Category: Iran

Turkey facing gas shortage

ANKARA, Turkey, Oct. 28 (UPI) — Turkey is faced with the possibility of a severe gas shortage if development of an Iranian natural gas pipeline falters, the state-owned pipeline firm said.

BOTAS, the oil and natural gas pipeline firm in Turkey, warned government officials that gas shortages would emerge as early as January if a pipeline from the Iranian South Pars gas field was not completed soon, the business daily newspaper Referans reported Tuesday.

Ankara and Tehran had agreed to develop additional arteries to meet Turkish demands as gas compression issues diminished the capacity along conventional routes.

Iran hopes to link its South Pars gas field to the planned Nabucco pipeline, a project favored by the European Union as a means to ease dependency on Russian natural resources.

Iran is keen on expanding its customer base amid Western-imposed economic sanctions as punishment for its controversial nuclear program. For its part, BOTAS has urged Iran to act expeditiously on developing its infrastructure to avoid shortages.

October 28, 2008
President’s dilemma

Oct 23rd 2008
From Economist.com

Deciding between Nabucco and South Stream

WHICH will it be? The next American president will have to decide.
Either Europe gets natural gas from Iran, or Russia stitches up the
continent’s energy supplies for a generation.

In one sense, it is hard to compare the two problems. Iranian nuclear
missiles would be an existential threat to Israel. If Russia sells it
rocket systems and warhead technology, or advanced air-defence systems
(or vetoes sanctions) it matters. By contrast, Russia’s threat to
European security is a slow, boring business. At worst, Europe ends up
a bit more beholden to Russian pipeline monopolists than is healthy
politically. But life will go on.

Europe’s energy hopes lie in a much discussed but so far unrealised
independent pipeline. Nabucco, as it is optimistically titled (as in
Verdi, and freeing the slaves) would take gas from Central Asia and
the Caspian region via Turkey to the Balkans and Central Europe. That
would replicate the success of two existing oil pipelines across
Georgia, which have helped dent Russia’s grip on east-west export routes.

Russia is trying hard to block this. It is reviving the idea of an
international gas cartel with Qatar and Iran. It also wants to kybosh
Nabucco through its own rival project, the hugely expensive ($12.8
billion) South Stream. Backed by Gazprom (the gas division of Kremlin,
Inc) and Italy’s ENI, it has already got support from Austria,
Bulgaria and Serbia. The project has now been delayed two years to 2015.

But politicking around it is lively. This week the Kremlin managed to
get Romania—until now a determined holdout on the Nabucco side—to
start talks on joining South Stream. As Vladimir Socor, a veteran
analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, notes, that creates just the kind
of contest that the Kremlin likes, in which European countries jostle
each other to get the best deal from Russia. Previously, that played
out in a central European battle between Austria and Hungary to be
Russia’s most-favoured energy partner in the region. Now the Kremlin
has brought in Slovenia to further increase its leverage.

All this works only because the European Union (EU) is asleep on the
job. Bizarrely, Europe’s leaders publicly maintain that the two
pipelines are not competitors. They have given the task of promoting
Nabucco to a retired Dutch politician who has not visited the most
important countries in the project recently (or in some cases even at
all).

The main reason for the lack of private-sector interest is lack of
gas. The big reserves are in Turkmenistan, but Russia wants them too.
Securing them for Nabucco would mean a huge, concerted diplomatic push
from the EU and from America. It would also require the building of a
Transcaspian gas pipeline.

That is not technically difficult (unlike, incidentally, South Stream,
which goes through the deep, toxic and rocky depths of the Black Sea).
But it faces legal obstacles, and could be vetoed by both Russia and
Iran. As Zeyno Baran of the Hudson Institute argues in a new paper,
“the fortunes of the two pipelines are inversely related”.

That is America’s dilemma. Befriending Iran would create huge problems
for Russia. An Iranian bypass round the Caspian allows Turkmen gas
(and Iran’s own plentiful reserves) to flow to Turkey and then on to
Europe. But the same American officials, politicians and analysts who
are most hawkish about Russia tend also to be arch-sceptics about
starting talks with the mullahs (or even turning a blind eye to
Iranian gas flowing through an American-backed pipeline).

