Category: Iran

  • Iran Opposes Any U.S. Peacekeeping Role For Karabakh

    Iran Opposes Any U.S. Peacekeeping Role For Karabakh

    A HALO Trust road sign in an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that was cleared of land mines.A HALO Trust road sign in an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that was cleared of land mines.

    June 24, 2010
    YEREVAN — An Iranian diplomat says Tehran is strongly opposed to U.S. involvement in a multinational peacekeeping force that would be deployed around the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the event of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace accord, RFE/RL’s Armenian Service reports.

    Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Seyed Ali Saghaeyan issued the warning at a news conference in Yerevan on June 23.

    Such a peacekeeping operation is an important element of the current and previous peace proposals made by the United States, Russian, and French mediators spearheading international efforts to settle the dispute over the breakaway Azerbaijani region.

    Analysts have long speculated about the possible composition of foreign troops that would enforce a future peace deal.

    According to Saghaeyan, the United States is keen to have troops in Azerbaijan’s Fizuli district, which borders Iran and was mostly occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces in 1993. He claimed such a move would pose a serious threat to Iran given its tense relations with Washington.

    “Iran is the only country adjacent to the conflicting parties, and in terms if ensuring its own security, it will not allow the deployment of American forces,” Saghayean said.

    Meanwhile, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian on June 22 urged Western powers to respect Iran’s geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus and held up Armenia’s economic projects with the Islamic republic as a model for regional cooperation.

    Ending an official visit to Germany, Sarkisian also asserted that the Western-backed energy projects involving Azerbaijan and excluding Armenia have only complicated a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

    In a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin, he said: “I do realize that in the light of the sanctions imposed on Iran some people will treat my approach with skepticism, but I am convinced that it is wrong and not possible to ignore Iran in regional solutions.”

    Sarkisian did not specify what concrete role Iran should play in regional security. Nor was it clear whether he thinks Tehran should have a major say in the Karabakh peace process.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Iran_Against_Any_US_Peacekeeping_Role_For_Karabakh/2081078.html
  • Kurdish Affairs Expert Offers Regional Perspective On Growing Violence In Turkey

    Kurdish Affairs Expert Offers Regional Perspective On Growing Violence In Turkey

    Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan (center) talks with Turkish soldiers in a trench during his visit to the Turkish city of Hakkari on the border with Iraq on June 20.Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan (center) talks with Turkish soldiers in a trench during his visit to the Turkish city of Hakkari on the border with Iraq on June 20.

    June 24, 2010
    With violence linked to Kurdish militants increasing in Turkey in recent weeks, the likelihood appears to be growing for a cross-border ground assault into northern Iraq by Turkish military forces. RFE/RL correspondent Ron Synovitz spoke with Michael Gunter — an authority on Kurdish affairs in Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, and Iran — for a regional perspective on what is happening. Gunter, a political science professor at Tennessee Tech University and the International University in Vienna, has written nine books about the Kurdish people of the region — including some of the first analyses in English of Kurdish unrest in the Middle East.

    RFE/RL: Violence in Turkey attributed to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, has been growing in recent weeks since the PKK ended the unilateral cease-fire that it declared last year. What is your overview of this situation in Turkey?

    Gunter: In Turkey, it’s extremely disappointing because last fall the Kurdish opening of the Turkish government promised to go a long way to begin solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey and I have never seen the Kurds so optimistic as they were last fall. However, all this came tumbling down for a number of reasons.

    Today we are back to square one. Turkey feels that the Kurds are trying to destroy Turkey. When I say the Kurds, I mean the PKK. There are many Kurds in Turkey that seem quite satisfied with the situation; whereas the PKK feels that the Turks have just not been sincere about any really genuine reform.

    RFE/RL: Turkish military forces this week launched operations in southeastern Turkey against Kurdish militants. Turkish forces also have set up blocking positions in the mountains along the Turkey-Iraq border. What is your analysis on these military operations?

    Gunter: Northern Iraq and the Qandil mountains near the Turkish border serves as a safe house for the PKK. In the last few weeks, the PKK has begun serious military action again in Turkey and the Turks feel it is coming from the Qandil mountains. That is partially true. But I think, too often, we don’t realize that there are PKK stationed in Turkey, too, and that even if the Qandil mountain safe house in northern Iraq were totally shut down, the PKK operations would continue from bases and safe houses within Turkey, too.

