TEHRAN, August 05 (ISNA) – Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has described President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s upcoming visit to Turkey as “vitally important,” according to ISNA news agency.
“The visit is vitally important and side issues can not overshadow it,” Babacan has said in a meeting with his Portuguese counterpart Luis Amado.
According to Turkish media, Ahmadinejad will start visit to Istanbul on August 14 for a 3-day visit.
Turkish President Abdullah Gul will be staying in Istanbul at that time of the visit to meet Ahmadinejad.
The Turkish media has said it is expected that Iran’s nuclear case to feature as the main topic of the talks. Other issues like bilateral relations and energy cooperation will be discussed.
By Manik Mehta, Special to Gulf News Published: August 03, 2008, 23:35
Turkey’s relations with the US went through a rollercoaster, last October, when the US Congress passed a resolution on Armenia, describing the killings of Armenians during the First World War in the Ottoman empire as “genocide”. This had angered Istanbul which was already riled by the war in Iraq from where the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) launched attacks on Turkey.
However, US-Turkish relations considerably improved, particularly after the warm welcome to Turkish President Abdullah Gul during his visit to Washington earlier this year. The ensuing strategic cooperation between the two sides is a manifestation of what Gul called a “new chapter” in bilateral relations.
Although Turkish public opinion is unfavourable against the US, the strategic cooperation has, meanwhile, resuscitated the relationship between the two Nato partners. Kurdish nationalism is Ankara’s Achilles’ heel; it has brought Turkey closer to Iran which has its own Kurdish problem and has found a common cause with Turkey. Additionally, both sides have a vibrant trading and economic relationship.
While critics fear that closer Turkish-Iranian ties will have ramifications for US-Turkish relations, others see an opportunity. Turkey’s close ties with Iran should be used to persuade the latter to renounce its nuclear programme which is causing a lot of concern to the US and, particularly, Israel which has been the target of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s belligerent outbursts.
US-Turkish contacts have recently intensified on Iran’s nuclear programme. President George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, met Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan in July in Ankara – just before Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki arrived in Turkey – to send, apparently, a carrot-and-stick message on Iran’s nuclear programme. Subsequently, US and Iranian representatives met, for the first time in three decades, at the six-nation meeting in Geneva to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme.
Indeed, Mottaki sounded unusually conciliatory, even calling the presence of Undersecretary of State William Burns, the third senior-most American diplomat, at the talks as “a new positive approach”. Turkey has apparently played a quiet role in Mottaki’s moderate reaction which was a far cry from Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric. Though glaring fundamental differences between the two will persist, an atmospheric improvement, with some help from Turkey, could bring both sides on “talking terms”.
Iran’s testing of two separate rounds of long-range ballistic missiles in early July has also unnerved not only the United States and Israel, but also the Gulf Arab states. The missile firing was intended to send different messages to different audiences. The missile tests warn the West that Iran, which has strengthened its presence in the Strait of Hormuz, could target oil shipments from the Arabian Gulf ports and deal a crippling blow to the Western and also the oil-driven Arab economies.
They were also aimed to silence Iran’s domestic critics, frustrated with the regime’s ruinous economic policies, by whipping up nationalist fervour and take the wind out of the critics’ sail.
Rapprochement
According to some American strategists, Turkey would be willing to bring about the rapprochement between the US and Iran, and thus prevent a military conflict. On the other hand, the hardcore Iranian leadership would prefer making concessions on the nuclear issue to Muslim Turkey rather than directly to the US.
Indeed, some Americans argue that by allowing it a face-saving withdrawal, Iran could be persuaded to eventually abandon its nuclear programme. The Iranian people desperately want an end to the West-backed sanctions against their country which is treated like a pariah at every international venue because of their unpopular regime.
Indeed, the regime knows this and also the fact that it will not be able to stop for long the tide of public disenchantment with its dogmatic attitude. This is a good time for the US to take more Turkish help and resolve the stalemate with Iran.
