Category: Iran

Israel delivers ultimatum to Barack Obama on Iran’s nuclear plans

At Monday’s meeting between Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama the Israeli prime minister will deliver a stark warning, reports Adrian Blomfield in Jerusalem

Last year Iran test-fired surface-to-surface missiles capable of reaching Israel Photo: EPA

By Adrian Blomfield, in Jerusalem

Their relationship, almost from the outset, has been frostier than not, a mutual antipathy palpable in many of their previous encounters.

Two years ago, Barack Obama reportedly left Benjamin Netanyahu to kick his heels in a White House anteroom, a snub delivered to show the president’s irritation over Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank. In May, the Israeli prime minister struck back, publicly scolding his purse-lipped host for the borders he proposed of a future Palestinian state.

When the two men meet in Washington on Monday, Mr Obama will find his guest once more at his most combative. But this time, perhaps as never before, it is the Israeli who has the upper hand.

Exuding confidence, Mr Netanyahu effectively brings with him an ultimatum, demanding that unless the president makes a firm pledge to use US military force to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb, Israel may well take matters into its own hands within months.

The threat is not an idle one. According to sources close to the Israeli security establishment, military planners have concluded that never before has the timing for a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities been so auspicious.

It is an assessment based on the unforeseen consequences of the Arab Spring, particularly in Syria, which has had the result of significantly weakening Iran’s clout in the region.

Israel has always known that there would be an enormous cost in launching an attack on Iran, with the Islamist state able to retaliate through its proxy militant groups Hamas and Hizbollah, based in Gaza and Lebanon respectively, and its ally Syria.

Each is capable of launching massive rocket strikes at Israel’s cities, a price that some senior intelligence and military officials said was too much to bear.

But with Syria preoccupied by a near civil war and Hamas in recent weeks choosing to leave Iran’s orbit and realign itself with Egypt, Iran’s options suddenly look considerably more limited, boosting the case for war.

“Iran’s deterrent has been significantly defanged,” a source close to Israel’s defence chiefs said. “As a result some of those opposed to military action have changed their minds. They sense a golden opportunity to strike Iran at a significantly reduced cost.” Not that there would be no cost at all. With the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas has chosen to throw its lot in with its closest ideological ally and forsake Iran and its funding, but it could still be forced to make a token show of force if smaller groups in Gaza that are still backed by Tehran unleash their own rockets.

Likewise, Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, could seek to reunite his fractured country with military action against Israel.

Iran would almost certainly launch its long-range ballistic missiles at Israel, while Hizbollah, with an estimated arsenal of 50,000 rockets, would see an opportunity to repair its image in the Middle East, battered as a result of its decision to side with Mr Assad.

Even so, it is not the “doomsday scenario” that some feared, and a growing number in the security establishment are willing to take on the risk if it means preventing the rise of a nuclear power that has spoken repeatedly of Israel’s destruction.

“It won’t be easy,” said a former senior official in Israel’s defence ministry. “Rockets will be fired at cities, including Tel Aviv, but at the same time the doomsday scenario that some have talked of is unlikely to happen. I don’t think we will have all out war.” In itself, the loss of two of Iran’s deterrent assets would probably not be enough to prompt Israel to launch unilateral military action.

The real urgency comes from the fact that Israeli intelligence has concluded that it has only between six and nine months before Iran’s nuclear facilities are immune from a unilateral military strike.

After that, Iran enters what officials here call a “zone of immunity”, the point at which Israel would no longer be able, by itself, to prevent Tehran from becoming a nuclear power.

By then, Israel assesses, Iran will have acquired sufficient technological expertise to build a nuclear weapon. More importantly, it will be able to do so at its Fordow enrichment plant, buried so deep within a mountain that it is almost certainly beyond the range of Israel’s US-provided GBU-28 and GBU-27 “bunker busting” bombs.

It is with this deadline in mind that Mr Netanyahu comes to Washington. Mr Obama’s administration has little doubt that their visitor’s intent is serious. Leon Panetta, the US defence secretary, stated last month that there was a “strong likelihood” of Israel launching an attack between April and June this year.

Senior US officials have, unusually, warned in public that such a step would be unwise and premature, a sentiment echoed by William Hague, the Foreign Secretary.