    RFE/RL: Could you discuss some of key Kurdish factions in Turkey, northern Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and their interests? Is there unity among them or are they working toward separate goals?

    Gunter: That would take an entire book and more. But in general, the Kurds throughout the region are in ferment. One of the main reasons is that the United States’ war against Iraq that began in 2003 opened up a Pandora’s box leading to the Kurdistan Regional Government, the KRG, in northern Iraq — which, in modern times, is arguably the first real Kurdish government in the world.

    RFE/RL: What impact has the creation of the KRG in northern Iraq had on the Kurdish question across the region?

    Gunter: The KRG not only has created a semi-independent state in northern Iraq, which attracts and inspires Kurds in Iran and in Turkey and in Syria; but the KRG has encouraged Kurds to strike out for their rights in these three other states. One problem the Kurds have always suffered from, though, is internal divisions, and these internal divisions among the Kurds are exacerbated by the fact that they live in different states, which has led the Kurds to have different interests. So I don’t see any particular coordination on the lines of a pan-Kurdish movement. Indeed, one traditional way the Kurds are controlled in the Middle East is “divide and rule.” The Turkish government right now is attempting to use the KRG in northern Iraq against the PKK that is stationed in Turkey.

    RFE/RL: Masud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq, visited Ankara on June 2, where he met with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul to discuss what the Turkish government described as “security issues.” Do you think these talks will result in any overt cooperation between them, or perhaps a tacit understanding, on the issue of rising PKK violence in Turkey?

    Gunter: It’s a very delicate situation. Both sides have very strong interests in cooperating with each other, but the KRG certainly has no interest in fighting against the PKK. Back in the early 1990s, Turkey was able to use the Iraqi Kurds to fight against the PKK — which caused an enormous amount of angst among the Kurds throughout the region and the world. So I don’t see any way that the KRG — Barzani — is going to fight against the PKK.

    On the other hand, Barzani and the KRG have a tremendous vested interest in cooperating with Turkey because as the United States prepares to leave Iraq, Turkey is, in effect, going to be the great power guarantee of the KRG. The KRG must cooperate with Turkey economically and politically. And that goes for Turkey too. Turkey has a great deal of vested interest in economic and political cooperation with the KRG. Exactly how you compromise and meld these two very contradictory goals of Turkey and the KRG is beyond me. It creates constant problems between the two — how they are going to cooperate when they basically have different interests concerning the PKK.

    RFE/RL: Some experts say it appears that there may be some kind of tacit “hot pursuit” agreement between the KRG and Anakara when it comes to cross-border incursions by Turkish forces to go after PKK militants in northern Iraq. What do you think?

    Gunter: I basically agree. But that hot pursuit agreement is tacit. There’s nothing written down. But in effect, I think that is going on right now. The KRG criticizes Turkey, but what can the KRG do. In effect, the KRG realizes that it is going to have to let Turkey make these ground interventions. As far as Turkey goes, Turkey has been intervening in northern Iraq for the last 20 or 25 years. The fact that the situation continues shows that Turkey has made little if any progress in its interventions. So I think the Turkish interventions into Iraq are largely for domestic consumption and are certainly not going to root out the PKK problem which has been there for over 30 years.

    RFE/RL: The rhetoric of Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan about Kurdish militants has been vitriolic — saying PKK fighters would “dry in their swamp and drown in their own blood.” Do you think this is a sign that Turkey may be preparing for another major ground offensive into northern Iraq like the kind last seen in February 2008?

    Gunter: I think Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey has opened up his reelection campaign and, by taking this belligerent attitude toward the PKK, is trying to get some legitimate looking nationalist credentials for the upcoming Turkish election. Yes, I think Turkey may well have a major intervention into northern Iraq. But I’m saying it won’t accomplish anything except rhetoric.

    RFE/RL: Do you think there are similar tacit “hot pursuit” agreements between the KRG and Iran?

    Gunter: Iran and Turkey mirror each other in their relations, off and on, with the KRG and the PKK. It’s Turkey that we hear the most about, but Iran has been fighting its own battle against a supposed PKK associate called the PJAK — the Freedom Life Party in northern Iraq, which has headquarters in the Qandil mountains. It is an Iranian-Kurdish party that periodically raids into Iran, and Iran shells the border and raids back into northern Iraq. So there is an overall firmament involving both Turkey and Iran.

