Turkish Forum

Category: Iran

  • Turkish-Iranian energy ties deepen

    Turkish-Iranian energy ties deepen

    By JOHN C.K. DALY, UPI International Correspondent 

    Published: Aug. 21, 2008 at 5:52 PM

    WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (UPI) — The repercussions of Russia’s reassertion of power within what it deems its “sphere of influence” in “the near abroad” continue to ripple throughout Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Washington’s increasingly strident rhetoric over the Russian-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia is having repercussions from Prague through Warsaw to Kiev, as governments scramble to assess the fallout from the dispute.

    Edging closer into Washington’s orbit, Poland has agreed to base 10 U.S. anti-ballistic interceptor missiles and the Czech Republic its complementary radar facility by 2011-2013 to complete a system with components already situated in the United States, Greenland and Britain. While the Bush administration avers that the system is designed to intercept rogue missile launches from renegade states such as Iran, the Kremlin fiercely maintains that geography alone plainly shows the system’s anti-Russian intent and that, along with incorporating former Eastern European and former Soviet republics within NATO, it is an American-led attempt to encircle Russia.

    Even more infuriating to Moscow, earlier this week Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, following Russia’s unilateral abrogation earlier this year of a 1992 agreement with Ukraine on the use of Ukraine’s two Soviet-era missile early warning system tracking stations, issued a decree ending Ukrainian participation in the accord and made an offer of the two stations for “active cooperation with European nations.”

    If Eastern Europe has been traumatized by the recent display of Russia’s military might, with Ukraine and Georgia seeing possible NATO membership as the surest guarantor of their security further east, another stalwart NATO member is carefully evaluating Russia’s other rising influence — energy. As Turkey re-evaluates Eurasia’s changing political and economic landscape, Washington in its eagerness to confront Russia may see another of its cherished foreign policy tenets, that of blockading Iran with sanctions, weakened, perhaps fatally.

    Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah, it has been a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy to contain the Islamic Republic of Iran, currently enshrined in the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Expanding Washington’s reach, ILSA threatened even non-U.S. countries and companies with possible sanctions if they invested more than $20 million in developing Iran’s energy resources.

    For Turkey, which imports 90 percent of its energy supply, the Washington dictum of “happiness is multiple pipelines” is a stark reality, however much Washington loathes the mullahcracy in Tehran. Turkey does not have the luxury of allowing “pipeline politics” to trump its national energy security policies, as its current choice of major natural gas suppliers is stark — Russia or Iran, while waiting for Azerbaijan to ramp up production. Highlighting the vulnerability of regional pipelines to conflict, the fighting in South Ossetia halted Azeri oil shipments through Georgia.

    Iran, which contains the world’s second-largest gas reserves, currently provides nearly one-third of Turkey ‘s domestic demand, while Russian energy giant Gazprom provides 63.7 percent of Turkey’s imports, primarily via the Black Sea undersea Blue Stream pipeline, with smaller volumes coming from Azerbaijan. Much to Washington’s annoyance, in 1996 Turkey signed a contract with Iran for natural gas deliveries, which began in December 2001 via a pipeline from Tabriz to Ankara. Five years later the South Caucasus pipeline, also known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, opened; with an annual capacity of 8.8 billion cubic meters, BTE carries Azeri Caspian natural gas to Turkey via Georgia.

    In June Turkey’s Devlet Planlama Teskilati (State Planning Organization) prepared a comprehensive projection for Turkey’s economy covering 2009-2011, which included measures to ensure Turkey’s long-term energy supply security and accorded top priority to decreasing Turkey’s dependency on imported natural gas. In the interim, however, given the vulnerability of Azeri imports because of the unsettled nature of current Georgian-Russian relations and the apparent unpredictability of the Kremlin, Ankara is deepening its ties with Tehran, however much Washington disapproves. On July 29 Iranian Petroleum Minister Gholamhossein Nozari said in Tehran that Turkey and Iran are negotiating over Turkey being a transit corridor for Iranian natural gas exports to Europe and that Iran will provide increased amounts of natural gas to Turkey during the winter.