Mr Obama is determined that beefed up US and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s central bank and energy sector be given the chance to work and is desperate to dissuade Israel from upsetting his strategy.

But to give sanctions a chance, Mr Netanyahu would effectively have to give up Israel’s ability to strike Iran and leave the country’s fate in the hands of the United States – which is why he is demanding a clear sign of commitment from the American president.

“This is the dilemma facing Israel,” the former senior military officer said. “If Iran enters a zone of immunity from Israeli attack can Israel rely on the United States to prevent Iran going nuclear?”

Mr Netanyahu’s chief demand will be that Washington recognises Israel’s “red lines”. This would involve the Barack administration shifting from a position of threatening military action if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon to one of warning of the use of force if Tehran acquired the capability of being able to build one.

Mr Obama will be reluctant to make such a commitment in public, though he might do so in private by pledging action if Iran were to expel UN weapons inspectors or begin enriching uranium towards the levels needed to build a bomb, according to Matthew Kroenig, a special adviser to the Pentagon on Iran until last year.

“Israel is facing the situation of either taking military action now or trusting the US to take action down the road,” Mr Kroenig, an advocate of US military strikes against Iran, said. “What Netanyahu wants to get out of the meeting are clear assurances that the US will take military action if necessary.” The American president may regard Mr Netanyahu as an ally who has done more to undermine his Middle East policy of trying to project soft power in the Arab world than may of his foes in the region.

But, on this occasion at least, he will have to suppress his irritation.

Mr Netanyahu is well aware that his host is vulnerable to charges from both Congress and his Republican challengers for the presidency that he is weak on Iran, and will seek to exploit this as much as possible.

Tellingly, Palestinian issues, the principal source of contention between the two, will be sidelined and Mr Obama has already been forced to step up his rhetoric on Iran beyond a degree with which he is probably comfortable.

Last week, in a notable hardening of tone, he declared his seriousness about using military force to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, saying: “I do not bluff.” Yet whatever commitments he might give to Mr Netanyahu it is far from clear that it will be enough to dissuade Israel from taking unilateral action.

Among the Israeli public, there is a sense of growing sense that a confrontation with Iran is inevitable. Overheard conversations in bars and restaurants frequently turn to the subject, with a growing popular paranoia fed by the escalation in bomb shelter construction, air raid siren testing and exercises simulating civilian preparedness for rocket strikes.

Last week, Israeli newspapers fretted that the government was running short of gas masks, even though more than four million have already been doled out.

But while the growing drumbeat of war is unmistakable, it is unclear whether or not Mr Netanyahu, for all his bellicose rhetoric, has yet fully committed himself to the cause.

Ostensibly, a decision for war has to be approved by Mr Netanyahu’s inner cabinet. But everyone in Israel agrees that the decision ultimately rests with Ehud Barak, the defence minister who is unabashedly in favour of military action, and, most importantly, the prime minister.

“Netanyahu is a much more ambiguous and complex character,” said Jonathan Spyer, a prominent Israeli political analyst. “We know where Barak stands but with Netanyahu it is less clear.

“Netanyahu is not a man who likes military adventures. His two terms as prime minister have been among the quietest in recent Israeli history. Behind the Churchillian character he likes to project is a very much more cautious and vacillating figure.”

Were Mr Netanyahu to overcome his indecisiveness, as many observers suspect he will, real questions remain about how effective an Israeli unilateral strike would be.

With its US-supplied bunker busters, Israel’s fleet of F-15i and F-16i fighter jets, and its recently improved in-air refuelling capabilities, Israel could probably cause significant damage to the bulk of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the Natanz enrichment plant.

But the second enrichment plant at Fordow, buried beneath more than 200 feet of reinforced concrete, could prove a challenge too far.

“Natanz yes, but I don’t think they could take out Fordow,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, an Iran expert at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. “They could take out the entrance ramps but not the facility itself.”

With its Massive Ordnance Penetrator bunker busters, each weighing almost 14 tonnes, the United States stands a much better chance of striking Fordow successfully, thus disrupting Iran’s nuclear programme for far longer than the one to three years delay an Israeli attack is estimated to cause.

