Category: Iran

  • DID PRESIDENT SARGSYAN BLAZE A TRAIL TO THE SEA VIA IRAN?

    DID PRESIDENT SARGSYAN BLAZE A TRAIL TO THE SEA VIA IRAN?

    Haroutiun Khachatrian 4/15/09

    Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s two-day visit to Iran produced a potential breakthrough deal that could ease Armenia’s economic isolation.

    Sargsyan and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad signed eight agreements during the Armenian leader’s two-day stay in Tehran on April 13-14. Two of those pacts stand to give a big boost to Armenian foreign trade. The first provides a blueprint for the construction of a 470-kilometer railroad between the two countries and the second would lower Iranian trade barriers to Armenian exports.

    At present, Armenia’s only viable overland routes to the outside world run through Georgia. That conduit has proven unreliable for Yerevan in recent years, though, given the long-running tension between Russia and Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Turkey and Azerbaijan currently maintain an economic blockade against Armenia, and although there has been much talk lately of a re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian frontier, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties, as well as a political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, do not appear imminent. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

    The proposed outlet to Iran would not bring immediate economic benefits to Armenia. Under terms of an agreement finalized April 15 by the transport ministers of Armenia and Iran, construction of the railway would take an estimated five years, and cost upwards of $1.8 billion. The first stage of the construction process involves a feasibility study, which is due to be completed by the end of the summer.

    Almost seven-eighths of the railway would lie on Armenian territory, stretching from the northern city of Sevan to Meghri on the Iranian border. The question of financing evidently was not addressed during Sargsyan’s Iran visit.

    In another potentially significant deal, the two countries agreed to cooperation on the construction of a hydropower station on the Arax River.

    One political analyst, Garnik Asatrian, an Iranian studies expert at the Yerevan State University, characterized President Sargsyan’s visit as a “historic step” for Armenia. But other experts were more circumspect. The global economic downturn, they emphasized, makes it impossible to say whether promises made today can be fulfilled tomorrow. Alexander Iskandarian, the director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, pointed out that already some erstwhile financial heavyweights in the Caucasus, especially Russia, are now finding it difficult to come up with the cash to meet assistance obligations. “Some previously adopted programs are now short of money,” he told EurasiaNet.

    Sevak Sarykhanan, an expert with the Noravank Foundation, a Yerevan-based think tank, suggested that the Iranian rail project is, in effect, an insurance policy for Yerevan. If the Turkish-Armenian border reopens in the near future, then Yerevan would have rail access to the Middle East and Gulf regions via the existing Gyumri-Kars rail link. In that case, the Sevan-Meghri-Iran rail route would not make financial sense.

     

    Editor’s Note: Haroutiun Khachatrian is a freelance writer based in Yerevan.

  • When your neighbor and enemy chum up…

    When your neighbor and enemy chum up…

     

     
     

    [ 16 Apr 2009 17:51 ]
    Armenian-Iranian economic partnership: reality or myth

    No sooner had Azerbaijan got out of the tension after notorious tittle-tattle in Turkish circles on the probability of opening borders with Armenia, one more neighbor moved to kiss on the lips of the aggressor country.

    The question is Armenian leader Serzh Sargsyan’s official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    During the visit from April 13-14, the two Presidents expressed satisfaction with the current level of political dialogue and their willingness to further expand intergovernmental relations.

    At a meeting with Iranian counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan didn’t seem to conceal his country’s emergency need for relations with Iran.

    In this regard, he thanked Iranian President for allowing essential goods through Iran during economically hard times – in the early years of independence and during hostilities between Russia and Georgia in August.

    The parties also focused on major infrastructure programs as the best indication of the further expansion of the Armenian-Iranian relations….

    Under memorandums and documents signed, Export Development Bank of Iran would open a credit line to Armenia, the parties agreed to build a hydropower plant on the Araz River, lay a railroad between the two countries, deliver Iranian gas to Armenia and study the prospects of re-exporting to Europe, create Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Black Sea Highway….

    The bilateral documents appeared to be part of strengthening Iran-Armenia-Russia triangle economically and politically against the backdrop of well-cemented strategic partnership among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the region.

    In favor of the formation of Iran-Russian-Armenian alliance, this is a call for Iran to sit as an observer in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

    Another point is that Armenia will get Iranian gasoline and diesel fuel refined in Tabriz, an Azeri-populated city.

    In fact, the expensive joint projects, including a rail link may come online in 3-4 years.
    The railway line is believed to allow Armenia to reach the outside world without Georgia let alone transportation and cargo shipment. Armenia and Iran are lucky this time because this project also interests Russia.

