I visited Turkey about 3–4 months ago. Landed in Ataturk airport. Passport control, a long long line where most of people from different nationalities were waiting to get through. Some got rejected upon the arrival, apparently they had to pay a fee and some other issues which made me absolute nervous about what’s about to happen! European citizens been rejected for some reasons and for me, an Iraninan passport holder…our father in heaven, even though I haven’t been a good son, just this one time please.
“Passport, please!”. Now let me get this straight that up to that time I’ve had loads of experiences on passing passport control. Most of the time, border officers take more time on checking my passport. Sometimes they go through all the pages, ask loads of questions and etc. These officers didn’t even look at my face for more than a second or two or they didn’t ask any questions whatsoever regarding to my travel plan or anything else. They stamped the passport and said: “Welcome to Turkey!”. They even answered my question regarding to which border I have to reach out to go to Gerogia and whether I need to leave the country a day before the 90 days visa or it’s alright if I leave on the last day.
Big smile on face, ready to collect my Backpack…disaster! My Deuter backpack was ripped off thanks to AirAstana! I asked an officer to help me reach to AirAstana or relative authorities to file a report regarding to my ripped off backpack!
My bad, I left the airport because I followed a wrong direction and when I got back, the information called for someone. A Turkish woman’s reaching to me. “Hello this is …, I’m sorry for what happened. Please, follow me.” Well, at least they’re polite, one of many things to dig to see when you enter a country. Long story, short they said even though I left the airport, they helped me file a report, and God they were polite.
Trying to catch the train from airport and I realise I don’t have small changes at all. I see some officer, dude they looked scary I tell you that. I ask some people and they seem like they don’t understand me, so I reach out to the officers and one of them ask me to follow her. She reach out to a small kiosk where they refused to give me small change first time I asked them, but then they changed a 50 lira note to smaller notes. I thank them all and get myself a card. Later on, I realised its not that cheap to travel around the town so, waste of time changing the money.
Next day, I arrive at my host’s house. Named Ali, a good looking lawyer in his mid 40. He invited me for dinner with his family, spent a great deal of time with them. Learnt so much about what’s really going on in Turkey from a well educated man. You then can realise what medias can do to a country, anyhow…not the main topic in here. They were absolutely lovely. Unfortunately, he had to go for a trip after my second day of stay, but he left me his keys!!! Unbelievable!! He left his house keys to a stranger from Couchsurfing. One of many things that you do not see at all.
The other days, walking in Bazzar, it’s enough if they catch your eyes direction on tea. You can’t get away from there without drinking at least 2 cups of tea. One guy even invited me and my wife for Baghlava. Hospitality, 10 out of 10. These stories can go on and on. I once catched a wrong ferry, and a girl on board guided me on how to deal with somehow Istanbul confusing ferries routes. And, she used her card for me to get pass through the gate when I wanted to go back to where I got on board the first time. Apparently, students get some sort of discount for public transportations. Interacting with polices, I reached one of Prince Islands and two police men gave me a ride to a campsite called madam Martha when they saw I was carrying a heavy bag. They didn’t even ask me to show them my passport or anything. Brilliant!
84 days of stay in Turkey. Istanbul, Bodrum, Antalya, Ankara, Samsun. Spent most of our -I and my wife- time with locals from different backgrounds, Turks, Syrian, and Kurds. They welcomed us to their houses, picked us up when we were pointing our fingers toward the road, and showed us the true face of Turkey and its people.
Sure, we had bad experiences too, but we mostly had good experiences. So, answering your question, I alone and many other people from Iran, at least those who seek for a deeper understanding of the people, and it’s culture, send our love to the people of Turkey. Thank you for the amazing time.
I can’t speak about Iran, because it’s mostly very closed society, at least when you look from outside. But when I have travelled over there, that I felt, that especially the cities in Iran are actually very liberal in comparison to their state. When you go more into rural areas, you’ll meet some more conservative people.
