It is understandable and predictable that Asia’s two giants – India and China – should be gearing up for a showdown somewhat similar to the East-West showdown of the Cold War. Given both countries’ growing economies, and given the waning influence of the West in global affairs, India and China are increasing their foothold in distant corners of the world through trade, investment, bilateral treaties and security relationships.
In this classic ‘great power’ rivalry, China wishes to win by keeping India in low-level equilibrium – for instance, by denying permission to an Indian lieutenant-general posted in the state of Jammu and Kashmir to visit China. The officer in question had intended to travel to China in August of this year for a high-level defence exchange between the two countries.
What is more, if media reports are to be believed, then policy-makers in New Delhi are losing sleep over the fact that 7,000 to 11,000 Chinese troops are present in Gilgit in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir – something that the Indian government is trying to verify, although Pakistan’s envoy to Beijing has denied the reports. The reports say that People’s Liberation Army soldiers entering Gilgit-Baltistan are expected to work on the railroad and on extending the highly strategic Karakoram Highway – a clear sign that China wishes to extend its influence in the oil-rich gulf region. There are also reports about a six-month visa to visit China having been issued Paresh Barua, Commander-in-Chief of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), a militant organization based in Northeast India.
Reacting to China’s aggressive posture, the Government of India recently held a meeting of the Cabinet Committee of Security, chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. New Delhi’s envoy to Beijing, S. Jaishankar, briefed the Committee on the current state of Sino-Indian relations.
Following the Bush presidency, given the general reluctance of the Obama administration to ‘contain’ China (let alone to engage on a sustained basis in Asia at large), China has decided to have a ‘free go’ throughout the world. This ‘free go’ has necessitated the establishment of a firm Chinese foothold in the Asia-Pacific region, from which it can broaden its sphere of strategic influence even to Africa, Latin America and Europe. India acts as a distinct challenger in this respect. With a population of more than one billion people, a growing economy and supple latent power, India is a clear leader in the affairs of South Asia. It has also increased its influence in Southeast Asia through its ‘Look East’ policy. In fact, East Asian countries like South Korea and Japan are more inclined to cooperate, and look for active strategic partnership, with India rather than with China. India has also started to spread its wings through active diplomatic ventures in Africa through the Indo-African forum, and in the South Pacific Islands through the Pacific Islands Forum. Furthermore, India has initiated more active dialogue with its diasporic populations through the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas festival that fosters better relations between expatriate Indians and Indians living in India. Indeed, the Indo-American civil nuclear deal that was sealed during the Bush administration would not have happened without the active lobbying of Indo-Americans. This has pushed India to initiate a ‘Forward Policy’ in its diplomacy.
All of this has irritated Beijing in that it has understood that, to clip the wings of the spreading India, China must first ‘box-in’ India in South Asia. That is precisely the strategy of Beijing in aiding Pakistan to follow an aggressive posture in its diplomatic relations with India. With India being distracted in Pakistan, and with the US distracted in Afghanistan and Iraq, China can expand quickly in Asia; that is, it can clearly establish many more ‘strategic condominiums’ in the world. In this sense, China profits from its authoritarian and more monolithic decision-making processes and culture in respect of international relations – as compared with the more reactive processes of major democratic states like India and the US. India, for its part, also suffers from the general dearth of strategic culture and acumen within its political class – a weakness compounded by the absence of emphasis on foreign policy in day-to-day media discourse in India. Though Manmohan Singh is not a classical professional politician, and while he could be considered of a statesman of the highest order (a later article with GB will deal with his declining popularity in India, and the reasons thereof), the general Indian policy inclination to look inward as a matter of dominant priority has manifestly prevented him from engaging with the international more actively.