    RFE/RL: What about Baghdad’s apparent benign tolerance of Turkish incursions into northern Iraq? Do you think Baghdad has an any agreements with Ankara to turn a blind eye toward Turkish forces that go after PKK militants in northern Iraq?

    Gunter: Probably even more so. Baghdad has its own serious domestic problems — headed by the fact that Baghdad doesn’t even have a government right now and therefore is in a very poor position to oppose Turkish and Iranian interventions. However, on a theoretical basis, of course, Baghdad is the ultimate sovereign authority in northern Iraq. So Turkey and Iran are going to have to, at least in theory, deal with the Baghdad government. Actually, this situation gives a little leeway because when the KRG does cooperate with Turkey, it can say, “Well, we’re not really cooperating with Turkey because we’re not the sovereign here. Baghdad is the sovereign.” “It’s Baghdad’s fault for cooperating with Turkey and letting Turkish troops into northern Iraq to chase the PKK.” So the situation with Baghdad can be played both ways by both sides and further complicates the situation.

    RFE/RL: Do you think Baghdad and Iran have tacit “hot pursuit” agreements when it comes to dealing with Kurdish militants like the PJAK in northern Iraq?

    Gunter: I certainly think there are tacit agreements here. And, of course, we don’t know ultimately the relationship between the Iraqi Shi’ite parties and Iran. I suspect that the most important accomplishment in overthrowing Saddam [Hussein’s regime] was to hand Iraq to Iran. Sometimes we see signs of that and sometimes we see signs that the Iraqi Shi’ites remain very Iraqi nationalistic. But certainly Baghdad has been in no position to oppose Iranian or Turkish interventions into northern Iraq. Even if Baghdad were, I think there would be tacit understandings that Iran and Turkey have a right to go after what they see as terrorist movements.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Kurdish_Expert_Regional_Perspective_Violence_Turkey/2081625.html

  • Turkey forced Israeli to blink–’freezes’ $56 billion defense deals

    Turkey forced Israeli to blink–’freezes’ $56 billion defense deals

    İlgi cekici bir analiz
    asagida sunulmakta
    Pulat Tacar

    Posted on June 21, 2010 by The Editors
    DIKKAT
    Turkey has the leverage of financial pressure and it is surely using it on Tel Aviv. Israelis understand the concept of money, and Ankara is pushing all the right buttons, hitting them hard where it matters. The question being asked in diplomatic circles is, will the financial pressure on the military industrial complex of Israel force a change in Mr. Natenyahu’s policy towards the Palestinians? Israel has never had to face this sort of economic pressure in its history. The US and Western Europe cannot make up $56 billion and other ongoing losses. Will it force Tel Aviv to pause and think? The Israeli military is hard pressed to find alternate places to get information on Iran. The fiasco with the Turks is costing them a lot of money at a time when they are facing international approbation.

    • Turkey is reported to have frozen at least 16 arms deals with Israel worth an estimated $56 billion
    • Contracts were suspended after the Israeli government refused to apologize for the May 31 killing of nine Turks
    • Just a matter of time before Ankara officially froze all defense deals with Israel
    • Turkish President Abdullah Gul has warned that Ankara would not rule out breaking off diplomatic ties if three demands — an international probe, a public Israeli apology and lifting the three-year-old blockade on Gaza — are not met.
    • “If the United States cannot be relied upon to pressure Israel on meeting these demands, Ankara will have to find some lever to do so itself,” the U.S.-based global security consultancy Stratfor observed in an analysis Tuesday.
    • “One such lever may be military and intelligence cooperation, which Israel has historically relied upon.

    In all probability, there will be intense pressure on the government of Mr. Natenyahu to crawl back on the steadfast positions that it has taken. Israeli has already loosened the embargo, and if President Obama is to place additional pressure, the military will force Mr. Natenyahu to retreat, apologize, and work it out with the Turks.  The change in two intelligence chiefs within a few weeks have raised eyebrows in Turkey. First the Afghan President removed the Pro-Indian chief of the Afghan Intelligence Services (RAMA), and the Turks appointed the  42 year old Hakan Fidan who has been a close adviser to Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. Hakan Fidan was named chief of the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, known as MIT. Both are considered the architect of Erdogan’s expansionist policy, for several years. Hakan Fidan is viewed with deep suspicion by Israel for several reasons, one of which is that he was  formulated the uranium transfer deal between Turkey, Brazil and Iran proposed in May. Turkey voted against the sanctions on Iran.