When we talk about Turkey, there was actually never a ‘’real discussion’’ about Secularism or Religious rule. It was over the years and decades an artificial debate between both intellectuals, liberals, and conservatives.
The fight was always about ‘’If you rule the country or me…’’
Over the last 50 years, the fight of the conservatives in Turkey was to become a ‘’face’’ inside of the society and reach the same privileges of the chosen white Turkish bureaucratic oligarchy. Since 2002 they became finally this face, even with loads of setbacks, but after 2013, for sure, they have also arrived at the top of the state and critical positions inside of the society.
And anything has changed? Well, not much. They have reached the same level of ‘’arrogance’’ that the previous secular oligarchy has shown to the rest of the population. So it turned out very clearly, that the problem of Turkey was never about secularism, or becoming a face, but it was about ‘’power for me or for you’’ and more structural and moral aspects of the society.
If I speak to most of the Turks, even though the divide is generally nowadays 50/50, around 80 % of the Turks are happy with Secularism. This includes readers of Hurriyet, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Sözcü newspapers.
The rest of the 15 % would love to see some more harsh penalties regarding horrible crimes and they think regarding this subject that if there are some more Islamic laws also incorporated into the secular system, that the crime rate would go down. You would land in that particular thought more by newspapers like Yeni Şafak etc. Similar to the conservatives in the US who debate about the death penalty etc. But that’s all about.
And people who advocate for a change from Secularism into Shariah law has never exceeded in Turkey 3–5 % at all. Those are mostly people who read the crap like Yeni Akit newspaper.
There is no real problem in Turkey regarding Secularism, they have other sociological and political things to solve. Secularism-Conservative divide generally has served over 50 years to distract the people from the real problems of the country. Sad, but this is the reality.
Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent rank due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. Since any failure, deception or deviation from the NPT Regime may bring about catastrophic outcomes; the regime is expected to have the ability and tools to cope with probable challenges.
The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Because North Korea withdrew from the NPT, it is no longer subjected to the NPT Regime, directly. Contrariwise, Iranis determined to stay as a state party to the NPT; thusly it is still subjected to the processes of the Regime.
Though, the Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. Iran has been demonstrating that it is possible to remain in the Regime without providing the necessary transparency to let the IAEA verify the absence of undeclared materials and inhibited activities. The question of my statement is “why the processes of the NPT Regime cannotspecify the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear program?” I examine the processesof the Regime in order to determine the weaknesses of the Regime and toaddress them. The aforementioned processes are the procedures run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC)and the multilateral negotiations. I argue that, the Regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.
On 8 January 2020, in a military operation code named Operation Martyr Soleimani (Persian: عملیات شهید سلیمانی),[3] Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched at least 15 ballistic missiles at the Ayn al-Asad airbase in Al Anbar Governorate, Western Iraq, as well as another airbase in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan in response to the assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani by United States forces.[4][5][6]
Iran had informed the Iraqi government regarding the attack. No Iraqi or American casualties were reported.[7]
Background
Main article: 2020 Baghdad International Airport airstrike
In the lead up to the attacks, Iranian officials had stated that Iran would retaliate against U.S. forces for the killing of general Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad on 3 January 2020.[8] Reportedly, following the Baghdad strike, U.S. spy agencies detected that Iran’s ballistic missile regiments were at a heightened readiness but it was unclear at the time if they were defensive measures or an indication of a future attack on U.S. forces.[9] U.S. President Donald Trump warned Tehran that any retaliation would result in the U.S. targeting 52 Iranian significant sites, including cultural sites.[10]
Weeks earlier[clarification needed], on 3 December 2019, five rockets had landed on the Ayn al-Asad airbase and there were no injuries.[11] A “security source” inside Ayn al-Asad airbase and a “local official at a nearby town” said that the reports that the Ayn al-Asad airbase were under attack at that time were false.[12] These reports on Twitter temporarily caused a rally of U.S. and Brent crude oil futures.[12]