    Nor is Turkey limiting its interest in Iranian energy purely to transit policies: In July 2007 Ankara signed a deal with Iran to develop three gas projects in its giant South Pars offshore gas field in the Persian Gulf as well as to build two pipelines to transport an estimated 30 billion cubic meters of Iranian and Turkmen gas annually through Turkey for resale to Europe. The 3,745-square-mile Persian Gulf South Pars-North Dome gas condensate field, straddling Iranian and Qatari territorial waters, is the world’s largest gas field, containing an estimated 51 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 50 billion barrels of condensate and reserves equivalent to 360 billion barrels of oil.

    The next result of such activity has been a rapid increase in bilateral trade; in 2007 bilateral Turkish-Iranian trade exceeded $8 billion, a 19.5-percent increase over 2006.

    In case Washington was inclined to shake its sanctions stick at Ankara in the wake of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day visit to Turkey last week, Turkish President Abdullah Gul hailed the visit as “fruitful and helpful” and added, “Expansion of relations on a regional level seems quite natural for Turkey, and it is not important what other states think of it; Turkey cares for its own interests. Turkey will establish good ties with its neighbors with an aim of stability and security in the region.” Underlining Turkey’s commitment to improving its energy ties with Iran, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler will pay a return visit to Iran within the next two weeks.

    Gul tersely summed up Ankara’s concerns in his closing remarks: “We are an independent country. Here we eye our country’s interests. … We have to make investments for the (energy) supply security of Turkey.” In the 21st century, keeping your electorate warm trumps alliance politics every time.

  • Turkish energy minister to visit Iran

    Turkish energy minister to visit Iran

    ANKARA, Turkey – Turkey’s energy minister on Monday announced plans to visit Tehran to discuss investment in gas fields and a pipeline project in a rebuff to the United States, which opposes energy deals with Iran.Washington said a new energy deal between Iran and Turkey would send the wrong message while the West threatens economic sanctions against Tehran because of its refusal to halt uranium enrichment. The European Union and the United States believe Iran plans to develop nuclear weapons – a claim that Tehran denies.

    But the energy minister of Turkey’s Islamic-rooted government insisted that Turkey needs natural gas and has to “protect its own interests.”

    By SELCAN HACAOGLU

    Read full story

  • Turkey bows to the dark side

    Turkey bows to the dark side

    From the Los Angeles Times
    Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit is a sign that the West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Iran.

    By Soner Cagaptay

    August 19, 2008

    ISTANBUL, TURKEY — Praying in Istanbul’s Blue Mosque on Friday, I witnessed firsthand Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s international publicity coup.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit produced little in terms of substantive policy; the signing of a multibillion-dollar natural gas pipeline deal was put off. But Ahmadinejad got something just as valuable: a chance to spin his own image, court popularity and bash the United States and Israel.

    I’ve long been fond of the Blue Mosque because it is where, many years ago, I attended my first Friday prayers. Last Friday, though, I felt uncomfortable in the prayer hall, where I found myself in front of God but next to Ahmadinejad, who turned the ritual into a political show.

    Departing from established practice of having visiting Muslim heads of state pray in a smaller mosque in Istanbul, the government allowed Ahmadinejad to pray in the Blue Mosque, Turkey’s symbol of tolerant Ottoman Islam. With permission from Turkish authorities, he also allowed Iranian television to videotape him during the entire prayer, in violation of Islamic tradition, which requires quiet and intimate communion between God and the faithful. There was so much commotion around Ahmadinejad that the imam had to chide the congregants. Then, as he left the mosque, Ahmadinejad got out of his car to encourage a crowd of about 300 to chant, “Death to Israel! Death to America!”

    Even without this behavior, any visit from a leader representing an authoritarian, anti-Western autocracy would have created controversy in Turkey just a few years ago. Not today. The ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government not only opened the Blue Mosque to Ahmadinejad but accommodated his refusal to pay respects at the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern, secular Turkey — a major violation of protocol for an official visit.