But whether Israeli is prepared to leave its fate in American hands is another matter.

“Israelis are psychologically such that they prefer to rely on themselves and not on others, given their history,” the Israeli former senior defence ministry official said. “We feel we have relied on others in the past, and they have failed us.”

www.telegraph.co.uk, 03 Mar 2012

March 4, 2012
‘NATO radar undermines Turkey neutrality’

The United States has reportedly confirmed for the first time that a controversial NATO radar base, part of a larger missile system, in eastern Turkey has begun operation.

A top US Army commander has declared that American forces are manning the radar system in Turkey’s eastern province of Malatya.

The system has been promoted by US and its European allies as part of a broader NATO “missile defense shield” in Europe that will place Iran and Russia within the range of US missiles.

The US-led missile system has provoked strong criticism from Russia, claiming that the system is not defensive and is aimed at Russian soil.

Press TV has conducted an interview with Michael Maloof, former Pentagon official, to share his opinion on this issue.

The following is a transcript of the interview:

Press TV: Mr.Maloof, first of all what is NATO after for the installation of such base in Turkey? I mean what does it gain from it?

Maloof: Well the gain for NATO would be or they perceive to be as a missile threat from Iran primarily. The other aspect of it is that it can also be used as any missile system against the Russians and also could be turned into an offensive system.

I think that is what the Russians are very, very concerned about and it generally does introduce a new ingredient of instability throughout the region because of that is particularly out of time when countries are trying to get along.

And I think for the Russians specially represents a NATO’s further push eastward and which they believe has gone beyond their role of why they even exist for the first place.

Press TV: Many say that Turkey is somehow playing into the hands of the West by allowing the installation of such a base there?

Maloof: Well I think it was clearly a political decision on Turkey’s part. Turkey does not really have to fear from Iran so much as it needs to somehow maintain a tie with the West and still maintain its pasture in NATO itself.

And it has been trying for years and years to get into the EU and they backed off from that it seems, but clearly Turkey has made a decision I think the politics behind it had to do with Turkey’s role and siding with Washington and [plot] the Saudis ultimately against Syria it is clearly for Turkey to show that it is backing the West in this case.

And of course Turkey makes the caveat that well Israel will not gain access to any of the radar data and I think that is going to be difficult to maintain, not withstanding any assurance that they might use.

Press TV: And cannot anything be done for the base to be scrapped? I mean the people for instance, what can they do?

Maloof: Well people can rise up I guess and protest. I think the Turkish government was very reluctant to get into this and I think it conflicts with their zero policy, zero problem policy as they call it to begin the show side and I think it could have repercussions for Turkey ultimately with respect to its neighbors in the region.

The reasoning behind Turkey’s decision I think again is political and I think they gonna have to weigh whether siding with Washington was really such a good idea.

I do not think it is a very firm policy but the radar system can be moved, there is no question about that, it can be moved elsewhere and I think if the Turkish people are that concerned about it and protested enough, I think the message would get clear, would become clear to Ankara.

AHK/JR

via PressTV – ‘NATO radar undermines Turkey neutrality’.

March 1, 2012
CNN Silences War-Skeptical Soldier

CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer

Exclusive: By obsessing over Iran gaining a nuclear weapon “capability” – even with no actual bomb – while ignoring Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal, the U.S. news media proves the point of its own bias. There’s also the usual hostility toward dissenting voices, as ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern notes.

By Ray McGovern

When CNN interviews a U.S. Army corporal preparing for his third deployment to Afghanistan, should TV viewers be permitted to hear him out on a front-burner issue like Iran’s alleged threat to Israel? For those who might think so, watch what happens when 28-year-old Cpl. Jesse Thorsen touches a neuralgic nerve by suggesting that Israel can take care of itself.

It’s impossible to say exactly what happened to the remote feed that suddenly got lost in transmission back to CNN Central, but the minute-long video is truly worth a thousand words:

The interview, which dates back to Jan. 3 when the Iowa caucuses were the evening’s big news, is at least symbolic of how our Fawning Corporate Media treats dissident voices that clash with the prevailing pro-war-on-Iran bias. I missed the segment when it aired, but I think it still merits comment today as war clouds thicken, again.