According to the PM’s spokesman, on 8 January shortly after the midnight, the Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi had received a message from Iran, that the response to the killing of General Soleimani had “started or was about to start”. Iran also informed the PM that only those locations where the US troops are stationed would be targeted. The exact locations of the bases were not disclosed. [7]
Attacks
According to the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), the country’s state-run news outlet, Iran fired “tens of ground-to-ground missiles” at the base and claimed responsibility for the attacks.[3] ISNA stated that the code used to launch the missiles was ‘Oh Zahra.’[13][3] The attacks unfolded in two waves, each about an hour apart.[14] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed responsibility for the attack and announced that it was carried out in response to the killing of Suleimani. The IRGC added that if the United States responded with a retaliatory strike, the IRGC would respond in kind. The IRGC further declared that their statement was intended as a warning and applied to all of the United States’ partners who provided their bases to its military.[15]
Although the Pentagon disputes the number launched, it has confirmed that both the Ayn al-Asad and the Erbil airbases in Iraq were hit.[16][17] A U.S. military spokesman for United States Central Command stated a total of fifteen missiles were fired. Ten hit the Ayn al-Asad airbase, one hit the Erbil base, and four missiles failed.[14] Other sources confirmed that two ballistic missiles targeted Erbil: one hit Erbil International Airport and did not explode, the other landed about 20 miles west of Erbil.[18]
According to the Iraqi military 22 ballistic missiles were fired on the two sites between 1:45 am and 2:15 am at the al-Asad and Erbil facilities. They said 17 missiles have launched on Ayn al-Asad base and five missiles on Erbil.[19][20]
Fars News Agency released video of what it claims is the attack on U.S. military forces in Iraq.[21][22]
Casualties
Neither missile targeted at the Erbil base caused any casualties.[18] No casualties were immediately reported at Ayn al-Asad airbase.[14]
U.S. officials stated that bomb damage assessment was ongoing in the hours after the attack. U.S. President Donald Trump later stated that an assessment of casualties and damages was taking place.[4][23] The initial assessment was that there were “no U.S. casualties”[14] and that the missiles struck areas of the Ayn al-Asad airbase not populated by Americans.[24] An Iraqi security source said there were Iraqi casualties at the base.[24] However, the Iraqi military later reported no casualties among its forces.[19][20][25] Senior Iraqi officials have added on their statements on that there were neither American nor Iraqi casualties resulting from the strikes.[26]
A spokesperson for the Norwegian Armed Forces stated there were no injuries reported for the approximately seventy Norwegian troops stationed at Ayn al-Asad airbase.[13] Scott Morrison, the Australian prime minister, confirmed that no Australians were injured in the attack. During the attack, the Australian PM reportedly told Angus Campbell, chief of the Australian Defence Force, to “take whatever actions are necessary to protect and defend” Australian troops and diplomats in Iraq.[4][27] Jonathan Vance, chief of the Canadian Armed Forces, confirmed that no Canadians were killed in the attack.[4][28] The Danish Defense confirmed that no Danish soldiers were harmed.[29] Poland’s Defence Minister declared no Polish troops stationed in Iraq were injured.[30][31] OPEC’s Secretary-General Mohammed Barkindo on conference in Abu Dhabi announced Iraqi oil facilities secure.[31]
Iranian Television claim 80 US deaths and damage to US helicopters.[32][33]
Aftermath
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued a notice to airmen prohibiting U.S. civil aviation operators from operating in the airspace over Iraq, Iran, and the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.[4][34][35] Singapore Airlines diverted its air flights from Iran airspace following the attacks.[36]
Oil prices surged by 4% on news of the attack, with analysts noting that traders had underestimated Iran’s expected response to Soleimani’s death.[37]Reuters reported of impacts to financial market and oil prices.[38]
Reactions
On 8 January 2020, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, said that military actions are not enough and that the “corruptive presence” of the United States in the Middle East must be ended.[39]
After the attack, Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif stated on Twitter that “Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens & senior officials were launched. We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.”[4][40][41]
In his first public comments on the attack, U.S. President Trump stated on Twitter that “All is well!”. He added that damage assessments were ongoing and that he would make a statement on the attack the following morning.[4][23]
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson denounced Iran’s missile attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq, urging Tehran to avoid further “reckless and dangerous” strikes.[42]
See also
2020 in Iran
2020 in Iraq
References
“بیانیه رسمی سپاه درباره حملات موشکی سنگین به پایگاه آمریکایی عین الاسد | نام عملیات: شهید سلیمانی”. همشهری آنلاین. 7 January 2020.