    In 1996, when Iran’s president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, refused to go to Ataturk’s mausoleum, snubbing Turkey’s identity as a secular pro-Western state, it led to a public outcry and sharp criticism of Iran. Relations soured. When the Iranian ambassador suggested a few months later that Turkey should follow Sharia law, he was forced to leave the country.

    This time, though, the AKP government has taken a different stance, playing down the diplomatic insult. It moved the meeting from the capital, Ankara, to Istanbul and labeled it a “working” meeting rather than an official visit. Yet all sorts of AKP officials flocked to Istanbul to meet with the Iranian president.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan asked the Turkish public to ignore the snub and instead “focus on the big picture.” It is the “big picture,” though, that is most disconcerting. By extending an invitation to Ahmadinejad, the first such move by any NATO or European Union member country, Turkey has broken ranks with the West. The West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Tehran.

    In the past, Turkey stood with the West, especially after the 1979 Islamist revolution in Iran. Also, Tehran gave refuge to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which carried out terror attacks in Turkey from bases in Iran. Since the Iraq war began, however, Iran has shifted tactics to win Turkey’s heart. While the U.S. delayed taking action, Iran actually bombed PKK camps in northern Iraq.

    Meanwhile, since the AKP assumed power in Turkey in 2002, bilateral visits with Iran have boomed; Ahmadinejad’s trip crowns dozens of visits by high-level officials. Trade has boomed as well, increasing from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion today. And even though the two countries didn’t formalize the deal last week, plans are still going forward for a $3.5-billion Turkish investment in Iranian gas fields — this at a time when the West is adopting financial sanctions against Iran to cripple Tehran’s ability to make a nuclear bomb. If there were any doubts about a Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, they were laid to rest last week: During Ahmadinejad’s visit, the two countries agreed to make 2009 an “Iran-Turkey year of culture” — marked by regular cultural and political programs and exchanges — to bring the two countries closer.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit also speaks volumes about the future of Turkish-U.S. ties regarding Iran. According to a recent opinion poll in Turkey, when asked what the country should do in the event of a U.S. attack against Iran, only 4% of respondents said Turkey should support the U.S., while 33% wanted to back Iran and 63% chose neutrality.

    As I shared the canopy of the Blue Mosque’s divine dome with Ahmadinejad, I could not help but ponder how far Turkish foreign policy has shifted since 2002. Before, Turkey picked allies based on shared values — democracy, Western identity, secular politics and the principle of open society — that appeared to reflect the Turkish soul. Iran has not become a pro-Western, secular democracy since 1996, nor have Tehran’s mullahs accepted gender equality or the idea of a free society. Yet Ankara has had a change of heart toward Tehran. Years from now, Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul will be remembered as the tipping point at which the West lost Turkey, and Turkey lost its soul.

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a visiting professor at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul.

  • Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     
    18/08/2008 14:49  (18:05 minutes ago)
    STRATFOR — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan. Read STARTFOR analysis. 

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    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
     
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
     
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
     
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
     
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
     
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Russia have every interest in avoiding.
     
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on MOSCOW ’s good graces.
     
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
     
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in MOSCOW and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi . During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows.
     
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
     
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
     
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
     
    Reprinted with permissions of STRATFOR.
    Strategic Forecasting, Inc., Stratfor, is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas. George Friedman is the founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the company.
     
  • Turkey bows to the dark side

    Turkey bows to the dark side

    Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit is a sign that the West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Iran.

    By Soner Cagaptay
    August 19, 2008

    ISTANBUL, TURKEY — Praying in Istanbul’s Blue Mosque on Friday, I witnessed firsthand Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s international publicity coup.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit produced little in terms of substantive policy; the signing of a multibillion-dollar natural gas pipeline deal was put off. But Ahmadinejad got something just as valuable: a chance to spin his own image, court popularity and bash the United States and Israel.
    I’ve long been fond of the Blue Mosque because it is where, many years ago, I attended my first Friday prayers. Last Friday, though, I felt uncomfortable in the prayer hall, where I found myself in front of God but next to Ahmadinejad, who turned the ritual into a political show.