Brenda Shaffer works to define cultural domination on states’ foreign or domestic affairs in “Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy?”article. With some examples, Shaffer is explaining this event us. Firstly, Shaffer begin the article with Huntigton’s thesis: “The Clash of Civilizations”1Shaffer gives an example about different state decision-making. Some Muslim countries have Anti-American people as behavioral. But these states make alliance with the USA like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. Commonly we can see incongruent actings between states policies and people behaviors. Iran – Playing Politics with Islamic Style
Samuel Huntigton’s thesis bases on idea that culture has main role in defining of policy. Also Brenda Shaffer agrees Huntigton’s thesis. Shaffer says that culture is main mechanism for diplomatic relations. Shaffer interprets culture as specific culture of country’s within religion, history and civilization.
Western scholars researched about Islam effection in Muslim countries after 11 September terrorist act. They looked at Muslim scholars, historians, diplomats and generals. They understood Islam effection as strong as nuclear weapons. But this is not a physical thing, this is an ideology. And they speeches to newspapers, politic journals a subject that has a title as “Do Muslim countries act differently than Non-Muslim States?”
On the other hand, Shaffer interests about this subject under the psychological perspective. Human beings are often driven by culture according to Shaffer. Also, human behavior effects on to state affairs. But state acts partly different from human behaviors. We can give example from philosophical history: Some philosophers think that the state is a thing like human. But it is systematically human. The state action is like people’s actions. State is big form of human and human is small form of the state. As behavioral psychological meaning has different dimensions.
Shaffer’s Caspian perspective has common beliefs. According to Shaffer, all Caspian countries have been influenced by Islam effection after from the Soviet Union. And now they have Islamic perspective on their state affairs. But Shaffer judges all Caspian and Middle Asia area as Islamic effection zones. But it is not totally like that. Today these countries are secular except Iran.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is important in this area according to Shaffer’s idea. After the collapsing of the USSR, Iran wanted to export their Islamic regime to other neighbor states. In Central Asia and Caucasus territory, Iran plays for exporting their Persian Islamic mind as a regime under the title as “Islamic Solidarity” with economic and security events. Shaffer is true for this event. Iran wanted to export their regime to other states. But American or Western scholars’ view point is different. They are looking as totally Islamic system to Iran. They say about Iran that they are working for Islamic fundamentalism. But Iran’s Islamic mind is very different from normal Islamic idea. Persian Islamic system bases on fundamentalist movement. If we look at Turkey, Egypt or others, we can see normal, laic Islamic behavior. Also Shaffer says their false point in next sentence. “Poor Muslim countries have an influence circumstance but secular Muslim countries challenges to Iran like Turkmenistan.” – The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (Christian Armenia versus Muslim Azerbaijan)
But Tehran has faced three regional disputes :
– The Chechen conflict (Chechen Muslims versus Moscow)
– The Tajik civil war (The Islamic Renaissance Party versus Moscow
In these mix circumstances Iranian fundamentalist approach transformed to self-interest system. And most telling of these policy preferences are Irans support for Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.2FinalCulture may be material interest of regime survivability. Islam is more likely to affect policy under conditions that see greater domestic and personnel influences on foreign policies.Mehmet Fatih OZTARSU
Qafqaz University Law Faculty
International Relations
By these events, Iran’s state security was challenged in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia since Iran is a multiethnic state. Shaffer Gives information about Iran’s population: Half of Iran’s population is comprised of non Persian ethnic minorities; Azerbaijani groups. The majority of the residents of Iran’s northwestern provinces which border the country of Azerbaijan and they are Azerbaijani. But Iran’s relations bogged down with Baku because of Iranian self interests.
Shaffer shows their ideas that Iranian diversity of opinion is good example for Iranian foreign policy. There are some different points as historical legacies and religious differences in policies.
“On the other hand Turkey attempted to conduct a balanced policy toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also Turkey helped for Karabagh conflict to Baku.”
Turkey changed its policy when Karabagh became a conflict. This is an example for cultural combines. (Brenda Shaffer)
According to many observers, religious differences have played a central role in the Caspian region. With these happenings, Azerbaijan supported Chechnya. Also some analysts have assumed that religious differences serve as a basis for conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia. Over these events, common culture serves as a basis role for alliances and coalitions and different cultures act as an obstacle to cooperation.
