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Working from the province by province breakdowns of the 2009 and 2005 results, released by the Iranian Ministry of Interior, and from the 2006 census as published by the official Statistical Centre of Iran, this paper offers some observations about the official data and the debates surrounding the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election.
The Chatham House
Iran has detained eight local staff at the British embassy in Tehran on accusations of having a role in post-election riots, local reports said.
UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband demanded their release, saying the arrests were “quite unacceptable”.
Relations between the countries are strained after Tehran accused the UK of stoking unrest, which London denies.
Some 17 people are thought to have died in street protests after the disputed 12 June presidential poll.
Tehran has expelled two British diplomats in the past week, and the UK has responded with a similar measure.
The arrests were first reported by the semi-official Fars news agency.
“Eight local employees at the British embassy who had a considerable role in recent unrest were taken into custody,” Fars said, without giving a source.
UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband expressed “deep concern” over the arrest of local staff on Saturday.
“This is harassment and intimidation of a kind that is quite unacceptable,” he told reporters at an international conference in Corfu. “We want to see (them) released unharmed.”
He said the British government had made a strong protest and denied accusations that the UK was behind unrest in Iran.
Poll verdict
Meanwhile, Iran’s powerful Guardian Council was due to give its verdict on the result of the disputed presidential election, which handed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a decisive victory.
But the BBC’s Jeremy Bowen in Tehran says there is much politicking taking place behind the scenes, and that the five-day deadline for the Guardian Council to return its verdict may be extended.
Our correspondent says there is an attempt to form a committee – including the disappointed presidential candidates – to oversee the recount of 10% of the votes, a move which they are resisting.
Another parliamentary committee is holding discussions with the grand ayatollahs in an attempt from pro-Ahmadinejad forces to put on a show of unity, he adds.
But opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi has not backed away from his claim that the election result was fraudulent, and has refused to support the Guardian Council’s plan for a partial recount.
Mr Mousavi has been calling for a full re-run of the vote, but said on Saturday that he would accept a review by an independent body.
However the Guardian Council has already defended President Ahmadinejad’s re-election, saying on Friday that the presidential poll was the “healthiest” since the Iranian revolution in 1979.
BBC
Yigal Schleifer 6/25/09
Turkey seems to be searching for a proper response to the upheaval in Tehran. The Turkish public has greeted the crisis in Iran with a mix of indifference and confusion, while on the official side, Ankara is treading with extreme caution. Not wanting to possibly strain bilateral ties, Turkish officials are refraining from criticizing Iranian hardliners, or questioning the results of the country’s recent contested elections.
“Iran has confused Turks,” Cengiz Candar, a political analyst and columnist for the daily Radikal, recently wrote. “They don’t know how they could deal with the situation in Iran, how they should react, or read [the situation].”
The Turkish press has largely underplayed the story in Iran, for the most part offering scant coverage of what is taking place there. Some nationalist papers have accused those protesting the elections in Iran as being part of a Western plot to overthrow the Islamic Republic. A few outlets in Turkey’s Islamic press, meanwhile, have almost been dismissive of the protests in Iran, and the violent response to them. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
At the same time, official statements coming out of Ankara have been cautious. “We must leave the discussion of the issue to the Iranians. We cannot intervene from the outside,” Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said in a recent interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel.
Turkey’s liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has pursued a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy in recent years. As a result, contacts between Turkey and Iran have improved dramatically, with trade between the two countries last year reaching some $10 billion, up from $1 billion in 2000. Ankara and Tehran have also developed a certain degree of military cooperation in their mutual fight against Kurdish guerilla groups.
In a recent column titled “Turkey Opts for Ahmadinejad,” Barcin Yinanc, a foreign affairs columnist for the English-language Hurriyet Daily News, suggested that for the sake of Turkish-Iranian relations, Ankara prefers “Ahmadinejad at the head of the Iranian government.”
“Ahmadinejad is said to enjoy excellent relations with both President [Abdullah] Gul and Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan,” she wrote.
“In fact, he is known to be an admirer of Erdogan, especially of his style — perhaps even more so after Erdogan walked off the stage during a meeting in Davos at which he had a harsh exchange of words with Israeli President Shimon Peres,” Yinanc continued. “But personal issues aside, Turkish officials believe the two countries enjoyed good relations during Ahmadinejad’s first term in office.” [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Erdogan and Gul were among the first leaders to congratulate Ahmadinejad, calling him a few days after his disputed landslide victory. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The quick congratulations offered by the Turkish leaders raised questions among Western and Middle Eastern diplomats about how closely the Turkish government had been paying attention to events in Iran, says Semih Idiz, an Ankara-based columnist with the daily Milliyet.
“I think [the Turkish leadership] underestimated what was going on in Iran, and that is pretty strange considering we have a foreign minister who is supposed to be an expert in the region,” he said.