In the aborted one-minute segment, Cpl. Thorsen is interviewed by CNN’s Dana Bash, who presumably picked him out for the live interview because he had a large tattoo on his neck about never forgetting 9/11. The tattoo – plus two tours in Afghanistan behind him (and yet another in front of him) – may have suggested to Bash and her CNN producers that Thorsen was unlikely to say anything to muddle or muffle the new drumbeat for war.

Based on Thorsen’s military appearance alone, the typical CNN viewer could almost settle back in an easy chair and anticipate some stirring patriotic bathos about America standing tall – and the interview ending with the obligatory “thank you for your service,” which any right-thinking journalist utters to show that he or she is part of Team America.

But Bash got more than she bargained for when Thorsen turned out to be a well-informed and articulate young man who began endorsing Ron Paul’s non-interventionist views on U.S. foreign policy, i.e. that the United States should go to war only when absolutely necessary to defend its vital national interests and shouldn’t be picking a fight with Iran on behalf of Israel.

Such comments, of course, are almost literally heretical at places like CNN, which accepts unquestioningly the idea of “American exceptionalism” and abides by the neoconservative dogma that U.S. and Israeli security interests are one and the same.

That’s why CNN and the rest of the FCM typically dismiss Ron Paul’s views on foreign policy as dangerously “isolationist,” if not laughably loony. “Can you believe it? He doesn’t want to station American troops all around the world! He doesn’t believe in preemptive wars to disarm our enemies of weapons that they may not have now but might someday in the future have the capability of building! Ha! Ha! What a nut!”

The FCM’s dismissal of Paul’s foreign-policy views was a key reason why comedian Jon Stewart once compared Paul to “the 13^th floor” of a hotel, the level that often doesn’t exist because customers consider the number unlucky. So, when the FCM would lavish attention on other Republican candidates, who finished both above and below Paul in some poll or in early balloting, the pundits would pass over Paul as if he didn’t exist.

Going ‘Off-Script’

So, what happened when Cpl. Thorsen veered “off script” – so to speak – and began reprising Ron Paulish views on the appropriate use of soldiers like himself? Well, CNN suddenly lost the feed. As Thorsen disappeared from the screen, CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer explained, “Sorry, we just lost our tech connection, unfortunately.”

It’s true that connections can be lost for any number of reasons – and I can’t say for sure that some alert CNN producer hit the “kill” switch as one might if Cpl. Thorsen had begun cursing uncontrollably – but Blitzer and other CNN honchos didn’t seem very eager to resume the interview, just as they generally don’t book anti-war activists who disagree with the imperial orthodoxy.

You might remember, for instance, how CNN, like the other networks, stocked its pre-Iraq War “debates” with hawkish retired generals and admirals who would face only the mildest and most respectful questioning from Blitzer or some other anchor. In the rare moment when some war skeptic got on the air, he or she was treated with disdain, if not outright hostility, all the better for the network to demonstrate its “patriotism.”

Some cable networks devoted more time to American restaurants that were renaming French fries into “Freedom fries” than to the millions of people who took to the streets to protest the looming invasion of Iraq. After all, what could those “activists” know about Iraq hiding all those stockpiles of WMDs?

But why mention the case of Cpl. Thorsen now? Because this one-minute video-that-is-better-than-a-thousand-words could come in handy as at least a symbolic reminder of the bias at CNN and other parts of the FCM when it comes to allowing a full and fair discussion about going to war against some “designated enemy.”

This reality is bound to assume increased importance next week when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu touches down in Washington to press his case for a preemptive war against Iran’s nuclear program – which has yet to produce a single nuclear bomb (and Iranian leaders say they don’t intend to build one) – while Israel has an undeclared nuclear arsenal of an estimated 200 to 300 bombs.

Just for fun, keep track of how many times Netanyahu and other war advocates get to weigh in on the unacceptable danger of an Iranian nuclear weapon “capability” compared to how many times they are asked why Israel has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and why it won’t let inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency into Israeli secret bases to examine Israel’s actual nuclear weapons.