    Departing from established practice of having visiting Muslim heads of state pray in a smaller mosque in Istanbul, the government allowed Ahmadinejad to pray in the Blue Mosque, Turkey’s symbol of tolerant Ottoman Islam. With permission from Turkish authorities, he also allowed Iranian television to videotape him during the entire prayer, in violation of Islamic tradition, which requires quiet and intimate communion between God and the faithful. There was so much commotion around Ahmadinejad that the imam had to chide the congregants. Then, as he left the mosque, Ahmadinejad got out of his car to encourage a crowd of about 300 to chant, “Death to Israel! Death to America!”

    Even without this behavior, any visit from a leader representing an authoritarian, anti-Western autocracy would have created controversy in Turkey just a few years ago. Not today. The ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government not only opened the Blue Mosque to Ahmadinejad but accommodated his refusal to pay respects at the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern, secular Turkey — a major violation of protocol for an official visit.
    In 1996, when Iran’s president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, refused to go to Ataturk’s mausoleum, snubbing Turkey’s identity as a secular pro-Western state, it led to a public outcry and sharp criticism of Iran. Relations soured. When the Iranian ambassador suggested a few months later that Turkey should follow Sharia law, he was forced to leave the country.

    This time, though, the AKP government has taken a different stance, playing down the diplomatic insult. It moved the meeting from the capital, Ankara, to Istanbul and labeled it a “working” meeting rather than an official visit. Yet all sorts of AKP officials flocked to Istanbul to meet with the Iranian president.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan asked the Turkish public to ignore the snub and instead “focus on the big picture.” It is the “big picture,” though, that is most disconcerting. By extending an invitation to Ahmadinejad, the first such move by any NATO or European Union member country, Turkey has broken ranks with the West. The West can no longer take Turkey for granted as a staunch ally against Tehran.

    In the past, Turkey stood with the West, especially after the 1979 Islamist revolution in Iran. Also, Tehran gave refuge to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which carried out terror attacks in Turkey from bases in Iran. Since the Iraq war began, however, Iran has shifted tactics to win Turkey’s heart. While the U.S. delayed taking action, Iran actually bombed PKK camps in northern Iraq.

    Meanwhile, since the AKP assumed power in Turkey in 2002, bilateral visits with Iran have boomed; Ahmadinejad’s trip crowns dozens of visits by high-level officials. Trade has boomed as well, increasing from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion today. And even though the two countries didn’t formalize the deal last week, plans are still going forward for a $3.5-billion Turkish investment in Iranian gas fields — this at a time when the West is adopting financial sanctions against Iran to cripple Tehran’s ability to make a nuclear bomb. If there were any doubts about a Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, they were laid to rest last week: During Ahmadinejad’s visit, the two countries agreed to make 2009 an “Iran-Turkey year of culture” — marked by regular cultural and political programs and exchanges — to bring the two countries closer.

    Ahmadinejad’s visit also speaks volumes about the future of Turkish-U.S. ties regarding Iran. According to a recent opinion poll in Turkey, when asked what the country should do in the event of a U.S. attack against Iran, only 4% of respondents said Turkey should support the U.S., while 33% wanted to back Iran and 63% chose neutrality.

    As I shared the canopy of the Blue Mosque’s divine dome with Ahmadinejad, I could not help but ponder how far Turkish foreign policy has shifted since 2002. Before, Turkey picked allies based on shared values — democracy, Western identity, secular politics and the principle of open society — that appeared to reflect the Turkish soul. Iran has not become a pro-Western, secular democracy since 1996, nor have Tehran’s mullahs accepted gender equality or the idea of a free society. Yet Ankara has had a change of heart toward Tehran. Years from now, Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul will be remembered as the tipping point at which the West lost Turkey, and Turkey lost its soul. 

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a visiting professor at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul.