    With Russia uninvolved, it is obvious that progress in any sphere of economic cooperation between Armenia and Iran will willy-nilly “hang in the air”.

  • Iran offers Armenia energy line of credit

    Iran offers Armenia energy line of credit

    TEHRAN, April 14 (UPI) — Meeting with the visiting Armenian energy minister Tuesday, Iranian finance officials pledged to support the energy sector in Armenia with a line of credit.

    Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisyan met with Iranian Finance Minister Shamseddin Hosseini to discuss trade issues and Iran’s offer of economic assistance, Iran’s official Islamic Republic News Agency reports.

    Movsisyan expressed his gratification for a line of credit offered through the Export Development Bank of Iran, saying the move was part of an expanding trade relationship between both countries.

    Armenia in March announced it had begun construction on a 186-mile pipeline to bring oil products from the Tabriz refinery in northern Iran in exchange for electricity.

    The project would bring 81 billion cubic feet of natural gas from refineries in Tabriz each year, which is about the same amount Armenia imports from Russia currently through Georgia.

    Movsisyan was part of a high-level delegation from Armenia that arrived in Tehran on Monday to discuss bilateral ties.

    https://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2009/04/14/Iran-offers-Armenia-energy-line-of-credit/UPI-27631239717538/

  • The Dream of a Kurdish State

    The Dream of a Kurdish State

    By Hewa Aziz

    Sulaimaniyah, Asharq Al-Awsat- Throughout its long history, the forty-million strong Kurdish nation has never had its own independent state. Since the decline of the Median Empire some 3000 years ago, the Kurds have remained part of other states or, at the best, managed to establish scattered principalities as part of larger empires dominating the region such as the Islamic and Ottoman Empires.

    The Kurds established the principalities of Baban in Sulaimaniyah, Ardalan and Botan, and later founded the province of Sharazor, the capital of which was Kirkuk, and Mosul and other cities.

    The idea of establishing an independent Kurdish state was not a priority for the Kurds, nor was it a matter of necessity. This is because the concept of the modern state was yet to emerge or appear in the region until the late nineteenth century when states began to emerge according to a modern system.

    At the time, despite their potential, Kurdish leaders were preoccupied with minor issues that took their attention away from realizing the dream of establishing an independent Kurdish state, a dream that the Persian and the Ottoman Empires, and modern-day Iran and Turkey have fought against.

    After World War I, an opportunity arose for the Kurds to outline the features of their independent state within the framework of treaties and the international and regional coalitions that dominated that period. However, the Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmoud al Hafid in particular, was content with establishing his small kingdom in Sulaimaniyah. The kingdom soon collapsed following bloody wars with the British occupation forces that brought down the Ottoman Empire and with it all its allying bodies including al Hafid’s kingdom. He failed to make the most of Kurdish sentiment at the time regarding the Kurdish right to establish a homeland.

    Sheikh Mahmoud al Hafid was unaware of the fact that the new age required a new a vision and conduct, and as a result, the Turks established their own state and the Kurds were dispersed between four of the regional countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

    Almost a century has elapsed since then. That experience was followed by other attempts to establish a Kurdish state such as the Republic of Mahabad by Qazi Mohammed in Iranian Kurdistan back in 1946. This attempt was short lived and was brought down by the army of the Pahlavi regime. The dream of establishing an independent Kurdish state is yet to be realized. But the main question is: will this dream ever come true?

    Many Kurdish politicians, intellectuals and decision-makers agree that this dream is possible and can be realized in the right political regional and international circumstances. Others are of the view that the dream is unattainable for geopolitical reasons whereas others predict that more than one autonomous or semi-autonomous state will emerge in the four parts of Kurdistan shortly in view of recent developments and the potential political shifts in the new Middle East over the next two decades.

    Fareed Asasard, a leading figure at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] party and the director of Kurdistan’s Strategic Studies Centre based in Sulaimaniyah, believes that the idea of forming or founding an independent Greater Kurdistan comprising of Kurdistan’s four areas continues to be a hypothetical issue.

    “The basic components required for establishing any state are still unavailable [to the Kurds] at the present time and I believe that they will not be available in the long term for several reasons, the most important of which is that the world will witness a shift in the decades to come causing it to rely on geo-economics instead of geopolitics as the case is at present,” said Asasard.