“Iran claims 80 American troops killed in missile barrage; US says no casualties”. www.timesofisrael.com.
“Iran launches missiles into US air bases in Iraq: US official”. ABC News. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
Washington (earlier), Maanvi Singh Joan E. Greve in; Doherty, Ben; Butler, Ben; Safi, Michael; Safi, Michael; Borger, Julian (8 January 2020). “Iran launches missiles at US forces in Iraq at al-Asad and Erbil—live updates”. The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Eqbali, Aresu; Malsin, Jared; Leary, Alex (7 January 2020), “Iran Fires Missiles at U.S. Forces in Iraq”, Wall Street Journal, retrieved 7 January 2020
“Iran Fires Missiles at Two U.S. Bases in Iraq: Live Updates”. The New York Times. 8 January 2020. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
“Iraqi PM received word from Iran about missile attack”. Reuters. 8 January 2020. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
U.S.–Iran tensions after Soleimani killing: All the latest updates Al Jazeera, January 5, 2020
“US spies detected Iranian ballistic missiles at a heightened state of readiness following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani”. Business Insider. 5 January 2020. Retrieved 6 January 2020.
Suleimani killing: Donald Trump defends threat to target cultural sites in Iran The Guardian, January 6, 2020
Rasheed, Ahmed; Hassan, Samar (3 December 2019). “Rockets hit base hosting U.S. forces in western Iraq”. Reuters. Cairo. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
“Reports of attacks on U.S. military base in Iraq are false: two sources”. Reuters. 3 January 2020. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
“Iran warns US not retaliate over missile attack in Iraq”. AP NEWS. 7 January 2020. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
Miles, Frank (7 January 2020). “Iran launches 15 ballistic missiles into Iraq targeting US, coalition forces, officials say”. Fox News. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
“Iran ‘Concludes’ Attacks, Foreign Minister Says”. 7 January 2020 – via NYTimes.com.
Borger, Julian; Wintour, Patrick (8 January 2020). “Iran crisis: missiles launched against US airbases in Iraq”. The Guardian. London. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 7 January 2020.
Alkhshali, Hamdi; Browne, Ryan; Starr, Barbara. “Pentagon says Iran attacked two Iraqi bases housing US forces”. CNN. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Alkhshali, Hamdi (7 January 2020). “Two ballistic missiles hit Erbil, sources say”. CNN. Archived from the original on 8 January 2020. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
“Iran missile strike: Two US-Iraq bases hit by 22 projectiles, officials say, as crisis escalates”. independent.
“Iran launches missile attacks on US facilities in Iraq”. aljazeera.
Agency, Source: Fars News (8 January 2020). “Iran releases footage of missile attack on US airbases in Iraq—video”. The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
“Iran launches missile attack against US forces inside Iraq in ‘revenge’ for Qassem Soleimani assassination”. ABC News. 8 January 2020. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump] (7 January 2020). “All is well! Missiles launched from Iran at two military bases located in Iraq. Assessment of casualties & damages taking place now. So far, so good! We have the most powerful and well equipped military anywhere in the world, by far! I will be making a statement tomorrow morning” (Tweet). Retrieved 8 January 2020 – via Twitter.