Shaffer’s opinion is that there are cultural alliances are created follow by from collapsing of the USSR.
Tehran’s main argument is Shiite background in their helping system. Also Turkey and Azerbaijan shares ethnic Turkic and Muslim backgrounds. Also Russian and Armenian background is Orthodox Christian form. But Georgian-Russian conflict is different from this event. It bases on security alliance.
Some governments explain and justify their policies in cultural terms. We must analyze a country’s foreign policy on the basis of actions. We have anticipated the New Testament to Germany or Russia or Torah to Israel like Islamic system. Shaffer asked question : “What does the Koran have to say a foreign policy question?”
If Islam influences them, they should act with Islamic interaction. (Shaffer)
The USA wants an enemy for their father emotion on the world. They forced as goodness of the world during the Cold War. They defended the world’s countries from dangerous communist system. Their interest was communism in that time. But they wanted a new enemy for regulate the world with themselves. After the Cold War, their White House scholars worked for a new enemy. There was a “Red Dangerous” line. But today there should be “Green Dangerous” line. And its name is Islam. 3
The USA’s fans defense western style always. There shouldn’t be a religious system like Islam around the world according to them. But they don’t look at Israeli system or American Christiantic base.
Today there is a Muslim conflict. And the USA is patron of the world. So they are working for peace, democracy and other good things. But the world’s people will know workings of the USA. All terror acts, all problems, all ethnic clashes…
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1 Dogu Bati Journal – 26
2 Karabagh conflict begin in the late 1980. And Armenia attacked to legal boundaries of Azerbaijan.
3 Politic Declaration Fikret Baskaya – Ideologies.
Deep in the cellar of the Noy Brandy factory in Yerevan, Armenia, there is a pungent, but not unpleasant
Noy Brandy's wine-tasting sessions are popular with Iranian tourists
smell of ageing, fortified wine.
On an upturned wooden cask sit a dozen glasses, and a bottle of 1944 sherry. The company’s wine-tasting sessions are popular with tourists and most of them, according to tour guide Anna, come from Iran.
“Ten metres underground, they think Allah is out of range,” she smiles. “They don’t want to taste the wine, they want to drink it.”
Across town, Omid Mojahed is one such Iranian looking for more than just a taste of Armenia. He is a 28-year-old student and an entrepreneur at heart.
He spends most of his time away from his books, working on his businesses, which include a travel agency working exclusively in the Iranian market.
“In summer I think that 90% of tourists are Iranian. Armenia is so close by and has attractive things – cafes and nightclubs, and beautiful Lake Sevan.”
Omid has also just opened a Persian restaurant, catering for locals as well as Iranian expats, keen for some home cuisine.
Gathered at the bar around a smoking pipe, a group of Iranian students are relaxing after their exams.
Twenty-year-old Mehdez explains that Armenia is popular with thousands of young people who cannot get a place in Iran’s over-subscribed higher education system.
“I chose to study in Yerevan because it’s an easier situation. Here we have more freedom,” she says.
“But of course anything that we do here, we can do in Iran – just not in public.”
Geographic isolation
Part of that freedom includes an increasingly liberalised economy, and that makes Armenia attractive to foreign investment.
The Armenian capital is hardly an international economic powerhouse, but there are signs that Iranian investors sense an opportunity.
On one street, many of the stores are Iranian-run. One of them is owned by Muhammad Rahimi.
Muhammad Rahimi benefits from Armenia's dependence on Iran
He started trading household goods 10 years ago. Business, he says, gets better and better. Practically every item he sells – from pots and pans to air-fresheners – has been imported from Iran.
Like many of his compatriots, Muhammad benefits from Armenia’s geographical isolation.
War with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s led to the closure of its borders with Azerbaijan and an unsympathetic Turkey.
That leaves landlocked Armenia looking towards Georgia to the north, and Iran to the south.
“Georgia, economically, is worse than Armenia,” says Alexander Iskandarian, director of the Caucasus Media Institute.
“But Iran has a population of 70 million and it has oil and gas. It’s rich by regional standards, so you should have normal relations with them. It’s dangerous not to do so.”
Yet trade turnover between the two countries remains modest, at just $200m (£100m) a year, according to the economic department at the Iranian embassy.