If Iran can make it clear that does not want to destroy Israel and
promote terrorism (and stops issuing rhetorical flourishes on the
subject) it stands to benefit hugely. The “grand bargain” has never
looked more tempting—or more urgent.

October 25, 2008
Kurdistan region president to visit Iran on Wednesday

PUKmedia 2008-10-21 19:55:49

Kurdistan region president Massud Barzani heading a senior political delegation will visit Iran on Wednesday, a close source from the delegation told PUKmedia correspondent.
The several-day visit is upon an Iranian formal invitation. Reinforcing bilateral relations between both sides and discussing conditions in Iraq and the area would be discussed during the visit.

Barzani would meet with top Iranian officials including the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s parliament speaker Ali Larijani, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili.

The accompanying delegation would include representatives of the Kurdistan region political parties namely: Fadhil Mirani, representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Arsalan Baez, representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Salaheddin Mohamed Bahadin, representative and general secretary of the Kurdistan Islamic Union(KIU), Kadir Aziz, representative and secretary general of the Kurdistan Toilers Party (KTP), and Fouad Husain, head of Kurdistan region presidency office.

October 21, 2008
Cultural Influences on Politics in Caspian

Brenda Shaffer who is an American thinker works to define cultural domination on foreign or domestic affairs of states in the “Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy?”article. Shaffer is explaining this event via some sharp examples. Firstly, Shaffer begin the article with Huntigton’s thesis: “The Clash of Civilizations”. Samuel Huntigton’s thesis follows an idea that culture has a main role in defining of policy. Also Brenda Shaffer agrees thesis of Huntington and creates new approaches about conducts of civilizations and state actions. Shaffer says that culture was a main mechanism to diplomatic relations. Also she interprets culture as specific subject of country’s within religion, history and civilization.

Western scholars researched about strong Islamic effection in Muslim countries after 11 September terrorist act and looked at Muslim scholars, historians, diplomats and generals who have an extraordinary situation over the people. As a result they understood Islamic effection as strong as nuclear weapons against to the world. But this is not a physical danger, this is an ideological spread. Their speeches to newspapers and political journals which had a title as “Do Muslim countries have a different outlook against Non-Muslim States?”

On the other hand Shaffer interests about this subject under the psychological perspective. Human beings are often driven by culture according to Shaffer. Also human behavior effects on to state affairs. But state acts partly different from human behaviors. We can give example from philosophical history: Some philosophers think that the state is a thing like human. But it is systematically human as a big organism. State actions have similarities with people actions. State is a big form of human and human is a small form of the state. As behavioral psychological meaning has different dimensions.[1]

Shaffer gives an example about different state decision-making; some Muslim countries have an anti-American approach as behavioral. But these are making alliance with the USA like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt. Commonly we can see inharmonious dimensions between state policies and people behaviors. Caspian perspective of Shaffer has a common beliefs. According to Shaffer, all Caspian countries have been influenced by Islamic effection after from the Soviet Union. Shaffer judges all Caspian and Middle Asian people as Islamic effected nations but it is not totally true if we looked at historical and contemporary situations. Also today these countries are secular except Iran.

Iran – Politics with Islamic Style

The Islamic Republic of Iran is an important country in this area as ideological mechanism according to idea of western scholars. After the collapse of the USSR, Iran wanted to export their Islamic regime for other neighbor states via some absolute ways. In Central Asia and Caucasus territory Iran plays to export their Persian Islamic mind as a regime under the title as “Islamic Solidarity” with economic and security events. Western idea is true about activities of this country. But common outlook to Islamic countries of American or Western scholars is different. They agree Islam as a common political tool among all Muslims. Example, Iran works to create an Islamic governing system for all Muslim countries. But Islamic mind of Iran is very different from normal Islamic idea. Persian Islamic system bases on fundamentalist movement. If we look at Turkey, Egypt or Tunis, we could see normal or laic Islamic behavior. Also Shaffer says their false point in next sentence. “Poor Muslim countries have an effective circumstance about this issue but secular Muslim countries challenges to Iran like Turkmenistan.” But Tehran has faced three regional disputes :

– The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict (Christian Armenia versus Muslim Azerbaijan)

– The Chechen conflict (Chechen Muslims versus Moscow)

– The Tajik civil war (The Islamic Renaissance Party versus Moscow)

In these mix circumstances Iranian fundamentalist approach transformed to self-interest system. An interesting point about is that Iran supports Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.[2] With these events, Iran state security was challenged in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia since Iran was a multiethnic state. We give information about Iran’s population: Half of Iran’s population is comprised of non Persian ethnic minorities; Turkmens, Kurds and Azerbaijani groups. Largest minority Azerbaijanis live in northwestern provinces of Iran which bordered with Azerbaijan. Relations of Iran bogged down with Baku because of Iranian self interests.