Some analysts were especially surprised by some of the comments made by Davutoglu in his Spiegel interview, most notably when he said that “the emergence of very different interpretations of results after the election” in Iran should be taken “as a sign that the political process in Iran is very healthy.”
Mustafa Kibaroglu, a professor of international relations at Ankara’s Bilkent University and an expert on Turkey-Iran relations, disputed the notion that Ankara’s actions in the wake of the Iranian elections reflected a lack of awareness.
“I found it [the response] consistent with Turkey’s foreign policy behavior, in general, and AKP’s ’zero conflict’ foreign policy for the last six or seven years,” Kibarolglu said. “Turkey has always, at least on paper, promoted the principle that no country should interfere with another country’s affairs.”
At the same time, Kibaroglu says, Ankara does not want to alienate Tehran. “Turkey needs to sustain and build the trust that is has developed in Iran,” he says. “Turkey, especially with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, only has one option, and that is the diplomatic option. Turkey thinks it may have a significant role, at some point, not at mediation, but maybe facilitating [discussions] between Iran and others.”
He added that “Turkey still needs to be [seen as] an honest broker. If Turkey criticized the elections, it would raise serious questions in the minds of the Iranians if Turkey is still a friend.”
Still, some critics of the government’s actions say its current Iranian policy, as realistic as it may be, may come at a cost. “There is no point to needlessly offending the Iranian powers-that-be since the safest bet is that they will manage to nip the green revolution at its roots,” Andrew Finkel, a columnist for the English-language newspaper Today’s Zaman, recently wrote. “At the same time, for the Turkish government to engage in such naked power politics is not a good investment for the future.”
Editor’s Note: Editor’s Note: Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.
Posted June 25, 2009 © Eurasianet
Shahin Abbasov 6/23/09
Iran’s ethnic Azeri community numbers roughly 15-20 million, or almost a quarter of the country’s overall population. Most Azeris harbor deep feelings of resentment toward Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration in Tehran, and they are believed to have voted strongly for the aggrieved presidential challenger, Mir Hussein Mousavi, who is himself an Azeri from Tabriz. Even so, most Azeris remain unwilling to take an active part in the continuing battle for control of Iran’s social and economic agenda.
Mousavi’s lackluster record on promoting civil rights for minority groups in Iran is the main reason why many Azeris are currently sitting on the sidelines. Iranian Azeris see little to gain from getting involved. Regardless of the outcome of the power struggle in Tehran and Qom, few Azeris expect that their quality of life will improve significantly.
Yashar Hakkakpour, spokesperson for the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran, an unofficial organization based in Tabriz, explains that Azeri activists see no advantage to be gained from pushing for Mousavi, or opposing Ahmadinejad.
“The Tehran-based organizations that back Mousavi do not report on the activists arrested in Azeri cities. Persian-language media ignores minorities. Why would Azeris support their cause?” asked Hakkakpour in a telephone interview from Van, Turkey. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
“It does not mean that Azeris support the current regime,” he added. “They just do not see a big difference.”
That situation, argues another activist, explains why the reaction to events by Azeris in Azerbaijan proper has been relatively muted. For example, there have been no pro-Mousavi protests staged outside the Iranian Embassy in Baku.
One Tabriz-based Azeri cultural rights activist concurred with Hakkakpour. “We [ethnic Azeris] have decided not to interfere in the confrontation between the regime and Mousavi,” said the activist, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The activist pointed out that some prominent Mousavi backers today endorsed the use of coercive measures to contain Azeri protests in Tabriz and other cities in 2006. The protests erupted after an Iranian youth magazine published a cartoon in which an Azeri was depicted as a cockroach.
While most Azeris may not feel inclined to publicly display support for Mousavi, some did take to the streets following the June 12 rigged presidential election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Media outlets in Azerbaijan reported that five people were killed and dozens injured in mass protests on June 13 and June 15 in Tabriz and Orumieh, the capitals of Iran’s East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces, respectively. [For additional information click here].
In general, many areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities — not just East and West Azerbaijan, but also Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Khuzestan — have been quiet amid the post-election tumult in Tehran. Minority groups, including Azeris, Arabs, Kurds and Baluchis, have long resented systematic discrimination carried out by authorities in Tehran, in particular restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights. But they don’t see the present crisis as an opportunity to seek redress for their grievances.
Hardliners in Tehran are doing all in their power to make sure ethnic minorities don’t become more active. The ethnic minority issue is a potential powder keg for Iran, and if it were to blow up at this time, it could completely alter the nature of the country’s power struggle. Just as hardliners have flooded Tehran with security forces, they have placed the regional capitals of ethnic minority enclaves under lockdown conditions. Hardliners also reportedly told the Mousavi camp that security forces would take drastic action if it appeared that the opposition was trying to stir up trouble among ethnic minority groups.