    TEL AVIV, Israel, June 18 — Turkey is reported to have frozen at least 16 arms deals with Israel worth an estimated $56 billion, including missile projects and upgrading combat aircraft and tanks, in a major escalation of its confrontation with the Jewish state.

    The Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman reported Friday that the contracts were suspended after the Israeli government refused to apologize for the May 31 killing of nine Turks when Israeli naval commandos stormed the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish-flagged vessel carrying humanitarian aid to the blockaded Gaza Strip.

    There was no official confirmation of the report in either Israel or Turkey. But relations between the two former allies have been crumbling since Turkey’s Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ferociously denounced Israel’s invasion of the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip Dec. 27, 2008.

    The Israeli daily Haaretz quoted defense ministry sources as saying it was probably just a matter of time before Ankara officially froze all defense deals with Israel.

    On Monday, state-run Israel Aerospace Industries, flagship of the Jewish state’s defense industry, and Elbit Systems ordered all their engineers, flight instructors and other employees based in Turkey to return home.

    Haaretz said the 16 projects being frozen include a $5 billion contract for 1,000 Merkava Mark III main battle tanks designed by Israel Military Industries — the Israeli army is equipping with Merkava Mark IV models — a $50 million upgrade of Turkey’s M-60 tanks, an $800 million deal for two Israeli patrol aircraft and an Airborne Warning and Control System jet.

    Turkey was also planning a $625.5 million deal for 54 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom strike aircraft to be upgraded to Phantom 2020 standard, and a $75 million program to upgrade 48 of the air force’s 87 Northrop F-5/F-5B fighter-bombers as lead-in trainers.

    Relations nosedived in October 2009 when Turkey canceled Israel’s participation in NATO air exercises. Turkey complained that IAI had delayed delivery of six of 10 Heron long-range unmanned aerial vehicles ordered by the Turkish military in a $185 million 2005 contract.

    Last April, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that the Israel defense ministry froze the sale of advanced military platforms to Turkey because of mounting anti-Israeli rhetoric from Erdogan’s government.

    The ministry’s foreign defense assistance and export procurement department also decided to review all Turkish requests for military equipment on a case-by-case basis.

    Turkey has been a major importer of Israeli military hardware and defense expertise since the two countries signed a military cooperation pact in 1996.

    That landmark alliance between the two major non-Arab military powers in the Middle East dramatically changed the region’s strategic landscape.

    Israeli pilots trained in Turkey and, according to some reports, Israel set up intelligence-gathering stations on Turkey’s borders with Syria and Iran.

    In the past, the Turks had preserved military cooperation with Israel, particularly the arms deals and joint exercises that formed the core of their strategic alliance, even when treatment of the Palestinians stirred widespread anger among Turkey’s overwhelmingly Muslim population.

    But the May 31 killings, and Israel’s dogged refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the bloodletting, has incensed the Turkish nation.

    The Financial Times quoted Namik Tan, Turkey’s ambassador to the United States, as saying Ankara could be forced to sever all ties with Israel, although he stressed: “We don’t want this to go to that point.”

    The unraveling of military links, including intelligence-sharing that Israeli leaders valued extremely highly because of Turkey’s proximity to Iran, underlined the seriousness of the current confrontation.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has said he does not trust Israel to carry out an impartial review of the May 31 incident, rather than be subjected to an international investigation.

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul has warned that Ankara would not rule out breaking off diplomatic ties if three demands — an international probe, a public Israeli apology and lifting the three-year-old blockade on Gaza — are not met.

    “If the United States cannot be relied upon to pressure Israel on meeting these demands, Ankara will have to find some lever to do so itself,” the U.S.-based global security consultancy Stratfor observed in an analysis Tuesday.