Take the case of Iran. The US is trying to engage with Iran through China, as India, the traditional ally of Iran, is left in the cold and dark. The abandonment of the foreign policy front by the political class in India has, as a rule, meant that major chunks of strategic decision-making on foreign policy have fallen to India’s army men. In this respect, India has decided to play to its strengths – understood as it is that India and China are both continental and naval powers. To counter China’s much-touted ‘Strings of Pearl’ strategy, India has decided to pursue active ‘naval diplomacy.’ China’s ‘Strings of Pearl’ strategy includes building deep-sea naval positions on the southern coast of Sri Lanka in the once sleepy fishing town of Hambantota. Moreover, China has helped Pakistan to build a deep-sea port in the town of Gadara in Baluchistan. It has also started to court the littoral states in the Indian Ocean – the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles – and invested funds in these micro-states to boost economic prospects. In return, China has sought to allow its bases to continue to be stationed in these littoral states. As a part of its counter-strategy, India is sending its naval officers on a routine trip to these countries. There are regular exchanges between India and these states at the naval officer level. India is also establishing for the Maldives a network of radars that will help the island nation offset for the plain fact that it lacks a navy. (Traditionally, all great powers that aspired to control the Indian Ocean – Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the US and the Soviet Union – have required a base in the Maldives. The southernmost island of the Maldives, the Gan Island in the Seenu Atoll, served as a base for the British Royal Navy during WW2.)
The Indo-China great power rivalry is the story of the first part of the 21st century – much like the rivalry between Great Britain and Germany was the dominant strategic dyad in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This rivalry was classically described by John J. Mearsheimer in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Wrote Mearsheimer: “Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival.” Raw realism has been the forté of China’s conduct in world affairs since 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established. For its part, India’s foreign policy has always flirted with moralism-cum-idealism. However, at the start of this new century, India had understood the importance of Realpolitik. Indian politicians are deft in conducting domestic politics – particularly in the area of alliance-building. They will need to show similar genius in world affairs if they are to counter China’s Dragon.
Balaji Chandramohan is the Asia-Pacific correspondent of World News Forecast and Editor, Asia, with World Security Network. He is based in New Delhi and Wellington, New Zealand.
Can Iran, Turkey, and the United States Become Allies?
By Mustafa Akyol
September/October 2010
AUTHOR Stephen Kinzer PUBLISHER Times Books YEAR 2010 PAGES 288 pp. ISBN 0805091270
In Reset, Stephen Kinzer argues that the United States should partner with Iran and Turkey to promote democracy and combat extremism in the Middle East. Although it is hard to imagine Iran as a friend of Washington, Turkey is ready to play that role.
MUSTAFA AKYOL is a Turkish journalist and the author of the forthcoming book An Islamic Case for Freedom.
Insanity, it is often said, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. When it comes to the Middle East, writes Stephen Kinzer, a veteran foreign correspondent, Washington has been doing just that. Hence, in Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future, he proposes a radical new course for the United States in the region. The United States, he argues, needs to partner with Iran and Turkey to create a “powerful triangle” whose activities would promote a culture of democracy and combat extremism.
This is, of course, a counterintuitive argument. At the moment, Iran, with its radical ideology and burgeoning nuclear program, is one of Washington’s biggest headaches. And although Turkey is a longtime U.S. ally, the U.S.-Turkish relationship has recently been tested. Last June, for example, Turkey’s representative on the UN Security Council voted against U.S.-backed sanctions on Iran. These days, most of Washington is asking, “Who lost Turkey?” rather than envisioning more extensive cooperation with it.
Yet Kinzer’s U.S.-Iranian-Turkish alliance is a long-term project, and the idea has ample grounding in the modern history of the region. Unlike other Muslim countries there, Kinzer shows, Iran and Turkey have at least a century’s worth of experience struggling for political freedom, during which they “developed an understanding of democracy, and a longing for it.” This means that they share some fundamental values with the United States. Moreover, Iran and Turkey have educated middle classes — bases for strong civil societies. The two countries even share strategic goals with the United States: a desire to see Iraq and Afghanistan stabilized and radical Sunni movements such as al Qaeda suppressed.
CARROTS ARE FOR DONKEYS
Still, Kinzer’s power triangle could not emerge in today’s world. Iran, he writes, “would have to change dramatically” and turn into a democracy before such an alliance could be formed. How that would happen — a truly daunting question — is unclear, but in the meantime, Kinzer proposes a twofold strategy: engage with the current regime as effectively as possible and wait for the day when the country’s democratically minded (and, as he calls them, “reliably pro-American”) masses make their way to power.