    Source : Los Angeles Times

  • Iran’s talks with Istanbul prove fruitless

    Iran’s talks with Istanbul prove fruitless

    Maryam Sinaiee Foreign Correspondent

    The United States opposed any gas deal between Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, left, and his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul. Bulent Kilic / AFP

    TEHRAN // Iran and Turkey had differing views about how the two-day working trip of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, could serve their national interests, but neither side seems to have accomplished much of what they had hoped, analysts say.

    Abdullah Gul, his Turkish host, had been eyeing the possibilities of establishing a mediatory role for Turkey between Iran and the West, despite pressure from the United States and Israel not to host the Iranian president.

    Before and during the visit, which wrapped up on Friday, the Turkish media largely focused on Mr Gul’s mediation initiative. His success in establishing such a role for Turkey, a Nato member, could have greatly strengthened his Islamist Justice and Development Party’s position in Turkey, which pits him and his party against his secular opponents, who had opposed the visit, the analysts said.

    “It was clever of the Turks to attempt to assume such a mediatory role,” said Mohammed Atrianfar, a high-ranking member of Iran’s reformist Servants of Construction Party and a journalist. “Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West is of such international importance that many countries will be very willing to mediate between Iran and the West if Iran shows interest in backing away from the position it has had over the past three years.”

    Iran might prefer to talk about suspending uranium enrichment, which can be used to help build an atomic bomb, in direct negotiations with major European powers, and perhaps might not see the point of involving Turkey in the process, Mr Atrianfar said.

    At a joint press conference during his visit, the Iranian president praised Mr Gul’s support for dialogue and diplomacy as the solution to the nuclear problem, but he did not signal any change in the position he has maintained.

    In an interview with CNN before his trip, Mr Ahmadinejad reiterated that Iran’s nuclear issue was neither a technical nor a judicial one, and that no mediation from Turkey was required.

    Iran insists that all its nuclear activities meet the regulations set by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a signatory.

    Ali Majedi, a former Iranian deputy foreign minister in economic affairs and a former ambassador to Japan, said he does not believe that Turkey or any other country could play a mediating role between Iran and the West.

    “Some countries may convey messages between Iran and the West, but given the circumstances in Iran, it seems too far-fetched to me that any country, including Turkey, would be able to play an actual and effective mediating role,” Mr Majedi said.

    Turkey has shown support for Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme to meet the country’s energy needs. But analysts believe it would be wrong to assume that Turkey will go any further than offering its support.

    “Turkey’s long-term strategic interests are defined within their relations with the West. They are a member of Nato and are trying to join the European Union. They can only be interested in maintaining their good relations with Iran,” Mr Atrianfar said.

    If Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West intensifies, Turkey and most other countries will avoid spoiling their relations with the West for the sake of economic relations with Iran, Mr Majedi believes.

    Mr Ahmadinejad’s government had been hoping to sign a natural gas deal with Turkey, one that would allow Iran to export its own gas as well as gas bought from Turkmenistan to Europe through a pipeline in Turkey. The Iranian president was accompanied by Parviz Fattah, Iran’s oil minister, on his visit to Turkey. Iran hoped to close a gas deal worth $3.5 billion (Dh12.9bn) with Turkey.

    The two countries failed to reach an agreement over differences on pricing and conditions for investment. Mr Ahmadinejad and his Turkish counterpart said reaching a deal of this kind is time consuming and that negotiations would continue.

    The Iranian media said that if signed during the visit, the gas deal could have been considered a defeat for the United States and its allies and a victory for Mr Ahmadinejad.

    The United States had opposed the deal and warned Turkey of consequences of signing the deal with Iran.

    A deal of this kind could strengthen the position of Mr Ahmadinejad domestically, too. He has been under heavy criticism from his political opponents in Iran for the economic failures of his government, including the inability to attract foreign investment.

    During Mr Ahmadinejad’s visit the two countries signed five protocols, including one on co-operation against terrorism. The two countries have for years worked together in this regard and share intelligence on armed separatist Kurdish groups.

    “The issue of Kurds is a matter of national interest to both Iran and Turkey regardless of what governments rule in these countries. Security co-operation in this regard will therefore always be desirable and sought by both sides,” Mr Majedi said.

    Email:msinaiee@thenational.ae