Browne, Ryan; Brown, Pamela (7 January 2020). “Missiles hit areas of al-Asad base not populated by Americans”. CNN. Archived from the original on 8 January 2020. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Politics, P. M. N. (8 January 2020). “No Iraqi casualties in 22-missile Iranian attack overnight -military | National Post”. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Rubin, Alissa J.; Fassihi, Farnaz; Schmitt, Eric; Yee, Vivian (7 January 2020). “Iran Fires on U.S. Forces at 2 Bases in Iraq, Calling It ‘Fierce Revenge’”. The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
“No Australian troops, staff hurt in Iran missile attacks on US airbases in Iraq”. SBS News. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Vance, General Jonathan [@CDS_Canada_CEMD] (7 January 2020). “CAF families: I can assure you that all deployed CAF personnel are safe & accounted for following missile attacks in Iraq. We remain vigilant” (Tweet). Retrieved 8 January 2020 – via Twitter.
Prakash, Thomas; Olsen, Theis Lange (8 January 2020). “Militærbase med danske soldater ramt af iranske missiler – meldes i god behold” [Military base with Danish soldiers hit by Iranian missiles—declared safe and sound]. DR (in Danish). Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Charlish, Alan. “No Polish troops in Iraq hurt in Iranian missile attacks: minister”.
“Iran fires missiles at US targets in Iraq: All the latest updates”. aljazeera.
Stewart, Ahmed Aboulenein and Phil (8 January 2020). “‘We slapped them on the face’: Ayatollah tells Iranians”. The Sydney Morning Herald.
“Iran missiles target U.S. forces in Iraq; Trump says ‘All well’”. 8 January 2020 – via www.reuters.com.
“US bans airlines from flying over Iraq and Iran after attacks on military”. The Guardian. 8 January 2020.
FAA, The [@FAANews] (7 January 2020). “#FAA Statement: #NOTAMs issued outlining flight restrictions that prohibit U.S. civil aviation operators from operating in the airspace over Iraq, Iran, and the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.pic.twitter.com/kJEbpPddp3” (Tweet). Retrieved 8 January 2020 – via Twitter.
“Singapore Air Diverts Flights From Iran Airspace After Attacks”. Bloomberg. 8 January 2020.
Stevens, Pippa (7 January 2020). “Oil prices surge 4% at high following attacks on Iraq bases”. CNBC. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
“GLOBAL MARKETS-Stocks, gold and oil whipsawed as Iran strikes spark fears of wider Mideast war – Reuters”. Reuters. 7 January 2020.
“Iran attack: US troops targeted with ballistic missiles”. bbc.
“Iran does not seek escalation or war, but will defend itself – foreign minister tweets”. Reuters. 8 January 2020.
Zarif, Javad [@JZarif] (7 January 2020). “Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens & senior officials were launched. We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression” (Tweet). Retrieved 8 January 2020 – via Twitter.
“British PM condemns Iranian missile attack; Iranian President pledges US forces wil be ejected”. Breaking News. 8 January 2020. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
Iranian missile attack on U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq
Part of the Persian Gulf crisis and the Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
Operational scope
Multiple-sites targeted military strike
Location
Ayn al-Asad Airbase, Al Anbar Governorate, Iraq Erbil International Airport, Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region, Iraq 33°48′N 42°26′ECoordinates: 33°48′N 42°26′E
Planned by
Iran
Commanded by
Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami
Target
Al Asad Airbase Erbil International Airport
Date
8 January 2020 (UTC+03:00)
Executed by
Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps[1]
Outcome
6 to 10 Fateh-313 missiles hit Ayn al-Asad Airbase 1 Qiam 1 missile hits 20 miles from Erbil International Airport (alleged) 1 Qiam 1 missile reaches Erbil International Airport and does not explode (alleged) 3 Qiam 1 missiles fail in the air (alleged)
Casualties
No Iraqi or American casualties officially reported; More than 80 soldiers killed and 200 injured (according to Iranian media)[2]
Ayn al-Asad AirbaseLocation of Ayn al-Asad Airbase in Iraq
Article Summary
Turkey and Iran have reversed a four-year downturn in bilateral trade as collaboration in Syria increases, but the possibility of a setback remains real.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) meets with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during an extraordinary meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul, Dec. 13, 2017.
