision and regulation. It is a positive development, that such issues are now being dealt with, not only at the national level, but also at the supranational level. In this direction, the World Bank, the IMF and other financial organizations need to be restructured to answer the requirements of modern economic times.

    A well-regulated free market economy should definitely continue to be our main point of reference. We should never overlook the productivity brought about by private sector activity. Although the shares of some financial institutions have been or will have to be transferred to national treasuries, these shares should come back to the hands of the private sector whenever conditions permit.

    Protectionism is also a dangerous trend. In the medium to long term, it is our own people, the consumers, who pay the price of protectionist policies. At the end of the day, such policies hurt everybody.

    In this respect, Turkey is ready to cooperate with the EU at the G-20 and the Doha Round.

    I hope that the EU will also stand up for the basic principles which have made it a great economy.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Let us consider some of the major challenges facing Europe today:

    Economic recession; Unemployment; Demographic decline; Illegal immigration; Terrorism; Energy security; Climate change and others.

    I am convinced that all of these challenges will be tackled much more effectively when the EU finally enlarges to Turkey. The ties that bind Turkey and the EU together are already strong and deep-rooted:

    – Our common values, like democracy, rule of law and human rights,

    – Our strong economic partnership framed by a highly successful Customs Union,

    – Our shared interests on matters like energy security, good governance, effective regulation of the free market and the fight against poverty,

    – Our joint objectives of expanding peace and stability in our region and beyond.

    The interests of Turkey and the EU overlap in a vast geography and across many areas.

    Turkey’s geography and its historical ties in a large region covering the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia give it unique opportunities. Out of the thirteen European Security and Defense Policy missions worldwide, seven are being conducted in Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey is the largest non-EU contributor to ESDP missions.

    On issues as diverse as Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Georgia, Kosovo and others, Turkey’s efforts directed at facilitating dialogue and compromise are clearly constructive. Just to cite a few examples:

    – Israel and Syria began indirect peace talks under Turkey’s auspices.

    – Turkey, together with Egypt, is actively working for inter-Palestinian reconciliation.

    – My trips to Baghdad two days ago and to Teheran two weeks ago are indications of our efforts to contribute to international peace and stability.

    – Next week, we shall bring together the Presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan together with their military and intelligence officials in Ankara.

    – My first-ever trip to Armenia last year and our initiative for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform have been part of our commitment to a better atmosphere in the Caucasus region.

    In short, Turkey is a force for good in a number of the world’s principal pressure points. Clearly, increased synergy between Turkey and the EU will be to our mutual benefit.

    Therefore, obstacles preventing benefits of such a synergy, like the Cyprus issue, should be removed before wasting more time and losing more opportunities. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have already done their share for a peaceful settlement of this issue. We are committed to continue in the same line. Our vision is to create another strong pillar of Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean among Turkey, Greece and the island of Cyprus once a comprehensive settlement has been reached.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Energy is yet another area of interest for all of us. It is obvious that energy security is closely associated with prosperity and stability.

    In this respect, let us not forget that Turkey is close to nearly 70 percent of the world’s energy resources. It has a strategic location along the main transport routes of the oil and natural gas resources of the Middle East, Central Asia and Caspian regions.

    Turkey’s energy security strategy overlaps with the EU’s policy of diversification of energy supply routes. Indeed, Turkey is aiming at becoming Europe’s fourth artery of natural gas after Russia, Norway and Algeria. Following the realization of the main projects of the East-West Corridor, we are now working with our partners to realize the Southern Energy Corridor which includes natural gas pipeline projects going through the territory of Turkey.

    In this context, the Nabucco Project is a priority of our energy strategy. It will play a crucial role in moving gas further towards European markets.

    Distinguished Guests,

    I have outlined some of the main areas where Turkey is uniquely placed to help address the challenges faced by Europe. Turkey is a negotiating candidate country determined to join the EU. Turkey continues on its path to accession and an enormous transformation process is also taking place. The comprehensive political reforms enacted in the past six years have enhanced our democratic system. We are determined to take them further ahead.