During the presidential election campaign, both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad promised to expand civil rights for Azeris. Ahmadinejad, who claimed to speak Turkish, promised to allow Azeri-language classes in universities and schools, the Tabriz source told EurasiaNet. Mousavi, meanwhile, promised to designate Azeri as Iran’s second official language and to grant greater financial autonomy to Azeri-populated regions.
But few Azeris treated these campaign pledges as anything more than empty rhetoric. “Every election, candidates come to Tabriz, Orumieh and other cities and make similar promises. However, once they win the elections, they immediately forget their promises,” Hakkakpour said.
“Mousavi during his entire career has never shown concern about [Azeri language rights and pressure on ethnic Azeris] and there were no signs he is willing to bring changes,” added Agri Garadagli, an Azeri activist now living in exile in Baku as the spokesperson for the South Azerbaijani National Awakening Movement.
Editor’s Note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. He is also a board member of the Open Society Institute-Azerbaijan.
Posted June 23, 2009 © Eurasianet
MOSCOW. (Alexander Knyazev, director of the regional branch of the Institute of the CIS, for RIA Novosti) – The European Union and Turkey plan to sign an intergovernmental agreement on the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project on June 25 in Ankara.
Why such a romantic name?
“Nabucco” is an opera by Giuseppe Verdi based on a biblical story about the plight of the Jews as they are assaulted and subsequently exiled from their homeland by the Babylonian King Nabucco (Nebuchadnezzar). It is also an enchanting story of love and struggle for power.
The latter element of the story is probably the only thing in common between the opera and the gas pipeline project initiated by U.S. President George W. Bush and based on some European and post-Soviet countries’ non-love of Russia, as well as the global battle for elbowing Russia out of the Eurasian gas market.
Since Nabucco is mostly a political product, Turkey’s efforts to use its transit location to its best advantage are perfectly logical from the viewpoint of its national interests.
Turkey will host a major portion of the 2,050-mile pipeline, which is to bring gas supplies from Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe without using Russian resources or territory.
A consortium of six countries – Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Germany – was set up to build the pipeline to Central Europe via Turkey and the Balkans. The shareholders will finance one-third of expenditure, with the remaining part to be covered by international financial and credit organizations.
The more than 3,300-km pipeline has been estimated at 7.9 billion euros ($10.7 billion) and will have an annual throughput capacity of 31 billion cubic meters. It is to be completed by 2013.
However, technical calculations show that it cannot be commissioned sooner than in 2015; and that given the high and stable energy prices. The project is burdened with political risks and will run across a difficult geographical terrain.
Europe, in truth, is encumbered by problems with energy delivery routes.
A small Polish oil pipeline running from Odessa to Gdansk via Brody in Ukraine has long been incapacitated by Chevron’s inability to supply oil from the Tengiz deposit in Kazakhstan.
Poland, which has been trying to break its dependence on Russian energy supplies, should now heave a sigh of relief, since supplies via Belarus are likely to shrink. The same goes for Lithuania whose oil refinery, Mazeikiu Nafta, that used Russian oil, has been idling since last year.
If this is the energy freedom they wanted, then the two countries are paying an excessively high price for it. Europe’s efforts to solve its energy problems without Russia by importing energy resources from Central Asia are counterproductive – this is a fact. And the same is true of the Nabucco project.
On the contrary, Russia’s South Stream project will have the guaranteed amount of natural gas, and its capacity can be subsequently increased. A recent agreement between Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s Eni stipulates increasing it to 63 billion cubic meters annually. Besides, Nabucco is unlikely to be competitive compared to Gazprom’s project in terms of prices.
The Russian gas export monopoly plans to pay for the South Stream construction and gas distribution and to sell gas to end users in Europe at attractive prices.
Gas for Nabucco is expected to come from Turkmenistan and possibly Iran. However, Russia has an agreement with Turkmenistan under which it buys all of its export gas, and Russia and Iran may veto the construction of any pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea.
This means that Nabucco can receive gas only from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz deposit, but the probability of this is undermined by tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan over the recent thaw in Turkish-Armenian relations.
In other words, Nabucco will have no reliable sources of natural gas in the near future.
A pipeline partnership is unimaginable without stability and reliability, something the U.S. administration cannot ensure even to its taxpayers. And so, what does the U.S. administration have to do with the Nabucco project?
Unlike the most naive part of the European establishment, the East European and other “democratic” media describe Nabucco not as a European economic or energy project, but as an American political venture.
The chaotic chanting in support of the Nabucco project reminds me of the “Va, pensiero” chorus of Hebrew slaves from Verdi’s opera – beautiful yet altogether gloomy and hopeless.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