Shaffer shows her ideas that Iranian diversity of opinion is a good example to explain Iranian foreign policy. There are some different points as historical legacies and religious differences in policies.

“On the other hand Turkey attempted to conduct a balanced policy toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also Turkey helped for Karabagh conflict to Baku.”

Turkey changed its policy when Karabagh became a conflict. It can be an example for cultural combines if western scholars wanted to define their issue. But it cannot be an absolute example about regional cultural alliences subject.

According to many observers, religious differences have played a central role in the Caspian region. With these circumstances Azerbaijan supported Chechenya. Also some analysts have assumed that religious differences serve as a basis for conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia. Over these events, common culture serves as a basic role for alliances and coalitions and different cultures act as an obstacle to cooperation.

Shaffer’s opinion is that there are cultural alliances are created follow by from collapsing of the USSR.

Tehran’s main argument is Shiite background in their support system. Also Turkey and Azerbaijan shares ethnic Turkic and Muslim backgrounds. Also Russian and Armenian background is Orthodox Christian form. But Georgian-Russian conflict is different from this event. Shaffer and other western scholars can not define this reality.

Final

Culture may be a certain material of regime survivability. Islam can be an effective reason to influence state system and people behavior like speeches of western scholars. Some governments explain and justify their policies in cultural terms. We must analyze a country’s foreign policy on the basis of actions. We have anticipated the New Testament to Germany and Russia or Torah to Israel like Islamic system. Shaffer asks question : “What does the Koran has to say a foreign policy question?” If Islam influences them, they should act with Islamic interaction.

The USA wants an enemy to rebuild their father emotion on the world. They forced as goodness of the world during the Cold War. They defended the world countries from dangerous communist system. Their interest was communism in that time. But they wanted a new enemy to regulate the world with themselves. After the Cold War, their White House scholars worked for a new enemy establishment. There was a “Red Dangerous” line. But today there should be “Green Dangerous” line. And its name is Islamic effection on politics.[3]

Fans of the USA defense western style always. There shouldn’t be a religious system like Islam around the world according to them. But they don’t look at Israeli system or American Christiantic base. Main question should be about Western classification about cultural conflicts. There are too many problems about this thesis.

Today there is a Muslim conflict. And the USA isa patron of the world. So they are working for peace, democracy and other good things. But the world’s people will know works of the USA. All terror acts, all problems, all ethnic clashes…

[1] Arnold Wolfers, Behavior of States, Dogu Bati Journal – 26, Istanbul 2003

[2] Karabagh conflict borned in the late 1980. Armenia attacked to the legal boundaries of Azerbaijan.

[3] Political Declaration Fikret Baskaya – Ideologies, Dogu Bati Journal 2003

Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU

Baku Qafqaz University

International Research Club (INTERESCLUB)

October 11, 2008
Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey

Georgia’s conflict and Iran and Turkey
By Rayyan al-Shawaf
Commentary by
Tuesday, September 09, 2008

Although the Russo-Georgian military clash is over, its ramifications will be felt for a long time, especially as the political crisis between the two countries remains unresolved. In the Middle East, two major countries, Turkey and Iran, have been directly affected by the recent events. While Turkey stands to lose should Russia and Georgia fail to resolve their differences, Iran stands to win.

An embattled Russia cornered by the West would never forgive NATO member Turkey; as a result, Russian-Turkish relations would plummet and Russia might even stop providing Turkey with natural gas. In casting about for allies, Russia would find a similarly isolated Iran to be amenable to giving the two countries’ ties a strategic dimension, but only in return for political and economic concessions. Thus, the Russo-Georgian crisis may ironically change the balance of power in the Middle East.