The FCM’s latest drumming for war is likely to reach a crescendo during the first days of March, with Netanyahu crashing the cymbals loudly and the propaganda orchestra swelling in a martial symphony designed to stir the American people into another standing ovation for another preemptive war.

Ray McGovern works for Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Savior in inner-city Washington. He spent a total of 30 years as an Army Infantry/Intelligence officer and CIA analyst, and is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).

consortiumnews.com, February 27, 2012

February 29, 2012
Pentagon Demands $100 Million More For War With Iran

Pentagon wants $100 million extra to be prepared for a war with Iran. The money, requested from the Congress, is to beef up US military presence in the Persian Gulf and rapidly upgrade weapons to more effectively combat Iranian armed forces.

US Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Gulf region, wants them prepared to defeat the Iranian fleet and shore artillery. They also want additional drone capabilities and mine swiping equipment to clear the Strait of Hormuz, should Iran act to set mines there as it threatened to, reports The Wall Street Journal.

As part of the push, US spec-op team stationed in the United Arab Emirates has also been ordered to be prepared to take parting in military action in the region, the newspapers say citing defense sources. The unit is currently training elite forces of the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and other US allies in the region.

The Pentagon submitted the request for extra funding on February 7, saying it is needed “bridge near-term capability gaps” in the Persian Gulf. The request is yet to be made officially public after lawmakers review it.

It comes on top of changes made last summer that provided Central Command with about $200 million for additional upgrades, some of which could be used in areas outside the Gulf region. The earlier request asked money for a torpedo defense system, airborne anti-mine weapons and new cyber weapons. It was approved by the Congress.

The Iranian Navy deploys relatively small fast-moving heavily armed vessels. US naval forces have been made to fight against larger targets and may lag in efficiency against Iranian, American military planners believe. To close the gap, US warships would need to be equipped with rapid-fire machine guns, anti-tank weapons and smaller caliber guns.

The planned upgrade comes on top of the nearly $82 million program to improve the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the largest bunker-buster bomb deployed by the Pentagon. The weapon may be used against Iranian fortified sites, but some experts believed the bomb would not be good enough to destroy those.

Tension has been building rapidly over the months over Iranian controversial nuclear program. The US and its allies accuse Tehran of secretly developing a nuclear weapon under the guise of civilian research, an allegation the Islamic Republic denies. There is no conclusive proof of the allegation, and even US intelligence doubts Iranian nuclear ambitions. Nevertheless, the US and the EU issued sanctions against Iranian oil exports in a bid to put leverage on the country.

There is speculation that Israel may launch an attack on Iranian military facilities in a pre-emptive strike. Tehran threatened to respond with military force against such an attack. It also said in case of a conflict it would block the Strait of Hormuz, through which some 20 per cent of all world’s traded crude passes.

Global Research, February 27, 2012

February 29, 2012
Turkey vs. Iran: The Rivalry for Dominance of the Middle East

After years of tenuous cooperation, the two regional powers look increasingly like competitors.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad meets with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul / Reuters

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party appears to be recalibrating its Iran policy and increasingly distancing itself from the more vocal support it previously gave the Iranian regime. As the two powers tussle over Syria, Iraq and other issues, analysts warn that their rivalry for leadership in the Middle East is only likely to sharpen.

But, for now, at least officially, Turkey maintains that it is still committed to maintaining its outreach to Iran and moving beyond the mutual suspicions that characterized the two countries’ relations in decades past.

“We are doing our best to create the atmosphere for dialogue,” one senior Turkish diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told me. “Yes, we don’t agree about all issues with Iran — about what’s happening in Iraq, in Syria — but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t talk with them. We are expressing our concerns and reactions with them about everything face-to-face.”

Some recent statements from Turkish officials, though, suggest a more complex picture.

At a February 5 meeting of the Justice and Development Party, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc delivered a blistering critique of Iran’s policy of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad despite the Syrian government’s bloody crackdown on opposition strongholds.

“I am addressing the Islamic Republic of Iran: I do not know if you are worthy of being called Islamic,” Arinc said, according to the Anatolia state news agency. “Have you said a single thing about what is happening in Syria?”