    Asasard, who has conducted a lot of research on this topic, stresses that the idea of founding a greater independent state has failed a number of times. For example the Turks failed to found the Greater Turkish Empire from China to the Mediterranean to ensure the existence of the Turkish race everywhere. Asasard adds, “In the mid-1990s, I presented a research paper on the geopolitics of Kurdistan in which I made clear that establishing an independent Kurdish state in Iraqi Kurdistan would be very difficult as it requires changing the map of a significant part of the world. Besides, even if this state were established, it would remain isolated from the world as it would have no seaports.”

    Asasard expects that there will be several small Kurdish statelets in other parts of Kurdistan in the long term especially as the initial step in this direction has already been taken in the sense that the political and administrative structure of Iraqi Kurdistan is quite independent. However, he stressed that the link between these Kurdish states on the economic level in the future will be very weak and that these states will remain linked to the central systems in Tehran, Turkey and Baghdad.

    Asasard stated that he believes that international politics will be subject to the logics and authority of the economy in upcoming decades. Therefore, the Kurdish statelets, if they emerge, will be economically weak and this will be their biggest problem, not to mention their unfortunate location, which will always tip the scale in favour of their neighbours, making it subordinate to these neighbouring countries. Therefore, the idea of founding an independent Kurdish state is an unachievable dream.

    On the other hand however, Dr. Jaza Toufi Taleb, professor of geopolitics at the University of Sulaimani believes that all the basic constituents are available for an independent Kurdish state to be established on Kurdish land such as the geographical borders, nation, economy and seaports. However, the political atmosphere is completely unsuitable for outlining the features of the state at present, especially as the concerned countries continue to reject even marginal autonomy for the Kurds in their countries. Dr Taleb explained that even though several independent states around the world, such as Kosovo for example, do not have the potential that Iraqi Kurdistan enjoys.

    “I believe that if reformists in Iran and the moderates in Turkey gain power in the upcoming elections, and with the geopolitical changes in Syria that are taking place, this would allow for the rise of political bodies in the Kurdistan region, specifically in Turkey which wants to join the EU but a precondition is the acknowledgement of the rights of all minorities. In Iran, there are signs of such bodies emerging under the rule of reformists. These bodies will represent the initial step towards the establishment of the Kurdish state in the long term. Turkey will be the starting point towards this goal. However, geopolitically, the dream of establishing the greater Kurdish state remains a difficult dream to make come true,” explained Dr Taleb.

    But Hussein Yazdan Bana, Vice President of the Kurdistan Freedom Party headed by Ali Qazi Mohammed, the son of the founder of the Kurdish Mahabad Republic in Iranian Kurdistan, stressed that the Kurdish nation has the right to an independent state on its land in accordance with international law. He emphasized that Kurdistan possesses all the requirements necessary for establishing an independent state just like other countries in the world. “Conspiracies and international interests were, and still are, the major obstacles to the establishment of the Kurdish state. This is exemplified by what happened to Sheikh Mahmoud al Hafid’s kingdom and the Kurdistan Republic [of Mahabad] founded by Qazi Mohamed.”

    Yazdan Bana emphasized that the most important prerequisite for the establishment of any state is the will and resolution of the nation itself and the favourable external factors and circumstances that have not been agreeable to the Kurds until now.

    “If the British had not been present and the superpowers did not have their own interests, the Kurdish, Baban, Botan and Ardalan principalities would have been successful in establishing Greater Kurdistan. In addition, the very few opportunities that were made available to the Kurds throughout history, specifically after World War I, were not utilised well by Kurdish politicians to establish that state.”

    Yazdan Bana confirmed that international policies in the current age of globalization are not resistant to the aspirations of countries seeking to establish their own independent states. These conditions can be utilised to make the Kurdish dream come true provided that there is a unified political will among the Kurds.

    Yazdan Bana said, “The establishment of the Kurdish state is a goal that the Kurds and their political powers should act to achieve, and we can do this provided that a unified and a solid political will is made available. At present, the establishment of this state is not possible for several reasons, but once the Kurdish politicians abandon their personal dreams and ambitions for power and influence then forty million people will be able to establish their own state.”

    Abdul Baqi Yousef, member of the politburo of the Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria highlighted that the establishment of an independent state is the right of the Kurdish nation and it is not an impossible dream. However, he explains that this is conditional upon future political developments in the region that will outline existing ties between the Kurds and the Middle East region and will result in establishing ties between all the parts of Kurdistan.

    “States are not established based on emotions or desires but basic factors such as geography, economy and others factors that are all available in Kurdistan. I believe that the future developments, in the long run, will allow for the establishment of several Kurdish statelets in the region, and this will lead to the establishment of independent greater Kurdistan.”