    We will continue the negotiations in good faith with the shared objective of accession as clearly stated in the negotiating framework of the EU. It is essential that Turkey’s accession process be continued objectively, fairly, in a foreseeable way and according to the rules of the game.

    Distinguished Guests,

    Strategic vision is no longer confined to military or geopolitical considerations alone. Strategic approaches now aim for common values, intercultural dialogue and mutual harmony. Such a strategic approach implies Turkey’s accession to the EU.

    Turkey’s accession will carry within it some keys to solving many of the EU’s political, social and economic problems. I shall remind you that tomorrow’s Turkey will be a much different and stronger country compared to what it is today. When Turkey becomes a member, it will shoulder some of the burdens of Europe.

    Turkey is proof that a well-functioning secular democracy in a predominantly Muslim society can prosper, preserve its traditional values and also be a part of Western institutions.

    None of these are new concepts in defending the cause of Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, their importance increases as the challenges confronting us gain urgency with every day going by.

    The case is a rather simple one: The world needs the EU’s soft power. And to become a global power, the EU needs Turkey. For such a successful “peace project” involving 500 million people, Turkey’s integration is the most viable way forward.

    Distinguished Guests,

    The EU needs to approach this matter with a sense of vision.

    It must take the vision of its own Founding Fathers who aimed to eliminate barriers which divided Europe and not create new barriers. Therefore, I wish to recall the Czech Presidency’s motto: “Europe without barriers”.

    Thank you for your attention.

  • Significance of Gul’s Iraq visit

    Significance of Gul’s Iraq visit

    VISITS abroad by heads of state are different to those by heads of government. They are a symbolic endorsement of good relations between countries; prime ministerial visits are about the nitty-gritty of politics — trade, military agreement, and foreign policy decisions. That is as true for Turkey as any other country. The visit to Iraq by its president, Abdullah Gul, is therefore something of a landmark. No Turkish head of state has visited Baghdad in over 30 years, although Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was there for talks with his Iraqi counterpart Nuri Al-Maliki last July.

    That, however, was a political initiative and even then the Kurdish issue ensured that relations between the neighbors remained fraught. A year ago, Ankara dispatched thousands of troops into northern Iraq to crush militants from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) who used it as a base for their campaign of violence against Turkey — a campaign that over the past 25 years has resulted in 40,000 people killed. Since the offensive, there have been other Turkish raids.

    Although the Kurdish issue is far from resolved, President Gul’s visit is a clear indication of warming relations. It is a change based on mutual need. Even though a few months ago, Turkey still felt that Iraq was failing to stop the PKK, it knows that with American troops preparing to leave, it has to cooperate with Baghdad if the PKK is to be neutralized. Likewise, Iraq knows that it has no chance of normality if the PKK continues to threaten Turkey and the Turks respond with cross-border attacks. The stability of Iraq requires good relations between Baghdad and Ankara — and will require it all the more when US troops leave.

    Turkey has other concerns, not least the well-being of the Turkmens of northern Iraq. It is complex situation. That the government of one country should see itself as the protector of a community in the country next door has obvious dangers; local disputes could end up poisoning national policies — and in the case of Iraq, the Kurds and the Turkmens are anything but friends. Kirkuk, one of the main centers of the Turkmen population but which the Kurds want in their autonomous region in a new federal Iraq, could be such a poison.

    Turkey, not least because the city is also the center of northern Iraq’s oil wealth, does not want to see it fall into Kurdish hands. But then neither does Prime Minister Al-Maliki who is busy building alliances to ensure a strong central government following parliamentary elections later this year.

    His vision ties in neatly with Turkey’s that likewise sees a strong central government in a united Iraq as the best guarantee of dealing with the PKK and lowering Kurdish ambitions. But that is not certain and elections are still some way off. All eyes in Ankara (and Baghdad) will, therefore, be on the much-talked about grand Kurdish conference expected soon in northern Iraq at which the PKK will be asked to end its violence against Turkey. If it does so, it would spell a much-needed end to the troubles in southeast Turkey. It would also remove any impediment to normal relations between it and Iraq.