This tone represents quite a change from 2009, when Turkish President Abdullah Gül was among the first world leaders to congratulate Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad on his contested reelection, or in 2010, when Ankara put its relationship with Washington on the line by voting against Iran sanctions in the United Nations Security Council.

News coverage also comes with a sharper edge. The Turkish press has increasingly started running articles that cast suspicions on Iran’s intentions in the region and in Turkey, with some recent reports and columns suggesting that the Revolutionary Guards were planning attacks inside Turkey and that Iran is smuggling weapons through the country to Syria.

Hugh Pope, Turkey project director for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, and one of the authors of a report on Iran and Turkey to be released on February 23, believes that Ankara’s more critical stance toward Iran indicates that “[t]he more hawkish faction in Ankara, the kind that thinks Iran is crossing the line in Syria and Iraq, is becoming more pronounced . . .”

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “feels personally burned by the Iranians . . . ” Pope commented. “Erdoğan likes to have wins and the risks he took for Iran did not pay off, either in the US or Iran.”

But the two sides’ mutual wariness is not always consistent. An Iranian general earlier threatened a retaliatory strike if Turkey hosted a North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile radar, but, nonetheless, Tehran has also proposed Istanbul as a possible site for another round of talks about Iran’s nuclear research program.

Much of the Turkish-Iranian sparring is done instead via proxies. In Iraq, Turkey’s neighbor to the south, Ankara’s support for the Sunni Iraqiya alliance resulted in a falling out with Iranian-backed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has since gone on to accuse Ankara of “interfering” in Iraq’s internal affairs.

“There is quite a strong and growing rivalry between the two countries inside of Iraq, and it stems from having genuinely different interests,” said Sean Kane, a former UN official in Iraq and the author of a 2011 report on Turkish-Iranian competition in Iraq for the United States Institute of Peace.

“For Turkey, having a strong Iraq has historically been a bulwark against Kurdish separatism and Iranian adventurism. Iran looks at all of this very differently. A strong Iraq is a rival, and historically has been a hard security threat.”

Trade between Iran and Turkey, long a buffer against bad relations, also appears to offer little room for cooperation.

While trade between Turkey and Iran shot up from $1 billion in 2000 to $16 billion last year, most of that consists of Turkish imports of natural gas and oil. Joint ventures between Turkish and Iranian companies have failed to materialize and several large projects that were given to Turkish concerns ended up being taken away with little warning or explanation.

“I don’t see Turkey’s outreach to Iran working,” said an executive at a large Turkish trade organization. “There’s no transparency or accountability in Iran. Turkish companies have had a very hard time penetrating the Iranian market.”

Despite Prime Minister Erdoğan’s multiple trips to the country, “Turkey didn’t get any deals out of Iran,” added the executive, who declined to be named. “Recent developments . . . will only make it harder.”

Still, despite the numerous points of friction and the growing rivalry, few observers expect outright conflict between Ankara and Tehran.

“I don’t think Turkey has any intent to fight Iran. In fact, it would like to avoid that at any cost,” said Turkish political analyst Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. “There are too many common interests between the two countries, although that’s never stopped them from competing fiercely in the region.”

What is most likely, Ozel said, is that Turkey and Iran will revert to the elaborate kind of diplomatic gamesmanship that has characterized the relations between these two regional powers and rivals for centuries.

“It’s all smiles between Turkey and Iran, but that’s very typical of the relationship between these two countries, which is competition and cooperation wrapped up in a total lack of trust.”

This article originally appeared at EurasiaNet.org, an Atlantic partner site.

February 27, 2012
Turkey and Iran: Amidst the Smiles, A Rivalry Intensifies

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party appears to be recalibrating its Iran policy and increasingly distancing itself from the more vocal support it previously gave the Iranian regime. As the two powers tussle over Syria, Iraq and other issues, analysts warn that their rivalry for leadership in the Middle East is only likely to sharpen.

But, for now, at least officially, Turkey maintains that it is still committed to maintaining its outreach to Iran and moving beyond the mutual suspicions that characterized the two countries’ relations in decades past.

“We are doing our best to create the atmosphere for dialogue,” one senior Turkish diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told EurasiaNet.org. “Yes, we don’t agree about all issues with Iran — about what’s happening in Iraq, in Syria — but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t talk with them. We are expressing our concerns and reactions with them about everything face-to-face.”