    But the issue differs for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK] in Turkey, which called for establishing greater Kurdistan since it began the armed struggle in 1984. The party reduced its demand to establishing a confederation system that ensures national and cultural rights for Kurds whose population exceeds ten million in Turkey’s Kurdistan region alone.

    Ahmed Deniz, the PKK’s foreign affairs officer, believes that the municipal elections that took place recently in Turkey were promising as they indicated fair democratic and political solutions to the Kurdish cause in Turkey.

    Deniz told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Kurdish nation, whose land was split between the four countries following the Treaty of Lausanne that was signed after World War I, is still the only nation with no independent state in the region despite that its population exceeds 40 million.

    “In the PKK, we believe that a confederation system based on the freedom and rights of the Kurdish people is best suited to the Kurdish cause not only in Turkey but in the entire Kurdistan region as is the case with several advanced European countries. However, the PKK still believes in the right of the Kurdish people to an independent state. But the PKK’s political strategy at present does not aim to establish an independent state that requires a particular atmosphere that we lack at present, especially as an independent state does not necessarily mean freedom for nations. What is more important to us is that the Kurds gain their freedom, enjoy real democracy and human rights. Only then can the Kurds decide themselves the nature of the political identity they want,” said Deniz.

    As for the renowned Kurdish-Syrian writer Nouri Brimo, he said that “the [establishment of the] Kurdish state is not a dream but a political course and its supporters increase as it gains strength through the sacrifices of its people. In all cases, the Kurds have been able to prove throughout history that they have always been rational in their political discourse and presentation and that they have always respected their neighbours.”

    But Sami Davood, a renowned researcher at the Syrian Sardam cultural institution, stated that the establishment of the Kurdish state is related to geographical factors first and foremost. In other words, the issue requires the liberation of Kurdistan’s geographical region before an independent identity can be built.

    Due to the geographical nature of the Kurdish areas in Syria, there cannot be any armed struggle unlike in the Kurdish regions in Iraq, Turkey and Iran in addition to the population density of each of the four regions. Therefore, Davood believes that any attempt by the Kurds to establish their own state will be confronted with strong opposition from the regional states not so that they can keep the Kurds within the boundaries of their own countries by force, but because the majority of water and energy resources are situated in the Kurdish areas of the four countries.

    Source: aawsat.com, 10/04/2009

  • Tuesday 7 April 2009
  • It is an inconvenient truth that the two most influential countries in the Middle East are both non-Arab – Iran and Turkey. But some hope must lie in the fact that Barack Obama yesterday chose to make Turkey the focus of an attempt to bridge the gulf between Islam and the west. Alighting on Turkey as an example of the deal that can be struck between the US and the Muslim world is as bold in foreign policy terms as it is risky in domestic ones. There are plenty on the right who would seize on Mr Obama’s self-identification as an American who has Muslims in his family. But to choose the Turkish parliament as the venue to say that his country is not and never will be at war with Islam is the mark of a man who is showing increasing confidence on the world stage.

    The French president and the German chancellor, who have bolted the door to Europe, have dropped the ball on Turkey. They have yet to see what Mr Obama has already understood. Turkey’s biggest asset is its geopolitical role, and it is using it intelligently. The president, Abdullah Gul, has gone to Armenia on the first visit by a Turkish leader in the two nations’ bitter history. Ankara is also trying to transform its relationship with Iraqi Kurds. Turkey mediated indirect talks between Syria and Israel, and when the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos, telling the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, that he was killing people in Gaza, Turkish flags went up all over Palestine.

    At a time when Washington is reviewing its policy on the stalled Israeli-Arab peace process, Mr Erdogan’s message that Hamas must be represented at the peace table carries weight. Not least it gives Israel, which maintains close ties with Ankara, cause for concern. If any country can reinforce the message to Mr Obama that the current status quo is untenable it is Turkey.

    Mr Erdogan is not without his domestic problems. His Justice and Development party won about 39% of the vote at recent local elections, well down on the 47% it got two years ago. It was 36% in Istanbul and the coastal cities, a clear sign that he must listen to the progressive areas of his country. He has relaunched moves to widen ethnic and religious freedoms, and promised to work on a new and less authoritarian civilian constitution. Turkey is always reforming and never reformed, and Mr Erdogan may have personally lost faith in the ultimate goal of seeking accession to the EU, no thanks to Mr Sarkozy. Turkey is not a model country, any more than any other is. But it is a telling example. It undermines the western notion that Islam and modernity are somehow fundamentally incompatible, and it does have useful regional contacts. Next stop Iran.