    “One such lever may be military and intelligence cooperation, which Israel has historically relied upon. Turkey has already downgraded cooperation and rumors have surfaced that Israeli intelligence operatives may be expelled from a radar post on Turkish soil near the border with Iran.” (UPI)

    • AS IF anticipating its next capitulation, government spokesmen told the media that in addition to ending economic sanctions on Gaza, Israel is now considering permitting the EU to station inspectors at its land crossings into Gaza.
    • That is, Israel is considering a move that will constitute a first step towards surrendering its sovereign control over its borders.
    • According to sources close to the cabinet, the main advocate for the latest capitulation was Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Jerusalem Post

    The liberal Israeli newspaper Haaretz reports that Tel Aviv has not yet felt the full effect of the Gaza flotilla. According to the newspaper, Israel will soon face more flotillas, even if the departure of ships from Lebanon is being delayed for now as a result of pressure by the U.S. and EU on Beirut.

    The Harretz says that the showdown has forced Israel’s hand. “The cabinet’s decision Sunday to ease the blockade on the Gaza Strip means, for the most part, an end to the siege on Hamas’ rule in the territory. And it’s more than a victory on points for Hamas and the Turkish government. It’s a genuine achievement for what is described as the muqawama (the resistance ) – the radical alliance of Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and recently also Turkey”.

    Haaretz feels that Israel will face a lot more pressure. “On the strategic level, all the bad effects of the flotilla have not been accounted for yet. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority reversed its decision to hold municipal elections, fearing that the Israeli interdiction of the flotilla would boost Hamas’ popularity. On the border with the Gaza Strip, the Rafah crossing is open most of the time because Egypt did not want to look like it was collaborating with Israel. Hamas, meanwhile, believes that it has found new strategic depth in the form of Turkey; the group’s behavior over the past three years had completely lost it support in Cairo.

    For all these reasons, we must assume that Israel will soon face more flotillas, even if the departure of ships from Lebanon is being delayed for now as a result of pressure by the United States and European Union on Beirut.” Jerusalem Post.


    Possibly related posts: (automatically generated)

    • Terror Scare Back in Tel Aviv?

    Filed under: Current Affairs | Tagged: Hakan Fidan, Turkish-Israeli relations

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    One Response

    Levo, on June 21, 2010 at 11:52 pm Said:

    Turkey may be the only nation capable of rehabilitating the (unofficially) rogue nation of Israel!

    Turkey asserted itself as the new sherriff in town and tiny Israel will have to take notice from now on. It will be far more difficult for Israel to have a free hand in massacering defenseless Palestinian civilia

  • Wait and See Game for Turkey’s Enforcement of UN Sanctions on Iran

    Wait and See Game for Turkey’s Enforcement of UN Sanctions on Iran

    Dorian Jones | IstanbuL

    21 June 2010

    ahmedinajad erdogan 17may10 480 eng 300 eng

    Photo: AFP

    Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad flashes the V-sign for victory as Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan looks on after the Islamic republic inked a nuclear fuel swap deal in Tehran (File Photo – 17 May 2010)

    Related Articles

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    • Israel Moves to Repair Relations With Turkey

    This month, Turkey voted against the United Nations Security Council’s fourth round of sanctions against Iran. With Turkey’s Islamic rooted government increasing its economic ties with Iran in the past few years, fears are arising that the pivotal Western ally is in danger of swinging eastward because of resistance in Europe to its bid for membership of the European Union.

    Despite growing international tensions over Iran’s nuclear energy program, the Turkish government has forged ahead with energy deals with Iran, expanding its dependency on energy with the nation.

    These deals put Turkey in a precarious situation: to enforce or not to enforce the UN sanctions imposed on its neighbor Iran.

    Turkey has long been seen as a bridge between East and West. But its belief that sanctions are ineffective and that there are dangers in pushing the Islamic republic into a corner is likely to change its relationship with Western nations.

    Earlier this month Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu expressed concern over the existing sanctions against Iran.

    AP

    “Turkey and Iran’s trade volume is around $10 billion,” he says. “And it can rise to $30 billion if sanctions are lifted.”

    Iran’s energy resources are seen as important by Ankara to break its dependency on Russian energy.

    Iran expert Gokhan Cetinsayar of Sehir University says that in addition to its dependency on gas, there are other trade initiatives with Iran that are economically key to Turkey.

    “75,000 trucks going on between Turkey and Iran every year,” said Cetinsayar. “Now there are energy deals. You know how important the Iranian natural gas and all other agreements and initiatives are economically important for Turkey.

    With large families usually depending for their livelihoods on cargo trucks, its estimated as many a million Turkish people depend on Iranian trade.

    With its increasing economic ties with Iran, there are growing fears that Turkey will balk at enforcing the UN sanctions against Iran.