Engagement, of course, is already the Obama administration’s stated policy, but Kinzer urges Washington to be bolder, that is, to launch “direct, bilateral, comprehensive, and unconditional negotiations” with Tehran. Nixon’s diplomatic breakthrough with communist China, he reminds readers, came at a time when Beijing was supplying weapons to North Vietnamese soldiers, who were using them to kill Americans. “Nixon did not make good behavior a condition of negotiation,” Kinzer notes. “He recognized that diplomacy works in precisely the opposite way. Agreement comes first; changes in behavior follow.”
Kinzer also criticizes the tone of current U.S. diplomacy, which does not give the Iranians what he thinks they are really looking for: “respect, dignity, a restoration of lost pride.” This makes a so-called carrot-and-stick approach to Tehran counterproductive. That “may be appropriate for donkeys,” Kinzer writes, “but not for dealing with a nation ten times older than [the United States].” The key to turning Iran from foe to friend is not to make Iran’s regime feel more threatened; it is to make it feel more secure.
Even then, there are many imponderables about Iran, and the current regime may be unwilling to partner with the United States no matter the tone of U.S. overtures. Kinzer’s only advice here is for the United States to avoid being emotional, “do nothing that will make that partnership more difficult to achieve when conditions are right,” and, if negotiations do begin, make “no concessions to Iran’s regime that weaken Iranians who are persecuted for defending democratic values.” Yet Kinzer leaves unclear how that delicate balance could be maintained and offers little guidance for policymakers looking for a more practical road map.
CLASH WITHIN A CIVILIZATION
The other leg of Kinzer’s proposed triangle, the U.S.-Turkish partnership, is much more realistic, having already been institutionalized by decades of cooperation between the two countries, and deserves closer attention. Although Turkey’s supposed shift away from secularism toward Islamism has raised eyebrows in the West, it should not. In fact, Turkey’s new path may actually increase the benefits of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, as Kinzer passionately argues.
To understand why, one must abandon the standard narrative about Turkey’s recent history. According to that story, Turkey was once the sick man of Europe, trapped in religious obscurantism. Then, Kemal Atatürk came along with westernizing reforms and took the nation on a great secular leap forward. Unfortunately, however, the forces of darkness survived underground and have recently reemerged in the guise of the quasi-religious Justice and Development Party (AKP).
At the heart of this story is a battle between Western enlightenment and obscurantism. But in fact, Turkey’s real dichotomy has always been between its westernizers and its modernizers. Whereas the westernizers, led by Atatürk, sought to remodel Turkey into a fully European nation, emphasizing cultural westernization and secularization, the modernizers called for political and economic reform but insisted on preserving the traditional culture and religion at the same time.
After winning control of the country after World War I, the westernizers imposed a top-down cultural revolution and used their tight grip on power to transform Turkey, in the words of their own witty dictum, “for the people, in spite of the people.” They ordered citizens to wear Western clothing, such as the brimmed hat, and listen to Western music, such as opera, and they disbanded almost all religious institutions. But only a small part of the population embraced these radical changes, convincing the revolutionaries that democracy had to be abandoned in favor of benevolent authoritarianism.
The modernizers, on the other hand, championed democracy and favored reforming Turkey through economic development, calling for free trade and private enterprise. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who came to power in 1950 in the country’s first free elections, soon became their icon. He halted the cultural revolution, eased the repression of religion, and presided over an economic boom — affording him three electoral victories in a row.
But his efforts ran afoul of the westernizers, and he was executed in 1961 by a pro-Atatürk junta. In the 1980s, the modernizers’ torch was picked up by Prime Minister (and later President) Turgut Özal, and more recently, it was picked up by the AKP, which has been in power since 2002.
Of course, the AKPs founders, including the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, originally arose from a third force in Turkish politics — Islamism. But over time, they reformed, both out of a sense pragmatism and because of the increasingly liberal outlook of their base, the growing Islamic middle class. And despite their leftover religious rhetoric, the AKP rejects true Islamists’ most basic goal — the creation of an Islamic state.
The differences between the westernizers and the modernizers have influenced Turkish foreign policy. The modernizers have never shared the westernizers’ ideological distaste for the East and began opening up to it after the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union dominated the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, leaving Turkey feeling isolated and surrounded by enemies. When the Soviet Union fell, then President Özal began to visit many Arab and Central Asian capitals and set up business exchanges. At the same time, he maintained close ties with the United States and other NATO allies.