After a four-year downturn, trade between Turkey and Iran rose in 2017, as the two neighbors began collaborating in Syria. Judging by figures from the past five years, the political climate between Ankara and Tehran seems to directly affect commercial ties. Their bilateral trade volume contracted during periods when Turkey’s Middle East policies led to closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia and deeper differences with Iran, but perked up in 2017, when the two countries engaged in joint efforts in Syria.
Trade volume between Turkey and Iran reached an all-time high in 2012, totaling $21.9 billion. In 2013, it fell sharply, to $14.5 billion, under the impact of US sanctions on Iran. The decline continued in 2014, down to $13.7 billion. In a bid to prop up commercial ties, the two countries enacted a preferential trade agreement at the start of 2015, cutting tariffs on hundreds of products. A target was set of $35 billion in annual bilateral trade.
The nuclear agreement Iran signed with the world powers soon led to the lifting of sanctions, fueling hope that no major obstacles remained to the desired boom in bilateral trade. Yet despite positive developments, trade volume slumped to $9.7 billion in 2015 and then to $9.6 billion in 2016. The worsening figures were a clear sign that commercial ties would fail to take off unless the two countries resolved areas of conflict in their regional policies, chief among them the crisis in Syria.
Things began to change in 2017, as Turkey came to loggerheads with the United States in Syria and engaged in efforts with Russia and Iran toward a resolution to the conflict. A significant factor bringing Ankara and Tehran closer has been a shared concern that their countries could be next in line for trouble stemming from the regional upheaval, with the Kurdish problem growing more complicated for both of them.
Turks have long been concerned that Western powers want to “divide” their country, and this has been a major factor shaping domestic and foreign policies alike. In this vein, one major motivation behind Turkey’s new alliances is to move to neutralize any risks that might lead to partition. For a great deal of ordinary Turks and even state officials, many NATO countries are not really allies, but Western powers plotting to carve up Turkey to create a proxy Kurdish state adjacent to Iran and diminish Turkey’s position as a regional power. Hence, the idea of bolstering regional alliances enjoys solid public support. Political, military and economic rapprochement with Iran, Russia and Iraq and the narrative of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity rest on the notion of standing together with allies to stave off threats to the integrity of Turkey’s border and avoid partition.
Amid the drive to strengthen regional alliances, high-level visits between Turkey and Iran intensified last year. The two sides agreed to use their national currencies, instead of the US dollar, in bilateral trade. A deal to that effect was signed by the Turkish and Iranian central banks in October.
Parallel to the political rapprochement, the trade volume rose for the first time since 2012, standing at $10.7 billion at the end of 2017, representing a $1.1 billion increase from 2016. Iran benefited more from the revival than Turkey did. Its imports from Turkey amounted to about $3.2 billion, down from nearly $5 billion in 2016, while its exports to Turkey increased to more than $7.5 billion, up from about $4.7 billion the previous year. In other words, Iran reversed the trade balance in its favor, from a $266 million deficit in 2016 to a surplus of nearly $4.3 billion in 2017.
In fact, however, the figures show that bilateral trade is only returning to normal. In the past 17 years, 2016 was the only year in which Iran ran a trade deficit in regard to Turkey, with surpluses ranging between $579 million and $8.8 billion in other years.
How did the balance shift in Iran’s favor? Increased oil supplies to Turkey were the main factor. Official data is not yet available, but according to figures compiled by Turkey’s state-run Anatolia Agency, oil imports from Iran reached 7.4 million tons in the first seven months of 2017, a 142% increase compared to the same period the previous year. Increases of more than 100% were also seen in Turkish imports of untreated zinc, nitrogenous minerals and chemical fertilizers, untreated aluminum, and fresh and dried fruits.
Why then did Turkish exports decrease? The decline stems primarily from a dramatic slump in Turkey’s once-booming gold exports to Iran, which trickled to $111 million last year, from $1.3 billion in 2016.
Iran’s vast energy reserves — 150 billion barrels of crude oil and 33.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas — make it one of the world’s leading energy producers, while neighboring Turkey remains a major oil and gas importer amid efforts to become a key energy route between the Middle East and Europe.