Both Russia and Iran have become increasingly alarmed with the West’s attempts to bypass them in the quest for oil. Moscow wanted the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the world’s second longest, to pass through Russia. That way, Russia would not only benefit financially, but also be able to exert some control over the supply of oil to the West, much as it does with the longest pipeline in the world, the Druzhba, which flows from southeast Russia to Europe. During its invasion of Georgia, Russia pointedly demonstrated that it can threaten the BTC pipeline, and that, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently put it, “Russia is a nation to be reckoned with.”

Meanwhile, Iran, most of whose oil flows to Asia, has long sought to lay oil pipelines to the West, a desire more often than not frustrated by Western sanctions. By supporting Russia in its current confrontation with the West, Tehran may have secured a future economic and political payoff. This would be especially true should Iran have extracted from Russia a commitment to devise a common oil strategy vis-a-vis the West.

However, even without this possibility, there are several indicators of the benefits that may accrue to Iran as a result of its pro-Russian policy. For example, Iranian (and Syrian) requests for a sophisticated missile defense system are being taken seriously in Moscow, much to the chagrin of the United States and Israel. When one remembers that Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant – built with Russian support – is slated to begin operation in 2009, it becomes apparent that Iran may be on the verge of radically enhancing its regional and international position.

Even as Iran makes a bid for regional power status, Turkey has almost by accident emerged as the country that could hold the key to solving the Russo-Georgian crisis. Indeed, Turkey is exceptionally well-positioned to be mediator, a role it is already playing with some success between Syria and Israel, and to a lesser extent between Iran and the West. Russia is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, and Turkey is dependant on Russian natural gas. At the same time, Turkey maintains strong economic and military ties with Georgia, which aspires to join NATO, of which Turkey is a strategic member. Turkey cannot afford to allow its relations with Russia to deteriorate – they have already been strained by the passage of American ships through the Bosphorus on their way to the Georgian port of Batumi – but neither can it shun the West’s call for supporting Georgia. As a result, mediating the current conflict is not only a role that could propel Turkey into the limelight as a major regional player, but also a necessity insofar as Turkish politico-economic imperatives are concerned.

If Turkey meets the challenge, there may even be added benefits. Turkish-Armenian relations could thaw, which would be of great significance to the oil and natural gas industry. The most direct overland route for an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Turkey would begin in Azerbaijan and pass through Armenia. Yet no such pipeline has ever been constructed due to political instability: Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over Nagorno-Karabakh and remain at loggerheads, while Turkey’s border with Armenia has been closed since 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan.

With the Russo-Georgian clash illustrating the vulnerability of Georgia, through which the BTC pipeline passes, Armenia’s importance has increased. Turkish President Abdullah Gul, on a groundbreaking visit to Yerevan last week for a Turkish-Armenian soccer match, spoke about the need for the countries of the Caucasus to work together to enhance stability. To that end, Turkey has called for the creation of a regional cooperation group comprising Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The trajectory of the Russo-Georgian conflict during the next few months could be critical in determining what happens in the Middle East. If mediation succeeds in bringing the two sides together and defusing the crisis, Russia will not find it necessary to turn to Iran. If the successful mediation is Turkish, then Turkey will have demonstrated a unique ability to bring stability to the Caucasus, broker Syrian-Israeli peace talks, and mediate between Iran and the West.

On the other hand, if the conflict drags on, Russia’s ties to the West and Turkey will inevitably deteriorate. Facing diplomatic isolation and possibly even sanctions, Russia may forge a strategic alliance with Iran, thereby drastically increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East.

\\\ a freelance writer and reviewer based in Beirut. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.is

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October 9, 2008
IRAN TO SUPPLY ARMENIA WITH GAS AND ARMENIA TO EXPORT ELECTRICITY TO IRAN

By Emil Danielyan

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

Armenia appears to have completed construction of a pipeline from neighboring Iran that will supply it with natural gas and significantly ease its heavy dependence on Russia for energy resources. The development will also allow the small landlocked country to avoid disastrous consequences if Moscow decides to cut off gas deliveries to Georgia, a possibility that has become real since the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war.