After Özal’s death, in 1993, Turkey suffered a “lost decade” of unstable coalition governments; an indirect coup, when the prime minister resigned due to military pressure; and two terrible economic crises. The country was left with very little capacity for, or interest in, independent activity abroad. That changed in 2002, when the AKP came to power and immediately faced a fateful decision: whether to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq. Caught between a crucial ally and an unpopular war, the AKP government somewhat hesitantly favored opening Turkish borders to the troops. But Turkey’s AKP-majority parliament, to the surprise of the United States and many others, said no.
Although Ankara was at first unsure whether it had done the right thing, an almost nationwide consensus soon emerged that the war in Iraq was disastrous and Turkey had done well to stay out of it. For its refusal to support the invasion of Iraq, Turkey enjoyed rising popularity across the Middle East, boosting not only the prestige of Turkey’s diplomats there but also the economic fortunes of its businesspeople, who were suddenly much more attractive partners to those in the Middle East.
The country’s recent vote against UN sanctions on Iran should be seen in this context. The Turks have learned that they can gain — both in standing and economically — by declining to join the United States when it acts in ways that seem needlessly aggressive. Although Turkey has many of the same foreign policy goals as the United States, it prefers to achieve them through the kind of soft power it displayed recently in its dealings with Iran. In May, Brazil and Turkey convinced Iran to sign a nuclear-exchange deal similar to the ultimately unsuccessful one the United States had helped broker six months before. Rather than praising the deal, Washington balked and pressed for sanctions anyway. This move surprised Erdogan, who believed that U.S. President Barack Obama had written him and Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in April to ask them to negotiate just such an agreement. Although the Obama administration claims that the Turks misinterpreted the letter, many in Turkey nonetheless believe that whereas Ankara has remained true to Obama’s initial calls for peaceful engagement, Obama has given in to the U.S. Congress’ more hawkish tone.
BAD NEWS, GOOD NEWS
Far from being a fleeting creation of the AKP, as some assume, this new, independent-minded Turkey is here to stay. For the rise of the AKP is much more a result of changes in Turkish society than their cause. The new Muslim entrepreneurial middle class, which emerged thanks to Özal’s free-market revolution of the 1980s, already outnumbers and economically outperforms the staunchly secular old elite. It is this class that makes up the modernizers’ base, and its vision is likely to guide Turkey in the years to come.
These Turkish modernizers are neither socialists like Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, who wants to put an end to the capitalist system, nor radical Islamists in the same vein as Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who wants to destroy Israel. In fact, for several years, Erdogan tried to enhance Turkey’s diplomatic ties with Israel, denouncing anti-Semitism, visiting Tel Aviv, welcoming Israeli companies to do business in Turkey, hosting Israeli President Shimon Peres, and initiating indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria. The rift came only at the end of 2008, when Israel launched catastrophic strikes against Gaza — which was seen as an insult to Erdogan, who had hosted then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for peace talks only four days before the attack. The rift widened in June after Israel’s lethal raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid ship.
As Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has often articulated, what the AKP seeks is a peaceful and prosperous Middle East integrated through trade and investment. These goals are very much in line with those of the United States. The difference is one of style, and Turkey will continue to diverge from the United States if Washington tries to realize its vision with hard power instead of the soft power that Ankara wields.
Whether this is good or bad news for the United States depends on how one envisions U.S. foreign policy objectives. Should the United States seek as many loyal, unquestioning allies as possible in a perpetual hard-power game? Or can it rely on independent, diplomatically inclined partners to promote security and prosperity in an increasingly complex world?
If it seeks the latter, this new Turkey will be an asset, as Kinzer notes. The fact that Turkey “has escaped from America’s orbit,” he writes, has given Turkey prestige that will be beneficial to both it and the United States. Now, “Turkey can go places, engage partners, and make deals that America cannot.”
FROM ZERO TO HERO
Beyond diplomacy, Turkey’s most valuable contribution to the troubled region might well be its synthesis of Islam, democracy, and capitalism. For years, the West assumed that westernizer-ruled Turkey offered just that model. But as Kinzer explains, “For most of Turkey’s modern history, the Muslim world has seen [the country] as an apostate,” having “no religious legitimacy” and acting “as Washington’s lackey.” Now, by becoming more Muslim, modern, and independent, Turkey has finally become appealing to Arabs. Indeed, a staggering 75 percent of those surveyed in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, and Syria named Turkey as a model for the synthesis of Islam and democracy in a recent survey by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, a liberal Turkish think tank.