    Turkish foreign minister spokesman Burak Ozugergin says Turkey has already paid a heavy economic price for UN policies with another of its neighbors, Iraq.

    “At the beginning of the 90’s, the Turkish volume of trade with Iraq was around the 15 to 20 percent mark of our total volume of trade. The next year, after the imposition of sanctions, this trickled down to almost zero,” said Ozugergin. “Money is not everything. But at least if it did work then we might be able to say to our public, ‘look it was for a good a cause.’ But can we really honestly say that looking back? For Iran again we don’t think it will help to solve the nuclear issue and perhaps may work against it.”

    The new sanctions on Iran are expected to cut into the present $10 billion trade volume. It could possibly undermine its energy policy as well. But political scientist Nuray Mert of Istanbul University say some western nations may now not be able to depend on Turkey.

    “I was inclined to think that at the end of the day Turkey will join the club when it comes to realization of these sanctions,” she said. “But nowadays I can see the government is planning to avoid these sanctions. Because now we have Turkey signing a lot of economic agreements, against the policy of sanctions.”

    For now Turkey has remained circumspect over enforcing new sanctions. One foreign ministry official said “you will have to wait and see.” Analysts say Iran would probably reward any breaking of sanctions with lucrative energy deals. But the political cost could be high because of Turkey’s aspirations for joining the EU. The coming weeks will see Ankara facing a difficult a choice.

  • In Kurdistan (sic.), Mossad is is an embarassment to Washington

    In Kurdistan (sic.), Mossad is is an embarassment to Washington

    by G. M.
    Resumed after the war which drove Saddam Hussein out of power in Baghdad in 2003, the secret security co-operation between Israelis and Iraqi Kurds was put to a crushing stop these last few months, under Washington’s influence.
    After Jalal Talabani’s (the Kurdish leader) nomination to the presidency of
    the Republic of Iraq in spring 2005, “a conflict of interest appeared
    between the two allies”, estimates an expert in Middle East safety. “In
    order not to be criticized by the Shiites and the sunnites,” he adds, “the
    new Head of the State Talabani could not allow the further development of a
    relationship that is condemned by the immense majority of the Iraqis. The
    Kurdish two-sided-game was stopped.” Since then, some of the Israeli agents
    are believed to have left the north of Iraq. Apparently, there would remain
    only one hundred of them, and Israeli businessmen practically only act
    through Kurdish or Jordanian intermediaries.
    The conflict had however helped to tighten the partnership between Mossad,
    the Israeli secret service, and the Kurdish leadership, who combined their
    effort in thirty years struggle against the nationalist regime of Baghdad.
    Israel wanted to support the Kurds’ federal aspirations and contain the
    Iranian influence over Iraq. “After the hostilities, the Israelis, anxious
    to see thousands of so-called Iranian pilgrims entering Iraq, tried in vain
    to convince the Americans to close the border between Iran and Iraq”,
    explains Patrick Clawson, deputy manager of the American research center
    “The Washington Institute for Near East Policy”. But the United States,
    willing to preserve their relationship with their Iraqi Shiites allies,
    refused to act.
    The Israelis then decided to take matters in their own hand. In Erbil and Souleymanieh, Israeli instructors, often disguised as businessmen, were charged to improve the training of the pechmergas, the Kurdish militiamen. Beginning of 2004, approximately 1,200 agents either from Mossad or from the Israeli military intelligence operated in Kurdistan, according to French
    military estimates. Their mission was to set up sufficiently strong Kurdish commandos that could effectively counter the Shiites militia in the South of Iraq (that are more or less manipulated by Teheran), in particular that of the troublemaker Moqtada Al-Sadr. The Kurdish leaders returned the favor by making positive declarations. Last 6 June, Massoud Barzani, of the democratic Party of Kurdistan, estimated that a relation with Israel “is not a crime since the majority of the Arab countries maintain the relationship” with the Hebrew State.
    Kurdistan’ mountains have always been filled with spies. “The presence of many people in this area, autonomous since 1991, makes it possible to the Israelis to recruit agents which will infiltrate other organizations, declared the former boss of a European intelligence service. Today, the Kurdish priority to infiltrate the new Iraqi army, directed by one of their own, serves the Israeli interests. Through its alliance with the Iraqi Kurds, the Hebrew State has reinforced its monitoring on Iran and Syria, its two great enemies in the Middle East. But Israeli actions ended up disturbing Washington. “We’ve received strong pressure from Washington to stop our operations with the Kurds”, said an Israeli sent to Erbil under cover of being a student. “the Americans do not agree any more with the Israeli plans”, he affirms. Washington does not seem to tolerate anymore this presence that threathens its interests.