    That is what President Gul’s visit seems to herald.

    US striking new tone with Tehran

    THE West’s overarching aim of preventing Iran acquiring an atomic bomb is best achieved by a “grand bargain”, offering Iran security but making it part responsible for the security and stability of the region, said the Financial Times in an editorial yesterday. Excerpts:

    Barack Obama’s overture to Iran, delivered by video on the eve of Monday’s Iranian New Year, is a smart move, tone-perfectly delivered, and a clear departure not just from George W. Bush’s bellicose attitude but the visceral animosity that has bedeviled relations between Washington and Tehran since the Islamic Revolution of 30 years ago.

    His use of the formal title of Islamic Republic implies US recognition of the revolution and abandonment of regime change. The emphasis on rights and responsibilities — the sort of discourse tailored for, say, China — suits Iran’s sense of entitlement and ambition to be acknowledged as a regional power. The address is well aimed, furthermore, not just at Iran’s leaders but at the Iranians.

    The more recent history, in which Iranians feel under US and Western siege, has enabled the theocrats to consolidate their puritan hegemony and their dense network of material interests. But this artificial national unity cracks and debate flourishes when Iranians sense the West is willing to engage with them. Not for nothing were the mullahs discomfited by the advent of Obama: He faces them with choices.

    But the US and Europe, as well as Israel and the Arabs, face choices too. After the enlargement of Iranian influence that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the resolution of most conflicts in the region — Iraq itself, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon — needs at least Tehran’s quiescence. The West’s overarching aim of preventing Iran acquiring an atomic bomb is best achieved by a “grand bargain”, offering Iran security but making it part responsible for the security and stability of the region. If we ever reach that point — a big if — the US and its allies will have had to decide if they can accept that Iran has reached technological mastery of the full nuclear fuel cycle.

  • Peres sends holiday greeting to Iran

    Peres sends holiday greeting to Iran

    By JOSEF FEDERMAN – 47 minutes ago

    JERUSALEM (AP) — Israeli President Shimon Peres sent a rare greeting to the people of Iran on Friday, praising what he called a great and ancient culture and saying they would be better off without their hard-line leadership.

    The greeting coincided with a video message sent by President Obama to Iran in which he said the U.S. is prepared to end years of strained relations if Tehran tones down its bellicose rhetoric.

    Peres, a Nobel peace laureate, talked of the warm ties that once existed between the two countries under the pro-U.S. shah, who was overthrown in 1979, and voiced hope that they could once again live in peace.

    “I turn to the noble Iranian nation in the name of the ancient Jewish nation and wish that it return to its rightful place among developed nations,” he said.

    But in an interview accompanying the greeting, Peres took a tougher tone toward Iran’s leaders, branding the leaders who came to power in the 1979 Islamic revolution “religious fanatics” and predicting that Iranians would eventually overthrow them.

    “I think the Iranian nation will topple these leaders. Leaders that do not serve the people will, in the end, the nation will get rid of them,” Peres said in the interview.

    “It’s such a rich country with such a rich culture,” he added. “On the one hand I look at Iran with admiration because of its history and on the other hand with sorrow because of what’s happened to it.”

    Peres’ blessing for the Persian Nowruz holiday was broadcast on the Farsi-language service of the Voice of Israel radio station. The station said the interview would air on Monday. The station claims to have several million listeners in Iran, though it was not immediately clear how many people had heard the message.

    Israel and Iran enjoyed close ties before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which toppled the U.S.-backed shah and brought to power a clerical leadership hostile to the Jewish state.

    Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel and questioned whether the Holocaust occurred. Israel also accuses Iran of supporting hostile Arab militant groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah, and says Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.

    Peres took aim at Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial. “Since when is he an expert on the Jewish Holocaust? Was he at Auschwitz? What does he know? All day he makes speeches and speeches, but they are destroying the nation. They won’t so quickly destroy us.”