No wonder Turkish products have become popular in the Middle East in recent years and Arab tourists have flooded Istanbul. Although they are banned by some conservative clerics, Turkish soap operas are hits on Arab television stations, and they promote a more flexible and individualistic form of Muslim culture. Turkish entrepreneurs, meanwhile, have invested billions in Middle Eastern countries. And the Sufi-inspired Gülen Movement, led by Fethullah Gülen, a popular Turkish cleric, has opened over 1,000 schools from Asia to Africa, with the goal of creating a generation of students well versed in the secular sciences and a distinctively Turkish form of Islam.
All this should be refreshing, not alarming. Turkish Islam has always been more flexible than other forms of the faith, such as Saudi Wahhabism. In the past few decades, moreover, it has become even more liberal as the Turkish middle class has grown more individualistic and welcoming of reformist theology. One Turkish commentator recently observed in his column in the Islamic daily newspaperYeni Safak that the young generation wants to hear about “the Qur’an and freedom,” rather than “the Qur’an and obedience.”
Of course, Turkey is far from perfect. The country’s two-century-long struggle to become a modern, democratic nation is hardly complete. The AKP has contributed notably to the effort, through economic and political reforms that serve not only conservative Muslims but also non-Muslim minorities, but there is still much to do. Erdogan faces an election next year and will need to show himself to be more tolerant of dissent to win it. He needs to be careful to avoid appearing too close to Iran, Hamas, or other Islamists at the risk of damaging Turkey’s credibility in the West — a balance that President Abdullah Gül, a former AKP foreign minister, has been more diligent in tending to. Meanwhile, the whole country must work to solve its most fatal domestic problem: the 25-year-long armed conflict with Kurdish nationalists. Since a military solution has proved unsuccessful, engagement along the lines of the British with the Irish Republican Army may now be the only option, but so far, the AKP’s initiatives have been too timid and the opposition’s stance too unhelpful.
In his book, Kinzer points to such domestic problems and reminds the reader that Turkey needs to develop further before it can become an influential global actor. But he says that the United States also needs to change by becoming more modest on the global stage. Americans, he suggests, need to realize that “they lack some of the historical and cultural tools necessary to navigate effectively through the Middle East and surrounding regions.” If they accept this truth and admit they need help, “Turkey becomes America’s next best friend.”
Turkey is ready to play that role, so this part of Kinzer’s power triangle is quite feasible. But the potential for Iran to complete it is, for now, constrained by powerful political obstacles. For, as Kinzer puts it, “the flame of freedom still burns in Iran — although, unlike in Turkey, it is not allowed to burn in public.”
Once again, the regime of Iran is planning a barbaric act of stoning a person to death. Mother of two children, Ms. Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, a South Azerbaijani woman, has been in an Iranian prison for over four years now. She is to be stoned to death anytime soon. Not only she was not given an attorney but also she was not given an interpreter in Azerbaijani Turkish, her mother tongue. Hence she was deprived of a fair trial in language which she would understand the charges, nor was she able to defend herself in her mother tongue.
She is a South Azerbaijani Turk. Her mother tongue is Azerbaijani Turkish. She was unable to understand what she was forcibly made to sign, confessing the charges under torture. She is a victim of Persian racism since she has not been represented, heard, tried, or treated fairly and justly. Under terrible conditions, forced statement under torture, and 99 lashes, now, she is waiting for stoning to death. The barbaric act of stoning to death for the alleged charge of adultery is shameful and is a remnant of ancient laws.
Ms. Sakineh is a victim of the Persian regime’s notorious tortures and forceful statements. We do not believe in capital punishment, and we strongly condemn Iran’s barbaric treatment of South Azerbaijani Turks under Persian-Shia laws. We beseech all people of conscience and all human rights organizations in the world to condemn the Islamic Republic of Iran for this matter. We ask all democratic and free countries in the world to condemn the horrific act of stoning and stop the Iranian regime from killing Ms. Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, an innocent person.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – the Spiritual Leader
Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Majles-e Shoura-ye Eslami)
Tehran
Islamic Republic of Iran
Date:
Your Excellencys
Re: Ms. Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani
I am concerned about the condition of Ms Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani an Azerbaijani Turkish mother of two who is currently in prison for over four years in Iran. Both Ashtiani’s physical and mental health is in terrible state.