US disapproval
That has not stopped the United States from expressing concern about Armenia’s ties with its neighbour. Those ties include the new Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, frequent bilateral talks and state visits, not to mention a sizeable Armenian minority in northern Iran.
In this year’s Country Reports on Terrorism, the US state department said warming relations between the two countries made Armenia “reluctant to criticise publicly objectionable Iranian conduct”.
The little country courts the Americans, Europeans and Russians. It is a difficult balancing act to follow.
But Armenia’s unique relationship with the regional power – Iran – is one it cannot afford to abandon.
Iranian students say they enjoy more freedom in Armenia
Moreover, the two countries are united by a shared sense of isolation from the rest of the world.
“Let’s not forget that Armenia is in a virtual blockade. We attach great importance to our relations with Iran. One can choose one’s friends but not one’s neighbours,” says Armen Movsisyan, Armenia’s minister of energy.
For those Iranians who have chosen to make a home in Armenia, geopolitics may not be foremost in their minds, but they are equally as pragmatic as the politicians.
“I’m no expert in international relations. All I know is we always had good relations with Armenia and that’s why I like working here,” says the trader Muhammad Rahimi.
Back in his restaurant, Omid Mojahed has no plans to leave while the going is good.
“Everything will be okay for me here, that’s why I prefer to stay,” he says.
“I like Armenian people, and it’s difficult for me to want to leave my friends. When you come to Yerevan for a month, you will stay in Yerevan forever!”
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ While Turkey has intensified its mediation efforts in the Middle East, Iran has volunteered to take on a similar challenge to break the ice between Ankara and Yerevan.
“The possibility of such an initiative by Iran is highly optimistic,” Arif Keskin, a specialist on Iran at the Eurasian Strategic Research Center, or ASAM. Explaining that a possible mediation would be a multi-dimensional gain for Iran, Keskin said this is what has likely driven the country to make such an attempt. “Iran is the sole country rescuing Armenia from its isolation within the region. Armenia is currently under geopolitical siege, surrounded by countries like Turkey and Azerbaijan with whom it has long-standing problems.”
“For Iran, Armenia has major strategic importance as well,” he said. “Iran wants to establish good relations with non-Turkish elements in the region, especially with Armenia. Its Azeri minority is a major concern. Therefore to alienate Turkey from Azerbaijan through an Armenian-Turkish reconciliation would be to its benefit,” he said.
“Iran could not solve the problems between Turkey and Armenia. Moreover it is not clear how sincere Ankara is for a rapprochement with Yerevan. The establishment in Turkey does not want any change in bilateral relations,” he said. “Previous mediation efforts by Iran between Azerbaijan and Armenia resulted in Baku’s losing territory. It is disputable how impartial Iran can be, or to whose advantage it would work. It is unlikely that it would defend the Turkish thesis against Armenia,” he said.
“Iran wants to give the message to the West that it can act within their parameters, that it is a stability factor in the region, not vice versa,” said Keskin. He said, however, that the initiative raises many questions in terms of Turkey. “I do not think that it was Ankara who asked for such a move from Iran. Turkey is disturbed by the depth of Iran-Armenia relations. Therefore it is definitely Iran’s own initiative.”
According to Keskin, the Turkish government has to explain itself publicly in terms of its recent relations with Iran. “It is not just this mediation effort. Let’s take Ahmedinejad’s planned visit for example. What could Turkey gain from the visit of such a radical figure? Sure AKP (Justice and Development Party) would have gains in domestic terms. But it is a very risky visit otherwise,” he added, the Turkish Daily News reports.
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is expected to pay an official visit to Turkey at the invitation of his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul.
The visit would take place late in August and diplomatic sources in Ankara have declared that a date for the visit will be set soon, Turkish Daily reported on Friday.
During the meeting agreements would be signed to further strengthen economic ties between the two neighboring countries.
In May, Ahmadinejad in a meeting with Turkish State Minister Kursad Tuzmen said the two countries have the potential to turn into major economic powers in the world.
The Turkish state minister said that the trade volume between the two countries could reach U.S. $20b by the end of 2011.