    In his aired greeting, Peres turned his focus to the Iranian people and offered a Nowruz blessing.

    “Our relations with the Iranian nation knew days of prosperity, even in modern times as we shared with you our experience in agriculture, industry, development of science and medicine and we developed with you the best relations possible,” he said.

    “To our dismay, our diplomatic relations are at a low point flowing from the desires leading the current leaders of your land to act in every way possible against the state of Israel and its people, but I am confident that the day we are hoping for is not far, when the good neighborly relations and the cooperation will flourish in all fields for the welfare of our nations and for the betterment of our common future.”

    Peres spoke in Hebrew for most of the blessing, but then ended his address with a traditional Persian holiday greeting in Farsi: “May your Nowruz be a victory, and every day be Nowruz!”

    Meir Javedanfar, an independent Iranian-born analyst living in Israel, called Peres’ statements “very significant.”

    He said both Peres and Obama were aware that Iran is preparing to hold a presidential election and are hopeful that they can encourage voters to choose a new moderate leadership.

    “Iranian right-wingers thrive on demonizing the U.S. and Israel,” he said. “This is basically to counter that, with the hope that the people of Iran will vote against extremism.”

    He said Peres also might be trying to encourage the people of Iran to embrace Obama’s diplomatic overture. “We should try not to allow the provocative messages of Ahmadinejad to destroy the rapprochement,” he said.

    Farnoush Ram, a broadcaster at the Israeli radio station, said Peres’ predecessor, Iranian-born Moshe Katsav, had also sent Nowruz messages to Iran in the past, but this was the first blessing since Ahmadinejad took office.

    Source:  www.google.com, 20 March 2009

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Turkey, U.S.: Strengthening Ties as Ankara Rises
    March 19, 2009 | 1837 GMT ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoganSummary
    U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Turkey on April 6-7 and meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The United States and Turkey have many areas of mutual interest, including Iraq, Middle Eastern diplomatic efforts, Iran and Central Asia. Obama’s visit indicates that his administration recognizes Turkey’s growing prominence, and it gives the United States a chance to coordinate policy with a rising power.

    Analysis
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed late March 18 that U.S. President Barack Obama will be visiting Turkey on April 6-7. In an interview with Turkish news channel Kanal 7, Erdogan said he had invited Obama to attend a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations initiative in Istanbul on April 7, but “did not expect” Obama to arrive a day early for an official state visit to Ankara. “Combining the two occasions is very meaningful for us,” he added. Obama’s trip to Turkey will follow a visit to London for the G-20 summit on the global financial crisis, a NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, and a trip to Prague to meet with EU leaders.

    Obama’s decision to visit Turkey this early in the game highlights his administration’s recognition of Turkey’s growing prominence in the region. The Turks have woken up after 90 years of post-Ottoman hibernation and are in the process of rediscovering a sphere of influence extending far beyond the Anatolian Peninsula. The Americans, on the other hand, are in the process of drawing down their presence in the Middle East in order to free up U.S. military capabilities to address pressing needs in Afghanistan. With the Turks stepping forward and the Americans stepping back, there are a number of issues of common interest that Obama and Erdogan will need to discuss.

    The first order of business is Iraq. The United States is putting its exit strategy into motion and is looking to Turkey to serve as an exit route for U.S. troops and equipment from Iraq. The Turks would not have a problem with granting the United States such access, but they also want to make sure that U.S. withdrawal plans will not interfere with Turkey’s intentions of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. With key Kurdish leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani retiring soon and Kurdish demands over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk intensifying, the Turks want to make clear to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq that Ankara promptly will shut down any attempts to expand Kurdish autonomy. Turkey will not hesitate to use the issue of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters hiding out in northern Ir aq as a pretext for future military incursions should the need arise to pressure the KRG in a more forceful way, but such tactics could run into complications if the United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces through northern Iraq. Therefore, the decision on where to base U.S. troops during the withdrawal process will be a political one, and one that will have to address Turkish concerns over the Kurds. Washington likely will see this as a reasonable price to pay, as it has other problems to handle.