Ms. Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani has been wrongly accused of adultery. Ms. Ashtiani.is to be stoned to death anytime soon. Not only she was not given an attorney but also she was not given an interpreter in Azerbaijani Turkish, her mother tongue. She was deprived of a fair trial in a language which she would understand the charges, and to defend herself in her own mother tongue.
I appeal for your help for her immediate release as Ms Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani’s detention is in violation of her human rights, and her right to a fair trial.
I demand that she, along with all Azerbaijani human rights activists, journalists and prisoners of conscience be immediately and unconditionally released from prison.
I call on you to finally put an end to capital punishment by stoning and to reverse the unjust judgment in the case of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani.
ISLAMABAD/TEHRAN – Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran have a common future, and the security of each country is dependent on the security of the others, but the enemies are creating problems for the four countries.
The Turkish prime minister made the remarks in Islamabad in interview with Hamid Mir, The News reported on Friday.
Erdogan said the United States was supporting some common enemies of Pakistan and Turkey and the time has come to unmask them and act together.
The Turkish prime minister insisted that Pakistan and Turkey must play a decisive role in the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
He said that both Pakistan and Turkey had suffered under military dictators who were always supported by the USA, politicians were hanged by military regimes in both countries, and both countries are fighting against terrorism nowadays.
“We have common problems and common solutions, military dictatorships have always created problems, and democracy is a common solution,” Erdogan noted.
Asked why no military dictator has ever been tried in the courts of Turkey and Pakistan, he replied, “I don’t support hanging any military dictator, but law must take its action against all those who abrogated the constitution.”
He also said that some foreign hands are supporting terrorists in Pakistan and Turkey directly and also through some NGOs.
Erdogan was very hard on the “double standards” of the USA and said that the Israeli attack on a Turkish ship of the Freedom Flotilla unmasked the so-called civilized face of Washington, which openly and shamelessly supported the state terrorism of Israel.
“Nine Turkish martyrs on the ship received 21 bullets from Israeli soldiers in their bodies. We provided post mortem reports and even the pictures to the EU and USA, but Washington is not ready to condemn the state terrorism of Israel against Turkey, which means that the USA is supporting international terrorists who killed our citizens in international waters.”
He said that the people of Pakistan should not fight with each other and they must concentrate on helping the 20 million flood victims. “Instability and infighting will only help your enemies, who are looking for an opportunity to use Pakistanis against Pakistanis.”
Turkey has sent “at least 125 million dollars of aid, both by the government and non-governmental organizations,” said UN Special Envoy to Pakistan Rauf Engin Soysal.
“We installed 2,000 prefabricated houses near Multan, and a total of 3,000 will be built,” the head of the Turkish Red Crescent, Omer Taslit, said.
“If you will not understand the evil designs of your enemies, then what will be the future of 20 million flood victims of Pakistan, who will help them if you start fighting with each other,” Erdogan warned.
“Pakistan is my second home, and I am concerned about the internal situation of my second home,” he added.
Asked what his advice would be to Pakistan about diplomatic relations with Israel, since Turkey has diplomatic relations with Israel, Erdogan responded very carefully, saying that “despite diplomatic relations, Israel never behaved like a civilized country with Turkey, and I cannot give any advice to my Pakistani brothers; it is their right to decide about making relations with Israel.”
He went on to say that Pakistan and India must resolve the Kashmir dispute by peaceful talks. “You need strong political will for resolving the Kashmir dispute,” he added.
Erdogan said Israel will “remain isolated” if Tel Aviv refuses to apologize for killing Turkish human rights activists, Press TV reported on Friday.
“Israel must apologize to Turkey and pay compensation. If it does not, it will be doomed to remain isolated in the Middle East,” Erdogan added.
We the undersigned are aware of the unjust treatment of Sakineh Ashtiani. We call for Sakineh Ashtiani’s immediate release.
We call for the elimination of stoning as a practice in Iran, a practice which violates any and all definitions of human rights.
We call for the elimination of other forms of the death penalty or flogging or imprisonment for those convicted of “adultery”.
