Category: Iran

  • Norton: Israel ‘unlikely’ to win another war

    Norton: Israel ‘unlikely’ to win another war

    Augustus Richard Norton, Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at the Department of International Relations, Boston University

    “(…) Since 2006, there has been an uncommon solidarity within the Shiite community and Hizbullah has been the beneficiary. I argue that the solidarity of the Shiite community is an aberration, it is an artifact of the recent war, as well as the fear that another war looms. This is a war that Hizbullah claims it does not seek, but that Israel is expected to launch. Preparations for that war are under way on both sides.

    During the late 1990s, while the Israeli occupation continued, Hizbullah’s full-time military cadre numbered about five hundred and was supplemented through a reserve system (in some ways similar to Israel’s). By 2006, that number had doubled. Today, the standing military force is measured in the thousands. There is no way for a civilian researcher to reliably estimate the size of Hizbullah’s arsenal, but by the group’s own estimates its store of arms is far more robust and more sophisticated than it was in 2006.

    Despite the fears of war, the Israeli-Lebanese border has been very quiet since the 2006 war. UNIFIL, bolstered under Security Council Resolution 1701, has provided an effective buffer. While it has stopped Hizbullah from publically displaying weapons in the border region, it has not, however, impeded Hizbullah’s ability to rearm.

    Unless Hizbullah can be decisively defeated by Israel – defeated in detail, in military parlance – the effect of another war would be to bolster Hizbullah, and to once again validate its narrative.

    For a variety of reasons, I believe that it is unlikely that Israel is capable of decisively defeating Hizbullah’s hardened forces. The level of civilian casualties, probably on both sides, would be dreadful, and would prompt a fierce backlash in the Muslim world. Equally important, Israeli soldiers would have to go toe to toe with Hizbullah fighters who know the difficult terrain of

    Lebanon intimately and have a strong incentive to protect the home front. The Israeli Army’s comparative advantages, especially technical sophistication, largely disappear in close combat.

    Mr. Chairman, I have tried to explain the solidarity that currently exists within the Lebanese Shiite community to the benefit of Hizbullah. Yet, there are a variety of divisions with the community as well. These include secular and clerical opponents of Hizbullah, and, of course, the longstanding rivalry with Amal. In addition, there are strong feelings in some quarters that Hizbullah is too closely aligned with Iran, and that the community’s interests are better served through Arab as opposed to Persian ties. We see variants of these views in Iraq. These latent divisions will remain submerged as long as so many Shiite feel that their community faces an existential threat. One key to reducing Hizbullah’s mass appeal may be to reduce the threat of war, rather than heighten it. So long as the threat prevails, Hizbullah will be a prime beneficiary.”

    www.dailystar.com.lb, June 10, 2010

  • Leveretts shout, Israel and the lobby are pushing us to war with Iran

    Leveretts shout, Israel and the lobby are pushing us to war with Iran

    by PHILIP WEISS

    This smart piece on Netanyahu and the lobby pushing for Iranian war is savagely titled: “Who Will Be Blamed for a U.S. Attack on Iran?” Hillary Mann Leverett and Flynt Leverett make the distinction between the “Jewish community”‘s non-responsibility for the last disaster, Iraq, and the “pro-Israel intellectuals,” including Ken Pollack and the neocons (guilty). (Yes but how many precincts of the Jewish community gave these stupid ideas aid and comfort, including the Union for Reform Judaism?)

    The message of the Leveretts overall seems to be “Shout it from the rooftops now, while there’s still time. Israel wants the U.S. to attack Iran. This is Netanyahu’s wish, the wish of his government, above all, and of American Likud promoters and agents. And if it happens, the disaster will have been brought to us by Israel.” The boldface emphasis is theirs:

    At least in theory, Obama could say “no” to Netanyahu’s exhortations—but that “no” would become public knowledge within roughly 15 minutes of its ostensibly private delivery.  And, if our assessment of timing is correct, Obama’s “no” would become public knowledge as the President’s re-election bid is gearing up in a serious way.