    Related Special Topic Page
    Turkey’s Re-Emergence
    Beyond Iraq, the United States is looking to Turkey as the Muslim regional heavyweight to take the lead in handling some of the knottier issues in the Middle East. The Israeli-Syrian peace talks that went public in 2008 were a Turkish initiative. These negotiations are now in limbo, with the Israelis still working to form a new government, but the Turks are looking to revive them in the near future. Turkey, Israel, the United States and the Arab states all share an interest in bringing Syria into a Western alliance structure, with the aim of depriving Iran of its leverage in the Levant. However, the Syrians are setting an equally high price for their cooperation: Syrian domination over Lebanon. These negotiations are packed with potential deal breakers, but Turkey intends to take on the challenge in the interest of securing its southern flank.

    Iran is another critical area where the United States and Turkey see eye to eye. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of the Shia in Iraq have given Iran a platform for projecting influence in the Arab world. But the Turks far outpace the Iranians in a geopolitical contest and will be instrumental in keeping Iranian expansionist goals in check. Erdogan’s outburst over Israel’s Gaza offensive was just one of many ways Turkey has been working to assert its regional leadership, build up its credibility among Sunnis in the Arab world and override Iranian attempts to reach beyond its borders. At the same time, the Turks carry weight with the Iranians, who view Turkey as a fellow great empire of the past and non-Arab partner in the Middle East. Washington may not necessarily need the Turks to mediate in its rocky negotiations with Iran, but it will rely heavily on Turkish clout in the region to help put the Iranians in their place.

    Some problems may arise, however, when U.S.-Turkish talks venture beyond the Middle East and enter areas where the Turkish and Russian spheres of influence overlap. Turkey’s influence extends into Central Asia and deep into the Caucasus, where the Turks have a strong foothold in Azerbaijan and ties to Georgia, and are in the process of patching things up with the Armenians. As the land bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey is also the key non-Russian energy transit hub for the European market, and through its control of the Bosporus, it is the gatekeeper to the Black Sea. In each of these areas, the Turks bump into the Russians, another resurgent power that is on a tight timetable for extracting key concessions from the United States on a range of issues that revolve around Russia’s core imperative of protecting its former Soviet periphery from Western meddling.

    The U.S. administration and the Kremlin have been involved in intense negotiations over these demands. Washington is still sorting out which concessions it can make in return for Russian cooperation in allowing the United States access to Central Asia for supply routes to Afghanistan, and in applying pressure on Iran. As part of these negotiations, Obama will be meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the G-20 summit and later in the summer in Moscow. Though it is still unclear just how much the United States is willing to give the Russians at this juncture — and how flexible the Turks will be in challenging Russia — Washington wants to make sure its allies, like Turkey, are on the same page.

    But as STRATFOR has discussed in depth, Russia and Turkey now have more reason to cooperate than collide, and recent diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Ankara certainly reflects this reality. In areas where the United States will want to apply pressure on Russia, such as on energy security for the Europeans, the Turks likely will resist rocking the boat with Moscow. The last thing Turkey wants at this point is to give Russia a reason to politicize its trade relationship with Ankara, cause trouble for the Turks in the Caucasus or meddle in Turkey’s Middle Eastern backyard. In short, there are real limits to what the United States can expect from Turkey in its strategy against Russia.

    Obama and Erdogan evidently will have plenty to talk about when they meet in Ankara. Though the United States and Turkey have much to sort out regarding Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia, this visit will give Obama the stage to formally recognize Turkey’s regional prowess and demonstrate a U.S. understanding of Turkey’s growing independence. Washington can see that the Turks are already brimming with confidence in conducting their regional affairs, and can expect some bumps down the road when interests collide. But the sooner the Americans can start coordinating policy with a resurgent power like Turkey, the better equipped Washington will be for conducting negotiations in other parts of the globe.

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