    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/apr/07/barack-obama-turkey-east-west

  • The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

    The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy

     

    Author:

     
    Steven A. Cook, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

     

    April 2, 2009

    As President Obama arrives in Ankara, he will find a Turkish government eager to play an influential role in the Middle East. While Turkey has made important contributions to the region in recent years, its activism has been controversial in Washington. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed out of a contentious panel on the Gaza crisis at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, he injected additional controversy into Turkey’s diplomatic foray in the Middle East.

    The incident produced a torrent of criticism from some U.S. policymakers, analysts, and journalists who regarded the uproar in Davos as proof positive that Turkey, under Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, which is rooted in Turkey’s Islamist movement, had made the turn away from the West in favor of the radicals of the Middle East. Erdogan’s behavior at Davos, his seeming embrace of Hamas during Israel’s Gaza offensive, and his strong criticism of Israel, which at times veered into classic anti-Semitism, left observers wondering whether Turkey could continue to play a constructive role in the Middle East.

    The Prodigal Pasha

    Since the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) came to power in late 2002, Ankara has pursued a conscious strategy of reestablishing Turkey’s links with the former Ottoman domains to the south and the east. To be sure, there have long been Turkish diplomatic missions throughout the Middle East, but given Ankara’s foreign policy orientation, which placed a premium on relations with the West and the official secularism of the republic, Turkey was a marginal player at best in the Middle East. The AKP governments, first under Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and since early 2003 under Erdogan, embarked on an ambitious foreign policy–concomitant with their equally bold domestic political and reform program–that sought to secure Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union while simultaneously cultivating relationships with Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, and Tehran. Turkey’s effort to draw closer to both Europe and the Middle East reflected a belief within the AKP that its foreign policy needed to be normalized. Although Turkey’s almost exclusive orientation toward Europe and the United States might have been appropriate during the Cold War, when its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a paramount foreign policy fact, Turkey’s interests now demanded a multidimensional foreign policy.

    The Justice and Development Party’s approach was met almost immediately with skepticism in Washington.  The often testy negotiations between Washington and Ankara in late 2002 and early 2003 over the use of Turkish territory for the planned invasion of Iraq and the parliament’s subsequent inability to pass legislation giving U.S. forces permission to launch the attack from Turkey angered the United States.  Yet Iraq was just the first in a series of episodes where Ankara and Washington found themselves on opposite sides in the Middle East. In 2005, for example, as the United States sought to isolate Syria over Damascus’s alleged responsibility for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and its central role in funneling jihadis into Iraq, the Turkish government continued a policy of deepening its diplomatic and economic ties with the Syrians. After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in January 2006, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and other Turkish foreign ministry officials hosted Hamas’s external leader, Khaled Meshal, at AKP headquarters in Ankara. These developments came against the backdrop of improved relations between Ankara and Tehran and Prime Minister Erdogan’s periodic tough rhetoric that Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were tantamount to “state terrorism.”

    Ties Shift, Eyebrows Rise

    Each of these developments at first blush raises serious questions about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Ankara’s seemingly abrupt divergence from the Western consensus was disorienting to policymakers and other observers who concluded that Turkey could no longer be considered a reliable partner or play the “honest broker” role in Middle Eastern conflicts that Turkish officials coveted. Hosting Khaled Meshal, who is responsible for a fair number of both Israeli and Palestinian deaths, was clearly a mistake. Not only did the Hamas leader resist Turkish entreaties to recognize Israel and to renounce armed struggle, the encounter also angered Jerusalem and Washington–two strategically critical relationships for Ankara. Yet, it is important to note that with all the questions about who “lost” Turkey and whether Turkey is “tilting East,” there is nothing extraordinary about Ankara’s approach to the Middle East. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s tortured relationship with the European Union, and the security fallout from the invasion of Iraq, any Turkish government would likely pursue a foreign policy similar to that of AKP.  The Hamas episode aside, it is abundantly clear that Turkey’s Middle East policy is consistent with Turkey’s national interests, and importantly, one that Washington can leverage to advance its own regional goals.