    If Obama says anything other than “no” to Netanyahu, the United States will be committed to military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets.  A U.S. attack on Iran would almost certainly result in a much broader confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic—with residual U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq at high risk, the strategic outcomes from our military adventures in both of those countries in even deeper jeopardy, profoundly negative effects on the global economy, and international perceptions that reckless and “rogue” U.S. behavior in the strategically vital Middle East was an idiosyncratic feature of George W. Bush’s presidency forever shattered.  These eminently foreseeable consequences would have a devastating impact on America’s standing in one of the world’s most important regions.

    Some critics of the American invasion of Iraq argue that this decision reflected undue influence by Israel and parts of the pro-Israel community in the United States.  As individuals who served at the White House on the National Security Council staff in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, we saw no evidence that Israeli officials and leaders of the American Jewish community (as opposed to some pro-Israel intellectuals like the Saban Center’s Ken Pollack and neoconservative policymakers in the Bush Administration) goaded the United States into invading Iraq.  However, if Washington initiates war with Iran over the nuclear issue, it will be primarily in response to pressure from Israel and the more Likudnik parts of the pro-Israel community in the United States.  And those actors will bear a significant share of the blame for the consequences of that war.

    https://mondoweiss.net/2010/07/leveretts-shout-israel-and-the-lobby-are-pushing-us-to-war-with-iran/, 12 July 2010

  • Iran buys gasoline from Turkey, Chinese sellers

    Iran buys gasoline from Turkey, Chinese sellers

    Iran is buying around half of its gasoline imports in July from Turkey and the rest from Chinese sellers, oil traders said.

    Many gasoline sellers have stopped trading with Iran due to US sanctions on those that supply the Islamic Republic, making it more expensive for Iran to meet its import needs.

    Iran would import around 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) of gasoline in July, steady from June, oil traders said.

    www.iranoilgas.com,

  • Review of Stephen Kinzer’s “Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future”

    Review of Stephen Kinzer’s “Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future”

    By John Lancaster

    By Stephen Kinzer

    Times. 274 pp. $26

    For the title of his new book, Stephen Kinzer borrows the latest diplomatic fad word — “reset” — in calling for a makeover of U.S. policy in the Middle East. I know what you’re thinking: Oh no. Not another book on — fill in the blank (American missteps in Iraq, the Israel lobby, Saudi oil politics, etc.). While Kinzer touches on several such themes, his main thesis is more provocative: The path to a stable Middle East runs not through Israel and traditional Arab allies but through Turkey and Iran. Therein lie the book’s strengths as well as its main weakness.

    First, its strengths: A former foreign correspondent for the New York Times, Kinzer argues persuasively that despite their very different governments — one friendly and free, the other hostile and theocratic — both Turkey and Iran are host to vibrant democratic traditions that make them natural long-term partners of the United States. He deftly interweaves the stories of the Iranian and Turkish democracy movements, whose roots are deeper than most Americans realize.

    For example, Kinzer shows how recent anti-government protests in Iran are part of a continuum that dates at least to 1906, when popular fury toward a decadent monarchy led to the creation of Iran’s first parliament. Of particular interest is the story of Howard Baskerville, a young Princeton graduate from Nebraska who was teaching in Tabriz when the ancient city was besieged by royalist forces seeking to crush the new democracy. Baskerville sided with the democrats and died while leading schoolboys into battle in 1909. “Today Howard Baskerville is an honored figure in Iran,” Kinzer writes. “Schools and streets have been named after him. His bust, cast in bronze,” holds a place of honor in Tabriz. Who knew?

    The account is typical of Kinzer’s lively, character-driven approach to history. Mustafa Kemal — also known as Ataturk, the charismatic army officer who is regarded as the founder of modern Turkey — is depicted as an alcoholic and libertine whose conquests included a teenage Zsa Zsa Gabor, or so she later claimed. More substantively, Kinzer describes a ruler so bent on purging the Turkish state of religious influence that he ordered civil servants to shed their traditional fezzes in favor of Western-style bowler hats. In that and other ways, Kemal had much in common with Reza Shah Pahlavi, the rough-hewn soldier who seized power in Iran in 1921. Despite their autocratic styles, both rulers were relentless modernizers who promoted education and women’s rights — and in doing so, Kinzer argues, helped create the conditions that allowed democratic ideals to germinate. The two countries “developed national identities shaped by the Enlightenment as well as Islam,” Kinzer writes. “This was a new synthesis. It invigorated Turkey and Iran and set them starkly apart from the countries around them.”