    Le Figaro International, 28 Sept 2005

  • A flash of lightning

    A flash of lightning

    A flash of lightning
    By Uri Avnery

    Night. Utter darkness. Heavy rain. Visibility close to nil.

    And suddenly – a flash of lightning. For a fraction of a second, the landscape is lit up. For this split second, the terrain surrounding us can be seen. It is not the way it used to be.

    Israeli government’s action against the Gaza aid flotilla was such a lightning flash.


    Israelis normally live in darkness as far as seeing the world is concerned. But for that instant, the real landscape around us could be seen, and it looked frightening. Then the darkness settled down over us, Israel returned to its bubble, the world disappeared from view.

    This split second was enough to reveal a dismal scene. On almost all fronts, the situation of Israel has worsened since the last flash of lightning.

    The Gaza Freedom Flotilla and the attack on it did not create this landscape. It has been there since Israel’s present government was set up. But the deterioration did not start even then. It began a long time before.

    The action of Ehud Barak & Co. only lit up the situation as it is now, and gave it yet another push in the wrong direction.

    How does the new landscape look in the light of Barak’s barak? (“barak” means lightning in Hebrew.)

    The list is headed by a fact that nobody seems to have noticed until now: the death of the Holocaust.

    In all the tumult this affair has caused throughout the world, the Holocaust was not even mentioned. True, in Israel there were some who called Recep Tayyip Erdogan “a new Hitler”, and some Israel-haters talked about the “Nazi attack”, but the Holocaust has practically disappeared.

    For two generations, Israel’s foreign policy used the Holocaust as its main instrument. The bad conscience of the world determined its attitude towards Israel. The (justified) guilt feelings — either for atrocities committed or for looking the other way — caused Europe and America to treat Israel differently than any other nation — from nuclear armaments to the settlements. All criticism of our governments’ actions was branded automatically as anti-Semitism and silenced.

    But time does its work. New tragedies have blunted the world’s senses. For a new generation, the Holocaust is a thing of the remote past, a chapter of history. The sense of guilt has disappeared in all countries, except Germany.

    The Israeli public did not notice this, because in Israel itself the Shoah is alive and present. Many Israelis are children or grandchildren of Holocaust survivors, and the Holocaust has been imprinted on their childhood. Moreover, a huge apparatus ensures that the Holocaust will not disappear from our memory, starting from kindergarten, through ceremonies and memorial days, to organized tours “there”.

    Therefore, the Israeli public is shocked to see that the Holocaust has lost its power as a political instrument. Our most valuable weapon has become blunt.

    The central pillar of our policy is our alliance with the United States. To use a phrase dear to Binyamin Netanyahu (in another context): it’s “the rock of our existence”.

    For many years, this alliance has kept us safe from all trouble. We knew that we could always get from the U.S. all we needed: advanced arms to retain our superiority over all Arab armies combined, munitions in times of war, money for our economy, the veto on all UN Security Council resolutions against us, automatic support for all the actions of our successive governments. Every small and medium country in the world knew that in order to gain entrance to the palaces of Washington, the Israeli doorkeeper had to be bribed.

    But during the last year, cracks have appeared in this pillar. Not the small scratches and chips of wear and tear, but cracks caused by shifts of the ground. The mutual aversion between Barack Obama and Binyamin Netanyahu is only one symptom of a much deeper problem.

    The Chief of the Mossad told the Knesset last week: “For the U.S., we have ceased to be an asset and become a burden.”

    This fact was put into incisive words by General David Petraeus, when he said that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict is endangering the lives of American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The later soothing messages did not erase the significance of this warning. (When Petraeus fainted this week at a Senate hearing, some religious Jews viewed it as divine punishment.)

    It is not only the Israeli-American relationship that has undergone a fateful change, but the standing of the U.S. itself is changing for the worse, a bad omen indeed for the future of Israeli policy.