Bolstering economic ties with Iran may be beneficial to Turkey, but the possibility of a setback cannot be ignored given recent fence-mending moves between Ankara and Washington. The Donald Trump administration clearly has Iran in its crosshairs. Meanwhile, Turkey has become a potential target of US sanctions over its plan to purchase advanced Russian missiles, atop the lingering spat in Syria.
If Ankara is committed to mending fences with Washington, doing so while maintaining cooperation with Iran will require masterful balancing acts.
Found in: Economy and trade, Syria war spillover
Mehmet Cetingulec is a Turkish journalist with 34 years professional experience, including 23 years with the Sabah media group during which he held posts as a correspondent covering the prime minister’s and presidential offices, economy news chief and parliamentary bureau chief. For nine years, he headed the Ankara bureau of the daily Takvim, where he also wrote a regular column. He has published two books.
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In recent times, the United States has increasingly resorted to economic and other sanctions to try getting countries, with governments often referred to as “rogue regimes,” to change their behavior. Today, Iran, Russia, and North Korea have been notable targets. But are sanctions genuinely a useful tool of policy—that is, do they work? And, if that proposition is at best debatable, why does the United States deploy them so often?
Some of us who have been both outside observers and US government practitioners of sanctions have long been skeptical that they are—at least very often—a ready tool to serve US foreign-policy interests, except as a means of threading the needle between doing nothing and going to war. They are certainly useful in US domestic politics as a feel-good device on Capitol Hill, among various interest groups, and for editorial writers.
For sanctions to work, generally six conditions need to be in play.
The Six Conditions
All the countries that supply critical commodities (including cash) to sanctioned country X must agree to and abide by the sanctions, while making sure that those under its sway follow suit. The second requirement is generally more difficult to achieve than the first. When a sanctioned country has ready cash, there is almost always someone in the outside world prepared to sell just about anything and to find a means of delivery. In virtually all countries, public and private sectors do not operate according to the same norms. A decade after sanctions were imposed on Northern Rhodesia for its 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, this author visited Salisbury and could find in shops there just about anything that could be bought in Europe or America.
The targeted behavior must not be something that the leadership of the sanctioned country believes to be of major importance, especially for national security. In such cases, as one Pakistani leader said about the need to get nuclear weapons to balance those of India, the people of the sanctioned country would “eat grass” if need be—or at least their leaders would require them to do so.
Just sanctioning leaders or the wealthy isn’t much good when in monetary terms they can just pass on the costs to the less powerful in their societies or forgo visits to Paris and London. In like manner, Western countries sometimes restrict foreign aid to developing countries to non-military purchases. Since money is fungible, these countries often just shift domestic funds to arms purchases, while using the money from abroad to pay for development.
The capacity for domestic substitution of critical goods in the sanctioned country must be so limited that sanctions will erode the capacity of the political leadership to keep control of its population through various means, like invoking national security or a foreign bully. Countries employing sanctions all too often underestimate the ability of sanctioned countries to develop substitutes from their own domestic sources. The history of Cold War embargoes (sanctions) on the Soviet Union and East European Communist countries should be a sufficient lesson. Today, in the case of North Korea, its leadership can plausibly argue to its people that the United States is bent upon regime change. Kim Jong-un and company extend that argument to include US threats to the North Korean people, themselves. Unfortunately for US efforts to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, this argument seems validated by President Donald Trump’s rhetoric about “totally destroying” North Korea, which has no practical effect other than to shore up the North Korean leadership.
The sanctioning countries must avoid a situation in which leaders of the sanctioned country can argue that it is being “picked on” by a bully (a role the United States, and especially the Congress, have in recent years too often been willing to play). Both Russia and North Korea have successfully used this stratagem. By the same token, Iran’s leadership has long argued that the US is at fault for the Iranian people’s economic suffering. However, in this case sanctions helped lead to successful negotiations to scotch the Iranian nuclear weapons program, although the role sanctions played can’t be quantified. A key factor was clearly that the sanctions had broad international backing. Sanctions did ensure that Iran missed out on major elements of economic modernization. Something similar was true in South Africa in the long-running efforts to get its white leadership to abandon Apartheid policies and practices.