    After decades of instability and military rule, Turkey, a NATO member, has capitalized on its democratic potential and has even moved haltingly toward membership in the European Union. For that, Kinzer assigns much credit to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, whose Islamist leanings belie the view that Islam and democracy are incompatible. “Democracy has become Turkey’s only alternative,” Kinzer writes. “Even pious Muslims recognize, accept, and celebrate this.”

    Iran, of course, is another story. That is at least partly the fault of the United States, whose role in ousting the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 forms an important part of Kinzer’s narrative (and the focus of one of his previous books). The coup restored the Pahlavi dynasty. It also set the stage for the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the decades of U.S.-Iranian enmity that have followed. But Kinzer still finds reasons for hope. Even now, he writes, “Iran is the only Muslim country in the world where most people are reliably pro-American. This pro-American sentiment in Iran is a priceless strategic asset for the United States.”

    Kinzer’s take on Iran and Turkey is fresh and well-informed, but he stumbles when he plays policymaker. His plea for a more conciliatory approach to Iran sounds a bit fanciful at a time of rising tensions over its nuclear program. And besides, haven’t we tried that already? Nor is there anything particularly new about Kinzer’s call for a recalibration of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia and Israel. For example, he is hardly the first to urge a tougher approach to Israel, a chorus that has only grown louder since Israel’s disastrous commando raid on a flotilla trying to breach its naval blockade of Gaza in May. In Kinzer’s view, it’s time for the Obama administration to “impose” a peace settlement on Israel and the Palestinians, but he doesn’t explain quite how it should do this, other than presiding over “a coercive version of the smoke-filled room.” After the riches of the book’s first half, I found myself wishing that Kinzer had dispensed with the think-tank musings (and bullet points) and stuck to his strengths as a journalist and historian.

    John Lancaster is a former Middle East correspondent for The Washington Post.

    https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070902109.html, July 11, 2010

  • US Warns Turkey to Stop Playing Both Sides

    US Warns Turkey to Stop Playing Both Sides

    Philip Gordon
    Philip Gordon, US Diplomat on EU Affairs

    On June 11, Turkey and Brazil both voted against further sanctions on Iran, a disappointing vote to the Obama Administration. On one hand, Turkey has applied to join the EU and is now a member of NATO, long hailed to be one of the only Muslim countries with a democracy and a western outlook. On the other hand Turkey has been strengthening ties with Iran. Turkey imports a significant portion of its natural gas from Iran and a Turkish company helped build the airport in Teheran. Turkey’s philosophy has changed, Turkey wants to play a significant role in regional relations. In order for that to occur it needs to develop its credibility with nations such as Syria and Iran.

    One way to accomplish that is to “play hardball” at the U.N. Turkey was of course aware of the fact that its vote would not prevent the sanctions resolution from passing but a negative vote would be appreciated by Iran. Another way is to minimize its relationship with Israel. And indeed, Erdogan’s administration that supported the flotilla to Israel eventually used its outcome to do so.

    US recognizes that Turkey is currently playing both sides, as Gordon added:

    “There is a lot of questioning going on about Turkey’s orientation and its ongoing commitment to strategic partnership with the United States,” he said. “Turkey, as a NATO ally and a strong partner of the United States not only didn’t abstain but voted no, and I think that Americans haven’t understood why.”

    www.worldofjudaica.com, Jun 26, 2010

  • Israel Launches Spy Satellite

    Israel Launches Spy Satellite

    The Israeli government has launched a spy satellite apparently capable of monitoring Iran. The Horizon-9 satellite was launched this week from a southern Israeli military base. The launch comes shortly after the former head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency said Israel should launch a military attack on Iran. Speaking to an Israeli conference, Shabtai Shavit said, “Since there is an ongoing war, since the threat is permanent, since the intention of the enemy…is to annihilate you, the right doctrine is one of preemption and not of retaliation.”