Some recent statements from Turkish officials, though, suggest a more complex picture.

At a February 5 meeting of the Justice and Development Party, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc delivered a blistering critique of Iran’s policy of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad despite the Syrian government’s bloody crackdown on opposition strongholds.

“I am addressing the Islamic Republic of Iran: I do not know if you are worthy of being called Islamic,” Arinc said, according to the Anatolia state news agency. “Have you said a single thing about what is happening in Syria?”

This tone represents quite a change from 2009, when Turkish President Abdullah Gül was among the first world leaders to congratulate Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad on his contested reelection, or in 2010, when Ankara put its relationship with Washington on the line by voting against Iran sanctions in the United Nations Security Council.

News coverage also comes with a sharper edge. The Turkish press has increasingly started running articles that cast suspicions on Iran’s intentions in the region and in Turkey, with some recent reports and columns suggesting that the Revolutionary Guards were planning attacks inside Turkey and that Iran is smuggling weapons through the country to Syria.

Hugh Pope, Turkey project director for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, and one of the authors of a report on Iran and Turkey to be released on February 23, believes that Ankara’s more critical stance toward Iran indicates that “[t]he more hawkish faction in Ankara, the kind that thinks Iran is crossing the line in Syria and Iraq, is becoming more pronounced . . .”

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “feels personally burned by the Iranians . . . ” Pope commented. “Erdoğan likes to have wins and the risks he took for Iran did not pay off, either in the US or Iran.”

But the two sides’ mutual wariness is not always consistent. An Iranian general earlier threatened a retaliatory strike if Turkey hosted a North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile radar, but, nonetheless, Tehran has also proposed Istanbul as a possible site for another round of talks about Iran’s nuclear research program.

Much of the Turkish-Iranian sparring is done instead via proxies. In Iraq, Turkey’s neighbor to the south, Ankara’s support for the Sunni Iraqiya alliance resulted in a falling out with Iranian-backed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has since gone on to accuse Ankara of “interfering” in Iraq’s internal affairs.

“There is quite a strong and growing rivalry between the two countries inside of Iraq, and it stems from having genuinely different interests,” said Sean Kane, a former UN official in Iraq and the author of a 2011 report on Turkish-Iranian competition in Iraq for the United States Institute of Peace.

“For Turkey, having a strong Iraq has historically been a bulwark against Kurdish separatism and Iranian adventurism. Iran looks at all of this very differently. A strong Iraq is a rival, and historically has been a hard security threat.”

Trade between Iran and Turkey, long a buffer against bad relations, also appears to offer little room for cooperation.

While trade between Turkey and Iran shot up from $1 billion in 2000 to $16 billion last year, most of that consists of Turkish imports of natural gas and oil. Joint ventures between Turkish and Iranian companies have failed to materialize and several large projects that were given to Turkish concerns ended up being taken away with little warning or explanation.

“I don’t see Turkey’s outreach to Iran working,” said an executive at a large Turkish trade organization. “There’s no transparency or accountability in Iran. Turkish companies have had a very hard time penetrating the Iranian market.”

Despite Prime Minister Erdoğan’s multiple trips to the country, “Turkey didn’t get any deals out of Iran,” added the executive, who declined to be named. “Recent developments . . . will only make it harder.”

Still, despite the numerous points of friction and the growing rivalry, few observers expect outright conflict between Ankara and Tehran.

“I don’t think Turkey has any intent to fight Iran. In fact, it would like to avoid that at any cost,” said Turkish political analyst Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. “There are too many common interests between the two countries, although that’s never stopped them from competing fiercely in the region.”

What is most likely, Ozel said, is that Turkey and Iran will revert to the elaborate kind of diplomatic gamesmanship that has characterized the relations between these two regional powers and rivals for centuries.

“It’s all smiles between Turkey and Iran, but that’s very typical of the relationship between these two countries, which is competition and cooperation wrapped up in a total lack of trust.”

Editor’s note:

Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist who focuses on Turkey. He is the editor of Eurasianet’s Turkofile and Kebabistan blogs.

February 25, 2012