    On the range of important issues from Iraq and Iran to Middle East peace, Turkey’s policies are generally consistent with those of the United States. The Turks have long sought a stable, federal Iraq. The flowering of relations between Ankara and Irbil, the seat of the Kurdish Regional Government, combined with considerable Turkish investment in northern Iraq mitigates a complicating factor in Washington’s Iraq policy. The situation in Kirkuk and the persistence of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) violence against Turkey remain flashpoints, but as the Turks and Iraqi Kurds develop closer ties, the magnitude of these problems diminishes, forestalling some of the most dire scenarios about Turkish military intervention that could unravel the progress that Iraq has made over the last eighteen months. In the context of improved Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations, the Kurdish president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, has called upon PKK terrorists to lay down their arms or leave Iraq. For the United States, Turkey is no longer the malevolent wildcard in the game of stabilizing Iraq.

    Iran, Syria, and Mammon

    Viewed from a U.S. standpoint, Turkey’s two most controversial relationships in the Middle East are Iran and Syria. While critics have often used these ties as clear indications of AKP’s Islamist worldview, Ankara nurtured relations with Tehran and Damascus in the late 1990s (before Justice and Development even existed) and early 2000s.  The Turkish leadership supports the Obama administration’s efforts to establish a dialogue with Tehran. From Turkey’s perspective, good bilateral relations with Iran and regional stability are critically important, not for ideological reasons, but economic calculation. Iran is the largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey only after Russia. Although the Turks would like to diversify their supplies and have plans to invest in large-scale renewable energy programs, in the short and medium term, Ankara will do all that it can to ensure its relations with both Tehran and Moscow remain cooperative and friendly.

    The exigencies of energy supplies are not bound up in Turkey’s relations with Syria, but there is a strong economic component to the relationship. Turkey’s predominantly underdeveloped southeast is closer to Damascus than to Kayseri, Ankara, or Istanbul. The Turks believe that increased bilateral trade serves two critical purposes–it promotes development in places like Cizre, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakir and provides a boost to the Syrian economy. The architects of AKP’s foreign policy make the argument that if Turkey’s neighbors prosper, they are also more likely to be pacific, ensuring Turkish security and providing a regional environment more conducive to peace. Turkey’s ties with Syria serve another geostrategic interest. In 2006-2007, some foreign policy analysts were seized with the idea that Damascus could be “peeled away” from its strategic relationship with Iran. Although it is unlikely that Damascus will easily relinquish its ties with Tehran, the Turks can play an important role in providing the regime of Bashar al-Assad with an attractive alternative to Iran. It is surely preferable to Washington for the Turks to be engaging in dialogue with the Syrians than for Assad to be speaking with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in isolation. Turkey’s ties with Syria have already paid dividends in the Middle East as Ankara sponsored indirect talks between Israelis and Syrians in 2008. Those negotiations did not produce an agreement and were halted over Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008, but by all measures the Syrians and Israelis made progress with the help of Turkish mediation.

    O, Jerusalem

    Perhaps Turkey’s most complex relationship in the Middle East is with Israel. While the two countries maintain close military and economic ties, relations have been decidedly uneasy. From the start, the Israelis perceived a Palestinian tilt in AKP’s approach to the Middle East and were wary of Ankara’s relations with Tehran. At the same time, the Israelis, by their own admission, have complete trust in Prime Minister Erdogan’s efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria. For their part, the Turks were concerned about reports that the Israelis were developing ties with both the Iraqi Kurds and an organization related to the PKK, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan or PJAK, which is battling Iran. Ankara also argues that Israeli actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip only undermine their efforts and those of others to broker peace. Relations between the two countries deteriorated during Israel’s Gaza offensive, yet recent reports that the Israelis have dispatched a senior foreign ministry official to Ankara may indicate that both governments are looking for ways to reestablish trust. If incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu places an emphasis on striking a deal with Syria, as many expect, Turkey will initially play a prominent role in bringing the two parties together and brokering their negotiations.

    Ultimately, the challenge for Turkey is, first, whether it has the capacity to pursue an activist role in the region without undermining its other priorities, and second, the extent to which other regional powers want Ankara to play the role it intends. Thus far, the Turks seem able to balance their desire to be influential in the Middle East with other national interests in the Caucasus, Cyprus, and Europe. There is also a palpable sense in the Middle East that Turkish activism, while helpful at times, can nevertheless undermine the efforts of more traditional regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As Cairo and Riyadh seek Palestinian reconciliation, there is concern that Turkish activism will provide a way for Hamas to resist Arab pressure to come to terms with Fatah. Still, there is no question that Turkey can play a constructive role in the Middle East. It has gained the confidence of the regional players on most of the major issues of great importance. As a result, in an era of diminished resources for the United States, Turkey can be a critical ally in the pursuit of Washington and Ankara’s overlapping interests.