The first, 24.6 mile (41-kilometer) Armenian section of the pipeline was inaugurated by the presidents of Armenia and Iran in March 2007, more than a decade after the two governments agreed to launch the multimillion-dollar project. The national gas distribution company ARG has since been busy building its second and final section. Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian announced on September 3 that work on the almost 120-mile (200-kilometer) stretch, passing through the country’s most mountainous region, was essentially complete; and that the pipeline would go on stream “in late October or early November” (Armenian Public Television, September 3).

Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisian confirmed this later in September, saying that ARG specialists only needed to conduct testing and other technical operations on the facility within the next few weeks. “Iran will pump three million cubic meters of gas [a day] to Armenia during this winter,” the head of the Iranian Gas Export Company, Reza Kasaei-Zadeh, was reported to have announced last week (www.panarmenian.net, September 23).

The pipeline project has given a massive boost to the close political and economic relations that the Islamic Republic has maintained with its sole Christian neighbor since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reaffirmed Tehran’s intention to deepen those ties when he received Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian in mid-September. “There is no limit to the expansion of relations with Armenia,” the Iranian media quoted him as saying. Armenian-Iranian cooperation, said Ahmadinejad, should serve as a model for the rest of the world (IRNA news agency, September 16).

Successive Armenian governments have keenly sought this cooperation in order to mitigate the effects of the economic blockades that its two other neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, have imposed on it because of the unresolved conflict over Karabakh. The war in Georgia, which temporarily disrupted the vital transit of Armenian cargo through Georgian territory, has only enhanced Iran’s geopolitical significance for Armenia in the eyes of local policy-makers and the public in general. As Movsisian put it, the Iran-Armenia pipeline will “guarantee” his country’s energy security in “cases of crisis” in the region. It was an obvious reference to the continuing Russian-Georgian conflict and its possible consequences for Armenia.

The most severe of those consequences would be a Russian decision to end gas supplies to Georgia through a pipeline that also feeds Armenia. With Georgia still heavily reliant on Russian gas, such a move is arguably the most powerful weapon in Moscow’s arsenal of sanctions against Tbilisi. Should the Russians decide to use it, they will almost certainly be unable to pump gas to Armenia through Georgian territory. Both South Caucasus countries use Russian gas for winter heating and for generating a large part of their electricity.

The launch of the pipeline from Iran could thus hardly come at a better time for Armenia. Access to Iranian gas will not only give Yerevan a viable alternative to Russian deliveries but could strengthen its bargaining position in difficult tariff negotiations with Gazprom. The Russian monopoly plans gradually to raise its gas price for Armenia, which is currently set at $110 per thousand cubic meters, to international levels. Under an agreement signed by Gazprom and ARG executives in Moscow on September 17 and disclosed by the Armenian government a week later, the price will rise to $154 per thousand cubic meters in April 2009 and on to $200 in April 2010. Yerevan’s bargaining position will be limited, however, by the fact that Gazprom has a controlling share in ARG. Whether the Armenian gas company will be ready to cut back on supplies from its parent company if the Iranians offer it a better deal remains to be seen.

According to energy officials in Yerevan, the new pipeline will have the capacity to pump at least 2.3 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas per annum. That is slightly more than the 2007 volume of Armenia’s gas imports from Russia, which was enough for meeting its energy needs. Officials say that Iranian gas will therefore be mainly converted into electricity at Armenian thermal power plants which will then be exported to Iran. In preparation for a surge in Armenian electricity exports, the two countries are currently building a third high-voltage transmission line linking their power grids.

Armenia might also need extra gas if it starts selling electricity to Turkey, with which it has no diplomatic relations or open border. According to Movsisian, a relevant agreement was reached during Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic September 6 visit to Yerevan that marked an unprecedented rapprochement between the two historical foes. “The Turkish side has asked for four months to complete their part of the [preparatory] work, after which we will start electricity supplies experimentally for a few days and then on a regular basis,” he said (RFE/RL Armenia Report, September 11). Armenia’s state-run power transmission company said that it would deliver 1.5 billion kilowatt/hours of power to a Belgian utility firm in Turkey in the next two years with the option of more than doubling the supply in 2011 (Arminfo news agency, September 16). The Turkish government has yet to confirm the agreement.

October 3, 2008