There must be coherence in sanctions policies toward a particular country and expectations about behavior changes that make sense. For example, the United States has imposed (with others) sanctions against Russia because of its aggression in Ukraine and threats against other European countries, but Washington also talks about the desirability of working with Russia on issues elsewhere. This kind of issue differentiation by the sanctioning country, however, looks peculiar to the sanctioned country and has little if any chance of working. Unless there is a proposal for a trade-off—for example, the US will stop sanctioning Russia over Ukraine if Moscow will help the United States in the Middle East—this is magical thinking.
Another example is the U.S. promise of sanctions relief against Iran after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But the chances for improved relations with Iran dissipated when the United States dragged its feet on promised sanctions relief and then either retained or even augmented sanctions targeting other Iranian behavior. This included misrepresenting UN Security Council Resolution 2231 as requiring Iran to stop work on ballistic missiles when in fact the resolution merely expressed a wish that Teheran would follow that course.
President Obama can be credited for resisting domestic political pressures in concluding the landmark JCPOA. But members of Obama’s own administration, particularly the Treasury Department, opposed potentially positive developments with Iran flowing from the JCPOA because they did not want to see any relaxation of sanctions beyond the absolute minimum and were able to thwart the president’s will. Of course, President Trump’s rhetoric against Iran and the JCPOA, in part at the behest of US regional partners Saudi Arabia and Israel, has closed the door, at least for now, on the chance of changed relations with Iran. Furthermore, the US “nickel and diming” of sanctions relief provided for under the JCPOA sends a message to North Korea’s Kim Jong-un that any prospective agreement with the United States on his nuclear program would need to be much more tightly crafted.
A Weak Reed
To be sure, sometimes the US will decide to make a political or moral statement by imposing sanctions on another country, especially when human rights are concerned, even if the US calculates that sanctions will not change behavior. Or the issue in question in the sanctioned country may not rise to the level of national security, and thus domestic opposition might grow to the leadership’s behavior that brought about sanctions in the first place.
In general, however, experience shows that sanctions are a weak reed. Too often, they become a substitute for serious diplomacy practiced by serious diplomats as part of a serious diplomatic structure. Alas, this is an area where the United States is increasingly deficient, especially as national leadership significantly reduces the ranks of able diplomats and the resources to help them be effective.
Of course, it is often useful to back diplomacy with a threat of force. Then sanctions can credibly be represented as a last chance before the use of force. This is provided that the interests of the sanctioning country are sufficiently important, that the threat of force is kept proportionate, and that there are other elements such as a UN Security Council Resolution and the lack of an offsetting threat from another powerful country. Thus, effective diplomacy over the Bosnia War only became possible when NATO was able to employ force. Then the war came to an end in 18 days, with the Dayton Accords afterwards tidying up what had already been achieved with force.
No doubt, the United States will continue to employ sanctions against other countries, if only out of habit and the perceived value of feeling good. But they are no substitute for intelligent, coherent, well-crafted diplomacy and other non-coercive instruments. Yet the prospects are poor for reviving these capacities, which have been permitted to erode throughout most of the post-Cold War period. Unless they are revived and given the pride of place that they traditionally held for most of US history, Washington will rely to an even greater degree on cruder instruments: both sanctions, which rarely achieve their stated goals, and military force, which generally is successful, at least initially, but can impose high costs down the road, as has been the case in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The search for alternatives to war should not lead to sanctions, which almost always are a dead end. Rather, the United States should invest more in serious diplomacy and the tools to make it effective.
Cover photo: U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley at U.N. Security Council meeting
33°48′N 42°26′ECoordinates: 
Iran
Ayn al-Asad AirbaseLocation of Ayn al-Asad Airbase in Iraq