We also call on the authorities to ensure that Sajjad Qaderzadeh will not be harassed in connection with expressions of concern he has made regarding the life of his mother, Sakineh Ashtiani.
In as much as Iran is a signatory to the International Declaration of Human Rights and related Conventions, we call upon Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the leaders of Iran to take responsibility for their commitments, and to intervene to free this woman who is being unjustly punished, and to make efforts for eliminating any practices violating human rights.
No matter what the differences are in religious or political beliefs, Iran must participate, along with all other nations, in creating a world where basic human rights and fundamental humanity prevail.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in recent days met with dignitaries at the United Nations to generate international support for Iran to engage in talks with the United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council over Iran’s nuclear program. But when Mottaki and other Iranian officials in Tehran have talked recently about restarting talks, they are not referring to the nuclear negotiations the Europeans and the United States are hoping for; rather, they are trying to gain traction on negotiations about the Tehran Declaration, the agreement brokered between Iran, Brazil and Turkey in May, which is limited to a swap deal over a portion of Iran’s enriched uranium. This is the deal the United States, Britain, and France dismissed in May as a sideshow and a manipulative tactic by Iran to get out of tough sanctions, shortly before crippling sanctions were passed in the United Nations, the European Union, and the U.S. Congress. At the time, this action prompted a hostile reaction from Iran.
Now that Mottaki is placing the deal squarely on the table again, the Obama administration should seize the moment. Rather than purse talks over Iran’s broader nuclear program and risk failure — during a period when there appears to be little time to waste before either a military attack is launched against Iran or Iran develops the technology to produce a nuclear weapon — a wiser move would be to talk with Iran first over the Tehran Declaration as a way of building trust.
This is certainly the view of the Turks. A delegation of Turkish parliamentarians was in Washington last week for meetings with the Obama administration over Ankara’s relations with Iran, Israel and other issues. The delegation likely advised the United States to take Iran up on its offer to begin talks immediately over the Tehran Declaration. At least one other Turkish delegation visited Washington this past summer, delivering this same message. But their efforts produced little more than hostility from members of Congress and less than enthusiastic responses from officials in the administration.
In interviews I had in Turkey during a recent trip there, Turkish diplomats who spent months shuttling between Ankara and Tehran last spring to broker the Tehran Declaration told me that the United States should accept Iran’s offer to make the Tehran Declaration the framework of any negotiations with the five-plus-one because there is no support in Tehran now to negotiate over Iran’s broader nuclear program. This might be what the United States wants, but there is no backing for it among a cross-section of Iran’s political elites. “The inner circle around [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei views this Tehran agreement as a first step to establish good faith with Western governments,” said one Turkish official with first-hand knowledge of the talks with Iran.
Iran’s new campaign to revive the Tehran Declaration extends from New York to Tehran. On Sept. 28, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast reiterated Iran’s position: “We have repeatedly said that we are ready for talks with Vienna Group based on [the] Tehran Declaration and we are continuing consultation to specify details of the negotiation as well as its place and time.”
Turkish officials have stated repeatedly — both last week during their Washington visit and in the summer — that Turkey wants to facilitate the negotiations with Iran and the five-plus-one. Indeed, as the arbiter Turkey would likely ensure success. By now, Turkish negotiators understand the internal politics inside the Iranian regime far better than their European or American counterparts do. The many months Turkish foreign ministry officials shuttled between Tehran and Ankara were instructive: “It was a good lesson in how to build a consensus with different political actors,” one Turkish foreign ministry official told me who participated in the delegation.
The Turks believe that negotiations first over the fuel swap deal — even though it falls far short of the demands of the five-plus-one — will lead the inner circle around Khamenei and the supreme leader himself to compromise over other issues of concern to the West, such as Iran enriching uranium at 20 percent, which the Obama administration adamantly opposes because it could allow Iran to eventually produce a nuclear weapon.
The United States should listen to the Turks, simply because there are no other options to begin a dialogue with Iran. At this point, we do not need any more negotiations with Iran to understand that Western states cannot effectively talk to the Iranians alone. Talks between the five-plus-one with Iran, with Turkey as the arbiter, are a positive path out of the deadlock.
Geneive Abdo is the Director of the Iran program at The Century Foundation and creator of .