    The world is changing, slowly and quietly. The U.S. is still by far the most powerful country, but it is no longer the almighty superpower it had been since 1989. China is flexing its muscles, countries like India and Brazil are getting stronger, countries like Turkey — yes, Turkey! — are beginning to play a role.

    This is not a matter of one or two years, but anyone who is thinking about the future of Israel in ten, twenty years must understand that unless there is a basic change in our position, our position, too, will decline.

    If our alliance with the U.S. is one central pillar of Israeli policy, the support of the vast majority of world Jewry is the second.

    For 62 years, we could count on it with our eyes shut. Whatever we did — almost all the world’s Jews stood at attention and saluted. In fire and water, victory or defeat, glorious or dark chapters — the world’s Jews did support us, giving money, demonstrating, pressuring their governments. Without second thoughts, without criticism.

    Not anymore. Quietly, almost silently, cracks have appeared in this pillar, too. Opinion polls show that most American Jewish young people are turning away from Israel. Not shifting their loyalty from the Israeli establishment to Israel’s liberal camp — but turning away from Israel altogether.

    This will not be felt immediately either. AIPAC continues to strike fear into Washingtonian hearts, Congress will continue to dance to its tune. But when the new generation comes to man key positions, the support for Israel will erode, American politicians will stop crawling on their bellies and the U.S. administration will gradually change its relations with us.

    In our immediate neighborhood, too, profound changes are underway, some of them beneath the surface. The flotilla incident has exposed them.

    The influence of our allies is decreasing constantly. They are losing height, and an old-new power is on the rise: Turkey.

    Hosni Mubarak is busy with his efforts to pass power to his son, Gamal. The Islamic opposition in Egypt is raising its head. Saudi money is trumped by the new attraction of Turkey. The Jordanian king is compelled to adapt himself. The axis of Turkey-Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas is the rising power, the axis of Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Fatah is in decline.

    But the most important change is the one that is taking place in international public opinion. Any derision of this reminds one of Stalin’s famous sneer (“How many divisions has the pope?”)

    Recently, an Israeli TV station showed a fascinating film about the German and Scandinavian female volunteers who flooded Israel in the 50s and 60s to live and work (and sometimes marry) in the kibbutzim. Israel was then seen as a plucky little nation surrounded by … enemies, … risen from the ashes of the Holocaust to become a haven of freedom, equality and democracy, which found their most sublime expression in that unique creation, the kibbutz.

    The present generation of idealistic youngsters from all over the world, male and female, who would once have volunteered for the kibbutzim, can now be found on the decks of the ships sailing for downtrodden, choked and starved Gaza, which touches the hearts of many young people. The pioneering Israeli David has turned into a brutish Israeli Goliath.

    Even a genius of spin could not change this. For years, now, the world sees Israel every day on the TV screen and on the front pages in the image of heavily armed soldiers shooting at stone-throwing children, guns firing phosphorus shells into residential quarters, helicopters executing “targeted eliminations”, and now pirates attacking civilian ships on the open seas. Terrified women with wounded babies in their arms, men with amputated limbs, demolished homes. When one sees a hundred pictures like that for every picture that shows another Israel, Israel becomes a monster. The more so since the Israeli propaganda machine is successfully suppressing any news about the Israeli peace camp.

    Many years ago, when I wanted to ridicule the addiction of our leaders to the use of force, I paraphrased a saying that reflects much of Jewish wisdom: “if force does not work, use brains.” In order to show how far we, the Israelis, are different from the Jews, I changed the words: “If force doesn’t work, use more force.”

    I thought of it as a joke. But, as happens to many jokes in Israel, it has become reality. It is now the credo of many primitive Israelis, headed by Ehud Barak.

    In practice, the security of a state depends on many factors, and military force is but one of them. In the long run, world public opinion is stronger. The pope has many divisions.

    In many respects, Israel is still strong. But, as the sudden illumination of the flotilla affair has shown, time is not working in our favor. We should deepen our roots in the world and in the region — which means making peace with our neighbors — as long as we are as strong as we are now.

    If force doesn’t work, more force will not necessarily work either.

    If force doesn’t work, force doesn’t work. Period.

    Uri Avnery, 86, is an Israeli writer and founder of the Gush Shalom peace movement.

    (Source: Gush Shalom)

    Photo: Demonstrators holding flags protest against Israeli attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in Istanbul, Turkey, May 31, 2010. (Xinhua/AFP Photo)